CURRENT TRENDS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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PREFACE

It is thirty-four years since the first edition of *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*[1] had appeared. In the last quarter of a century a number of important things have happened in India culminating in the transformation of a stagnant and enslaved country into a progressive and dynamic nation which for the first time in the last two centuries is free to choose her own form of government and shape her destinies. A great process of change is set in motion at home, and its impact is felt even abroad. As the world's most populous democracy fights its poverty and illiteracy, the whole world watches as though the Indian experiment is a crucial test for the survival of democratic form of government in the developing nations of Africa and Asia.

The political changes that took place and the social and economic changes that are taking place pose fresh problems and raise new questions. These problems are as much intellectual and philosophical as they are practical and material. What are the effects of political freedom on Indian thinkers? Is it accompanied by new thinking independent of the traditional systems of thought that dominated the Indian scene so long, or does the new tide of national pride precipitate a nostalgia for the past and a rededication to the obsolete causes? The forces of social inertia are being broken down. Do they give away to critical thinking and creative action or do they help only to reinforce the reactionary elements in the name of nationalism? As India marches ahead with its ambitious programme of industrialization aided by science and technology and as new social institutions emerge, there is an imminent conflict between traditional notions and the new innovations. What form does this conflict between tradition and innovation take in the philosophical discourse? What have the philosophers done to resolve the problems that confront their nation? Or conversely what have these problems done for philosophy

[1]*Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, edited by S. Radhakrishnan and J.H. Muirhead, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1936.

in India ? While this book may not answer all these questions, it is our belief that the contents reflect the main trends along which the answers may be found.

We have asked a number of philosophers, some too young to have seen much of pre-independent India and others who have lived through this period of historic transformation of their country, to write for this volume, within the perspectives of the problems to which their attention is directed in recent years, what they consider to be their contribution to philosophy in India. From their articles we hope, the reader will discern not only their philosophical affiliations but also the sources of influence on their philosophies.

Our contributors are drawn mainly from University departments of philosophy. To avoid duplication of what is already available in print, we have not asked any of the many philosophers still living who contributed to *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*. The articles published in this book are specially written on our request and none of them appeared in print before.

As all the philosophers in India cannot possibly be included in a volume of this size, we necessarily had to choose and invite only some to contribute. Though all selection is to some extent arbitrary, we hope the dominant ways of thinking in contemporary India are represented in this book, but it is not claimed that this book is exhaustive ; so non-inclusion in this is no way a judgment upon the quality of anyone's work. Though most of the papers were in our hands some five years ago, we regret that due to circumstances beyond our control this book could not be published earlier.

We are thankful to all the contributors for their co-operation. We recall the many kindnesses we received from the late Dr. V. S. Krishna, who encouraged in every way philosophical activity in this University. We are indebted to Dr. B. V. Kishan, Reader in Philosophy, Andhra University, who helped us with the manuscript. We are grateful to Asia Foundation whose grant to Andhra University made it possible to publish this volume.

Andhra University
May 1970

K. S. MURTY
K. R. RAO

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MODERN INDIA AND PHILOSOPHY

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY

I

THOUGHT AND SOCIETY

VERY EARLY in their history human beings have formed various conceptions of nature, of themselves, of their relations with each other and nature, of their destiny, of their duty, and of the totality of existence including humanity and nature. Some of them have also been led to believe in a reality beyond existence, which has given rise to the latter or serves as its ground. Some of these conceptions and beliefs have been later found to be errors, and have been either replaced or revised by others; new conceptions and beliefs have been formulated in every age to be discarded, modified, confirmed or developed in the same or succeeding ages. All these, however, do not arise in a vacuum, but in a particular *milieu.* Social and political circumstances as well as legal and other institutions influence their orgins, shaping and growth. Economic necessities and development condition and mould politics and social institutions, whereas political and social theories, views and institutions in their turn influence economic development. In most cases there is no direct economic causation or determination of religious and philosophic conceptions and beliefs and their development; but political, social, legal and moral ideas and institutions on the one hand and economic relations and existing material conditions of existence on the other hand exercise reciprocal influence on each other and the former interact with religious and philosophical thought, mutually influencing each other. Thus to a certain extent and, more often indirectly, religious and philosophical thought and beliefs react upon the whole development of society including economic development, and are themselves reacted upon by such development.

Although not wholly, man is a free and creative being; so material modes of existence or social, political and legal ideas

and institutions cannot completely determine his thinking or activity. It is generally true that "philosophers do not grow out of the soil like mushrooms; they are the product of their time and of their people".[1] Apart from the fact that the growth of mushrooms too is not accidental or haphazard, it is not true that every philosophy is "the spiritual quintessence of its time"[2], for a philosophy may be atavistic, futuristic, or transcendental. A Marxist may say that such cannot be "true" philosophies, but others may refuse to agree with him. "Man", said Feuerbach, "thinks differently in a palace and a hut"[3], and again while this is largely the case, there have been some emperors who thought and acted like *sannyasins* and dervishes, and some slaves who formulated philosophies of harmony, cheerful optimism and contentment. Notwithstanding all that I have just said in modification of Marx and Feuerbach, philosophical and religious thought can be properly understood only in relation to their political, social and economic circumstances and these in relation to prevalent ideologies.

That it is not its inner dialectic alone or the nature of reality only that determines thought can be argued out in a somewhat different way also. An individual's situation in life penetrates into the processes of his experience and thinking, influencing to some extent their origins and scope as well as their intensity and content. Further, though it is always the individual who looks at things and thinks about them, no two individuals need have the same point of view or the same way of thinking about anything, because the psychic structure of each differs from another and one may comprehend certain truths to which others are blind. "The philosophy which is so important in each of us", said William James, "is our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos".[4] But even a genius cannot function in isolation, nor can he rise entirely above the experience of his generation and culture, for what one sees and feels and the manner in which one sees, feels and expresses are coloured to some extent by the historical experience of a particular society. Even when one thinks further ahead of or differently from what others thought, the latter conditions the former, for the ways of looking at and thinking about things are limited. So, the origin and growth of ideas cannot be adequately understood at

the level of ideas only, but by taking into consideration the structure, attitudes, beliefs, expectations and ideals of the society in which they are generated.

But no society is entirely homogeneous; for in every society there are various strata, and conflicting interests and impulses, and so different ways of looking at things and interpreting experience and building up knowledge. Not only different cultures, ages and societies have different perspectives, but the different strata in the same society have different perspectives, all of which mutually influence each other and some of which may at times merge into each other. While the way of thinking of the stratum or section in a society to which one belongs would influence naturally one's own way of thinking, that of the dominant section would tend to subordinate, if not suppress, other ways of thinking. And in every society the dominant section would be that which controls the means and techniques of material production and the levers of military and political power. But if a society is colonial, its mentality as a whole and all the ways of thinking of its different sections will in turn be dominated by the way of thinking and the view of the world of the society which has acquired mastery over the former.

So, if "every great philosophy up to now has been the personal confession of its originator, a type of involuntary and unaware memoirs"[5], it must not be forgotten that every person wills, sees things and thinks from the perspective of the society to which he belongs. Nevertheless it is possible for one to try to transcend the mentality of one's epoch, class and society, and seek to see things and desire to comprehend them objectively, and one may also succeed in this. He may then end up by appropriating the perspective and mentality of another epoch, class or society, or by giving rise to a new way of looking at things and an original mode of thought.

Philosophy in modern India is closely related to politics and social conditions and these latter have been shaped by the new material conditions of existence that arose in modern India. So, I propose to deal with these in their interconnection.

II

MODERNIZATION AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution were the proximate causes of the modernization of the West. The American Declaration of Independence, which preceded the storming of the Bastille by thirteen years and made the rights of man known to all Europe, proclaimed that all men are free and equal, that people institute governments among themselves for their common good, that governments must derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that people have an incontestable and unalienable right to alter or abolish governments when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it. Yet, the French Revolution had greater significance for the world; for, its principles, as Condorcet observed, were "purer, more precise and deeper than those that guided the Americans". As Hegel pointed out, it was during the French Revolution that humanity for the first time arrived at the conclusion that man can base himself on thought and build reality accordingly. "This was a glorious dawn", and "in its content this event was world historical".[6] The framework of ideas provided by the French Revolution were abstract enough to become universal.

The Industrial Revolution created new material conditions of human existence, i.e., a new manner and method of producing means of subsistence and exchanging and consuming the products so produced. As the material mode of existence is a major determining element in history, this Revolution caused a restructuring of society. The social process or modernization set in motion by the Industrial Revolution made the West dynamic, expansive and aggressive.

Seeing that they could not hold their own against the industrialized West in any other way, parts of the non-Western world deliberately began to imitate the West by adopting wholesale the technology that arose in the industrialized West along with all such ideas and institutions which were inseparable

from *it*, for it was found that as this technology was an indivisible part of a new way of life, a new civilization, unless a people lived this life they could not master this technology. The choice that confronted the non-Western world was between wholesale industrialization including adoption of Western institutions and enslavement by the West. In any encounter between modern industrial civilization and a non-industrial civilization, the latter cannot just take over the former's technology without a radical social transformation after the pattern of the former. The first man of genius to realize this was Czar Peter the Great (1682–1725) who saw that Russia[7] could be "raised on its hind legs" only through Westernization. About 230 years later, from 1928 by a forced march in less than forty years Russia caught up with the West by adopting Western technology and ideas[8], and may even outstrip the West in future.[9] Similarly, in the Meiji era (1868–1912) Japanese statesmen came to realize that the independence and dignity of Japan could be maintained only if it was modelled after the modern West. At the end of the period of Meiji (=enlightened government), everything in Japan was renovated (*Ishin*) and it became a unified industrialized modern state and a world power. In the nineteen-twenties, under the direction of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey transformed itself to the European way of life and was thus able to preserve its national independence and dignity. Like these three nations, India could not modernize itself of its own accord. Here modernization began under different circumstances.

In India before the rulers and people could become aware of the challenge of modernization and realize what it could contribute and bring it about, the British East India Company succeeded in planting British despotism on Indian despotism. This was to some extent mitigated when the British in 1833 accepted their responsibility to give civilized government to India, and more so from 1858 when the British Crown assumed responsibility for the direct Government of India and a minister responsible to the British Parliament began to control the government in India. As time went on, the British government in India on the whole became more humane and responsive to Indian needs and aspirations.

The administration of Marquess Wellesley (1798-1805) as

Governor-General marks the definite beginning of the modern period in Indian History, for it was only during this period that the British became, as Munro said, "the complete masters of India", although parts of the country became British possessions some forty years before. From then on the British increased and exploited India's resources with Western techniques. In proportion to the growth of Indian nationalism, their exploitation became somewhat less. Mainly to consolidate their empire and develop the resources of India with a view to appropriate them, but also to promote the welfare of India, the British had to introduce machinery (e.g. railway, telegraph, press), undertake irrigation works, organize an effective uniform administration, give people an English education and raise an Indian army. All this set in motion necessary and related industrial processes, started industrialization and urbanization, extended farming, improved communications and means of conveying and exchanging produce, unified the country, spread Western ideas, gave India peace and security from external aggression and brought it into easy communication with Europe. Thus unlike in Russia and Japan, or Turkey, by direct contact and imposition of techniques and institutions, India was forced to modernize.

Because of the unification of the country by railways, telegraph and centralized administration, national consciousness and secularism gained ground, and the foundations of the national state were strengthened. But the oppressive weight and ruthless efficiency of this administration with its paternal attitude killed the initiative and inhibited the individual energies of people. The new type of economic activity put an end to crafts and local markets, and led to increasing mechanization, import of techniques from abroad, concentration of industry and availability of new markets. While this closed down some avenues of employment, others were opened, thus resulting in the unemployment and misery of some but new opportunities for others. The new land revenue system which the British introduced into India hoping that it would lead to competitive capitalist farming, did not bring into existence a competition of giant farms, but no doubt created private property in land, with landlords and peasants as owners, and also led to the flow of land into the hands of the money-lenders, the rack-renting of tenants-at-will by absentee landlords, proletarianization of peasants and decline of

village communities. These agro-industrial changes brought about a change in social relationships. Castes began to give place to classes bound together by community of interests, and it was not one's birth into the social hierarchy, but money which conferred power and influence on one. These were some of the new classes that came into existence: the modern commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, urban proletariat, absentee landlords and their tenants, moneylenders, peasants, landless labour, and professional classes like government employees, lawyers and doctors. The growth and strengthening of the middle class which received English education and the dissemination of current Western values (e.g. nationalism and democracy) among them was an important phenomenon. Slavery and a number of social evils were consequently abolished; women came into their own; and the Penal Code with its doctrines of equality of all before law and presumption of innocence before conviction, undermined various forms of oppression including the caste system based on inequality. Thus every aspect of life was modified by new opportunities, new ways of doing things and new ideas and ideals.

In the middle of the eighteenth century India was at the lowest point of moral decay and political weakness.[10] Early British rule destroyed the old order, plundered this country and produced unparalleled suffering, but by the time of Governor-General Lord William Bentinck (1828-1833) signs of a new order began to appear. Thereafter to some extent British rule deliberately and consciously regenerated this country by modernizing it and infusing into it the spirit of progress; to wit, the Parliamentary Committee of 1832 after three years of enquiry "laid down the principle that the Indian Empire did not exist for the sake of Britain, but for the welfare of the Indian peoples", and that whenever there was a competition between the two the interests of Indians were "to be consulted in preference to those of Europeans". Practice on the whole fell short of this, but it was a great thing that this principle was recognized and acted upon by at least some British statesmen and administrators. It must be recognized that the British by a series of steps* taken

*These were in response to pressures within India and due to the recognition by the best and more sensitive minds in Britain that all peoples had a right to liberty and self-government.

in 1909, 1917, 1921 and 1935 contributed to a slow but gradual development of responsible government and parliamentary institutions in India. An administrative structure sufficiently strong to function effectively even after independence and a judiciary on the whole independent were the legacies of the British.

In 1857 the dispossessed feudal classes of India with the help of the mutinous elements in the Indian army organized a great revolt to expel the British from India, and much of North India was freed by them. But some Indian princes remained neutral and others aided the British; the insurgents had no central leadership, co-ordination, or plan, and no effective alternative government was soon established. So, in spite of the general sympathy of the people, the movement could not spread all over India and was quelled. This earliest effort to win freedom, though abortive, provided* an incentive to the development of national consciousness and revolutionary temper; the latter manifested itself concretely from late nineteenth century and continued to do so sporadically till 1935[11]. The English-educated middle class founded the Indian National Congress in 1885 to demand increasing Indianization of administrative and other services and representation of Indians in government, so that by prolonged preparation and apprenticeship to the British and by constitutional reforms Indians might be prepared for self-rule within the British Commonwealth. On the other hand, from 1905 some who thought these means would not bring national freedom, adopted boycott and passive resistance. Meanwhile the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 heralded the close of the period of European aggression and dominance over Asia, and after the success of their Revolution in Russia (1917) the Communists started supporting and working for the liberation of colonies and dependent countries from imperialism. These world events accelerated the struggles for Indian independence. During the First World War several individuals and groups conducted their struggles for Indian independence from abroad.

In 1920 Mahatma Gandhi gained control of the Congress and thereafter converted it into an anti-imperialist amorphous mass

*Along with Italian, Irish and Russian examples.

movement†, committed to non-violence and led by the English-educated middle class, with which in due course Indian monopoly capitalism allied itself with a view to share power in the national government to be formed when freedom came. In 1929 the Congress declared its goal to be complete national independence. During the early twenties communist groups developed in India, and by the beginning of the thirties communism gained a sure footing and in its own way began to work for the emancipation of the country. In 1942–43 sections of the urban middle class and middle and small peasantry rose in a national insurrection under the leadership of socialists and others who were neither communists nor believers in Gandhian non-violence; and though some of these were members of the Congress, this party as such had nothing to do with this revolution. While 1857 was a feudal revolution, this was a bourgeois revolution. Lacking a clear and complete programme and organization and a solid mass base, it was ruthlessly and brutally crushed by the government. During the same period, Subhas Chandra Bose organized abroad an Indian National Army made up of volunteers, and Indian officers and soldiers captured by the Japanese. Aided by the Japanese, this army intended to liberate India, came close to the Indian borders, but with the Japanese defeat it came to an end in 1944. The story of its achievement and contacts with its men made Indian servicemen politically conscious. This was responsible for serious naval mutinies and unrest early in 1946 in the other two services of the armed forces. This proved that the British could no more rely on the Indian Army to continue their imperialism. After the world war the British also realized that they were in no position to perpetuate imperialism. Though *all* the forces and movements mentioned in this and the previous paragraph were responsible for the freedom of India, because of its excellent countrywide organization and mass support, only the Congress under the leadership of nationalist bourgeoisie* could form the national government when the British quit India in 1947.

†But not a mass struggle. Even the more successful civil disobedience campaigns involved directly less than one in every 200 Indians.

*I use this in Engels' sense, viz. the class of modern capitalists, owners of means of social production and employers of wage-labour.

Born in early twentieth century in the fear of some Indian Muslims that any representative government in India would be dominated by Hindus who would neglect Muslim interests, the Muslim League started by demanding separate representation for the Muslim community as such and more than in proportion to its numbers, and in the forties it ended by insisting on a separate state for Muslims. It had its way when Pakistan was created in 1947. British Imperialism, Hindu nationalism and the medieval and obscurantistic religious components in Gandhian ideology* nurtured Muslim fears and separatist tendencies. While it could not prevent the partition of the country, the national movement liberated it from imperialism, and power was transferred to the native ruling class.

*It had also a revolutionary component.

III

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDEPENDENT INDIA†

During the colonial period extending over a hundred and fifty years the mentality and social organization of India were so much transformed that in 1911 Gopal Krishna Gokhale could say that "whereas the contact of the West with other countries had only been external, in India the West had so to say entered into the very bone and marrow of the East".[12] But it is most remarkable that in spite of this, many characteristics of the four thousand years old Indian civilization and the habits, thoughts and beliefs coming down through ages have persisted and have blended themselves with what was received from the West. K. M. Panikkar wrote: "The New Indian State represents traditions, ideals and principles which are the results of an effective but imperfect synthesis between the East and the West".[13] Nehru's ideal was to develop in independent India through planning and democracy a new civilization which would be different from old feudal civilizations, the cash-based aggressive capitalist civilization of the West with its uncontrolled industrialization and multiplying wants, and the communist civilization based on all-encompassing planning, dictatorship and denial of individual liberty. This new civilization implied "socialist humanism" as the faith of all people.[14] Through means which would commend themselves to a Buddha or a Gandhi, Nehru hoped to construct a new society based on science, technology and industrialization, to achieve social justice and prosperity for all. The State while recognizing the liberty, worth and dignity of the individual was to provide an opportunity and become an instrument for the welfare of all through their voluntary collective effort.[15] This attempt "to create a new civilization . . . . is without doubt the greatest "and most" "unique experiment", because "it is the first revolution consciously undertaken through democratic

†Developments in Nehru era only are concentrated upon. Since then progress has been slight.

processes".[16] Let us now see whether a revolution has occurred, and, if so, to what extent.

Independent India in the Nehru era (1947-1964) has many achievements to its credit. I will deal with them briefly. Ten million people who were rendered refugees as a result of the partition of India were rehabilitated. The erstwhile British India and 582 princely states having bilateral agreements with Britain, which became independent when the British quit India, were peacefully integrated into a single nation. A democratic republic with a constitution which is "a synthesis of the most advanced thinking of Britain and Asia"[17] was established. Civil liberties were secured by law to all citizens. Planning was introduced within three years of independence. Three general elections based on universal suffrage were held successfully. The country was reorganized into states based on languages. The bigger landlords (Zamindars) were dispossessed after payment of compensation and land was distributed among the peasants. Some gigantic irrigation projects were built. There was a phenonmenal increase in social services (education, health, etc.). A number of sectors of economy and areas of production were nationalized. The pace of industrialization was accelerated.

The economic progress achieved in this era would be evident from the following figures. From 1950-51 to 1964-65 agricultural output increased at the rate of 4.5 per cent per annum and industrial production at the average rate of growth of about 11 per cent per annum. In this period the national income increased at an annual rate of growth of 4.7 per cent and the per capita income at 1.9 per cent. This was achieved in spite of a phenomenal increase in the rate of growth of population. Compared with some other Asian countries and with India in the period 1900 to 1950*, the growth of national income from 1950 to 1965 is not unsatisfactory, but the rate of growth of per capita income is not satisfactory when compared to other Asian countries, though satisfactory when compared to its growth (about 0.25 per cent annually) from 1900 to 1950. There has also been some real increase in the per capita

*During this period national income increased at an annual rate of about 1.5 per cent.

availability of goods in India in the period from 1950 to 1965. To give just two examples, the per capita availability of cereals in 1950 was 315 lbs. while in 1965 it was 340 lbs., and of cloth 9.7 yds. in 1950 while in 1965 it rose to 16 yds.[18]

But all these achievements failed to bring about a revolution and the construction of a new society or the creation of a new civilization, because they were slight when compared to the magnitude of the task. The following facts will make this evident. Indian poverty is abysmal. In 1955–56 half of India's population was living on Rs. 14.6 or less per month, i.e., on 10 U.S. cents per day. Only 10 or 11 per cent of the population could spend more than one rupee per day.[19] During 1954–58 our average yearly income per head was Rs. 263, whereas at official exchange rates in rupees it was 350 in Thailand, 558 in Ceylon, 995 in Malaya, and 1700, 4067 and 9258 in Italy, U.K., and U.S.A. respectively.[20] But as goods and services produced in India are cheaper than in U. S. A., the disparity between the two countries may be only of the order of 12 to 1.[21] At the rate at which our economy and population grew from 1950 to 1965, our per capita income might be doubled by 2000 A. D. But while our economy from 1965 received many set-backs and had a recession, human reproduction in India continued unchecked. So, it is doubtful whether our per capita income would be doubled even by 2000 A. D., and even if it were to be it would be no higher than that of Ceylon in the fifties. This means our society will remain even then one of the poorest in the world. This is all the more poignant if it is remembered that in this harshly inegalitarian society[22] by 1964 there was "no significant change in the overall distribution of incomes, though they do indicate a slight probable increase in inequality in the urban sector and some reduction in inequality in the rural sector".[23]* But the total gross capital formation of rural families which was 650 crores of rupees in 1951–52 went down to 398 crores in 1961–62.[24] The relative shares of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors in national income have also shown no significantly large changes: In 1950–51 the share of the agricultural sector was 51.3 per cent and in 1963–64 it was 47.1 per cent, while of the

*But according to the reported findings in September 1969 of Wolf Ladejinsky (World Bank), the gap between the rich and poor in rural areas is growing.

manufacturing sector it grew from 33.8 to 35.9 per cent.[25] This shows that no structural changes have occurred in the economy. This means an industrial revolution in any significant sense has not yet begun in India.

The unemployed numbered about 13 million in 1965 and may be approaching 35 million by 1971. In 1964 the educated unemployed were 7,61,094 and may have increased since then by 40 per cent. In 1967 about 630 lakhs of children had no schools and there was a housing shortage of 741,000,00. Our population is increasing by 13 million each year. In September 1967 the Indian population was 541,078,153 and by 2000 A.D. it would be 100 crores.[26] As 70 per cent of the population depend on agriculture now as in 1947, the land-man ratio will be tremendously reduced year after year. The area of poverty and despair is thus spreading. The extent of the tragedy of Indian democracy and planning is brought home if it is remembered that : in 1950 the expectation was that within a generation the per capita national income could at least be doubled ; in 1955 it was expected that full employment could be reached in ten years ; and in 1960 the goal was to ensure a self-reliant and self-generating economy within the shortest possible period. These and most of the other important targets of the Plans remain unfulfilled and the Fourth Plan which ought to have started in 1966 has not been finalized till the time of writing this (September 1969).†

Such is the situation as far as economics is concerned. In social institutions and attitudes also there has been a slight progress in some directions, but no revolution. Evils like illiteracy, child labour, untouchability, dowry system, exploitation of the tribals and some backward classes, inequality of sexes, linguistic and communal riots, irrational and barbarous practices of all sorts including human sacrifice, starvation deaths, begging, corruption and nepotism, squalor and pestilence – all these have not been eradicated, while surprisingly some of

†According to growth rate figures for 1961–67 now (1969) made available in the World Bank Atlas, India is among the last 23 of the 118 countries for which such figures are available. Our annual increase in growth rate is 0.9 per cent, much lower than that of many underdeveloped countries. Our per capita rate is 90 dollars, and our gross national product is not higher than that of countries like Guinea, Congo and Sudan.

them appear to have increased since independence, though all these are sought to be eradicated by the Directive Principles of State Policy in our Constitution,[27] and some prohibited by specific legislation. Since independence the acquisitive spirit and overrating of material success, unrelieved by charity and idealism, are becoming rather more evident ; the puritan virtues, identified by Max Weber, viz., honesty, hard work, discipline, devotion to duty, frugality and austerity, are becoming somewhat rarer. Acquisitions and possessions are either unproductively hoarded or wasted away in ostentation. Social relations and action as well as economic activities and dealings are seeking to free themselves from the governance of universal moral rules. Politics is moving away from principles and religion from spirituality. Violence is increasingly resorted to by political and social groups to achieve their ends. Jayaprakash Narayan was right when he said that in no country in the world today there was greater violence than in India. The social situation is thus a complement of the economic, and they are reinforcing and perpetuating each other. Lastly, as the state machine—bureaucratic—military-police complex—inherited from the colonial era was neither smashed nor forged into an instrument for peoples' welfare, it continued to enmesh the body of society and repress common people, and retard or nullify social and economic reform policies.

In the Nehru era it appeared as if a new society would be constructed through a peaceful revolution involving radical social and economic changes. (1) Universal suffrage, (2) the parliamentary system, and (3) industrialization were expected to bring about such changes gradually. But due to the following reasons among others such an expectation has been belied. (1) In a society in which for most people only action in terms of local issues, caste and community, and not policies, programmes and plans, was easily intelligible, universal suffrage strengthened centrifugal forces and traditional ethos. As election campaigns are very expensive, on the whole elections have augmented the power of the affluent, who alone can afford to contest. (2) The political party in power, Parliament and legislatures, dominated by the upper strata and entrenched concerns, while accepting in principle the necessity for social justice, economic equalization and the eradi-

cation of poverty, have delayed effective measures by insisting on gradual implementation of the requisite reform policies. The full programme of the ruling party was never translated into legislation and all the enacted legislation was not vigorously and sincerely implemented. A 'dichotomy between ideals and reality' and a 'combination of radicalism in principle and conservatism in practice' has been 'woven into the fabric of Indian political life'.[28] Reform laws and policies have been universally, systematically and persistently sabotaged. Consequently, the substance of economic exploitation and social injustice has in no wise been affected by the substitution of republican-democratic forms of government for colonial forms. (3) Industrialization has not drastically changed institutions, attitudes and other sectors of the economy, because the general culture and level of living have set up inhibitions and obstacles to possible changes. Modern enterprises and sectors of change have been so few and small when compared to the size and complexity of the society to be transformed, that they have become only "enclaves in a largely stagnating economy".[29]

The Indian liberation movement, whose vanguard was the upper class, was inspired only by the determination to overthrow imperialism. It was not caused by the sufferings or the awakened conscience of the masses, or the desire for progress.[30] So, with independence the state apparatus as it was merely got transferred from one hand to another, leading to no epochal changes in peoples' lives. Without a peoples' revolution, radical social and economic changes would seem to be impossible. In India so far there has been no such revolution in which "the mass of the people, their vast majority*, come out actively, independently, with their own economic and political demands".[31] So, the common people, unawakened and unenlightened, have not yet learnt to compel the leaders to govern in the interests of the former. This is so because till now there has been no wide, systematic and organized movement to develop revolutionary consciousness among them. For whatever reasons, the Communist movement in India has failed.[32] Other political parties have

* i.e. the proletariat and peasantry, "the very lowest social groups crushed by oppression and exploitation". —Lenin, p. 295–6. (See notes)

failed to develop a philosophy of revolution and imbue their rank and file with it. Without a philosophy of revolution there can be no revolution,[33] for "revolution", as Camus wrote, "originates in the realm of ideas. Specifically, it is the injection of ideas into historic experience...... (It) is an attempt to shape actions to ideas, to fit the world into a theoretic frame".[34] So far India has had no revolution and one does not even loom on the horizon.

IV

RENAISSANCE AND HINDU REFORMATION IN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

In the nineteenth century and very early twentieth century there occurred a renaissance in India, which was as significant and far-reaching (but not so wide-spread) a movement as the European renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But the Indian renaissance went on calmly and gradually, as it was not obstructed by the government; and as Hinduism and Islam did not have organized Churches with resources of power and wealth, there was no effective opposition from conservative forces. The conflict between the progressives and the conservatives was never unequal, neither of them having the backing of an established pervasive organization, or of economic and political power. So the forces that were generated were able to work themselves out unimpeded.

This movement began with the realization that Hindu society was anachronistic, that there was a need for its reform and reorganization to adjust obsolete social relationships. This impulse for reform did not come from the oppressed classes or the lower castes, but from persons who belonged to the upper classes*, studied Western science and literature and understood the needs of their contemporary world. It was soon found that without religious reform there could be no social reconstruction. So the awakened Indian mind began to critically study and assess its past and recover from obscurity great ideas hidden for centuries beneath thoughtless belief and selfish custom. Inspiration to reshape and rebuild Indian thought and practice was sought in these ideas. The essence of the fundamental beliefs which form the core of Hinduism was identified, reexamined and reinterpreted. Simultaneously, this movement also discovered what constituted the source of European

* Narayana Guru of Kerala (1857-1928), a great religious teacher and social reformer, was an exception, for he was born into the Chovan section of the Ezhava caste, considered untouchable then. There might have been a few such others who did not become prominent.

superiority and what could not be found in or derived from Indian tradition, viz., the "useful sciences and mechanical arts". With the development of self-consciousness and knowledge of the greatness of the past, along with English education which provided the entire Indian elite with a common language and operating set of new ideas, Indian nationalism too developed.

As Rabindranath Tagore said, the man who ushered in the modern epoch in India was Rammohun Roy (1772–1833), who may also be considered as the father of modern Indian philosophy.[35] In the work he did and the lasting effects he achieved, he was to India what men like Petrarch, Erasmus, Bacon and Lessing were to Europe at various times. In originality and clarity of thought, in humanism, in the ability to express himself in elegant language, he is not inferior to any of these great Europeans. His achievements were all the more remarkable as his movement was not helped in his life time or subsequently by persons who came anywhere near him in calm clear thinking, in catholicity of outlook and humanism. While he was no technical philosopher like Kant or Hegel, his writings have no less philosophic value than those of Bacon, Lessing, or Voltaire.

While the influences that shaped Roy's thought were the writings of Bacon, the ethics of Christianity, rationalism, Deism, the Enlightenment and Utilitarianism, it was firmly rooted in the Vedanta. Vedanta restated was his religion, while his approach to problems of life was scientific and rationalistic. He was the first modern Indian thinker to conclude that Upanishadic teachings, rightly interpreted, contain eternal truth relevant to all ages. After Sankara the Upanishads lost the unique authority, influence and vogue which they had with him and some others, for devotional schools exalted Agamas and Puranas also to their rank. Roy for the first time tried to show that only a correct interpretation of the Upanishads could be the true Hindu religion, and that only such a religion could be reconciled with the modern world and science. The social legislation which from time to time sought to modernize Hindu society and which ultimately culminated in a uniform law for all Hindus, was the outcome of the movement started by Roy.

Another leader of thought, Keshub Chunder Sen (1843–1884)

for the first time clearly expressed an idea which later gained wide acceptance. He envisaged the synthesis and harmony of the West and India and the mutual absorption of their cultures and religions. He talked of England "sitting at the feet of hory-headed India" to "learn ancient wisdom from India", "to gather the priceless treasures which lie buried" in "Vedism and Buddhism", and India sitting at the feet of England to learn "modern art and science". That a new Indian civilization could arise from the synthesis of Indian spirituality and Western science, Vedanta and Western technology, has been the hackneyed theme of the speeches and writings of many Indian academic philosophers as well as others since then till today.

Two other giants of this epoch deserve mention. Dayananda Saraswati (1824–83) went back to the Veda, the source book of Indian religion and philosophy which was interpreted *almost* polytheistically by Sayana and naturalistically by many European scholars, and which was to some extent disparaged by the Vedantins, and believed he found in it rational monotheism and a law of life based on reason and ethics, and not on mechanical performance of rituals for material rewards. A number of passages in his *Satyartha Prakasa* are philosophically as good as those in the works of Sabara, Sayana or Ramanuja, and his criticisms of others' views do not fall below the level of *Sutra Bhashya, Tarkapada*, St. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, or Ghazali's *Tahafut Al-Falasifah.* Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), the father of the Indian liberation movement, by his commentary on the Gita made it *the* scripture of modern India, drawing forth from it an ethic and a social and political message, capable of rejuvenating Hindu society. Sri Aurobindo considered Tilak's book to be a "monumental work" of "original criticism and presentation of ethical truth".[36] Since then the Gita has been providing an inspiration to the social and political action of some of our best minds like Gandhi and Vinoba.

It was, however, Vivekananda (1863–1902) who found in his own words "the common bases of Hinduism" and tried to "awaken the national consciousness to them". K. M. Panikkar rightly claimed him to be "a unifier of Hindu ideology" and considered that it was chiefly Vivekananda who created

"a sense of community among the Hindus", which in turn "gave Indian nationalism its dynamism and ultimately enabled it to weld at least the major part of India into one state".[37] In a daring original way Vivekananda developed Advaita metaphysics as he felt best and tried to reconcile it with logic, experience and science. Very much aware of the world in which he lived, he developed an ethical and social theory in tune with his metaphysics; permitting himself speculations regarding the future of India, while offering interpretations of India's past cultural and religious history. Fighting against "priestcraft and social tyranny", considering the removal of poverty and misery as the primary tasks, he thought the primary needs of India were (1) food for the hungry millions, (2) social justice for the lower classes, and (3) national strength, self-respect and self-reliance.[38] "The poor, the ignorant, the illiterate, the afflicted, - let these be your God", he taught, for, he added, "service to these is the highest religion".[39] He foresaw that socialism would become popular, as "people will certainly want the satisfaction of their material needs, less work, no oppression, no war, more food". He realized that if the masses woke up and understood their oppression, they could blow off the upper classes entirely "by a puff of their mouth".[40] Vivekananda succeeded in constructing a new world-view. But like all other systems and world-views, it also, as a whole, may not stand up to criticism.

As much of what Vivekananda said is contained in extempore lectures and letters and not in carefully written books, a certain amount of oratory, looseness of expression and repetition is found in his works. But some other forms of expression – dialogues, commentaries, sub-commentaries and books of disputations (e.g. the *Republic*, the *Bhamati*, the *Kalpataru*, *Advaita-siddhi*), or aphorisms and essays (e.g. Nietzsche and Emerson) - have their own defects; still they have been used for philosophizing, and there is no reason why carefully prepared sermons and extempore lectures should not be used for that. In the history of modern Indian philosophy, Vivekananda should be given a high place. Academic men can derive from his works as much food for thought as they can from any Advaitin since Sankara, and there is as much philosophy in them as in those of Bishop Butler, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Emerson and others.

The Indian renaissance and Hindu reformation were strengthened by, among others, M. G. Ranade (1842–1901) and Rama Tirtha (1873–1906). Ranade's importance lies in his recognizing the interdependence of social, economic, political and religious spheres, and the need to achieve justice and equality steadily and gradually.[41] According to C. F. Andrews, the last and most enduring aspect of the reformation in India was associated with Ranade. Rama Tirtha did in his own way what Vivekananda did, viz., to develop Vedanta such that it becomes relevant to the contemporary world. Combining a knowledge of technical philosophy with a sure grasp of mathematics and science, and displaying a sensibility refined by studies of Sufi mystics, Rama Tirtha's speeches and writings have greater philosophical excellence than those of many academic interpreters of Vedanta. Like Vivekananda he thought spiritual regeneration and social transformation had to go hand in hand.

Thus the period which began with the publication of Rammohun Roy's **Tuhaft-al-Muwahhidin* (1803), which more or less foreshadowed most of the important ideas and arguments of the Hindu reformation and the Indian renaissance of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was a great age of Indian philosophy, comparable in some respects to the pre-Cartesian period starting with Nicholas of Cusa, insofar as new ideas and forces were at work and a new vigorous approach and a new world-outlook emerged. The men mentioned above were great reformers as well as philosophers of merit.

It may be mentioned that though Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–98) initiated a kind of reform movement in Islam, it was not so fruitful as the Hindu reform movement. Syed Ameer Ali's (1849–1928 ?) *The Spirit of Islam* was the only important influential modernist interpretation of Islam in this period.[42]

It may be worthwhile to mention some of the dominant ideas which are the legacy of this period: (1) All religions are but different paths to the same goal; so they have an underlying essential unity and are in a sense equal. Similarly, different philosophical systems do not mutually contradict each other, but are reconcilable points of view, having an underlying unity.

* *A Gift to Monotheists.*

(2) Vedanta is the quintessence of the Vedas and the highest philosophical peak reached by Indian thought, and the Vedanta Sutras, as interpreted by "the celebrated Sankaracharya",* contain its authentic exposition. (3) Vedanta is the only religion and philosophy, which is in harmony with reason and science, and can be universal. It is not against any religion or philosophy, but all truth is included in it. (4) The genius of India is to achieve a synthesis of cultures, civilizations and philosophies ; in Indian history such syntheses were achieved in the past. (5) The culture and philosophy of India are predominantly spiritual, while those of the West are materialistic. The present task is to achieve a synthesis of these two. (6) The political vicissitudes of India were due to ignoring the positivistic and activistic component of Indian thought, such as that contained in the Gita. (7) A just society can be constructed on the basis of the philosophy of the Upanishads and the Gita.† Exponents of the Vedanta in Indian Universities in the twentieth century have hardly done anything more than to work out these ideas and suggestions.

Also, the emphasis which the Indian renaissance placed on individual liberty and human rights and on reason and moral conduct deserves to be noted. The leaders of the renaissance believed that mental enlightenment and reform of conduct and principles would lead to national resurgence, political freedom and welfare. Believing that everyone would prosper if educated and if everyone worked hard, they did not realise the necessity for the material transformation of society and equitable distribution of wealth†† and for creating conditions wherein work could be found and its fruits enjoyed by all. This led to the national movement having no concrete picture of its objective aspiration.

The impact of the renaissance and Hindu reformation on India must not be exaggerated. They meant little for the vast masses of the country, who remained for the most part undisturbed

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* So Rammohun Roy called Sankara, whose glosses on some Upanishads and Sutras were abridged and rendered into Bengali and English by Roy and published in 1815–16.

† Dayananda would not endorse (2) and (3), and would rate the Vedic as the one true religion and philosophy and so would modify (7).

†† Vivekananda is somewhat an exception, and so may be a few others.

in their traditional ways of thought and behaviour. They very much influenced only a small minority of the middle class, creating a new social class ‡, which in thinking and behaviour differed from the majority of the middle class and all other classes. But this became the dominant minority and continues to be so till now.

‡ But most of the women in the families of this class did not develop a new mentality.

V

NON-ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY

Let us now take a cursory look at non-academic philosophy in twentieth century India. In between 1914 and 1921 was completed the most comprehensive, creative and systematic philosophic endeavour, which modern India up to date has been able to conceive. During these years in the monthly philosophical journal *Arya* appeared serially all the seminal works of Aurobindo (1872–1950), *The Life Divine*, *The Synthesis of Yoga* and *The Human Cycle : The Psychology of Social Development*. His *Essays on the Gita* too appeared in *Arya*. His *magnum opus*, *The Life Divine*, a landmark in the history of modern Indian thought, revised and rewritten in 1939–40, was published in book form in 1940. Convinced that a real Indian philosophy can only evolve out of spiritual experience and canalize spiritual knowledge, Aurobindo sought and believed he achieved such experience, and at the same time he acquired a profound knowledge of European and Indian philosophies and cultures. He began work of a new type in modern India, viz. philosophical system-building, synthesizing his own Yogic discoveries with a number of ideas from European and Indian philosophic and religious traditions and science. Critics will, of course, differ in judging the success of his effort.

In this century again Mahatma Gandhi and Gandhians have made important contributions to social and political thought. Gandhi's philosophy, as Albert Schweitzer pointed out, "is a world in itself". His uniting "the idea of ahimsa to the idea of activity directed on the world" is, according to Schweitzer, an important event in the thought of humanity.[43] "Through word and deed" Gandhi provided, wrote Karl Jaspers, "the true answer" to the question we face today : "How can we emerge from physical power, and wars, so that we do not all perish under atom bombs ?"[44]

Mention should also be made of M. N. Roy (1889—1954) who in his earlier phase "came nearest to defining the outlook of young India during a period when Socialism was not very

much talked about",[45] and sought to promote an understanding of Indian history and modern India by applying Marxian theories, and who in his later phase from 1947 discarding Marxism attempted to outline "a comprehensive philosophy which links up social and political practice with a scientific metaphysics of rationality and ethics".[46]

One must not also ignore the many reflections and insights scattered through the writings and speeches of Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), who, as Richard McKeon noted, "has gone further in the philosophy of society and culture, of education and religion than the technical philosophers who write on these subjects". Equally significant are Jawaharlal Nehru's (1889–1964) ideas on politics, history and society.

Muhammad Iqbal's (1873–1938) brilliant book *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* should also be mentioned in this context. It is as original an interpretation of Islam in terms of German idealism as that of Vedanta by the best Hindu philosophers. Abul Kalam Azad's (188–1958) commentary on the Quran is a learned contribution and modernistic in outlook.

VI

ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHY IN 20TH CENTURY

In India from 1854 a new system of education was introduced and some universities were opened for the first time in 1857. Almost from the beginning logic and philosophy were taught in the colleges affiliated to these universities, but till almost 1927 "Indian thought was not a subject of study in the Indian universities".[47] Many of the early colleges in India were started by Protestant missionaries; the Catholic colleges in India did not generally teach philosophy (and it is so even now), because the syllabi prescribed by the universities, drafted by men trained in British universities, did not give an adequate place to medieval European philosophy. Many of the first teachers in the colleges came from Britain and quite a number of them were themselves missionaries. The philosophical education of Indians born in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was undertaken by these men. A good number of them were from Scottish universities. The Scottish Church College at Calcutta and the Madras Christian College had teachers with reputation and capacity to influence. A number of Indian philosophers were taught by men like Urquhart, Henry Stephen and Hastie at Calcutta and men like Radhakrishnan were products of the Madras Christian college.

To understand the nature of the influence Great Britain exerted on Indian philosophers, the philosophical situation in that country has to be noted. David Hume died in 1776 (four years after Rammohun Roy was born), and Thomas Reid (1710-96) reacted against Hume and gave rise to the Scottish School of common sense, which continued to have adherents into the nineteenth century [e.g. William Hamilton (1788-1856)]. The eighteenth century was characterized by the Enlightenment, and Deism, a movement which was influential in England till Hume from one side and Butler from another side hastened its disappearance. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), James Mill (1773–1836) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) gave rise to Utilitarianism; and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903)

attempted to develop a 'synthetic philosophy' on the basis of contemporary science. But none of these developments influenced the men who studied philosophy in Indian Universities. Deism, which rejected established religion, and Hume's scepticism could not obviously be inculcated in missionary colleges. Bentham's Utilitarianism which had no need of God's commandments as the foundation of morality and Spencer's agnosticism shared the same fate†, as they could not be reconciled with revealed truth regarding ultimate verities and morality conceived as following God's commands or the inner voice of the conscience through which God speaks. So these theories were never presented in a favourable light by the Christians who taught in the Indian Colleges.

There was, however, another movement which gained ground in nineteenth century England. Coleridge (died 1834) and Carlyle (died 1881) made the first efforts to introduce German Idealism into England. Starting with Stirling's popular book (1865) on Hegel, it established itself in Scotland due to the work of John and Edward Caird and in Oxford due to T. H. Green, roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century, and prevailed till 1920. So, most of those who came from Britain to teach in India were influenced by some form of Kantianism or Hegelianism, more often by a mixture of both as found in Cairds. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (1893) and Bosanquet's objective idealism also began to be influential in India from the first decades of the twentieth century. So, the first generation of Indian philosophers learnt to look upon Idealism as the last word in philosophy. It was also the period when the new Hindu world-view that emerged accepted Vedanta as the highest type of philosophy. Also, European Indologists who saw that Kantianism was foreshadowed in Sankara were not wanting. Naturally, therefore, almost the entire first generation of philosophers to come out of Indian Universities were Idealists*,

† Mill's Logic was, however, studied.

* Sir Brijendranath Seal, who also to start with was a Hegelian, later accepted Vaishnavism. Dasgupta was also a Hegelian in the beginning, but later "threw off" its "shackles" and ultimately "getting sick of Absolutism" revolted against it. S.K. Maitra of Banaras at first a "devotee" of Hegel ceased to be so in later life. But did even such men give up Idealism altogether, or only one of its varieties, specially the Hegelian ?

influenced by Advaita Vedanta and some form of European idealism derived from Kant and Hegel. Consequently, the older Indian academic philosphers were more or less favourable to religion and in the thought of every one of them there was a place either for the Absolute or God.

This is shown by considering *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (2nd edition), edited by Radhakrishnan and Muirhead. Among its twentyfour† contributors, there is not a single atheist or materialist; all of them except seven have been predominantly influenced by Advaita Vedanta; nineteen of them are idealists of some sort or other; and only three of the twentyfour were born in this century.

Bergson with his international reputation and favourable attitude to mystical thought was another thinker whose philosophy was found congenial by the older generation of Indian philosophers. The only three men - Lloyd Morgan, Alexander and Whitehead - in the English-speaking world, who attempted construction of systematic philosophies also appealed to this generation, which under the influence of Kant, Hegel and Vedanta thought that the right kind of philosophy could only be systematic philosophy about the cosmos as a whole. Other Western thinkers like Lotze and Royce were also familiar to this generation.

The philosophical situation in England changed by the 1920's, because by then almost all university teachers and students were laymen, while previously teachers mostly belonged to clerical orders and students came from or intended to go to vicarages and manses. Interest in theology and philosophical theology declined and the ideas that stimulated philosophy were those derived from men like Cantor, Maxwell, Mendel, Marx, Frazer and Freud. By the 1920's separate departments of philosophy came to be constituted and philosophy was not anymore tied to classics, theology, economics and psychology. Journals and societies which promoted professional discussions among philosophers and published technical papers came to be founded. Developments in methodology of science, the logic of mathematics, probability, statistics and induction took

† excluding M. M. Sharif, who became a Pakistani. He started as an empirical idealist, but later became a realist.

place. Except for the sake of the Gifford Lectures, the practice of writing books in which comprehensive systems were developed waned, and that of writing articles and discussion-papers employing rigorous philosophical techniques and arguments came into vogue. The epoch-making works of G. E. Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein made their appearance by 1921. What is philosophy if it is not the effort to comprehend the universe as-a-whole? How can the cogency, rigour and correctness of philosophical thinking be established? In answer to such questions arose the analytical method, logical atomism and positivism and concern with language.[48] But this movement as well as the continental movements like Phenomenology and Existentialism and American Pragmatism* scarcely influenced Indian philosophers† till the 1950's; though the British concern with the problems of theory of knowledge, specially discussion of sense-perception in the 20's and early 30's (e.g. Broad and Price), was emulated in India.†† It is curious that though the Communist Party came into existence in India before the 1930's and its membership in 1965 was according to the *Pravda*, 100,1000, there do not seem to be more than three or four academic philosophers who are Marxists. To those nurtured in Vedanta and European idealism these new philosophies did not appeal very much, while the younger generations did not have ready access to many books on these during the period of the second world war, and they were not taught these in the Indian Universities. The Gifford Lectures constituted themselves as contemporary philosophy for Indian Universities.

After national independence came, the number of Indians going abroad for higher studies increased very much. Many

* Some of James' books, however, seem to have been read by a considerable number of pepole in India long before. So were some of Russell's books.

† Exceptions can be thought of. For example, S.K. Maitra of Banaras and Syed Vahiduddin, formerly of Osmania, both of whom had knowledge of German.

††This resulted in the production of books on Vedantic and Nyaya theories of knowledge and ancient Indian theories of perception. In the Radhakrishnan-Muirhead volume only three contributors out of the twenty-four refer to Moore, and these and two others to Russell and one of them and two others cursorily to Logical Positivism, but none to Existentialism, Marxism, or Wittgenstein and others

went to Anglo-Saxon countries and came under the spell of analysis and one or two of pragmatism ; the few who went to continental European universities returned back bearing the impress of the trends of thought there. Even others who did not go abroad began to have ready access to the new philosophical literature by 1950's. Consequently, a considerable number of those who are now in their thirties and forties or younger, are under the influence of these non-Idealistic ways of thinking. In general it may be said that just as the previous generations by and large tried to be *au courant* with idealism, the generations which came to maturity after the second world war on the whole attempt to be so with analysis. In the latter circles Indian systems and schools which appear to be in tune with existentialism or analysis (e.g. Navya Nyaya) are coming into vogue. But it is right to remember that Vedanta and Idealism also continue to have their citadels in a number of Indian Universities.

Some might argue from the above account that Indian academic philosophy is largely "colonial", i.e., it is intellectually dependent on thinking in the West, specially Britain. Is this charge justified? Philosophical work of a particular type is undertaken in India because it is done abroad ; certain philosophical methods, ideas, systems or schools are adopted because they are the current fashions in the West ; and the problems posed in the Western present along with the standards by which the West currently judges its own philosophical work are adopted here though they do not arise from, nor are they conjoined to, the Indian situation and tradition. Classical Indian systems or schools in which contemporary Western methods or fashions of thought can be discerned are, because of this, evaluated higher as compared to others. Thus at a time when idealism dominated in England, Sankara was the rage ; now as symbolic logic and analysis prevail there, Gangesa and others are coming into their own. Ancient as well as modern Indian philosophers are understood and interpreted in comparison with Western thinkers. Thus Nagarjuna is understood in relation to, say, Kant, and Gandhi in relation to American Pragmatists. Indian philosophers whose books have been published under a Western imprint or at least favourably reviewed in Western journals, or whose writings

have appeared in them, and those who have studied or lectured in Western Universities, on the whole receive, for these reasons, greater attention and respect from their Indian colleagues. Philosophers who do not gain some sort of recognition from abroad often go unrecognized in India. Indian philosophers do not take each other's work as seriously as they do the work of the Western philosophers. This is the situation not only in philosophy, but in other fields as well.* The grip which the West, especially Britain, acquired over the mind of India has not been very much loosened even after the latter became politically independent. A competent sociologist observed, "the sad fact is that India is not an intellectually independent country".[49] This does not mean that there is any rootlessness, schizophrenia, or ambivalence among Indian intellectuals, as no evidence for these has been found.[50] The mentality of the Indian intellectuals is what is normal for those of a country with a backward economy, using mostly primitive tools, weapons and techniques, which is dependent on countries with advanced economies and modern technological skills, for its food, defence, a number of goods, capital and export markets, as well as for technical assistance for modernizing its economy.

But, it may be asked, what is wrong in adopting and appropriating the theories and methodology developed in another country? Was not a good deal of medieval and modern European philosophy Platonism or Aristotelianism? Was not German idealism alien to the British tradition and was British philosophy largely 'colonial' from about 1850 to 1920 when idealism dominated British Universities? And, did British and American philosophy become again 'colonial' when ideas first

* Prof. A. Appadorai remarked about "the barrenness of much of the thinking in Social Sciences in India, which cannot be doubted." "This has", he thinks, "resulted, from the tendency to adopt concepts from other countries without realizing that those concepts had been evolved in those countries from their experience". (*Essays in Politics and International Relations*, Bombay, 1969.) Similarly, in his address to the 1967 session of the Indian Economic Conference, L. K. Jha, Governor of the Reserve Bank, emphasized the need for "fresh economic thinking" within "a framework of sound theories evolved from a realistic analysis of the forces and factors at work". We have to, he said, evolve our own pattern of economic thought and organization, as it might be unwise and sometimes dangerous to apply the techniques of the developed world in Indian conditions.

developed by Moritz Schlick and his colleagues at Vienna gripped Anglo-Saxon universities? Philosophic chauvinism is reprehensible. One might reply that if the Indian situation were analogous, has it given rise to, if not a Bradley, Royce, Quine or Ryle, to at least a number of first-rate men at home in these schools? This is not the place to discuss this in detail.

Anyhow, in 1964 Kurt Mendelssohn commented that Indian scientists work on outmoded problems and depend on science abroad.[51] This is the case with Indian philosophy also. As D. M. Datta said, contemporary Indian philosophy is either "a product of purely Western influence" or "a peculiar development of European philosophy in Indian atmosphere", for even when it ultimately upholds an indigenous view, it draws its "sustenance" from European thought.[52] In the same context Mendelssohn also pointed out that as the Indian administration does not recognize science as a major factor of social transformation, its outlook on science and attitude to it hampers scientific development. In India the outlook and the attitude of the powers that be is much less favourable to philosophy than science. This may surprise some, but the fact is that "the idea that the Hindus had great love and reverence for philosophy and respect for philosophers is a figment of the European mind. What we respect are the Sadhus, possessors of occult power, not philosophers who professed to possess only knowledge and that useless in our eyes".[53]

What are the main types of philosophical activity of our academic men?[54] First, there are those who with a thorough mastery of the texts meticulously and faithfully expound the classical systems. Ganganatha Jha's books on Purva Mimamsa and Dasgupta's *History* are of this type. Second, there are those who with a sure grasp of the sources constructively interpret a system by instituting comparisons of it with allied Western and Indian doctrines, while showing how it differs from others. T. R. V. Murti's book on Madhyamika metaphysics is of this type. Third, there are those who treat modern problems in ways suggested by Western philosophy, but stamped with the mark of ancient Indian thought. Some of the writings of K. Satchidananda Murty (e. g. *Metaphysics, Man and Freedom*) are of this type. Fourth, there are those who

under the influence of Western motives and methods interpret Western thought, or attempt to think on problems which are occupying the interest of Westerners. Hiralal Haldar's work on Hegelianism and J. L. Mehta's on Heidegger are of this type. Many of the younger men doing analysis do work of this type. Fifth, there are those who attempt to construct world-views incorporating into them as many different positions as possible, endeavouring to reconcile their apparent contradictions. Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life* and *The Religion of the Spirit and the World's Need*[55] are of this type. These do not exhaust all the types of philosophical activity in contemporary India.

Finally, it would do good to contemporary professional Indian philosophers to know what intelligent outsiders think of their work. Mulk Raj Anand thinks their philosophies of life "are either various reinterpretations of ancient Indian thought or intellectual positions relevant to local problems in Great Britain, France or America". He believes they have produced no coherent systems of thought in accord with the impulses, ideas, needs and interests of contemporary India.[56] According to K. M. Panikkar, "not one of the Universities has produced a philosopher of any distinction who has made a contribution of value either to the traditional systems of thought or to the modern schools".[57] This is not the place to discuss whether these evaluations made in 1963 are justified, and, if so, why such is the situation and how it could be improved. If these evaluations are incorrect, why did two perceptive and critical minds, not unacquainted with philosophy, form such opinions?

NOTES

[1] Marx & Engels, *On Religion*, New York, 1964, p. 30.

[2] Op. cit., p. 31.

[3] Quoted in Marx & Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1949, p. 346.

[4] James, *Pragmatism*, New York, 1907, p.4.

[5] F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Chicago, 1955, p. 6.

[6] Hegel, "Lectures on the Philosophy of History", *Works*, Vol. IX, (Ed. Gans), p. 229, 441.

[7] It is generally acknowledged that Russia belongs to the non-Western world as the forces that moulded it and the traditions it inherited were not those which shaped the West.

[8] Communism itself is a Western ideology which owes its development to Western thinkers. Nothing in Russian civilization could by itself have originated it.

[9] In postwar years Soviet economy expanded at something like 1½ times the rate of American economy. H. L. Roberts, ***Russia and America : Dangers and Prospects***, New York, 1956.

[10] Jadunath Sarkar, *India Through the Ages*, Calcutta, 1928.

[11] K. Satchidananda Murty, *Readings in Indian History, Politics and Philosophy*, London, 1967, p. 166 ff.

[12] Quoted in P. J. O. Malley, *Moslem India and the West*.

[13] *The Foundations of New India*, London, 1963, p. 16.

[14] Mulk Raj Anand, *Is There A Contemporary Indian Civilisation ?* Bombay, 1963, p. 116–7.

[15] See extracts from Nehru in K. Satchidananda Murty, op. cit., pp. 203-5.

[16] Panikkar, op. cit., p. 253.

[17] Vera Micheles Dean, *The Nature of the Non-Western World*, New York, 1966, p. 97.

[18] Source for all above figures : C. T. Kurien, *Our Five Year Plans*, Bangalore, 1966, Chapter V.

[19] Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, London, 1968, Vol. I, p. 565.

[20] loc. cit., p. 477.

[21] loc. cit., p. 481.

[22] During 1953–54 to 56–57 20 per cent of India's national income went to the top 5 per cent of households and 10 per cent of it to the top 1 per cent of them. The bottom 80 per cent of households got only 44 per cent of it. 4 per cent of households own 33.3 per cent of the total area cultivated with size of holdings ranging from 25 acres (minimum),

while 64.4 per cent of households own 16.8 per cent of the total cultivated area, with size of holdings ranging up to 4.99 acres (maximum). (*Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, September 1963. S. R. Mohnot, *Concentration of Economic Power in India*, p. 82.)

[23] Report of the (Mahalanobis) Committee on "Distribution of Income and Levels of Living", 1964. But the Parliamentary Committee on Policy, Resources and Allocations reported: "Inequalities of wealth and income had increased rather than diminished". *Link*, January 1, 1961.

[24] *Rural Credit Survey*, 1954; *Rural Debt & Investment Survey*, 1961-2.

[25] *Eastern Economist Annual*, 1966, p. 1420.

[26] The above 1967 Figures were published by the Family Planning Department in September 1967.

[27] *Vide* Articles 38, 39 etc.

[28] Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 275, 261.

[29] loc. cit., p. 19–20.

[30] loc. cit,. p. 275.

[31] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1967, p. 295.

[32] This is declared by a Resolution of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), adopted in Calcutta on October 9, 1968. (*The Indian Express*, Vijayawada, October 11, 1968).

[33] A truth clearly seen and enunciated by Lenin, and in our country by M. N. Roy (*M. N. Roy's Memoirs*, Bombay, 1964, p. 413–4).

[34] Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, London, 1953, p. 78.

[35] Whether such a situation is desirable or not, "The Philosophy of India", as Hegel said, "is identical with its religion, so that the interest in religion is the same as its interest in philosophy". (*Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der philosophie*, ed. Michelet, p. 144) So Rammohun, though a religious and social reformer, is as much a philosopher as Sankara or Ramanuja.

[36] *Bankim - Tilak - Dayananda*, Arya Publishing House, Calcutta, p. 16.

[37] *The Determining Periods of Indian History*, Bombay, 1965, p. 53.

[38] Quoted in Majumdar, *The British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance*, p. 493.

[39] Gambhirananda, *History of the Ramakrishna Math & Mission*, pp. 109-10.

[40] Vivekananda, *Caste, Culture And Socialism*, Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, 1947, p. 94. For above, Ch. VI.

[41] K. Satchidananda Murty, *Readings*, p. 154.

[42] K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophical Thinking of the Indian Muslims*, *Indo-Asian Culture*, New Delhi, Vol. X, No. 4, April 1962.

[43] Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and Its Development*, Boston, 1957, p. 225, 234.

[44] Radhakrishnan (ed.), *Mahatma Gandhi : 100 Years*, New Delhi, 1968, p. 170.

[45] M. R. Anand, op. cit., p. 154.

[46] M. N. Roy, *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, Calcutta, 1952–5, Preface.

[47] S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, 1956, p. 778.

[48] For above, Gilbert Ryle, "Introduction" to A. J. Ayer and others, *The Revolution in Philosophy*, London, 1956, pp. 2 ff., Richard I. Aaron's "Contemporary British Philosophy" in Radhakrishnan and others (eds.), *A. R. Wadia : Essays In Philosophy Presented In His Honour*, Bangalore, 1954.

[49] Edward Shils, "The Culture of the Indian Intellectual" in *The Sewanee Review*, July–September, 1959, pp. 404–5. For similar views, *Intellectual Values in Modern India*, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 15-17.
In a meeting of the Chatra Parishad in Calcutta on September 13, 1969, the Prime Minister of India said : "Our mentality to a great extent even today is one of a nation which is not free".

[50] Shils, op. cit., 417–420.

[51] *The Listener*, September 24, 1964. Mendelssohn is an F. R. S., Reader in Physics, University of Oxford (Clarendon Laboratory).

[52] D. M. Datta, *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1950, pp. 123–4. Datta had chiefly idealism in mind, but this is the case even when Indians think under the influence of existentialism or analysis.

[53] Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *The Continent of Circe*, London, 1966, p. 149.

[54] For this see D. M. Datta, op. cit., on contemporary Indian philosophers; Radhakrishnan & Muirhead (ed.), *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, London, 1952 ; K. Satchidananda Murty (ed.), *Samakalin Bharatiya Darsan*, Faridkot, 1962 ; and C. T. K. Chari, "Philosophy in India" in *Philosophy In The Mid-century*, ed. by R. Klibansky, Firenze, 1959.

[55] Pages 3 to 82 in P. A. Schilpp, *The Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan*, New York, 1952.

[56] op. cit., p. 151.

[57] *The Foundations of New India*, London, 1963, p. 135. Panikkar, however, believed that monasteries like Sringeri and seats of ancient learning like Nawadvip have kept up "a faint light" of philosophical thinking, in contrast to the Indian universities. A competent survey showed this to be incorrect, as the light there too is no brighter. (N. S. Dravid's paper in K. Satchidananda Murty, *Samakalin Bharatiya Darsan* Faridkot, 1962).

THE PHILOSOPHICAL TASK IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD*

V. S. KRISHNA

I AM not sure of general support if I say that contemplation is the highest kind of philosophical activity. Contemplation, some say, is enjoyment of truths already learnt rather than seeking new truths through analysis and demonstration. We have not yet learnt all the inner secrets of nature, and even the few simple truths we have need continuous analysis and proof, if we are to have a firm hold on them. Has not Lessing, the originator of critical movement in German literature, said that it is better to pursue truth than to possess it?

It is, however, wrong to stress the passive nature of contemplation. It is true that no new individual facts are obtained through contemplation, but the difference between it and other kinds of activities of mind, especially discursive thought, is that the former aims at a comprehensive vision. This comprehension is an activity, and it is not purely intellectual, as will is associated with intellect in this activity. It is through such a contemplative activity that ancient sages constructed a world-picture similar to the one now offered by the scientific cosmologists. But, while science has, in the modern times, been continuing this ancient philosophical tradition, modern philosophy has directed its attention to introspection into sensuous or cognitive apparatus of human beings, and into the logical and psychological processes. While modern science has been extending the range of application of the cognitive apparatus, philosophers have been stressing its limitations.

* Welcoming the XXXV Indian Philosophical Congress Session, 1960, to the Andhra University, Dr. Krishna set before the assembled philosophers three urgent tasks: contemplation, the need for evolving a new *weltanschauung*, and the discovery of common cultural presuppositions on which universal peace can be based.

If we survey the development of scientific thought from Copernicus to Einstein we find a gradual approximation to the ancient philosophical tradition.

From a philosophical point of view, what is significant in the efforts of Copernicus and Einstein to construct universal systems without taking the earth as the centre of reference, is not the consequent simplicity in accounting for phenomena, but the realisation that man understands the universe better, if he frees himself from entanglements with his near surroundings, and views everything from a distance. In scientific thought this step was facilitated by the development of modern algebra which, in the words of Prof. Burtt, "succeeded in freeing itself from the shackles of spatiality". Geometry is based on earthly measures and algebra has emancipated man from earth-bound experience.

Another major effort of modern science is to find universal forces and the laws of their working throughout the universe. It is found that these are the same both in the mundane and trans-mundane spheres and that the physical events on earth are largely determined by forces emanating from outside.

All these developments in science demonstrate man's ability to take a cosmic view while remaining on earth, and we no longer need "theology to tell us that man is not, cannot possibly be, of this world even though he spends his time here".

In spite of these radical changes in the scientific point of view old modes of thought still persist. They persist not only among the common people who, quite naturally, do not follow the implications of the substitution of the astro-physical for geo-physical view-point, but also among the scientists at the highest level. For example, 1958 was called by international scientists the 'Geo-Physical Year', though during that period they were concerned more with the celestial than with terrestrial phenomena. This shows that there is need for an organisation to study the wider implications of the modern developments in science.

At the beginning of the modern scientific movement, philosophy, especially the Platonic and Neo-Platonic, played a notable part. Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo drew inspiration from this source, but from the 17th century we find a gradual sepa-

ration of science from philosophy. It is not now possible to go into the detailed reasons for this, but the main cause is to be found in submission of the philosophers to the prevailing fashion of specialisation. Nietzsche had already foreseen this trend for, he said, "The extent and the towering structure of the sciences have increased enormously, and therewith also the probability that the philosopher will go tired even as a learner, or will attach himself somewhere and 'specialise', so that he will no longer attain to his elevation, that is to say, to his superspection, his circumspection and his despection!" We now find in all our universities the faculty of philosophy just a particular discipline, concerning itself with a limited field of mental and moral sciences, and losing its prime importance as a general discipline for all subjects of study.

The philosopher may, however, do well to think of himself in this scaling down of his supreme value. Most of the philosophers of the past possessed expert knowledge in fields other than their own, Plato in geometry, Aristotle in natural sciences, Descartes, Leibnitz and Kant in mathematical and physical sciences. Nowadays one can call himself a philosopher even though he may be quite innocent of any of the dynamic branches of science. Of course it is not possible for him to possess a mastery of details in every branch of knowledge, especially in the fast-developing sciences. What a philosopher can usefully do is to examine the methods and concepts of the three major divisions of science, viz. the physical, the biological and the social, and the place of each in the general scheme of knowledge. Philosophy has always striven for unity, for imparting a comprehensive view of things; and therefore in concentrating on the above tasks it would only be resuming its legitimate duty to repair the rifts in the edifice of our knowledge. Before this century the searchers and seekers of knowledge had that fine advantage of wide background and extended range of interests; and at some level or other they could find that common ground and mutual communication are possible. Moreover, the concepts used and the attitudes adopted in each individual branch of knowledge were all related to the general humanistic interests of the time. That way there was a kind

of equilibrium between the different branches, which has been upset by our sharp specialisation today.

It is here that a case seems to be built up for some kind of a remedial measure to avert the danger that is staring us in the face. A type of a general education at a basic level of university studies is the solution that has found wide favour. We have in Andhra University asked our Honours students to take a compulsory course in the History and Philosophy of Science. Apart from the substantive knowledge of their own particular studies, this course along with a course in literature including classics in the humanistic disciplines, should take the young minds over a wide range, that of physical and biological sciences and philosophy and social sciences. It should enable the students to gain a historical perspective of the growth of knowledge and also train their judgement in the elucidation of truth.

Being at this advantageous end of a long period of human achievement, we can see more of the world and understand more of knowledge than many before us. Political and economic opportunities have also opened the closed doors of the castles of wisdom to many who were denied before; we have increased the number of students in our colleges manyfold during the last ten or fifteen years. But at the same time we find that the proportion of those who can communicate with each other at a high level of thought and discourse is steadily falling. Perhaps scientific inventions and pressure of modern life have something to account for here. But philosophers must think out how the aristocracy of culture could be restored to the position of trust and how the ascendancy of knowledge and good taste could be established in the climate of democracy. Depreciation of cultural and intellectual values in a country leads to a decline of faith in its destiny and to a loss of self-respect in the people, which really affect the source of a nation's strength.

There is also an international level on which a philosopher has a part to play. The policy of peaceful co-existence has been more or less universally accepted. But an acceptance of mere togetherness or co-existence cannot form a basis for peace in a world of shortening distances and of uneven distribution of raw mate-

rials. Nor is it sufficient to collect more and more data relating to the several systems of culture, as some social scientists are doing. As in the different scientific disciplines in universities, here too the philosophers should try to discover the major presuppositions of these cultural systems and to analyse the assumptions of our ideals of peace, and to devise international institutions, which, in the light of these studies, will bring about a co-ordination of the various systems, establishing the principles of harmony amongst them. They have to face their old task of finding unity in diversity in this vast welter of different entities and systems of the world. It is ultimately through their instrument of reason that the false can be separated from the true and through their concept of conscience that right and wrong may be properly identified. Philosophy was ever man's guide for finding the truths of physics and metaphysics; it should now help him in the equally valuable sphere of international understanding.

THE DESIRED AND THE GOOD

A. S. AYYUB

Different is the good, and different indeed is the desired. These two, with different purposes, bind a man—KATHA UPANISHAD

I

AS THIS essay is an enquiry into the notion of value and of the good (I shall use the words interchangeably) it would be best to begin with notions that are least high-sounding and closest to common sense. But as in epistemology so in the theory of value, when philosophers make a deliberate effort to move closer to common sense, they only succeed in moving further away from it. The gap, however, is easily closed—not by retracing the philosophical steps but by towing common sense round to wherever the philosopher has chosen to take his stand. Such a philosophically commonsensical position was taken by R.W. Perry when, in protest alike against the 'high-falutin' theories of the Austrian value-philosophers and the too down-to-earth English common sense of Moore, he defined value as "any object of any interest"—'interest' being preferred to 'desire' on account of its blanket coverage of desiring, striving, liking, enjoying, etc. Philosophically more popular and of more ancient lineage is another variant of a professedly commonsensical theory, viz. the conception of value as inherent not in the object but in the satisfaction of desire (the moderns prefer 'satisfaction' to 'pleasure,' again because of its wider coverage pleasure being regared as one of the constituents of statisfaction). Dewitt H. Parker, for instance, says: "To speak of things as having value is only a *façon de parler*; things do not really have value, they only borrow value from the satisfactions corresponding. Hence we could not define value 'as any object of any interest' as has been proposed, but rather as the satisfaction of

any interest in any object."[1] Bertrand Russell seems not to have been able to make up his mind as to which variant to choose for himself, so we find him propounding that "an occurrence is good when it satisfies desire, or, more precisely, that we define 'good' as satisfaction or desire".[2]

This, however, is a family quarrel within the subjectivist fold. My concern here is to point out that there is nothing wrong with such subjectivistic or naturalistic definitions of value provided we are not thinking of extending them to values of the highest kind. Applied to such specimens of good things as a bar of milk-chocolate or a game of pushpins, they are far more satisfactory then either Brentano's or Moore's definition. It is equally absurd to think of these things either as objects of right love or as possessing an indefinable non-natural objective quality. After we have described their natural properties, there is only the relational fact to add that I, or a certain number of people, happen to desire and enjoy them. Perry has criticised Brentano by saying that the sort of objects to which Brentano's theory appears to fit "may be valuable in a superlative sense, but not in that generic sense of which we are here in search".[3] My point against Perry is that like many other naturalistic value-philosophers of today, he was so preoccupied with objects valuable only in a trivial sense that he never quite succeeded in reaching beyond them to the superlative values, and therefore failed to find that generic sense of which he was in quest. I shall try to show that no monistic theory of value can do justice to values at the lowest as well as at the highest ends of the axiological scale; the facts of the value-situation demand a dualistic theory.

If the good (the intrinsic good, that is to say) is equated with satisfaction, the highest good on the personal plane will be the maximum amount of satisfaction that an individual can obtain

[1] Parker, Dewitt H., *Human Values*, George Wahr, Michigan, 1944, p. 21.

[2] Russell, Bertrand, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1954, p. 55.

[3] Perry, R.W., *General Theory of Value*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, p. 81.

in the entire course of his life. It is obvious that this optimum cannot be reached by the simple addition of all his separate satisfactions. For that it would be necessary to remove conflict among desires, to cultivate and promote fecund, tolerant and mutually co-operative desires and to harmonise and organise them into one or more hierarchical patterns by suppressing or diminishing the force of discordant impulses and desires. "The greatest good will be the object of an all-inclusive and harmonious system of interests,"[4] writes Perry. But a harmonious system of interests is not itself an interest. Perry realises that this is something to be achieved rather than a normally existing psychological fact. It is to be achieved because a harmonious personality is evidently better than a conflicting personality, and this, according to Perry, is "true as judged by the standard of inclusiveness". Now the standard of inclusiveness is quite peculiar and altogether different from the other two standards of comparative value mentioned by him: intensity and preference. Of this Perry does not seem to be aware. The intensive or the preferred interest is a psychological fact which by ousting the less intense or the less preferred interest establishes within the framework of a subjectivistic value theory that the object of the latter is a lesser good than the object of the former. In contrast, the inclusive interest, in the sense we are concerned here, i.e. in the sense of a harmonious system of interests, is not a fact at all; it is only a desideratum. Therefore, its goal, the harmoniously happy life, is not definable in naturalistic terms. It can only be referred to as what ought to be desired, or as the object of an interest which ought to be cultivated. Kant was wrong in thinking that this state of overall happiness, which he called the prudential end, was the natural object of every one's desire. On the other hand, C.I. Lewis seems right in maintaining that "it is the universal rational end, the end we aim at so far as we approve of our aims and ourselves in aiming".[5]

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 659.

[5] Lewis, C.I., *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, Open Court, Illinois, 1950, p. 483.

Subjectivist theories of value fail even more egregiously when we come to consider the value for me of other people's happiness. There is no sense in which this can be regarded as a function of my desire, and yet if I do not regard that as good or value for me, there cannot be any such thing as morality. Of course some semblance of moral action may still be performed by the dictates of prudence, but so long as I treat other people's happiness as only a means to my own happiness, my action is not truly moral. Morality is essentially based on the maxim that I must treat everyone as an end and not merely as a means. I take it that this point has been fully established by Kant. And we all know of the fallacy which Mill committed when he argued from the premise that everyone desires his own happiness to the conclusion that everyone desires the happiness of all. It has been maintained by some that man as a social being is endowed with love for his kind, and therefore he naturally finds happiness in the happiness of his fellowmen.[6] I doubt if there is sufficient empirical basis for this wishful generalisation. Community love is not a fact, it is only a desideratum; and sociality is a fact only in the sense that everyone needs and desires the company of a few others of his kind. The rest of mankind, outside a very small group of their friends and relations, mean little to most men. Some of course are tribal-minded or nationalist in their genuine emotional make-up, but far more are not, at least in peace time. And lovers of all men can be counted on one's fingers.

The value of other people's satisfaction, and even of my own total system of integrated satisfactions (or harmonious happiness) is, I conclude, not a function of my desire or interest. None the less, they are goals which I cannot set aside. The fact is not that I naturally desire them; the fact is that I feel an obligation to desire them in preference to the things which I do happen to desire. There is a compulsiveness here which though different from the compulsiveness of sense, cannot be dismissed theoretically or practically.

C.L. Stevenson had pointed out in his *Ethics and Language*

[6] Parker, Dewitt H., *op. cit.*, Ch. X.

that interest theories, though not false, give but a part of the meaning of 'X is good'. To take it to mean only 'X is liked or approved by me' leaves no room for disputation, yet moral (and aesthetic) disputes do occur and are often not reducible to differences about the facts of the case. A directive to the hearer is also contained in the meaning of ethical sentences in addition to the expression of a psychological state of the speaker. The full meaning of 'X is good' therefore is 'I like or approve of X; do so likewise'. If, however, the hearer were stubbornly to question, "Why on earth must *I* like what *you* like"? the most natural answer—"Because I want you to" proves by its total irrelevance to moral and aesthetic contexts how flimsy the command theories are. For that is quite an adequate answer when I am actually issuing a command proper like "leave the room". According to C.L. Stevenson, although I cannot simply answer "because I wish you to", what I actually do is to use all sorts of persuasive devices which language allows to make you like what I like. He sees in the meaning of 'good' nothing beyond "the power to influence, which I find the only intelligible part. The rest is confusion". It should be noted that we do not normally bother to influence other people's simple likes and dislikes. The question why we are eager to influence and be influenced in ethical and aesthetic matters (for we not only declare 'X is good', we also ask, 'is X good?') is left unanswered by Stevenson.

J.N. Findlay in his recent work *Values and Intentions* takes up this question, and finds the answer in 'the propensity to impersonality' which, according to him, is a natural and deep rooted propensity of the human mind. "Wanting X, we cannot but want others to want it also, we cannot but feel it natural that they should want it also, and we cannot but feel confirmed and strengthened in our wants by the fact that others apparently share them."[7] Expressed sweepingly so as to cover all and sundry desires for chewing gums as well as for the Kingdom of God it involves an obvious psychological error, and this error vitiates

[7] Findlay, J.N., *Values and Intentions*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1961, p. 210.

an otherwise fine work. It is to the credit of Findlay that he does not overlook the error; and one is therefore surprised to see him dismiss it as only an exception to his general rule. After admitting that "the wish to set a standard to others in the realms of values often founders on other people's simple refusal to see things in the light we do: the whole field of personal taste, e.g., in food, drink, objects of sexual interest, etc., bears witness to this discrepancy",[8] how can he insist none the less that we all wish to universalise *all* our wishes? It is only little children who take it for granted that their likes and dislikes are, or will be, shared by everybody. But they soon come to notice that disagreements are sharp and sometimes aggressive. In the process of growing up they learn to accept these disagreements and cease to bother about them.

Moreover, even if this dubious psychological generalisation were not false, it would not be of much help. For if pushing our valuations out into this social space were "the characteristic of our most commonplace valuations", a significant point of distinction between the values which are relative to our trivial desires and those involved in the serious and considered judgements of our moral and aesthetic experiences would be lost sight of. Again it goes to the credit of Findlay that he is fully aware of this distinction as well as of the fact that his theory is in difficulties about it—difficulties which would never have arisen if he had not mistakenly insisted that all our valuations, trivial as well as profound, are measure-setting and magisterial. Only our profound value-experiences tend to be so, and that is because they are in some sense felt as 'right' or 'fitting'. Brentano defined the good as the object of 'right love', and this 'right' for him had a semantic reference. Love in this context is not a purely emotive experience but has embedded in it a cognitive element which can be characterised as 'insight'. The desire to share our value-experience is basically of the same genre as the desire to share our cognitive experience. Both spring from the conviction that we are right and from a sort of felt obligation to help others out of their error. In both cases forcing our opinion on others

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

would be morally wrong—except in totalitarian ethics.

C.A. Campbell, on the other hand, maintains that there is an absolutely vital distinction between our value-reaction to the value of moral virtue and our value-reaction to any other value whatsoever. For him while other values are subjective, that is, definable in terms of our desires and emotions, moral value alone is not so. The argument for the objectivity of the value of moral virtue is very simple. It is simply the absurdity of regarding this particular value as subjective, the repugnance that we all feel in identifying it with any relation to subjective interests. "When a man in defiance of strong temptations rises to what he recognises to be his duty, it seems merely inept to suggest that his dutiful act derives the value which we all regard it as possessing from any subjective feelings that are entertained towards it by any one. We seem to see quite clearly that we need pay no attention to the presence or absence of any subjective feelings whatsoever in order to know that the act has value".[9] I may add that it is always permissible to doubt with regard to any particular act however honestly performed whether it was in point of fact an act of duty or not; it is also open to question whether even if that act came under the category of duty according to accepted norms (e.g. in so far as it was an act of keeping a solemnly made promise), whether the consequences on the whole involved more harm than good to the persons affected by the act. Questioning these, we may condemn the act from certain points of view and deny its value. But in so far as it was an act done in the face of risk and hardship under the honest belief that it was an act of duty, it possesses a high value which does not depend upon our attitudes and emotions towards it. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which I may even come to hate the act (e.g. if as a result of it my rival in love finds favour in the eyes of the beloved). But when I soberly re-examine the whole situation, I will not be led to deny value to the act because of my revulsion towards it; on the contrary, the value of my own personality will fall in my critical judgment.

I therefore fully endorse the conclusion reached by Campbell

[9] Campbell, C.I., 'Moral and Non-moral Values', *Mind*, 1935, 44.

that *at least* the value of moral virtue (and moral personality) is objective. But why at least? Does not the type of argument which he uses apply to some other values besides virtuous deeds? Campbell is quite aware that there are other values whose claim to objectivity gains support from the same considerations which he has brought to bear on moral virtue. Amongst these claims the strongest are, according to Campbell as well as according to most objectivists, those of knowledge and aesthetic experience. His arguments to prove the subjectivity of these traditionally regarded absolute values follow more or less the same lines as those of Findlay. The significant difference is that whereas Findlay explains the 'apparent' objectivity of such values as knowledge and art by our propensity to universalise our preferences, Campbell finds the explanation in the fact that those are objects of liking not by me alone but by all mankind. But is that a fact? Do all men, or even the majority of men, actually value such things? Campbell gets away from this awkward question by positing 'liking by human nature as such' in place of 'liking by all men'. And we soon find him talking of the most developed or ideal human nature. But who are the most developed, the best men? If we are not to get ourselves into a circle by replying that 'the best men are those who like the best things', we must answer that the judgment about the 'best man' or the 'good man' is an independent judgment and refers to an objective fact. Although Campbell has not expressed himself thus, this might well be his position, for he has already admitted the objectivity of moral goodness. Thus the goodness of art and knowledge would obtain an indirect objectivity as objects of preference by 'good' men—this last 'good' having an objective sense. There is something to be said for this line of argument, but not much. For our moral heroes, however venerable in their own sphere, have not been known to possess any unusually keen appreciation of art or devotion to knowledge. There is some connection between moral, aesthetic and poetic values, but not that of the dependence of the last two on the first. I conclude by saying that Campbell has made no case for excluding knowledge and aesthetic experience from the purview of arguments which following Ross, he has so forcefully

brought against the subjectivity of the value inherent in moral virtue.

As for myself, I find in my own value-experience all the justification I need for the conviction that the value inherent in all these three so-called 'eternal verities' has a compulsive character about it which is totally at variance with its interpretations in terms of desire or interest. When I contemplate the Real through art or science, I have an experience of value which I can only describe as objective. By objective I mean that the value is felt to be out there, standing over against me as a feature of the Real, which I may miss sometimes, but which I can never dismiss as a figment of my imagination or as a projection of my desire or emotion. The thought that I confer value on what is revealed by greatest art or deepest philosophy and science or in the presence of majestic vistas of nature through my paltry approval or enjoyment, strikes me not only as emotionally repugnant but as epistemologically false, for it is a total, and totally unjustified, repudiation of my most immediate and unshakable experience. In fact, that experience is witness to something quite the opposite, viz. the fact that I confer value upon myself by developing the capacity to understand and appreciate the values revealed in these spiritual experiences.

II

Any claim for the objectivity of values (though we are restricting this claim to the sphere of the higher values) must face two kinds of objections. The more common and commonsensical objection is: if valuation is a matter of insight, why is there so much difference of opinion in our moral and aesthetic judgments? The more philosophical objection is: if we regard value objectively, we cannot give any account of the conception of obligatoriness that is necessarily involved in the conception of value. Both objections have weight and cannot be treated lightly.

The philosophical point can be dealt with more briefly. Frankena and Ayer, and very recently Findlay, have all objected to Moore's characterisation of value as a property of things and situations on the ground that if value is an objective property of something, whether the property be natural or non-natural, it is

just a statement about that thing, and as such it involves on the part of anybody who apprehends it no obligation to appreciate it wish for it or strive for its realisation if it does not already exist. And yet when we say that something is good or have value, we undoubtedly intend to convey that it imposes some sort of obligation on us. I may parenthetically remark, or rather remind the reader, that the question of obligation arises only in the case of the higher values; no such obligation is felt in regard to a coveted neck-tie or a cherished vintage.

Moore had made the mistake of arbitrarily restricting the word 'good' to mean only a unique objective feature of the situation, a mistake which he corrected in his later theory.[10] His critics are making a similar mistake when they restrict it to mean only the subjective feature of obligation. The point is simply this: (1) Does the experience of value clearly indicate that its character is receptive and compulsive? (2) Does the experience of apprehending a value carry some sort of obligation with it? I do not see how we can avoid giving an affirmative answer to both questions. If so, we must recognise that 'value' or 'good' is a Janus word having a double significance – objective as well as subjective (subjective in the sense of implying an 'ought'). We must not repeat Ayer's and Findlay's mistake[11] in insisting that because 'good' carries an obligatory sense, it cannot mean anything objective. There is no incompatibility between the two meanings, so we cannot make that a ground for saying that 'good' must mean either the one or the other, but not both.

Perhaps the confusion has its roots not in incompatibility but in too much compatibility. The conjunctive relation between the normative and predicative meanings of 'good' is not empirical. The fact is that we cannot even think of the objective goodness of anything without also thinking of some sort of obligation that it imposes. And we, at least I (I am contrasting

[10] See Moore's reply in the *Philosophy of G.E. Moore*, Library of Living Philosophers.

[11] Ayer, A.J., *Philosophical Essays*, Macmillan and Co., London, 1954, p 241. Findlay, J.N., *ibid.*, p. 213.

my position with Ewing's[12]) cannot think of an obligation to have a ‚pro-attitude' toward that thing unless I also think of some unique feature over and above its natural properties (though not independent of them) which is expressed by saying that the object is worthy of our pro-attitude. It seems obvious to me that 'ought' is a more complex concept than 'good'. The latter I simply cognise, but in the former I 'engage' myself (in the existentialist sense) as an active agent. And why should I commit myself to do something unless I cognise either the action itself or its consequences as on the whole good? Since the connection between the normative and predicative senses of 'good' is neither analytic nor empirical, we are obliged to conclude that it is synthetic a priori. The refusal to recognise 'good' as an objective character appears to stem, at least in part, from the distaste for the notion of synthetic a priori. Kant's favourite phrase is very outmoded today in the English-speaking countries — despite Moore.

I come now to the objection that a very much greater degree of difference of opinion prevails in the sphere of value-judgments than in the judgments of science or of perception. This is supposed to provide strong, if not conclusive, evidence of the fact that statements about value are subjective, or, as Nowell-Smith puts it, are not judgments at all and are not therefore characterisable as either true or false. It will be convenient at this stage to recall a distinction that had been drawn by Nicolai Hartmann in his *Ethics* between the values of achievement and the values of appreciation. The answer to the objection just raised has two aspects: one applicable to both types of values (briefly dealt with in the following paragraph), the other (which I call the primary aspect) requiring a separate discussion for each type.

When we judge a particular action to be right or wrong or a particular work of art to be good or bad, we implicitly or explicitly refer to certain rules or standards. Of course these rules differ from one social order or cultural group to another. Within

[12] Ewing, A. C., *The Definition of Good*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1947, p. 174.

each society or group, however, they constitute a measuring set in accordance with which judgments are made and disputes about them settled, or at least attempted to be settled. In this regard there is little essential difference in the objectivity-claim of a judgment like 'this is a good bicycle' or 'that is a fine horse' on the one hand, and 'this is a good picture' or 'that is a fine thing to do', on the other. None the less, much greater consensus of opinion is reached in the former type of judgment than in the latter. This is because the purposes which the former type of rules serve are evident, and therefore rules can be clearly laid down and readily accepted. In the latter type, the purposes are more vague, more elusive, almost mystical, and therefore rules are difficult to formulate and are not infrequently disputed. In fact disputes about the moral worth of so-and-so's generosity to some penniless idler, or the aesthetic value of Picasso's painting of the cubist period, almost inevitably lead to questions like whether private charity is a virtue, what do we mean by a virtuous action, or what constitutes a good painting. We must therefore take up this primary aspect of the question, and we shall deal with it first in the sphere of the values of appreciation.[13]

A work of art is at once an artefact and a symbol. Jacques Maritain refers to this duality as a conflict between art and poetry within each artistic medium: "Whereas art demands to shape an object, poetry demands to be passive, to listen, to descend to the roots of being". Tagore expresses this duality by using two Bengali words (derived from the Sanskrit) for poet – *rupadaksa* and *kavi*. The former literally means 'expert in forms' and the latter, 'seer'. So far as a work of art is regarded as a mere artefact, a skilful organisation of sensuous and imaginative elements, a source of delight for sense and imagination, it is enjoyed as a thing. Sartre thought that even poetry which uses

[13] This aspect of moral values (or values of achievement) is not discussed here partly for lack of space and partly because I have dealt with it elsewhere. See my article 'Varieties of Moral Experience', being the presidential address at the Ethics section of the Indian Philosophical Conference, Cuttack, December, 1959.

words—meaningful sounds whose essential function is to signify something other than themselves—has this artefactual quality of opacity. He insists that the poet considers words as things and not as signs, that in poetry we are on this side of words and not on the other, as in prose. This is tantamount to turning a poem into a fascinating pattern of sound and image with no meaning, no reference to the world beyond. A section of modern poetry is in fact just this, and exults in being nothing more. Critics suffering from a jaded palate and poets under the influence of craft-fetishism have in their attempt to make poetry 'pure', that is, as different from prose as possible, succeeded in making it paltry. This sort of poetry corresponds to purely decorative painting and light music meant only to please the ear. These have essentially the same trivial value as delicacies of the palate. They are among the good things of life, not among its great things. Judgments about them need not claim any universality or objectivity; the value of such art *is* a function of our interest in them. Great art has a different status and function.

Great artists use their technical skill in making an artefact not as decorators but as creators. And what they create is not an enjoyable pattern of sound or colour, but a symbol. A symbol, normally, plays the humble role of a mere pointer; it is meant not to be seen but to be seen through. An artistic symbol, however, is both seen and seen through in the same experience. It draws attention away from everything else and focuses it upon itself by its surface beauty, but does not hold it there. When we see it disinterestedly and one-pointedly as a difficult yet simple unity of many diverse elements, we see, not through it but *in* it, something that is infinitely more than an artefact enjoyable as a thing by itself. Only *he* is a great artist who has a vision to communicate and the technical mastery to embody that vision in a concrete symbol.

What is the nature of that vision? One can only hint at it in the vaguest possible terms, for the proper and full answer is the work of art itself. "This unique expression, which cannot be replaced by any other, still seems to express something beyond itself. ... About the best poetry, and not only the best, there floats

an infinite suggestion. The poet speaks to us of one thing, but in this one thing lurks the secret of all" – writes the literary critic A.C. Bradley. And the art critic Roger Fry says more poignantly, but also more guardedly: "I think an artist might if he chooses take a mystical attitude, and declare that the fulness and completeness of the imaginative life he leads may correspond to an existence more real than any that we know in this mortal life"; and further: "Feelings to which the name cosmic emotion has been somewhat unhappily given find almost no place in life, but, since they belong to certain very deep springs of our nature, do become of very great importance in the arts".

This cosmic emotion is, in my opinion, no less important in knowledge. For we value a piece of knowledge in proportion to the help it affords us in expanding our mental horizon and bringing within our intellectual grasp all that there is to know. Einstein's tensor equation in which he was able to incorporate almost the entire theory of gravitation and electro-magnetism is beyond question of far greater value than, say, Boyle's law. Why, if not because of its greater cosmic significance? The value of every serious work of art and every significant piece of knowledge reflects the value of all reality. This is the value that we are thinking of when we regard them as intrinsically and not merely instrumentally valuable. Some have suggested that apart from utility we value knowledge principally as a healthy exercise of our mental powers – thus bringing Einstein's Theory of Relativity on a par with a game of chess played against an expert opponent.

The work of art is often regarded not as a symbol of the Real but as an expression of the artist's mind and personality. But the artist's mind, although a world by itself, is not a world in its own right. It is ever receptive of and responsive to the great world outside. It remains empty to itself if it does not fill itself with the infinitude of the universe. "What are the contents of our personality", asks Tagore, and answers that they are nothing short of the whole world. "With our love and hatred, pleasure and pain, fear and wonder continually working upon it, this world becomes a part of our personality. We are great or small

according to the magnitude or littleness of this assimilation. If this world were taken away, our personality would lose all its content."

A particular work of art or view of nature might appear to be charged with beauty or sublimity to some; to others it may signify little. That depends upon how we see it at the moment, on the receptiveness of our mood and sensibility. It also depends upon the cultural training and make-up of the observer. Even if it is appreciated by a large number of people, its value is derivative from the value of what it symbolises. Not everyone, however, can read a sign. The fault may lie in the reader, or in the technique of signification used by the artist. But the value of what is signified, which is nothing short of the universe in one or other of its infinite aspects, is universal. You may, if you like, say that it is potentially universal, for our capacity to appreciate it depends upon our growth towards the ideal self we are striving after. Can scientific judgments claim any other kind of universality? They are not in fact accepted by, or even intelligible to, the great majority of men.

Besides the two end-values discussed earlier – happiness and moral perfection – we have thus arrived at another whose universality (in some qualified sense) and objectivity must be granted, whose subjectivist reduction is, if I may say so, a *reductio ad absurdum*.[14] This is the value of the world in its multifold infinity and, one may add with Spinoza, viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*, that is, as art and philosophy view it when they reach their highest point. The philosopher expresses his vision through a symbol whose constituent elements are organised logically; the artist through a symbol whose pattern is aesthetic and elements sensuous. The vision of the philosopher and scientist is austere; that of the artist is charged with emotion. None the less, it is a vision, not a mere visceral disturbance. To suggest to any one who has caught a glimpse even for a moment of this vision of

[14] As an instance of this *reductio ad absurdum* I should like to cite the following: "So far as the quality of experience goes, there is no notable distinction between the appetitive value of a beef-steak and the spiritual value of a Gothic facade or symphony." C.I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, p. 448.

Natura Naturans, of *isavasyam idam sarvam jagatyam jagat* (all that is and moves in this world enveloped by divinity), that this has value only as a target for his desires – when it is only by learning to rise above the plane of one's desire that one can at all reach this vision (*tena tyaktena bhunjitha*)–is to suggest something that has no foundation either in logic or in life. If all this is an illusion, then its correction would be a disaster for our life as a whole. It would mean not only the end of religion in the deepest sense, but also the end of all art and philosophy, at any rate their degradation to mere trivialities. Art will sink to decorative patterns, and philosophy turn itself to a skilled game of words or to a handmaid of science, which unfortunately does not want a handmaid. With such abasement of art and knowledge there will be nothing left to give worth and dignity to our lives.

That the world is charged with value for the aesthetic and, more broadly, for the contemplative vision does not, however, imply that it is morally perfect too. I mention this point because the view that I am presenting might strike some as essentially religious and therefore as baulked by the problem of evil from the outset. I do not see any meaning in calling the universe to the bar of moral judgment. Moral categories apply only to persons, and the universe is not a person, whether even a personal God conceived as omnipotent and omniscient, having nothing to achieve through effort and strife, could be praised as good or condemned as bad in the moral sense may be questioned. But the question does not arise here, for I am holding no brief for such a God. That pain and sorrow are inescapable, that individual life must end before any individual can reach his fulfilment, that there is before us the scientific conjecture (I do not call it prediction, for it has been questioned by such eminent scientists as Weizsaecker) about the ultimate dissolution of all life, are undeniable facts about the world. But this does not destroy its aesthetic worth; it only indicates that we are the spectators of tragic beauty, that the spectacle is sublime rather than beautiful. Even Bertrand Russell had this to say, and said it in his youth when he was preaching against God and religion with religious zeal: "In the spectacle of death, in the endurence of pain, and

in the irrevocableness of a vanished past, there is a sacredness, an over-powering awe, a feeling of the vastness, the depth, the inexhaustible mystery of existence ... a strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abyss of space, has brought at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother.'' I do not know why Russell did not speak in this context of the awe-inspiring beauty of the spectacle of Nature and Life which modern physics and biology are unfolding before our eyes from year to year. But my real point is that this 'sacredness', this 'inexhaustible mystery of existence', is not a mere construction of imagination or projection of emotion. The feeling of awe and wonder and mystery which the spectacle inspires are no doubt subjective, but they are *appropriate* to the real character of the world, and 'appropriate' here cannot be understood without a semantic reference.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

N. V. BANERJEE

I

It would perhaps be a presumption to suggest, but it seems true, that philosophy as such, especially in the West, is in a general way approaching a state of liquidation, among other things, through its gradual and progressive subservience to the cause of science together with its applications. This speaks of the ascendency of man's natural interest in the outer world over his spiritual concern with himself or his inner being. In a more concrete way this is an indication of the failure on the part of the strict Graeco-Roman attitude permeating the Western mind to assimilate, and to be animated by, the truly human outlook on life such as is revealed in the teachings of the Buddha or the way of life of Jesus.

As for the East in general and India in particular, philosophy, an erstwhile living force, but weighted with indifferentism in worldly matters, has by the course of events been unavoidably driven into somnolence. This has resulted in the suppression of the traditional spiritual dynamism alongside of the persistent dearth of what is nowadays known as scientific spirit. Between this philosophical situation and the one that is making headway in the West we really have no choice to make, notwithstanding the fact that the latter obviously has outstanding material advantages over the former. The fact, however, seems to be that the two together constitute the ultimate source of the crisis of civilization which perhaps has reached its climax in our day, threatening the human race with extinction.

However well-intentioned it may be, the modern idea that social, political and economic plannings and re-adjustments alongside of the progress of science are remedies for the crisis in question – an idea which is today being more or less univers-

ally accepted with approval and zeal – is involved in a fallacy popularly describable as putting the cart before the horse. This fallacy, it would be worth-while to bear in mind, has repeatedly been committed, and still continues to be committed, in the world of human affairs. It seems, therefore, that in the interest of the present as well as the future of mankind nothing should be more important as a first step than to realise the nature and aim of that activity of the human spirit, which constitutes the essence of, and lends meaning to, human existence. And in the view of Advaita Vedānta and other major schools of Indian thought, this activity is of fundamental importance in the enquiry known as philosophy. The subject thus presented is obviously such that it would be worth-while to dwell upon it at some length.

II

Since a disembodied spirit, as should be admitted on all hands, is a fiction rather than a fact, spiritual activity as such cannot be unconcerned with body or even the external world – with the not-self in general. As a matter of fact, the stimulus to spiritual activity is provided by certain conditions, due, at least partly, if not wholly, to the not-self including the body in particular. But then, the homogeneity of spiritual activity with mundane activity, which is thus a plain fact, is only superficial; and below the surface there lurks a fundamental difference between them. This difference needs to be brought to light and taken into serious consideration lest the real cause of philosophy should be lost and the true significance of human existence should remain hidden in nescience.

In its strict sense, mundane activity is that kind of activity which springs from the identification of the self with the not-self – with the body in particular and even with some physical thing or other, through the intermediary of the body. This process is obviously *natural* and *universal* among mankind, owing to the fact that the self has a biological organism as its necessary adjunct (*upadhi*). However that may be, its inevitable consequence, as one may have the wisdom to see, is that human individuals are left oblivious of their intrinsic dimensions so as

to be rendered unable to behave except as insular units. And at the same time, as a compensation for this loss, as it were, they are informed with the will to live and seized with craving (*trshna*) knowing no satisfaction. Thus that which is humane in man is delusively limited to life in its biological sense with its attendant struggle for survival. This brings in its train fear, jealousy, envy, hate – indeed, the entire gamut of inhuman passions that have hardly anything to their credit except the power to bring about the suffering of man. Hence is revealed the secret of man's ordinary life, which, in spite of all that has happened to the contrary, has remained in force and persisted in exercising its misleading influence upon the march of civilisation, laying mankind exposed to predicaments through the ages. The fact of the matter, then, is that human bondage or, in other words, dehumanisation of man is set as a dead weight upon the history of the human race. This is indeed a sad commentary on historicism, the outlook that seems to ignore the truth that man, in a sense, has no history, that he either *is* or *is not* what he need be, and that there arises no question of his *becoming* what he is not.

III

That man naturally is not what he need be, and is thus alienated from his self or in other words, is in bondage would, however, have for ever remained unknown to him but for the fact that he *suffers* at least occasionally and his suffering is *felt* by himself. But, then, all his sufferings cannot be attributed to his responsibility. For man may suffer owing to circumstances over which neither he nor his fellow-men can have any control. And it seems that suffering of this kind would be amply compensated for if it were, as it certainly can be, a tie to bind the sufferers in a direct and immediate, or, let us rather say, strict human relation. Herein is involved an idea, the importance of which has been recognised from time to time. But what is generally not realised is that the fulfilment of this idea necessarily presupposes the removal of the veil of insularity which conceals what is strictly human in man. And this is a pointer to the truth that, with the removal of the cause of man's spiritual sufferings,

that is, sufferings causally connected with the inhuman passions, the *effect* of all other sufferings is undone as a matter of course.

But why, it may be pertinent to ask, should the question of the removal of the cause or the effect of suffering or of suffering itself arise at all? May it not be that the fact that man suffers and that his suffering is felt by himself is the end of the matter? The importance of this question can hardly be exaggerated in view of the fact that on the answer to it would depend the possibility of spiritual activity and, consequently, the future of philosophy. Now the feeling of suffering, it may at once be pointed out, is strangely anomalous as all facts vitally related to the deeper problems of human life are bound to be. The anomaly consists in this, that suffering felt is *eo ipso* suffering tending towards its self-annihilation – which means that the feeling of suffering is inseparable from the wish to get rid of suffering. This is perhaps due to the fact that suffering, as the Upanishads teach, cannot belong to the essence of the self, that the self as such does not and also cannot suffer. In any case, to hold that the feeling of suffering can rest content with itself is to resort to a subterfuge and to refuse to explore the secret of that feeling.

The wish to get rid of suffering, though it should on no account be regarded as purely mundane, is also not strictly spiritual any more than the feeling of suffering with which it is inseparably bound up. For, not to speak of the actual attainment of freedom from suffering, even the idea that such freedom is attainable is not necessarily warranted by the wish to get rid of suffering. Nevertheless, this wish, being of the nature of a struggle with suffering, is expected to stimulate spiritual activity. But to this end it is, from the nature of the case, in need of the help of an intermediary. And the intermediary in question should be something which, if available at all, is, for obvious reasons, to be found within the domain of human bondage and yet should have a sense of freedom from suffering. This something, though it thus appears to be curious, is, however actually available; and it is none other than human happiness. Indeed, while the wish to get rid of suffering is but struggle

with suffering, happiness is conquest over, and, in a sense, freedom from, suffering. One should not, however, fail to realise the true significance of this essential aspect of happiness lest one should be infected with the mistaken enthusiasm of the hedonists who identify happiness with the supreme good or the final achievement of spiritual activity.

The fact is that the freedom as represented by happiness is not *absolute*, but *relative* inasmuch as happiness is freedom from suffering, but not from the *potentiality* of suffering. So the position of happiness is inherently precarious. Happiness as such is in ceaseless danger of being lost to suffering. And this points to the *metaphysical paradox* of hedonism which is generally left out of account. Besides, the feeling of happiness, like the feeling of suffering, is naturally incapable of resting content with itself. But while the discontent of the latter finds expression in the wish to get rid of suffering, the discontent of the former is a call for the continuation and even increase of the desire for happiness. And, consequently, it is a means of the indefinite prolongation and intensification of the danger of the invasion of happiness by suffering. This obviously means that happiness is the freedom of the bondman, and not of the free man. Herein lies a truth with which we have been familiarised by Schopenhauer. But, then, Schopenhauer was ultimately prevented by his Western outlook from seeing the whole truth, which -- apparently paradoxical, but really of vital importance to human welfare -- relates to the integration of the feeling of happiness and the feeling of suffering.

With its predominantly objectivist attitude, the Western mind is prone to neglect the fact that the feeling of suffering is not complete in itself, but finds its completion in the wish to get rid of suffering which it invariably bears. In consequence, there has prevailed in the West the rather superficial view that the feeling of happiness and the feeling of suffering are, in the final analysis, *disjunctively* related so as to preclude the possibility of their integration into a whole. This view, it would be worthwhile to notice, lies at the root of the two extremes between which the Western outlook seems to be divided: one, dominant

and of wide extent, is imbued with that unthinking optimism which insists on the all importance of happiness – of course, with hardly any consideration of freedom from the potentiality of suffering; the other, rather rare and restricted in scope, consists in the uncompromising pessimism as represented by Schopenhauer which exorcises happiness by treating it as at best a veil of the concealment of suffering. Both, the extremes as is obvious, meet at a common point which consists in the neglect of the possibility of freedom from the potentiality of suffering, i.e. freedom of the free man or rather complete human freedom as distinguished from freedom illusorily restricted to a specific field or fields of human concern, whether political, economic or otherwise.

Now complete human freedom is obviously not of the nature of *fact* in the sense in which happiness and suffering are. Positively speaking, it is an activity of a synthetic character, in virtue of which the mere wish to get rid of suffering may find its appropriate positive content in happiness, and happiness, in its turn, may by that very wish be so transmuted as to rise above the reach of suffering. From its very nature this activity is a liberating process conceived of as *mukti* in Indian philosophy. It seeks to liberate the human in man from its false identification with the not-self including the body, from its natural limitation to life in its predominantly biological sense with its attendant struggle for survival and the inhuman effects consequent thereupon. Thus it is diametrically opposed to mundane activity; and it may appropriately be called spiritual – spiritual in no recondite sense, but in the easily intelligible sense as the remedy for the dehumanisation of man into the non-human ego *(jiva)* and the way of his rehumanisation, of his restoration to the human self that he is, as it were, in the manner of his conversion, regeneration or rebirth. *Mukti* as a way of life is, however, hard when it is so seldom found. But it is not a mere fancy or an idle dream. On the contrary, when the dehumanisation of man is an unquestionable *fact* his *mukti* as a way of his rehumanisation is a *necessary* demand and hence, as the major schools of Indian philosophy including Advaita Vedanta believe, must be realisable.

IV

One should not, of course, mind the historical fact that philosophy has been ushered into existence whether in the East or in the West, by man's natural interest in the outer world instead of as a result of his spiritual concern with his inner being. But the dependence of philosophy upon this *occasional cause* of its origin in the manner of its being shaped after the pattern of, or its deriving its substance and sustenance from, mathematics, logic, physics or biology seems a travesty of philosophic thought. The predicament of philosophy is, however, left unaffected even when psychology takes the place of any of these disciplines in the present respect. For psychology, whether old or new, being, in fact, an enquiry only parallel to, and co-ordinate with physics, can at best produce a deceptive show of its concern with the inner being of man. And what redress does contemporary existentialism bring to philosophy when, with its avowed interest in man himself and as a result of its painstaking enquiry into the secret of his being, it finds that secret in Hope or in Fear and Anxiety, obviously failing in either case to look beyond human bondage? But, while existentialism as well as philosophy as based on, or affiliated to, psychology are at least attempts to rescue philosophy from its suicidal absorption into objectivism, philosophy in the name of logical positivism and philosophy of analysis has in our day returned, with the widest scope possible, to its early state of dependence upon the occasional cause of its origin; and it has done so in a new garb, the garb of linguistic formalism, with hardly any content of its own.

In consideration of the persistent predicament of philosophy, and with a view to the rehabilitation of this hapless discipline, it is perhaps imperative to turn to the enquiry outlined above. For want of a better title for it to bear, this enquiry may be called metapsychology. And as the source of belief in the realisability of complete human freedom or *mukti*, it may be regarded – as Advaita Vedanta, in common with the major schools of Indian philosophy, especially Buddhism and Samkhya, regard it – as foundational in a philosophical investigation.

V

As already seen, belief in the realisability of *mukti* constitutes the necessary background of Advaita philosophy. This seems to indicate that this philosophy is, as philosophy strictly speaking should be, primarily, though of course not exclusively, concerned with man and what, in the final analysis, is the problem of his life. Whether and how far this is actually the case is, however, the outstanding question. In dealing with this question as we now propose to do, we have naturally to consider the basic doctrines of Advaita Vedanta inasmuch as they are obviously intended to be elaborations of the postulate relating to the realisability of *mukti*. These doctrines are: (1) the doctrine of Maya conceived of as the cosmic principle of illusion, according to which all manner of individuality, whether in the world of spirit or in the world of Nature, is illusory; (2) the doctrine of Brahman conceived of as the unindividual, undifferentiated and indeterminate Absolute; (3) the doctrine of Isvara or Brahman as viewed in reference to Maya; (4) the doctrine of *mukti* regarded as the identity of the individual self (*jiva*) with Brahman.

A detailed discussion of these doctrines is, however, beyond the scope of the present discourse; and it is also not necessary for our immediate purpose. We have only to take notice of the obvious fact that they are bound up together by a logical necessity, and that, whether taken single or all together, they seem to belie the postulate of which they are intended to be elaborations – the postulate relating to *mukti* or complete human freedom. Indeed, the real achievement of these doctrines is two fold: (1) the arbitrary expansion of I or the subject to the extent of infinity at the cost of the independent reality of man as well as Nature; (2) the affirmation of the perfection (eternity, omniscience, purity and freedom) of the Infinite thus arrived at, that is of Brahman, in the name of the demonstration of the realisability of complete human freedom. But in his identity with Brahman man himself is conspicuous by his negation; and in the *nitya-buddha-suddha-mukta* (eternal, omniscient, pure, free) Brahman man's freedom, nay, his complete perfection are indeed accomplished, but without his being there to realise them. This

obviously points to a way of escape from what Advaita Vedanta, in common with other major schools of Indian philosophy, takes to be the fundamental problem of human life – the problem of complete human freedom.

VI

But, then, in fairness to Advaita Vedanta it is necessary to consider the immediate foundation upon which its basic doctrines rest. In this respect we are really referred to the Advaita view of the status of the individual self which may be stated as follows:

The question of *mukti* can have meaning so as to be of vital concern with a philosophical investigation provided it is a fact – and Advaita Vedanta rightly takes it to be a fact – that man naturally and universally is in a state of bondage. And bondage, according to this system of philosophy, is the individuality or rather insularity of self consisting in the identification of self with the body. Viewed with reference to the Advaita concept of *jiva*, bondage may as well be defined as the limitation of self to life in its strict biological sense. Thus a self in bondage is a self feeling itself *embodied* or rather *complete* in what really its mere adjunct. viz., a biological organism. However that may be, by drawing an initial distinction between human bondage and complete human freedom or *mukti*, Advaita Vedanta only wants to bring to the forefront of philosophic thought the consideration of life as it is *worth* living in distinction from life as it is *ordinarily* lived. And thereby it makes no secret of its view which it shares with other major schools of Indian philosophy, viz., that philosophy is no mere theory, but the welding of theory and practice.

The position stated above is, however, open to a serious difficulty which is as follows. Since man *ex hypothesi* is *naturally* in bondage and not free, it seems that he has no means of knowing that he is so, and that there may be such a thing as his freedom in distinction from his bondage. This difficulty, of course, is not peculiar to Advaita Vedanta, but common to all those schools of Indian philosophy which admit the distinction between bondage and freedom or liberation. But it appears to be greater and more acute in the case of Advaita Vedanta than in the case of other schools; especially Samkhya and Buddhism may easily

entitle themselves to the view that the fact of bondage is only *inferable*, and may actually be inferred from a kind of fact that is empirically verifiable, viz., pain or suffering. Advaita Vedanta is of the view that the fact in question is capable of being apprehended in a direct or non-inferential manner – which seems to be out of the question.

Advaita Vedanta, however, seeks to make out a case for its present thesis with reference to its view that the self in bondage, i.e., the embodied or individual self, is illusory. The argument on which this view is based is as follows. The individual self, after all, is not subject or I (*asmad*). It is really *me* which is object; or rather it is a sort of you (*yusmad*) which is at once both me and I, that is, objective subject and hence false or illusory, being self-contradictory. But even granted that this argument is valid, there is no gainsaying the fact that it conveys an answer to the question how the individual self *is* illusory whereas the question before us is whether this self can be said to be *conscious of* itself as illusory. What is suggested is not, however, that Advaita Vedanta does not deal with the latter question at all, but that it arbitrarily mixes up the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi* in the matter concerned, and thereby finds an answer to the latter question in the answer to the former.

It seems that except on the basis of such a confusion Advaita Vedanta cannot bring itself to hold, as it actually holds, that 'to be conscious of oneself as me is to be conscious of the me as illusory and of the subject or I as the truth'. True, one's consciousness of oneself as me necessarily presupposes the subject or I that is conscious. But this obviously implies that the I is logically *prior to* the 'me', and consequently, that the 'me' cannot be construed as at once both me and I which it must be, in order that it may be held to be illusory. The real fact of the matter is that the distinction that the analysis of an epistemological situation can legitimately lay bare is merely the distinction between subject and object, and that to interpret this distinction as the distinction between the true and the illusory, as Advaita Vedanta does, is, from the strict epistemological point of view, arbitrary and unwarranted. What follows, however, is not that there is

nothing illusory about the self in bondage or the individual self but that that which is illusory about it, however else it may be brought to its notice, cannot be an immediate deliverance of its consciousness of itself.

It is, however, to be borne in mind that, according to Advaita Vedanta, the individuality of the individual self does not consist in the mere *identity* of self with body, but is essential to the self feeling itself embodied, to the self as objectified in body. The individual self as it is known to itself is then a mere object or purely objective, despite the fact that it is in itself at once both I and me, subject and object. That being so, in so far as Advaita Vedanta holds that the illusoriness of the individual self is an immediate deliverance of this self's consciousness of itself it obviously holds this view on the understanding that illusoriness, at least in this case, consists in objectivity. But the difficulty here seems to be this, that objectivity cannot really be the same thing as illusoriness except in so far as it is at the same time known to be involved in self-contradictoriness, which, in the present context, is obviously out of the question. This difficulty really is one that is insoluble. But Advaita Vedanta finds a way of escape from it by adding arbitrarily a new meaning of illusoriness, viz., objectivity, to the one to which alone it is legitimately entitled, viz., self-contradictoriness.

The real point about the Advaita view of the individual self (*jiva*) as illusory seems, however, to be only a logical corollary of the general assumption that whatever is *object* is illusory, the objectivity as such is illusoriness. And as regards this assumption, it would perhaps not be going far from the truth to say that it stands on no valid ground any more than the Yogacara, the Berkeleyan view of object as *subjective* or Kant's view of it as *appearance* may be said to do. Of course, it may be contended that Advaita Vedanta does not deduce its idea of the illusoriness of the individual self from the assumption in question, but on the contrary, finds in that idea whatever justification the assumption is in need of. Accordingly, it may be held that the individual self is the *original* object that one may know of, and that to be aware of the individual self as illusory is to envisage the *possi-*

bility that objectivity itself is illusory.

Now *possibility*, though it is in itself far removed from *actuality*, may be a fair approximation to the latter provided that it is *legitimate*. But it is this question of legitimacy that brings out the real crux of the situation. To treat the individual self as the prototype of objectivity is to enter headlong into a predicament which, to say the least, is atrociously ego-centric. Besides – and this is the most important point – the individual self is object because it is the product of the identification of the I or subject with the body, and because the body is trans-subjectively and not, like the individual self merely subjectively, objective. And this goes to show at least that the individual self cannot be the prototype of objectivity so that, even granted that this self is illusory, it does not follow that whatever is object is illusory, that objectivity as such is illusoriness. This immediately cuts the ground from under the feet of the Advaita doctrine of Maya conceived of as the cosmic principle of illusion, and indeed, throws into jeopardy all the basic doctrines of Advaita Vedanta inasmuch as they are bound together by a logical necessity.

VII

The real difficulty of Advaita Vedanta is not, however, merely logical, but, as in most cases of philosophy, is primarily due to the misunderstanding of an ultimate fact and other kinds of misunderstanding consequent thereupon. The ultimate fact in question is human bondage. In recognising human bondage as an ultimate datum, Advaita Vedanta, of course, starts at the right point in so far as it thereby realises that philosophy, strictly speaking, is primarily concerned with man and the fundamental problem of his life, instead of being dependent upon the occasional cause of its origin, viz., man's natural interest in the outer world. Further, it goes to the credit of Advaita Vedanta to realize that human bondage is due to something illusory about the individual self that man ordinarily is. And the real importance of this point lies in that, whatever else may be the case with other disciplines, philosophy is such that in its case truth only calls for acceptance and it is falsity or illusoriness that sets

a problem or problems on foot. It is precisely for this reason that human bondage is a philosophical problem of primary importance.

Nevertheless, while it is undeniable that human bondage is a necessary correlate of something illusory about the individual self, to hold, as Advaita Vedanta does, that the individual self itself is illusory is obviously tantamount, on the one hand, to undermining the concept of man, and, on the other, to rendering the fact of human bondage nugatory. In fact, it is in consideration of human bondage that Advaita Vedanta goes to the extent of surrendering human dignity by declaring the individual self to be illusory. But this position is on no account preferable to its opposite which is upheld by Descartes in so far as he, with no consideration of the fact of human bondage, goes to the other extreme in accepting as the fundamental principle of his philosophic thought the thesis that the individual self is a truth – indeed the primary truth.

For Descartes the individual self is an abstraction. It is abstracted from the body and the not-self in general, so that man comes to be conceived as a 'ghost in the machine'. As a result, the world of Nature, of course, remains intact and, consequently, the cause of science is left unaffected; but man is alienated from himself, for without relation to the world of Nature where it is given to him to act, he is really not himself. Advaita Vedanta, however, goes further. In a way it dismisses the world of nature; and, as already indicated, it admits the expansion of the ghost in the machine to the extent of infinity, in the name of reaching absolute Truth (Brahman). In consequence, science is lost to its antithesis nescience, and man with all his problems disappears into a state where he is a stranger to name and form *(nama-rupa)* and indeed is non-human. All this points to the unfulfilled demand of philosophy. The demand is both theoretical and practical. The former relates to the understanding of the nature and status of man and the latter to the discovery of the fundamental principle of conduct – the principle, the observance of which ensures complete human freedom.

As regards this practical demand, it needs to be observed,

however, that, although it seems at first sight to be strictly ethical in character, it really belongs to the essence of religion.[1] But, then, its peculiar religious character is prevented from making its appearance by the might of science on the one hand and the general lack of privacy of the religion of God on the other. And, curiously enough, the same effect follows most irresistibly from Advaita Vedanta's denial of what is human in man and its dismissal of science. But this brings to light an old challenge to which is added a new one by science and technology. And philosophy's future would depend upon its success in meeting both.

[1] Vide my *Concerning Human Understanding*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1958, pp. 297–308.

THE NATURE OF REFLECTION IN METAPHYSICS

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA

I

WHEN WE say we have *reflective* knowledge of an object what we mean is that this object, though already known, has now revealed characters which it had not revealed before, and we are sure at the same time that these characters, though unrevealed till now, had all along been there. The only proof that these characters had been there all along is that I do not feel that my reflection creates these for the first time; and one cannot say that though I have not created these they themselves come to exist for the first time just when I reflect. If the only conceivable change in the world that has taken place is that I have come to reflect and if the emergence of the new characters is not to be connected with it, there remains nothing to account for this emergence. These characters must have been there all along.

Yet it is a fact that they were not revealed till I reflected. And here is the crux. Why is it that these characters, though present, could not be known? One answer, useless though (as will be presently evident), readily suggested, is "Because I did not reflect". But what is this 'I did not reflect' if it is not just another name for the fact that these characters, not known till now, have just come to be known, of course with the *proviso* (1) that as I know these for the first time I know also that they were present all along and (2) that the general context to which they belong – the substance of which they are characters, or a system of other characters with which they are associated, or just their general situation – was already known? "Because I did not reflect" is thus as idle a reply as saying "Because I did not know" to one who asks me, "Why was a thing not revealed to

you?". The problem is serious and it is doubtful if it has ever received the serious consideration it deserves.

To the question "Why were the characters not revealed till I reflected though they were present all along?" there are other answers too, almost equally light-hearted. One might say, "Because I did not pay attention", "Because I had not the requisite training", "Because there was something wrong with me", etc. But these are all *ad hoc* hypotheses, neither clearly conceived nor manipulatable any further. Nobody, for example, knows for certain what attention is, and though psychologists have spoken a lot about it they have never told us how much of attention is needed for certain characters to be detected. We may go on paying attention to a picture in order to detect a certain thing suggested to be in it and yet fail to detect it, and it may well happen – why, nobody knows – that suddenly that suggested content flashes before our eyes. To one, again, who holds that some training is necessary to detect these characters we may point out that this training is precisely the training in *reflection*, which means we have not solved the problem. And no less light-hearted is the off-hand answer that there must have been something wrong with me. For, nobody except an Advaita thinker knows what precisely this subjective defect could be. And when the Advaita thinker has carefully infered *ajnana* with all its paraphernalia he is not particularly concerned with reflective knowledge. His concept of *ajnana* accounts for knowledge in general – to be precise, to explain why we come to know a thing which was not known before. The problem of reflection, we have seen, is more complicated. It is the problem that though the object or the general context to which the characters hitherto unknown but present all along belonged was known these characters themselves have somehow remained unknown till now, though we were sure all along that they had been there. The Advaita thinkers were concerned with knowledge in general, not particularly with reflective knowledge as distinguished from the unreflective.

There is still another reply, equally abortive, which we may dispose of before we proceed further. We may be told that the reason why before reflection certain characters did not reveal

themselves is that a particular attitude to a given situation was absent. We reflect, we may be told, when not being satisfied with a given situation as such we treat it as a problem, looking at it from the viewpoints of different ideas suggested, so that in course of such intellectual manipulation of the given situation it comes to place before us certain characters unsuspected before or, at least, undetected till then; and from this, we may be told, it follows that the only reason why these characters could not be known till then is that we had not treated the given situation as a problem.

This, we admit, is a correct account as far as it goes. Our only complaint is that it has not advanced enough. When, for example, I perceive a table it has certainly been necessary that I have had turned my head toward it and had certain other physiological movements, subtle and gross, and it may be equally true that in the absence of these conditions I could not have perceived it. But would any epistemologist in search of a theory of knowledge look for these conditions? Many, if not all of these movements, are just general conditions for all types of attention, not specially relevant to perception. Just similar, we claim, would be the treatment of a given situation as a problem. The peculiar attitude of treating the given situation as a problem is undoubtedly a necessary condition for *all types* of reflective knowledge, mediate or immediate, not particularly for the type of reflection we are concerned with here, viz., reflective *perception.* It would not, therefore, be wholly correct to say that the reason why I did not perceive certain characters before reflection (the characters which I could only perceive when I reflect) is that I did not treat the given situation as a problem. Something else is necessary to account for this non-perception.

II

If anything, say X, exists and if yet I am not aware of it, this may be due to any one of the following reasons:

1. There is some defect in me the knower;
2. There may be something in the objective situation that stands in the way of my knowledge of X;
3. There is some defect in the very object X.

1. When X that exists is perceivable and yet I do not perceive it, this, as many have claimed, is due either to my not having attended to it or to a lack of training to dig it out, so to say, or plainly due to some defect in my sensibility; and where the object is not perceivable but can be inferred I may yet fail to know it inferentially because I have not correctly employed all that leads to this inference.

2. Sometimes, again, I may not perceive an otherwise perceivable object, because of an intervening distance or because of something that shields it from our view. I may similarly fail to know an object inferentially simply because some external agency has prevented me from inferring it.

3. Often, again, I may fail to perceive an object because it is too subtle for perception, the subtlety in question being due either to its being undistinguishedly fused with other objects, as water mixed with milk or, as in the case of atoms, to the simple fact that it is imperceptible. This is exactly what we mean by 'defect in the object itself'.

An important feature of this third type of non-knowledge requires special notice here. It is that this non-knowledge is always *non-perception*, never a failure to infer. There is no case where an object, though existent, can fail of being inferred because it is subtle, or, for that matter, because there is some defect in the object. People have indeed spoken of God as *uninferable*. But, whatever may be the motive behind, *prima facie* the thesis is unintelligible. If we cannot infer an object it goes without saying that we cannot perceive it too, so that as neither perceivable (intuitable) nor inferable it cannot be deemed an existent thing at all. It follows that in every case we fail to know an object because of some defect that resides in the object, the non-knowledge in question is but *non-perception*, 'perception' meaning any kind of direct awareness – sensuous or non-sensuous – another name of which is *intuition*.

Now, therefore, if in the case of a puzzling picture I fail to discover a bird-form which, we are told, stands half drawn there (being drawn as a gap in the foliage), and if this non-discovery is due neither to any defect in me, as we have already seen, nor

obviously, to any intervening obstruction in the objective world – for, despite our best attempt we cannot find any – it follows *per reductio ad absurdum* that this non-perception is due only to the fact that there is something wrong with that bird-form itself: it must have remained there *undistinguishedly fused* with the foliage, much as water gets fused with milk, with only this difference that while in the case of the water-milk the water as such could not be detected till one had physically separated it from the milk, in the case of the bird-form it is only *reflection* that could distinguish it. In unreflective perception the bird-form had stood undistinguishedly fused in the foliage and now stands distinguished in reflection.

We are using the word 'fused' very deliberately, distinguishing it from what is ordinarily called *confused*. Confusion is only an epistemic situation, and what we intend by 'fusion' is a conceivable objective situation that would *exactly* correspond to subjective confusion. Normally in cases of confusion the items that I confuse with one another are objectively quite distinct: it is I alone who stand responsible for all that is unclear. By 'fusion', however, we mean a situation where even objectively the items stand mixed up with one another undistinguishedly. That the bird-form in the picture stands fused with the foliage, not confused, is clear, as we have seen, from the fact that I was in no way responsible for the non-perception, nor was there any intervening obstruction. The water mixed with milk is another illustration, and so is the case with hydrogen and oxygen mixed up into water. We may add another illustration, viz., the real expanse and colour of a thin sheet of india rubber remaining concealed as that sheet is compressed into a lump. What through these illustrations we are insisting on is a sort of objective implicitness. The objective implicitness that we find in these cases is, we admit, not always of the same kind. The differences in the cases of the water-milk complex and the bird-form in the picture we have already pointed out. Later on we may have occasions to point to other kinds of objective implicitness.

One point we like to dispose of here before we pass on to the next section. It is the argument, sometimes offered, that when

the so-called implicit is said to pass over to the stage of explicitness, or *vice versa*, the so-called implicit – or the so-called explicit, as the case may be – has really ceased to exist, yielding place to the so-called explicit or implicit as the case may be. When, for example, hydrogen and oxygen combine chemically to yield water we are told that the old hydrogen and oxygen have ceased to exist and we have only a particular drop of water, and when again that drop is decomposed it in its turn, we are similarly told, has ceased to exist yielding place to another hydrogen gas and another oxygen gas brought to existence for the first time. The idea is that these two new gases have nothing to do with the older two gases which ceased to exist long ago, yielding place to the drop of water which has now been decomposed.

This view, contrary to all that is common sense, is only a desperate attempt to by-pass the difficulties that we find genuinely involved in the notion of objective implicitness. We never say that objective implicitness is a clear enough notion and easily manipulatable. Indeed, the central task of the present essay is just to clarify it. What we insist on here is that on the ground of this apparent unintelligibility we should not avoid the concept. If in some cases implicitness could not be traced to mere subjective defect or accounted for as due to intervening obstructions, we should not on that ground throw it over board and declare the implicit dead. True, if we cannot in any way tackle the concept we have to follow the Vaisesikas. But what if we first permit the concept, as otherwise we have to go violently against all commonsense, and then proceed to clarify it!

As fusion is thus different from confusion we would in the same manner understand distinctness as the *exact* objective counterpart of subjective distinguishing. Another name of objective distinctness is *autonomy* or *self-containedness*.

Metaphysics is said to have for its subject-matter pure ontic entities like space, time, self, God, Reality as a whole, etc. Whether as rational beings in this twentieth century we should at all recognise such ontic entities is, of course, a serious question. But before one turns to that one has first to understand how

much the metaphysicians themselves have actually claimed.

The first thing they claim is that we, human beings, start our life with an initial faith in such pure entities, 'initial' meaning either that the faith in question is innate or that it is the starting acceptance of what the elders we respect have admitted.

Their second claim is that through intellectual analysis and reasoning or, alternatively, through reflection disciplined in other ways, we can realise the exact nature of these entities in their inter-relation, this realisation maturing in the end into a type of intuition that reveals them in their distinctness, i.e., as freed from the state of fusion they appeared in at the unreflective stage of our knowledge. This intuition as the ultimate end of all analysis and reasoning, and of all reflection esoterically disciplined, may be called reflective intuition or, if one likes, intuitive reflection.

The third point they insist on is that in case we have reached these entities, not through intellectual analysis and reasoning, but through the other method stated above, viz., reflection disciplined through some esoteric exercises, we as rational beings have to employ, if only at the next stage, the intellectual method of analysis and reasoning in order at least that others may be convinced, if not positively led to intuit these entities for themselves.

Obviously, for the metaphysician himself the most important of the three claims is the second one. For him, in other words, the central method of discovery is reflective intuition that detects these entities in their autonomy and inter-relation, freed from the fusion they appeared in at the unreflective level. This method is largely similar to the type of reflection (discussed earlier) that detects the bird-form in the picture, though we must note at the same time a fundamental distinction between the two, viz., that while in the case of the bird-form it could be detected in its distinctness, though per chance, even at the unreflective stage, there is no such possibility with regard to metaphysical entities. Space, time, self, God, etc. are never experienced in their autonomy at the unreflective stage : at that stage they are experienced as fused – as either relations or functions

or adjectives, not as autonomous substantives. The metaphysical entity – often called 'essence' or 'ideality' – is that which, never being apprehended in its exact pure form at the unreflective stage, is apprehended precisely in that form in reflection.

Obviously, the prior non-apprehension was not due to any subjective defect or any specifiable intervening obstruction in the objective world. Nobody, for example, can point to any defect in me that could be responsible for my not having apprehended pure substantive space or time. That I did not reflect or attend or that I was under the spell of *ajnana* or even that I did not take the given situation as a problem, none of these, as we have already seen, accounts for my failure to discover substantive space and time, and nobody can point to any conceivable obstruction that could intervene. The non-apprehension was, therefore, due to objective fusion, and hence of the nature of *non-perception*, which means that when later I succeeded in discovering pure substantive space or time, the discovery was in a form of *intuition*. Initial faith in these pure entities, and all intellectual analysis and reasoning that I could employ were, as we saw earlier, either accessories or required for communication with others. The exact function of analysis and reasoning we shall examine later.

III

Before we proceed further we feel we ought to consolidate our position at this stage by meeting all possible objections to our concept of reflective intuition.

The concepts of fusion and distinctness, or, for that matter, objective implicitness and objective explicitness, are often so unpalatable that in spite of all we have said people might revolt and insist on tracing non-apprehension at the unreflective stage to some subjective defect. They would argue that a defect in the object itself is unthinkable. We have claimed that the defect in question is objective fusion: we have said that at the unreflective level the object stood fused and that in reflection it stands, distinct in its autonomy. But we may be asked: Is the moment from fusion to autonomy itself objective? This, according to them, would be fantastic, at least a gratuitously complicated

account. It would be a much better account, they would argue, if it could be said that the entity in question was there in its distinct autonomy even when I did not reflect and that if at that stage I had not perceived it that way, this was because something was wrong with me.

Our first reaction to this argument is that such subjective defect is often an *ad hoc* hypothesis. This we have explained before. We add that even in case a subjective defect could be validly inferred we should prefer phenomenological analysis of experience as providing us with a direct picture like the one we have already given. Such phenomenological account is at least a good alternative to mechanical inference.

True, even as phenomenologists we have to face the difficult question whether the movement from fusion to distinct autonomy is itself objective. But we like to answer straight that it is so. Let us see why.

We admit one can legitimately question whether the movement from fusion to distinctness is objective or, for the matter of that, whether even the so-called fusion state is so. But one thing is certain, viz., that the distinctness of the object revealed in reflection is, beyond all doubt, objective; it is clearly apprehended that way and our contention is that if only we analyse this objective distinctness a little more closely we shall see in what way fusion too could be objective and how there could be objective development from fusion to distinctness.

The distinctness of the object revealed in reflection is evidently objective. But there is yet another side of the story equally evident and no less important. It is that this distinctness is yet relative to the subjective act of distinguishing that is reflection, and this is at least strongly suggested by two facts: (1) We did not perceive the object in its distinctness so long as we had not distinguished it, and (2) immediately as we distinguish it in reflection it stands revealed as distinct. This shows how a perfectly objective feature like distinctness – perfectly objective, because it is clearly felt that way – may yet depend on a subjective act like distinguishing, there being no incompatibility of the two.

A study of the exact nature of this dependence will throw a flood of light on the nature of the said passage from fusion to distinctness.

Distinctness of an object to depend on my subjective act of distinguishing does not mean that it is *produced* by that act, as though the act in question is a form of will that could produce change in the external world. Could distinctness be produced that way? This would presuppose that there was a bare object X to which this distinctness had not originally belonged but to which it accrued later; and this is absurd. For, is this bare X different from X-as-undistinguished, different, in other words, from X-as-fused, or is it not so different? If different, one would be compelled to hold that even the fusedness of that X was *produced* by unreflective awareness. But this unintelligible – fusedness of X just means that of this X we had no awareness at all, though we might have been aware all the time of the general context to which this X belonged. The hypothesis, often put forward by eminent thinkers, that even at the unreflective level we were somehow aware of the object X, though it was not then distinct, the hypothesis, viz., that at that stage it was known as unknown or that the object X, somehow known, was yet covered from our view by some mysterious *ajnana* involved in unreflective awareness is unnecessarily more complicated than the phenomenologically evident fact that at the unreflective stage this X was not known at all. True, we had insisted earlier that though we had not known it at the unreflective stage it yet was present all through. But this we could say only retrospectively, i. e., from the point of view of the later reflection which assured us that in that reflection the object X was not created for the first time. To account for this *retrospective* assurance of the existence of X it is not necessary to postulate states like 'known as unknown', 'covered by *ajnana*', etc.

We have just seen what consequences we are led to if we hold that the so-called bare object X is different from X-as-undistinguished (fused). Consequences would, however, be worse if to avoid the difficulty we should deny the difference outright. In reflection, we have seen, X stands distinguished. But if this X,

i.e., the bare X, is not different from X-as-undistinguished it would amount to saying that in reflection X-as-undistinguished stands (yet) as distinguished, which is a blatant self-contradiction. If, then, the so-called bare X can be said to be neither different nor non-different from X-as-undistinguished three possible conclusions can follow. They are:

1. There is no bare X at all;
2. There is no stage called X-as-undistinguished;
3. Bare X is admissible, though as indescribable.

Of these three possible conclusions the second may be dismissed immediately, for, at the unreflective stage X does remain undistinguished. The third too may be disallowed on the ground that beside X-as-undistinguished we need not postulate a bare X. Were there a bare X other than X-as-undistinguished there could be no escape from the conclusion that it is indescribable – or an indefinite something, if one may so like. But this bare X is an unnecessary postulate. Hence the only conclusion left is that there is no bare X. It would be useless to argue, as some have done, that bare X is that which has the potentiality of developing, in whatever context, into X-as-distinct, for, as so understood it is nothing but what we have been calling X-as-undistinguished, i.e., X-as-fused.

If, now, there is no bare X, it follows that neither unreflective awareness produces fusedness in it nor, what is our main concern here, reflection produces distinctness in it. Reflection could produce that distinctness if only it could in the same act produce that X itself. But as in reflection we never feel that we have created X for the first time, it follows that the distinctness of X is not *produced* by reflection. If, therefore, as already said, it yet depends on reflection which is the subjective act of distinguishing, this is dependence of quite another sort.

There is nothing mysterious with this type of dependence. It is nothing more strange than relative features like rightness or leftness of things, or comparative features like largerness, smallerness, etc., that depend on, without being created by, the

subjective act of comparison. If of two things one is to the right of the other which, therefore, is to its left, or if one is larger than the other, which latter, therefore, is smaller, this rightness and leftness or largerness and smallerness are perfectly objective features, though decidedly relative to subjective comparison. Obviously they are not produced by this act of comparison, for we never feel that way. Nor can we say that they are just as much revealed in comparison as a table is revealed in perception. For, while we never feel that the table is dependent on my perception, we do feel like saying that the rightness or leftness and largerness or smallerness depend on comparison. As depending on the subjective act of comparison and yet as not produced by it, they are just relative to it, though perfectly objective at the same time. Another example of such dependence we find in the illusory snake that stands corrected. It is definitely felt as objective (though not real), and yet as not unqualifiedly *the snake*, but as only a-snake-to-me, it is, of its own constitution, relative to me the percipient.

The difficulty we were faced with at the beginning of this section, viz., whether the passage from fusion to distinctness is itself objective, may now be disposed of. If what is intended be that there is a bare X which passes from the fused state to distinctness the problem itself is abortive, for there is no bare X that could pass from one state to another. If, on the other hand, it be intended that the fused X comes to appear as X that is distinct, we claim that the passage is perfectly objective though dependent as much on the subjective act of distinguishing reflection,-quite as much as comparative features like rightness or leftness, largerness or smallerness are, or, if one likes, much as the rope comes to appear as the false snake.

One serious objection against our analysis of the concepts of fusion and distinctness we have disposed of. We now turn to two other objections, equally serious. One of them is as follows: If in every case of *objective distinctness* – which is such a difficult concept and not acceptable to many – one finds also a subjective act of distinguishing, should we not, so we may be told, very justifiably be content with the latter alone, discarding the former

as unnecessary, to say the least? If in course of explaining reflection we have insisted on objective distinctness, but when faced with difficulties turned to the subjective act of distinguishing round which this objective distinctness is, as we have held, perforce to move, is it any good admitting this objective distinctness over and above the subjective act, particularly when reflection could be adequately explained as merely this act of distinguishing?

We would reply as follows: Our normal attitude to life is objective. Normally we are interested in objects, discovering characteristics of different objective situations. It is only late in life that we turn to the subjective, and even then what forces our interest that way are more often than not certain peculiar features in the world of objects. We are scarcely aware of the niceties of subjective states and acts except through the corresponding peculiarities in objective situations. Had we began with the inward attitude God only knows what we could discover. History of philosophy is replete with muddles and confusions that introverts and immature idealists have bequeathed to us. We do not deny that there are good idealists and inspired introverts. But they too, at least most of them, had to wade through objective life; and if a few could have direct access to the subjective this is certainly not for us to emulate. To start with the objective attitude, to think in terms of object, is at least less confusing than idealistic effusions and is, therefore, initially a more reliable method of procedure.

We do not for a moment deny that there are conscious states and acts. We only insist that these states and acts being mostly object-oriented we should at least begin with understanding these as diaphanous, distinguished from and related to one another through the peculiarities evident in the respective objects they are oriented to.

This is why in our analysis of reflection we have tried to avoid the traditional and psycho-physiological accounts as scrupulously as possible and have relied instead on objective features that are evident, though for that reason we have not denied subjective states and acts altogether.

Two objections against our account of reflection we have disposed of. There is a third objection, apparently innocent, but not less serious than what we have grappled with so far. It is that the object which now stands distinct in reflection is a new object altogether, not the one that we experienced at the unreflective stage, there being no evidence that way. More precisely the point of the objection would be as follows.

The object X that now in reflection stands distinct is either different from the distinctness it has or not. If not different it, obviously, could not be present at the unreflective level, for, at that level the object, *ex hypothesi,* was X-as-not-distinct. How could X-as-distinct be identical with X-as-not-distinct? If, again, X be different from that distinctness, if, in other words, there could be a bare X, then its presence at both the reflective and unreflective stages would not matter much. The important point that reflection is said to testify to, though retrospectively, is that the *distinct X*, not merely the bare X, was present at the unreflective stage. But, as just shown, the distinct X could not have been present at the unreflective level, as that would have meant that the distinct X *as distinct* remained, at least for some time, indistinct. This is the objection.

We reply, we have in a way already dismissed it. In reply to the first objection to our account of reflection we have shown that it is the indistinct X itself which has become distinct X and we have shown how this is intelligible. What is commonly called 'bare X' is nothing but X-as-indistinct. We now add that of the two Xs, viz. X-as-indistinct and X-as-indistinct, the former alone is *X proper*. We hold this view on a simple ground—it is that the form in which reflection reveals a thing is always its proper nature. 'Proper' here does not mean *true*, so that the form in which a thing appeared at the unreflective level may not be illusory *ex hypothesi*. The dimension *proper-improper* cuts across the dimension *real-false* and is not identical with it. The distinct and the indistinct may both be real and both false as the case may be. We are not here concerned with the reality or falsity of an apearance.

To the charge that distinct X could not have been indistinct

at the unreflective level even for a short while we would reply that, properly understood, this involves no self-contradiction. X-as-indistinct could be equal to indistinct-X-as-distinct if only X-as-indistinct were equal to X+indistinctness. But that is not the case. What we call indistinct X at the unreflective level is really a not further analysable homogeneous whole, spoken of as X-as-indistinct only retrospectively from the point of view of reflection which has for the first time revealed that X *as X*, i.e. as distinct. The indistinct, as such intrinsically unamenable to representation by language, has per force to be described in terms of the distinct which is revealed in reflection.

That the indistinct X is a not further analysable homogeneous whole is evident not merely when we find it for the first time at the unreflective level but equally so when once having discovered X in its distinctness at the level of reflection we drop back to the unreflective level. Though enriched with all the details we have discovered in reflection, if we have dropped back, we find the same homogeneous whole once again, the details remembered only hovering round it ineffectually. None of the things we had discovered in reflection are found fitting in with the object, once we have dropped back to the unreflective level. This is so not merely when there is relapse through some defect on our part but equally so in a deliberate turn-back.[1]

The object of our unreflective awareness is thus always a homogeneous whole. What reflection distinguishes out in that homogeneous whole when we reflectively intuit it is the *distinct* X, X proper, i.e. X in itself. The relation between this X proper (the distinct X) and the homogeneous staff (the indistinct X) is largely like that between the form of a table and the table as first perceived unreflectively. We deliberately say, 'between the form of a table and *the table*', not between the form and a formless matter; for, phenomenologically, we never find in any given complex a form and a formless matter. We never intuit a

[1]The reflection that we are analysing here *vis a vis* the prior unreflective stage is one that discovers *metaphysical* entities like pure space, time, self, etc. Earlier we have called it *metaphysical reflection*. What we are speaking about metaphysical reflection here is not always true about other types of reflection.

formless matter; indeed we cannot even imagine what it could be like. The table that we start with in unreflective life is one homogeneous whole, and later in reflection we discover a form in it; and if even after this discovery we yet speak of *the table* it is again the same homogeneous whole, though, it may be, along with the once-distinguished form loosely hanging on to that entire homogeneous staff. The matter which is said to remain over as the form is taken out in always an indefinite abstraction, neither intuitable nor conceivable otherwise, except in deference to the mechanical rule of algebraic summation, as just *what could* remain over, nothing better than the simplest and, therefore, the contentless equation $a\text{-}b = a\text{-}b$, the trivial proposition, in other words, that when b is taken away from a total situation a what would remain over is $a\text{-}b$. Absolutely nothing else is known about this $a\text{-}b$, nothing is known as to whether it is c or d or e, etc. The table is the fused state of the table-form not that form *plus* a matter. The table-form is what is reflectively distinguished in the table, though the table is not the form *plus* something else, it is nothing but the used state of the form. Similarly with the distinct X and the object of unreflective awareness: the distinct X is only what reflection discovers out in the object of unreflective experience, which object is only a fused state of that X, X as such being nothing but X as distinct. Indistinct X is not X *plus* indistinctness; nor can one say that distinct X is X *plus* distinctness. There is no intuitable or otherwise conceivable bare X.

The analysis that we have offered so far is one of metaphysical reflection. It is the analysis, in other words, of that type of reflection which distinguishes pure entities like space, time, self, etc. It need not be valid of other types of reflection where, for example, when we have turned back to the unreflective stage the distinct X might continue to occupy the whole field of vision. If after a rapid glance at a heap of objects I reflectively distinguish a particular thing out of that heap, I may, even when I have returned to unreflective experience, continue to perceive that particular thing. A little more complicated, though basically of the same nature, is the reflective awareness of the

hitherto unattended tic-tic sound of a clock just after it has ceased – I feel as though I had been hearing that sound all along. Metaphysical reflection is sharply different from all such cases. As already noted, its very characteristic is that it distinguishes entities which in their distinct nature cannot be perceived at the unreflective level, either originally or when we have come back to it, or which can at most loosely hover round it without adjustment.

We may now dispose of a fourth objection to our account of metaphysical reflection. We have said that the distinct X, though objective, is intrinsically relative to subjective distinguishing. One may ask, however, if this is not precisely the reason why it could not have been present at the unreflective level. The illusory snake, for example, though appearing objective, is yet intrinsically relative to someone's perception, and may not one say, on just this ground, that the snake could not have been present before it was perceived as a snake?

We reply, we deny the prior existence of the snake not because it is relative to a percipient, not because there is anything intriguing in this relativity, but because it comes to be sublated, or, if one so likes, because it does not fit in with other things of the universe; in plain language, because it is, for whatever reason, definitely declared to be false. The distinct X, on the other hand, is never felt as *false*. Indeed, while the denial of the *prior* existence of the snake amounts in effect to the denial of its all-time existence – past, present and future – with regard to the distinct X one may at most question its *prior* existence. Even then, the denial of the prior existence of the distinct X is only a theoretical possibility: nobody ever seriously denies even this prior existence of the distinct X.

IV

We have now to meet the most serious objection that could be raised against all that has been said so far about metaphysical reflection. This objection has, as a matter of fact, been raised again and again by powerful thinkers. It is that metaphysical reflection is altogether a myth; there can be no such reflection at all, none which could distinguish in a sort of institution the

so-called pure entities often called essences, idealities, noumena etc. This objection has taken two forms. Some hold that metaphysical entities cannot be intuited but only inferred, and some go further and hold that there is no such entity at all.

Let us first dispose of the first form of objection, viz. that metaphysical entities can only be inferred, not intuited. We may note in passing a milder form of this objection. It is that even if some intuition of these entities is possible the nature of this intuition is not amenable to any epistemological analysis; it just happens somehow and that ends the matter. All that we should be concerned with in philosophy is the *inference* of these entities.

To this first objection and its sub-form our reply is as follows.

Assuming that there are metaphysical entities, why should one deny the possibility of a sort of reflection that could intuitively discover these entities in themselves and also in their inter-relations? If other types of *reflection* – one may call them empirical reflection – be allowed, what particular point is there that we should disallow the metaphysical one? Is it because the anti-metaphysics thinkers do not possess this particular faculty or because one ought not to speak at all of these entities? That one does not possess the faculty is no proof that there is none such. There are people who cannot appreciate classical music, but that does not prove that such appreciation is an impossibility. Like aesthetic appreciation, metaphysical reflection may require a sort of prior training. Blind men cannot deny the fact of seeing, nor should they throw the onus of proving this fact on those who say they can see.

One cannot also hold that metaphysical entities cannot be *spoken of*. Metaphysicians have, as a matter of fact, spoken of them, and their number is legion. For thousands of years philosophers have said so many things about pure entities like space, time, self, God, etc.

The only possible point, then, against metaphysical reflection is either that these entities are known in some other way, not through metaphysical reflection as a form of intuition, or that

they cannot be known at all. Those who deny metaphysical reflection on the former ground hold that metaphysical entities can only be *inferred*, not intuited. Those, on the other hand who hold the other view, viz. that the so-called metaphysical entities are *non-est*, are driving at a basic change in outlook. These latter are the real full-fledged anti-metaphysics revolutionaries.

But there is much to say against both these views. As against the first, we ask: How can one infer a thing which cannot be intuited? Normally, if *a* is inferred from *b*, this is possible if we had previously intuited *a* and *b* together. If we had never intuited *a* we could not have intuited it along with *b* and are, therefore, unable now to infer it from that *b*. Even in cases where this togetherness of *a* and *b* has itself been arrived at through a previous inference, or in case it is just taken on the authority of another person, the intuitability of *a* is not precluded, for *a* must have been perceived, even as a pre-condition of that earlier inference; and where the togetherness is taken on trust from another person it only means that I believe that in my behalf he had intuited *a*.

It is possible, we admit, that often *a* is inferred when not it precisely, but only its like, had been intuited before. 'Its like' does not mean the trite that as the same identical event cannot be repeated what we intuited before was always a *like*. By 'its like' we mean here to refer to cases where we explain a given situation by postulating a hypothesis *in the light of* one postulated earlier, though not as unintuitable, in a similar situation. This is what we always do when we infer supersensuous entities like atoms, electrons, etc.

It may be noted, however, that what we infer in such cases is never so unlike the entities intuited before as to be wholly unintuitable. Proportionately to the peculiarity of the situation under investigation the intuitability of what is inferred is only modified to a degree, the power of our sensibility being stretched, in imagination, to the degree required – it may be, to the maximum degree. There is never a need of denying sensibility altogether. If, for example, through such a process of inference we

establish that there are certain things in the moon we never intend that these things are unperceivable; the most what we can mean is that normally with the present-day amenities we cannot go to the moon to see for ourselves the things that are inferred to be there. The imperceptibility of atoms and electrons is only a grade further removed; we only believe that with the power of sensibility we happen to possess we cannot perceive them. And, just as we can *imagine* that we are present in the moon face to face with the things inferred there, we can equally *in imagination* stretch the power of our sensibility to an extent enabling us (in imagination, again) to perceive atoms and electrons. Metaphysical reflection that intuits pure entities may in this context, be understood as the farthest possible stretch of sensibility. What is inferred is thus never altogether unintuitable, and the so-called non-sensuous intuition is only the optimum extension of sensuous perception. In different grades of the so-called non-sensuous intuition we only progressively get rid – in imagination, of course – of the normal limitations of our sensibility. All intuitions, sensuous and non-sensuous, are fundamentally of the same nature, the sensuous being only laden with physical and physiological limitations and different forms of the non-sensuous being only progressively free from these.

We may have some idea of this even when we analyse the common process of explanation-through-hypothesis. When, for example, a scientist, faced with a difficult situation, seriously attempts an explanation, what normally happens is that a certain hypothesis suddenly *flashes before his mind's eye* and he next tries to substantiate it through relevant considerations. If the hypothesis can be substantiated, well and good, but if it fails another hypothesis *flashes* again, and so on. What now is this flash? Is it not a sort of intuition? It is not necessary that every intuition should be correct; even incorrect intuition is after all intuition, just as any erroneous perception is still perception. This flash, again, may not be of the nature of metaphysical intuition immediately, but it is intuition all the same. As intuition, again, it is not perception in any ordinary sense of the term. Though it has for its object something that is empirical it

is undoubtedly supersensuous to a degree. This type of intuition, sometimes called *pratibha* is intermediate between sensuous perception and metaphysical intuition.

We do not intend that there may not be a class of hypotheses which do not or need not flash at all. Such hypotheses are quite possible, but they are more or less of the nature of formulae and technical principles postulated to knit together diverse facts into neat systems. Explanation of or understanding a situation, when we proceed by postulating such principles, is nothing more than neat description, and of course, of the neatness of the description there are various criteria. The distinguishing feature of this type of hypotheses is that none of them claim to be facts: they are only formulae for neat descriptions, i.e. sheer *methods* of organization. As such they cannot, obviously, be objects of knowledge, they are only postulates in the strictest sense of the term. It is only in a loose sense that we often say they are known through inference; in the strict sense they are not *known*, and *a fortiori* not inferred, though the process of arriving at them looks very much like inference.

We have already seen how some people have held that metaphysical entities are not intuited but only inferred (through the process known as hypothesization) and we have refuted their views by saying that nothing can be so inferred which is not intuitable. To obviate this charge some may now hold that these entities are neither intuited nor inferred (as existent), but only *postulated* in the strictest sense of the term. They may, in other words, hold that these entities do not exist though we may very well speak of them and even use them for systematizing our knowledge of the universe. These entities are, in short, essences that do not exist.

Should one choose to hold this view, we confess we have nothing to say against him except that hypotheses, even those regarding metaphysical entities, do often flash, they are not always cold mechanical formulae or just techniques of usage, linguistic or otherwise. There is nothing, we admit, against treating, if one so likes, *all* hypotheses as just techniques of usage; but there is certainly no binding that way. The reason why these

philosophers are so vehemently against living *hypotheses* is not that they never have hypotheses flashing before their minds' eye; it is only that they genuinely believe that they have no so-called metaphysical intuition, and fearing that once living hypotheses are granted in other fields there would be no justification for *a priori* condemnation of hypotheses regarding metaphysical entities, they prefer to treat all hypotheses, without any distinction of caste and creed, as dead mechanical postulates. Extremes are always more respectable than compromises. The philosophers whom we are considering here, are, therefore, more respectable than their feebler associates in the field of Logical Empiricism; more respectable, we mean, than those who treat *some* hypotheses as about existents because they are empirically verifiable and reject metaphysical ones as not so. These feebler of the Logical Empiricists forget that if by far the largest number of hypotheses they allow as verifiable are verifiable as only *indirectly* referring to sense-experience there is no reason why even metaphysical hypotheses should not have such indirect reference, though the reference in their cases may be more indirect than in other cases. But have these Logical Empiricists ever told us how much of indirect reference is permissible and why a reference which happens to be a little more indirect should be discredited?

The extreme of the Logical Empiricists are largely consistent and their attitude is genuine. They have also done a useful service in not having allowed metaphysical intuition in a slipshod manner, and their contribution in the field of Logic and Semantics is decidedly immense. In a way, again, they have given us a very respectable philosophy meant for those who either do not possess metaphysical intuition or have no faith in it. Our only point against them is that in spite of all this they have not made out a decisive case against metaphysical entities. We do admit that if in spite of all our pleadings for metaphysical reflection some people do not, very honestly find any such, for them the only reasonable course would be to vote whole-heartedly for the extreme form of Logical Empiricism. But there is nothing in this philosophy to prevent metaphysicians from proceeding with their own type of reflection.

One may ask here the oft-repeated question: Supposing I have that intuition, of what good would it be to me if I cannot put it *logically* before others? We reply: The old-day metaphysicians did present their intuitions in the logical forms of argument and analysis, and, except for a few anti-intellectualists, they never shrank from this. For convincing others they employed logic from the beginning to the end. Apart from what actually the metaphysicians did, there is, at least, nothing to prevent one from employing logic, even though he has intuited metaphysical entities.

V

Metaphysicians have used logic in two different ways:

(1) In the interest of listeners they have argued from empirical matters to their metaphysical entities.

(2) For themselves, they make continuous effort to intuit metaphysical entities in the exact relations in which they stand to one another, so that once these are intuited in proper interrelation they would be assured of their journey's end. These relations that bind the metaphysical entities into a system or organize them, as the case may be, in a hierarchy are precisely the principles of pure logic.

Let us explain here the former of the two uses of logic as stated above. For lack of space we do not propose to explain in this paper the second use. The metaphysician, otherwise satisfied with his intuitions, is yet interested in convincing his listeners, and it is only in this latter interest that he argues from empirical matters to his metaphysical entities; and it may often happen that due to some lack of conviction somewhere he himself plays the part of a listener. The sole purpose of such argument – to put it, in another language, the ultimate objective in trying to convince the listener – is that once the listener is convinced, through arguments, of the existence of a metphysical entity he would, of his very rational nature, seek to discover it for himself through intuition, a demand on him which he can only ignore at the cost of his rational constitution. For, if following the metaphysician's arguments, he has, in a way, himself inferred the metaphysical entity, he is bound, as we have already seen, to take it as ***intuitable,***

because nothing can be inferred which is not to be sensuously intuited; his very rational constitution would demand that he should actively see how otherwise it can be intuited.

The effort has to be made, though we cannot at the same time hold out a promise that it will be successful. It may well happen that despite all honest efforts the listener fails to intuit metaphysical entities. There is nothing indeed to worry about if he fails to intuit only some of these entities but succeeds in other cases; for then our only advice to them would be 'try and try again'. But in case he fails to intuit any of these entities – which is not at all an impossibility, for there are people who, in spite of their best attempts, cannot be artists – in case he thus fails utterly, we cannot impose metaphysics on him. Under these circumstances he will have three other alternatives left open to him. He may choose to be an extreme intellectualist, relying solely on inference and analysis and going so far as to doubt perception even till its content comes to be confirmed by some inference, explicit or implicit. Or, despairing of solid gain that way he may turn violently against this intellect too and choose to live in the fool's paradise of romantic sentimentalism. Or, thirdly, he may choose to be a Logical Empiricist.

The choice of these alternatives, we have just seen, springs from the failure to intuit metaphysical entities. It must be noted, however, that this failure is only an accident, there being no *a priori* necessity that one must fail. Success too, we admit, is equally an accident. The point we insist on is that if some people have succeeded and if metaphysical entities can at all be inferred and are, therefore, at least intuitable, one should try one's best to intuit these. The whole question thus boils down to the simple point whether the inferences that metaphysicians have actually offered are valid. One of our main charges against the Logical Empiricists is that they have nowhere examined these inferences. They have simply ignored these. Arbitrarily believing that metaphysical entities cannot be intuited they have obstinately adhered to their equally arbitrary thesis that all intuition is sensuous and the real is nothing but what is sensuously intuitable. They have never even tried to intuit these, they have started

with the arbitrary assumption that these cannot be intuited. If only they had examined the inferences that were offered by metaphysicians regarding these entities, the whole picture might have been altered.

One might argue that Logical Empiricists do not even believe that one can infer metaphysical entities. The question of intuiting these could arise if at all they could be inferred. But Logical Empiricists would deny even this possibility of inference.

But why after all, we ask, should they deny this possibility of inference? Is it because according to them these entities are sensuously unintuitable? But, first, why should *sensuous* intuitability be taken as the criterion of reality? Could it not be enough if it were just intuitable, sensuously or not? And, further, would it not be putting the cart before the horse to say that metaphysical entities cannot be inferred *because they are unintuitable?* The fact that, metaphysicians have inferred these entities, inevitably establishes that they at least claim to be intuitable. To start with the idea that they are unintuitable and to conclude from this that they cannot, therefore, be inferred, would be moving just the wrong way about. *A priori* we cannot deny the *inferability* of anything, and if anything is *inferable* there is at least a demand for intuiting it. Logical Empiricists would have done better if they had examined the arguments the older metaphysicians had offered and refuted them one by one, instead of condemning them all together at one stroke. Kant too has condemned the *inferability* of metaphysical entities, and though he appears to examine some of the traditional inferences in all details, the main reason for his condemnation is that these entities cannot be sensuously intuited. He and the Logical Empiricists sail in the same boat. Logical Empiricists have tried still other ways of escape. They have held that the equation of reality with what is sensuously intuitable is valid on any one or all of the following three grounds:

1. Unsophisticated common sense understands reality invariably that way;

2. The sensuously intuited can be pointed to others who can, therefore, perceive it for themselves, while that which is said to

be non-sensuously intuited is always elusive, if not to one who so intuits, at least to those who are addressed;

3. Definition of reality as what is sensuously intuitable is at least one by means of which we can give a consistent account of the universe acceptable to all and which, therefore, is at least a prescriptive definition, a sound postulate, in contrast with the idea that it may also be non-sensuously intuited, which can at most give us *discrete* noumenal entities, never a system of these, and which labours under another defect, viz. that the empirical world has been ignored by these intuitionists.

None of these three grounds, however, are tenable to the end. Regarding the first we may point out that unsophisticated people understand by 'reality' not merely what is sensuously intuited but equally what is intuited otherwise and, besides, many other things also. If there is anything common to all that unsophisticated people mean by 'reality', it is just what is independent of our knowledge of it, and it matters little to common sense whether it is apprehended sensuously or non-sensuously, whether it is intuited or inferred, etc. Common sense is either no exclusive indicator of truth or one has to keep it confined to a system of primitive beliefs that has not, on some valid ground or other, been rejected. One cannot eat it and have it too.

Regarding the second consideration above that has led the Logical Empiricist to prefer sense-intuition, we like to offer two simple comments. If what he intends is that only the sensible objects can be pointed to, this is obviously wrong, for the objects intuited otherwise are also pointed to by those who intuit them. If, on the other hand, what is intended is that the pointed object must be such as can be followed by the listener, our reply is, first, that sometimes listeners cannot follow even sensuously intuitable objects, when, for example, the perception of them require some training, as is abundantly evident in laboratories and, secondly, we argue that if adequate training is granted, even non-sensuous entities can be followed. This is why metaphysicians have offered suggestive analogies, and irrefutable inferences and have often prescribed esoteric exercises as a part of the training in question. It is no good shutting our eyes to these

procedures, seeing that even in our empirical life we resort to many of these procedures to get the listeners on our side, and these devices do often succeed in making the listeners perceive the objects we point to them.

As for the third ground mentioned above, viz. that with the definition of reality as the sensuously intuitable, and with this definition alone, we can offer a systematic account of the universe, and that, therefore, this should be the best definition acceptable; we observe that the different metaphysics which the old-day philosophers have offered have also been systematic accounts of the universe, no mere loose catalogues of discrete noumenal entities. If those metaphysicians have intuited noumenal entities they have intuited them in their inter-relations, as either in a system or in a hierarchy, and they have presented their metaphysics accordingly. The logical way in which they have presented their intuited entities is just a shadow of those noumenal relations – a projection of those relations on matters of our empirical life. We do not claim that non-sensuous intuition is unerring because it is non-sensuous; we do not claim that the different systems of metaphysics given to us by different metaphysicians are all faultless. But sense-perception also errs and even different systems of science are not all correct. Metaphysicians, therefore, are not particularly to blame. It will not do to say, as Logical Empiricists have done, that whereas in the case of science an agreement can be arrived at by referring directly or indirectly to public facts of sense-experience there is no such possibility with regard to metaphysics. For metaphysicians also seek to settle their disputes by referring directly or indirectly to facts of sense-experience, and this is exactly what they have done by inferring noumenal entities from empirical data, or, in some cases, by offering more and more suggestive analogies, so long as the listeners do not succeed in intuiting noumenal entities for themselves. It will not do again to argue that metaphysical accounts of the universe do not contain anything about our everyday empirical world; for, first, in many metaphysical systems the world with many of its empirical details has been considered, and secondly, has not

science also been largely indifferent to noumenal entities? The fact is that both science and metaphysics are concerned with the structure of the universe, not necessarily with its empirical details, and if science has studied a relatively empirical structure, metaphysics proposes to arrive at a deeper structure primarily through non-sensuous intuition but proximately, and for listeners, through arguments and analysis and, therefore, referring so far to a large extent to empirical details. And, lastly, if to many Logical Empiricists the structure of the universe is only a system of postulates, may not metaphysics also be allowed as another system of postulates of a different kind? And who will determine which system is better if the metaphysical one is not sympathetically understood?

If some of those who have failed to intuit metaphysical entities have swung over to Logical Empiricism, others, we have noted, have turned into extreme intellectualists and still others into sentimental romantics. As for the romantics, we have nothing to say for or against them. They move in a field so alien to ours that we do not know what to say regarding them. Against the extreme intellectualists, however, we have just two points to urge. One of them is that there is no scope for inference at all unless we start with the relatively unquestioned belief in what is intuited, sensuously or otherwise, normally sensuously intuited. It is because the sensuously intuited data are accepted as real that we can take the inferred object also as real; and when inference is said to correct a perception what actually happens is either that a sensuously intuitable defect is discovered in a given situation or that a coherent system of intuitable data is just preferred to an isolated datum or to another system which is less coherent, coherence in the latter case not constituting the reality of that which coheres but only determining its reality for us. A thing is not real because it coheres, rather it coheres because it is real. Neither coherence nor intuitability constitutes its reality, and coherence, like inference, pre-supposes that what coheres is intuitable.

SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

SATINDRANATH CHAKRAVARTI

1. IT SEEMS to me that many elements in Indian philosophy have been neglected or adversely criticised by some scholars simply because these elements have been distasteful to them although no real effort has been made to understand them.

It should be observed that the empirical, secular and analytical phases of Indian thought have been sympathetically considered by a few. Although the needs of the times are quite otherwise warranting a new philosophical synthesis, "India", to quote A.C. Ewing, "remains a great (perhaps at the moment the only) stronghold of metaphysical idealism, based on epistemology, mystical experience and the idea that a study of the nature of the self discloses that it is identical with the supreme principle or reality".[1] That such is the case among contemporary Indian philosophers may be seen from a study of *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*[2] edited by Muirhead and Radhakrishnan and of the proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

I am not, however, prepared to subscribe to the views of A.C. Ewing. I think that naturalism, empiricism and scientific thought are not alien to Indian genius but are important elements in India's cultural heritage.

2. It seems to me that one of the two chief tendencies in Indian philosophy, the tendency known as empirical-naturalistic, has not received the consideration that it deserved. Vedanta divided the world into two kinds of being, the *Paramarthika*, the transcendental being, superior, accessible to intuition and ideal in nature, the other, *Vyavaharika*, inferior, practical, empirical, changeable, accessible to sense-perception. But if it is possible

1. Ewing, quoted in *Teaching of Philosophy, International Enquiry*, UNESCO, 1953, p. 96.

2. Muirhead and Radhakrishnan, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, second, revised and enlarged edition, George Allen and Unwin, London.

to resurrect the ideology of the Carvakas, Ajit Kesakambali, Maksali Gosala, Purna Kasyap and others and if we can delve deep into the significance of Buddhism, their doctrine of momentariness and *Pratityasamutpada*, the *Syadvada* and the atomism of the Jains, it will be understood that Indian thinkers also addressed themselves to the actual, empirical world and pursued a method of understanding and eliminating specific social ills, of course, within the framework of their own assumptions.

It is indeed true that the results of the thinking of transcendental philosophers have been wrought into the fabric of dominant Indian ideas. The transient nature of sensuous enjoyment, the non-reality of change and time, the fragmentariness and imperfections of things non-eternal, are ideas common to the Indian transcendentalists. But on the other side of the shield, we have the Sankhya theory of change and evolution together with its atheism. Then again, the Naiyayika logical realists concerned themselves with the empirical world and did not subscribe to the Vedantic view that change and temporality indicated mere lapse and deficiency. The atomism of the Vaishesikas, despite their religious fetters, constitutes an important landmark in the development of a scientific apprehension of reality. And the host of realist thinkers who fought subjective idealism on the epistemological plane like the Sautrantikas, Mallisen, Vacaspati, Gautama and others have left us a legacy of philosophical thought of which we can very well be proud.

3. It seems to me to be true that the future reconstruction of Indian philosophy depends, to a great extent, on a proper evaluation of this legacy. I do not maintain that the transcendental idealistic systems do not possess a fascination for the Indian mind. But what I wish to stress mainly now is the substantial weakening of such systems in the present age.

The present age we are living in, especially in India, is an age of strange anomalies and contrasts. It is also an age of ferment. Important economic and political changes have occurred and will continue to occur in India for many years to come. Such changes are sharply posing many new problems and very naturally tend to produce a new sense of social conflict and awareness and

awaken the spirit of questioning. From a prescientific and agricultural landscape India is destined to pass into a scientific and industrial one. In the circumstances, Indian thinkers must, willy-nilly, venture to seek new solutions to the questions posed by the new age. The future urbanised, mass, industrial society will necessitate new pathways in religion and philosophy. And it seems to me to be true that the new problems posed by society and existence will have to be solved by Indian philosophers no longer through traditional channels and established institutions. The new industrial and technological India that is emerging, to my mind, may not have an all-round development if philosophers fail now to evolve a new philosophy recording the scientific and naturalist shift in modern consciousness, while at the same time indicating the lines of authentic human fulfilment.

4. The view is often held that philosophy to be authentic cannot simply reflect the social situation as it is and cannot owe its allegiance only to the historical present. This view undoubtedly embodies an important element of truth. The function of philosophy is not simply to mirror the present reality. Philosophy, as the Indians believe, is a way of life. Its motive is to secure peace from the torments and perplexities of life. Whatever its ups and downs, Indian philosophical thinking never admitted a sharp distinction between theory and practice. In India, I think, philosophy was never "a toy guaranteed to amuse professional thinkers safe behind their college gates".[3] Indian philosophy was a weapon. Its business was to secure human fulfilment and to give meaning and significance to human existence. It was the foundation of all other disciplines – *Sarvavidyapratistha.* I am persuaded that, despite the inroads of logical positivism, existentia lism etc. n o the philosophical world, the character of Indian philosophy as a 'way of life' can be given up only at our peril. Indian philosophy has to be reconstructed to suit our present requirements. But it cannot afford to lose its genuineness and feel consoled only with the shadow side of contemporary human existence. To me it seems that the practical character of Indian philosophy has been its asset. And Indian

[3] Collingwood, R. G., *An Autobiography*, Penguin Books, 1944, p. 102.

philosophical reconstruction to be fruitful has to retain its synthetic character, avoiding the pitfalls of mere language, analysis and/or nothingness. Philosophy must now, as in the past, be an instrument for human deliverance.

5. But though it can reasonably be said that the emphasis of Indian philosophy was on human deliverance, it does not follow that human deliverance was understood in a manner which can satisfy the modern man. Individual liberation (*moksa*) is the value held dear by Indian philosophy. And in a society, hierarchical in structure and none-too-egalitarian, *mokṣa* or liberation postulated an equality on the philosophical plane. Men may start at different points and may have different handicaps. That is certainly the result of past actions. But as each man can attain liberation, all men are potentially equal. Individual development and liberation however, in the peculiar social milieu of small groups governed by considerations of caste, status etc., did not entail social equality, much less the positive act of elimination of economic inequalities. This is not to criticise the conception of *moksa*, from the standpoint of new objectives and purposes which we cherish today. But the inadequacy of the old concept of human deliverance should not be lost sight of.

6. It seems to me that Indian enlightenment in the present period as also in the days to come, can be secured only if philosophers address themselves to the problem of human alienation. A philosophical theory of 'alienation' and 'rediscovery' of man will help us to define man's place in the universe. It will also underline the distinctive characteristics of human history and progress in relation to biological evolution.

It is a matter of pride to us that Vedanta was the first system to consider the concept of alienation of man which in later times recieved the attention of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. Vedanta, true to its idealistic–mystical assumptions, considered 'alienation' and 'rediscovery' of man as the activity of mere spirit. At a later date, Hegel also did the same, for the feudal period in India resembled in some respects the Germany of the 19th century. Material existence was sordid and consequentially 'alienation' was linked up in both the lands with the life of the

spirit. Impotent to secure adequate mastery over nature and indifferent to public affairs, the elite in both lands had to sustain their ideals only in the realm of religion and philosophy. In so doing they evolved a philosophical awareness of individual worth and possibility and a way of life which stood in stark contrast to the actual realities of their life. At the same time they could not break through the charmed circle of the life of spirit and find a way back to mundane affairs, to ordinary human community, society and state.

I am prepared to accept that in recent times Indian thinkers, despite their intoxication with the Infinite and the Absolute, the Supreme Truth, have been loath to ignore the empirical world of objectivity – Sri Aurobindo for example was a great critic of Samkara's 'Mayavad'; and Rabindranath Tagore saw the vision of paradise in the sunlight and the green of the earth, in the beauty of the human face and the wealth of human life, even in objects that are seemingly insignificant and unprepossessing.[4] Much earlier the Visishtadvaitins, specially the Vaishnavas accepted the reality of the world and arrived at a conception of a transcendent realm of being, qualified by the empirical world and the finite selves. All this is true. Indian humanism, however, by and large has remained God-centred. Indian thinkers knew that in the peculiar social milieu man had no feet in the universe and that he possessed no true reality. Consequently religion to them was not so much a theological system as a solid psychological matrix surrounding the individual's life from birth to death.

I am however persuaded to believe that any programme of human emancipation would have to embody now a call to abandon the condition which requires transcendental illusions. The first task therefore in India today is to despiritualise nature, to empty it of all the symbolic images projected upon by the human psyche. In a sense man would then be impoverished, nature would be stripped of all fantastic conceptualisations and turned into a realm of neutral objects which science may control. The loss of the 'transcendental' and the whole system of images,

[4] Tagore, Rabindranath, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Allen and Unwin, London, p. 44.

symbols, dogmas and rites connected with religion will undoubtedly leave a vacuum for a period. But as Marx said:

> 'The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of man, is a demand for their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition which requires illusions.'[5]

I am inclined to believe that with the ending of the relation to God of the modern man, a void need not necessarily ensue. The discoveries of science, the possibility of human fulfilment with the help of an ever-increasing quanta of material and cultural values, the rational and humane ordering of society are fertile soil for the flowering of new philosophies adopted to cope with the knowledge amassed and the creative possibilities of nature and man.

7. My philosophical predilections have been influenced by many currents of philosophical thought. At a certain period I was an admirer of Kant, then of Samkara Vedanta. Thereafter, I was under the spell of Marxism for a pretty long time. Russell's passionate scepticism also impressed me with its brilliance. I have also been deeply influenced by the instrumentalism of John Dewey and the teachings of A. N. Whitehead. Oddly enough, a book of Gordon Childe,[6] by profession an archaeologist and not a philosopher, left a deep impress on my mind. It seemed to me to be a quarry of ideas. Among Indian schools of thought I have liked Carvaka, Buddhism, Jainism, Nyaya-Vaishesika and Sankhya. I think these schools make their point of departure from 'experience' and however hesitant and speculative are their endeavours, contribute elements necessary for the reconstruction of a philosophy for the modern man. Among modern Indian thinkers, I have great admiration for Swami Vivekananda. I am persuaded to believe that Swamiji alone endeavoured, prior to Mahatma Gandhi to expose the alienation of the Indian man and wanted to give him back his lost individuality drowned by the oppressions of religion, caste, creed and economic inequality.

[5] Bottomore, T. B. and M. Rubel, *Karl Marx, Selected Writings*, Watts and Co., 1956, p. 27.

[6] Childe, Gordon, *Society and Knowledge*, Allen and Unwin, 1956.

Finally, I should record that if my present attitude to the Marxian teachings has become in many ways dissident, this does not mean that I do not owe an immense debt to them.

8. In the context of what is said above, I propose now to formulate my philosophical position in a rather cursory and dogmatic fashion. To me living, labouring men and evolving nature constitute the data of philosophy and I think that 'experience' and 'science' are the means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature.

I agree with the philosophers of emergent evolution and of organicism and accept that Nature is not a mechanism but a process. And this conception of Nature (Prakriti) as a process I believe, was grasped by the Sankhya system of India, whose merit has already been noted. It seems to me that we all owe a debt of gratitude to S. Alexander, L. Morgan, John Dewey and A. N. Whitehead for their very able presentation of the new philosophy of an evolving universe having integrative levels.

A. N. Whitehead says: "Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical nor purely biological. It is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is a study of the larger organisms, whereas Physics is a study of the smaller organisms."[7]

"Instead of a closed universe", says John Dewey, "Science now presents us with one infinite in space and time, having no limit, here or there, at this end, so to speak, or at that, and as infinitely complex in internal structure as it is infinite in extent."[8]

Relying on the verdict of science and the philosophies of organicism, I have no hesitation to accept that ours is an open world, an infinitely variegated one. This world, in the old sense, can hardly be called a 'universe' at all. Today we are really interested in laws of motion, of generation and consequence and not in any fixity of Being. For the notion of unchangeable 'substance' (either mind or matter) we have today qualitative events' marked by certain uniformities and levels. The result is that, willy-nilly, we arrive at a conception of a many-levelled reality as Process – as Activity.

[7] Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World*, p. 150.

[8] Dewey, John, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, A Mentor Book, p. 67.

Philosophical systems are generally classified into two exclusive kinds – materialistic and idealistic. The basis of the classification is the answer to the question: What Reality is made of? Materialism is supposed to accept that nature (or matter) is the sole reality. Idealism on the other hand goes to the other extreme and proclaims mind to be the sole reality. From the standpoint of organicism, however, the question seems to be meaningless. Reality we now understand, is neither material nor spiritual. It is rather a complex of activity and internal relations between its various factors. Modern speculative physics, A.N. Whitehead points out, substitutes Organisation and Energy for Form and Matter. Thereby it dispenses with the sharp distinction between nature (matter) and life (mind) which has poisoned classical philosophy, both Indian and Western.

Repudiating the exclusive claims of materialism and idealism, A.N. Whitehead says: "In truth this formulation of the problem in terms of minds and matter is unfortunate.

"The doctrine I am maintaining is that neither physical nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in a composition of the 'really real' things, whose interconnections and individual characters constitute the universe."[9]

Relying on the evidence of experience and science, I confess that, to me, change is real and is indeed a basic fact of the world. I next accept that change is controllable by men. The instrument of controlling change, I believe, is knowledge of nature and society. Finally I am persuaded from the evolutionary progress of Nature and man to accept that, the psycho-physical organism, known as man, can act as the instrument and conscious agent of further evolutionary progress, creating many desirable qualities of the world.

9. Man is no doubt a product of nature as the animals and the plants. The evolutionary process is continuous, exhibiting on the whole attainment of higher integrative levels. Therefore, it is legitimate to hold that as the evolution of life is continuous with the cosmological evolution, so social evolution is

[9] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 213.

also continuous with biological evolution and the higher stages of social organisation, embodied in advanced conceptions of good life are not utopia but are the necessary consequence of all foregoing evolution.

The agencies of evolution at distinct levels, however, are different. At the cosmological sector the agencies are matter and motion. Changes in that sector occur entirely due to mere physical interaction. Living beings, on the other hand, have two basic properties, 'self-reproduction' and 'variation' which the biologists hold, are much more potent methods of change and were available to life. Coming to the human sector, it is noticed that while animals *adapt themselves* to Nature, man *changes* Nature (including society). New and more efficient methods of change are thus available to man through his distinctively human properties like tool-making, speech and the capacity for abstract thought. Thanks to technology and science man has attained mastery over the forces of nature. His evolution, however, has also a cultural aspect. The cultural evolution of man has been made possible by the transformation of shared and transmissible symbol-based systems and their communication. It seems to me that of the philosophers, Marx was the first to recognise the character of man as a 'tool making' animal, who changed nature in the process of labour. The distinctive feature of the human being is that he remakes nature in the course of social production aided by thinking.

Marx says: "What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees, is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his *modus operandi*."[10]

It may therefore, be said that according to Marx also human activity pursues a *conscious* aim and purpose. Precisely for this reason human conduct has a definite meaning and purpose and

[10]Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, The Modern Library, New York, p. 198.

may be said to be ideally determined. Marx would however point out that this meaning or these aims are not arbitrarily determined and *in the final analysis*, they are historically conditioned by economic development. Hence, according to Marx, mankind only sets itself such tasks as it can solve; since looking at the matter more closely we will always find that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or are at least in the process of formation.[11]

It seems to me to be true that man does not only *remake* nature in the course of social production but also operates by the self-reproduction and self-variation of mind and its products which give rise to the methods of cultural evolution based on cumulative experience. Man's biological success in the struggle for survival has undoubtedly been achieved by his capacity to make tools. But this capacity is learned from society through a cumulative social tradition. Owing to the distinctively human means of communication with the aid of conventional symbols, each generation has been able to profit by the experience of previous generations. Man, therefore, as the modern thinkers point out is not simply a technological animal, he is a cultural animal in the anthropological sense. Unfortunately, Marxism has been prone to emphasize man's capacity to make tools and to underestimate other human activities like rites and rituals, religious beliefs, social institutions, speech etc., which act on the technological base and have been potent factors in human evolution.

To me it seems that although the conception of man as a tool-making animal is true so far as it goes, modern science teaches us that man is an evolving psycho-social organism. The second conception perhaps does greater justice to the possibilities and responsibilities of man.

10. Despite philosophical limitations, Marx must have the credit for posing the question of 'alienation of man' in the context of man's 'making nature'.

Marx has explained the primary source of 'alienation' in the development of social production accompanied by a growing division of labour. Arising out of division of labour animal

[11] Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.*

husbandry was first separated from crop-growing. Later handicrafts separated out. Precisely because of such separating out at a certain stage occurred a division between mental and manual labour and the subsequent specialisation of labour. In itself these processes were progressive for they increased the productive forces of society. However, with the appearance of private ownership of the means of production and the emergence of social classes, the processes acquire a conflicting character. Private ownership of the means of production and the break-up of society into classes, very often antagonistic, lead to a situation in which the social division of labour 'alienates' from most men some of the functions inherent in man – intellectual activity, the freedom to dispose of the product of his labour, to have a say in the management of production etc. These become the special functions of certain groups (officials, priests, owners of land and enterprises). These are personified in the State, the market etc., which acquire a certain measure of independence and confront the common man and workers as an external and hostile force. In the soil of this alienation, Marx says, germinates in a class-society, the peculiar ideology of 'alienation' – religion, idealism, cult of the State etc.[12]

Marxists endeavour to prove that 'alienation' is a phenomenon of only of a class-ridden society, specially of a capitalist society. The practice of communist countries, as came to light recently, do not justify any such exclusive claim. Under an omnipotent State and a monolithic party the problem of human alienation, it is now accepted by all, remains unsolved.

Thus, (*a*) in modern society (whether capitalist or communist) that which the worker produces is not his personal creation. He participates blindly in producing an anonymous commodity. The worker has no freedom of choice and realises the aims of other people. He no longer sets aims, he becomes a means. This is a common aspect of 'alienation' of the worker in modern society. In both the systems the worker becomes an appendage to the machine. His actions and his behaviour are determined from without, by the place assigned to him in the vast complex

[12] Marx, *On Human Alienation*, Bottomore and Rubel, pp. 168–75.

system of social production. The second aspect of alienation thus consists in the estrangement of labour from the process of labour, a symptom characterising modern society. Marx of course indicted 19th century capitalism and said, under capitalism labour "is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a *means* to satisfy needs external to it". That which is truly human and creative in man – labour – he said, is reduced under capitalism to a means of satisfying purely biological needs. This aspect of alienation, it is now well-known, has also been a persistent feature of present-day communist societies.

It seems to me to be obvious that capitalism is non-human inasmuch as it gives rise to social relations from which 'man' is absent – alienated by inhuman *property* relations. In capitalism man is forced to give up one vital aspect of his human essence – that of *consciously pursuing* aims and striving to realise them through meaningful social endeavours. This alienation has the propensity to dehumanise man. In communism, as practised in communist lands, also the 'alienation' is not at an end. The all-powerful Party State permeating every aspect of society, its all-inclusiveness and totalitarianism, create a situation of total self-alienation of man. When for instance, the omnipotent Party and State fleece the peasants and ordinary workers in the name of rapid industrialisation, when space ships costing millions are flown because of military, foreign and political considerations, while wages are freezed, the Party and the State cannot be said to have anything to do with human considerations. The sovereignty of a single ideology, the sovereignty of thought of a single Party as embodied in the wisdom of a Stalin or Mao Tse Tung or the central committee, creates of communism a theocracy where human values cannot thrive. The man, in communism as practised, is a cog in the gigantic State and Party apparatus. All the alienations cited by Marx in respect of capitalism prevail also in communist lands. That in communism man lives in an alienated world is proved by the fact that here also the world of reality is reduced to illusion. In communism, long after the revolution is over, terrorist and oppressive methods continue to be used. All alternative standpoints in philosophy,

art, literature, music etc., are weeded out so that one exclusive ideology may blossom. The right to an independent judiciary and the right of habeas corpus etc. are denied on the ground that the rights are fictitious. The masses of the nation do not enjoy the fruits of revolution which go to the bureaucracy in the Party and the State. Oppression, tyranny, lying, deceit etc. are also there. But in the world of communism, these are all treated as illusion, imaginary – 'no-facts' – temporary lapses and deficiencies, occasioned by the 'cult of the individual'.

The material culture of man has undoubtedly made gigantic progress under communism. But the motive behind the advance was not science and humanism but the communist lust for power. That is why most of the achievements of communism were attained in spite of the prevailing tendency of alienation or as its by-product such as industrialisation, organised scientific endeavours and technical invention.

It seems to me to be true that man cannot become man unless he can emancipate himself from the capitalist fetters. On the other hand human emancipation also entails a repudiation of totalitarian communism which denies of man all that humanises him, art, poetry, philosophy etc., and demands submission to the claims of a rigid, all-inclusive ideology.

11. It was already noticed that the evolution of man has another, if not more important aspect, namely, cultural evolution. Although Marxists lay almost an exclusive emphasis on the law of motion of the technological base of society, the pace of cultural change may become so fast, because of 'diffusion of ideas' that we may speak of a social revolution. Social revolution does not only connote qualitative changes in productive relations; on many occasions, as archaeology teaches us, it may have only a cultural basis.

A culture is an organic whole and not a mechanical aggregate of parts. The philosopher cannot legitimately isolate one component, namely the technological base, and label it as the lever of progress and then reduce all other elements of culture to the base. Anthropologists and archaeologists have amassed a huge quanta of knowledge which have opened up new vistas of social

evolution. On the basis of this knowledge, it is not possible to claim as Marx did, that material culture, in the final analysis, determines spiritual culture. The fact is that evolution is not unilinear and human culture has not advanced everywhere along parallel lines.[13] Moreover, even technological evolution has not been unilinear. Consequently the Marxian hypothesis of unilinear social evolution according to which all peoples on earth were advancing along parallel roads to a single goal, namely that of communism, cannot be accepted as legitimate. The philosopher, I am persuaded to believe, cannot accept the naive realism' of Marxism nor the 'idealism' of the transcendentalists; Marxist materialism supposes that 'mind' is simply a reflector of a single external world. Therefore they conclude that this world produces the same ideas in mind. Idealists on the other hand, assume that the law of thought and the categories of knowledge are universal and *a priori* and thereby they evade the sociology of knowledge. They forget that the categories are constructional tools and have also developed in the course of history and vary from society to society even today.[14] Therefore, while I accept that man *makes* nature it seems to me to be important to acknowledge that 'adaptation to the environment' is the condition of survival for societies as for organisms, including man. Twentieth century man needs a new system of economic and cultural beliefs adapted to the new situation in which his societies now have to exist. He has not only to maintain those qualities which spelt progress in the biological past—"efficiency and control of environment, self-regulation and independence of outer changes, individuality and physiological organisation, wholeness or harmony of working, extent of awareness and knowledge, storage of experience, degree of mental organisation etc.," but has also to aim at a continued increase of these qualities, especially in this present atomic age.[15]

12. I prefaced this article with the remark that the empirical

[13] Childe, Gordon, *Social Evolution*, Chapter I and Chapter XII, Watt and Co. *Piecing Together the Past*, Chapter IV and Chapter IX, Kegan Paul.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Huxley, Julian, *Knowledge, Morality and Destiny*, A Mentor Book, p. 265.

naturalistic elements of Indian philosophy did not receive the consideration they deserved at the hands of indologists.

The *nastika* and heretic schools made a determined effort to abandon the traditional intellectual inheritance, which certainly reflects the social and moral strifes of their own day. Apart from the tradition of spirituality, there was another and a parallel tradition in India which emphasised the pursuit of prosperity and happiness as worthy goals of human life. This tradition accepted 'change' for the eternal, evolution for creation, the empirical world for a world of transcendental being. But if we consider both the traditions and endeavour to assess the broad outlines of ancient Indian culture we cannot but accept as the essence of Indian culture "a sense of the transience of life, the all-pervasiveness of her moral law of Karma and transmigration, the belief in an organic or spiritual hierarchy of society, the sacredness of family life and obligations, the ideal of human brotherhood and compassion of fellow creatures, and the aesthetic attitude towards life, with its emotions and sentiments treated abstractly and hence concentratedly".[16]

Today Indian culture has been secularised to a great extent and the process of secularisation is to continue. Scientific and technical explorations have given the common man all over the world, including India, the notion of physical possibilities. Thanks to science and higher forms of social organisation the common man in India, always underprivileged, is coming to believe that no one need be underfed today or chronically diseased or deprived of the good things of life. And in fact, new possibilities have arisen in the present age which can ensure greater collective and individual fulfilment.

In India as elsewhere, philosophers must determine the direction of human fulfilment with the help of new categories or constructional tools. Such tools perhaps are socialism, democracy and humanism. Today socialism is on the agenda of world history. Socialism can eliminate the anarchy of production and can secure economic equality. Socialism, however, must not be allowed to degenerate into the tyranny of a monolithic system,

[16] Mukherji, Radhakamal. *The Culture and Art of India*, p. 18.

maintaining by force human alienation in the name of future human happiness. And socialist democracy today cannot be separate from humanism, the concept of one world, a socialist Commonwealth of Nations. Some of the values of our ancient civilisation should no doubt find their place in the new philosophy. But it is necessary to attain new levels of apprehension of this our very real world. The philosopher has to promote such an apprehension. That is his inescapable destiny and the sooner he realises it and starts believing in it the better for philosophers and for all concerned.

I may record in retrospect that with all our admiration for our ancient culture and tradition, it is high time that our philosophers catch up the spirit of modern times and give philosophic form to the naturalistic and democratic-socialist temper of the age. As a corollary it follows that our dependence on the life-denying aspects of Indian thought should lessen and we should do our own independent work in philosophy on the basis of our naturalistic-secular tradition and by assimilating the best elements in other national traditions.

India was poor but rich in spiritual possessions. Today, we must grow very fast material values and create the conditions for the blossoming of new spiritual and humanist values on Indian soil, grown rich by the application of science and technique. When we have learnt to revere matter and spirit, freedom and organisation, science and holiness of all existence, we shall have the Indian philosophy for the future, dedicated to the cause of human emancipation.

FROM STRUCTURALISM TO A MYSTICAL PERSONALISM

C. T. K. CHARI

1. General Standpoint

I may sum up my philosophical researches in the last quarter of a century by saying that I have been all along an unashamed and unrepentant Oriental groping my way from an epistemological structuralism to a mystical personalism. I am quite unable to acquiesce in the modern dismissal of the 'metaphysics of the self' as a web of pseudo-problems. I cannot persuade myself that the subject or the human person is a linguistic convenience or logical fiction. I report the occurrence of sense-experience by saying that "*I am* seeing" or "*I am* hearing". In all such situations we have to do with more than grammar. There is, in all these experiences, something specific: a unique asymmetry between empirical 'data' or 'things' and a referent designated by 'I'. "I think that I think" may be an 'idempotent' symbol [$J = J^{(2)}$] yielding only 'I think'. Nevertheless there must be some sense of the term 'real' or 'existent' which makes awareness commensurate with it. Mystical philosophy is empiricism in the highest and widest sense of the term: a scrutiny of awareness in all its reaches. In Vedantic mysticism, as I prefer to construe it, consciousness is not ascribed to the self; the self is rather ascribed to consciousness. Consciousness has its personal, interpersonal and transpersonal ranges. The transpersonal in mystical experience discloses itself to a unique person who is ever transcending himself and ever finding himself in a network of interpersonal relationships. Valuation in its protean forms is the enterprise implicit in every I-Thou relationship (32). That man is the "Great Amphibian" inhabiting several worlds of awareness is, according to my view, the abiding significance of the Greek *nous*, the Indian *Atman*, the Chinese *Tao*, the German *Grund*, the *Scintilla* of Plotinus and the *Scintilla animae* of Augustine,

Aquinas, Peter Lombard and Jerome.

The issues about the self are not those turning on the choice of a particular philosophical and scientific language; they go beyond all attempts to specify conditions of 'assertability' in a language or logic. I quite see that Ryle's view that the meaning of 'there are' varies with the category of the predicate it quantifies, 'shoes' or 'minds', and Carnap's view that ontological existential propositions are linguistic stipulations useful or useless, but not factual statements, clear up some muddles about language; but I do *not* see that they undermine the approach to personal mysticism I am sketching.

The point of view to which I have been increasingly drawn has its undeniable affinities with the personalistic mysticism of the classical *Visiṣṭadvaita* and *Saiva Siddhanta* schools, I can accept the *dharma-bhūta-jñana* of Rāmānuja and the *Sivatva* and *Siva-Sakti* of the Siddhāntin, but not without important qualifications. I cannot subscribe to the blueprint of a tripartite division of the empirical self into body, mind and soul unfolded in the classical Indian system. The question whether consciousness pertains to the 'mind' or the 'soul' is to me more arbitrary and misleading than the question whether 'particle' or 'wave' is a valid description of various quantum field theories. Perhaps 'mind' and 'soul', regarded as *substances* in the traditional sense, are little more than Ryle's 'umbrella-titles', nouny, abstract words posing as problems. A plurality of selves is not for me a plurality of substances but *dynamic levels* ranging from various modes of stratified or structured awareness (Ramanuja's *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is an attributive *jñāna* intrinsic to the awareness of *objects*) to various kinds of non-stratified or non-structured consciousness. (1, 2, 3, 4.)

2. Logical Studies

Most supporters of Oriental mysticism defend a classical logic and most advocates of modern, mathematical logic eschew metaphysics and mysticism. I am rather unusual, I suppose, in rejecting classical logic and using the apparatus of a modern logic as a vehicle of my thinking. A mathematical logic is not

necessarily committed to neo-positivism. I have more than once voiced my opinion that the fault of modern logic is not its technical virtuosity, its too obvious preciosity, but its almost myopic concentration on arbitrarily restricted domains of experience thin: sense-perception and mathematical constructibility.

I hold that the postulationist divorce of symbols from their *interpretation* in an ordinary syntax-language provides for a greater generality of treatment than classical logic and also for the recognition of *alternative* systems which, when interpreted in suitably constructed languages for particular domains, would correspond to non-Aristotelian modes of argument (5, 6). 'Analyticity' has no transparency for me. I agree with Ajdukiewicz (*Studia Logia*, pp. 259-81, 1958), that neither semantic nor syntactic conventions suffice for the erection of postulates. And I must point out explicitly that 'truth-tables' are not always machines for grinding out tautologies like sausages. Whether there are tautologies for "all possible worlds of discourse" and whether two infinitely-valued truth-tables are 'equal' in some pre-designated sense (e.g., Kalicki's sense of yielding the same tautologies, *J. Sym. Logic*, 1954) are unsolvable problems. Besides syntactics and semantics, we may require Myhill's intermediary 'apodictics' (*J. Phil.*, 1960).

I take quite seriously the "*crise de raison et la logique*", the modern "*décline des absolus mathematico-logiques*", the repudiation of *An-sich* logics. Gödel's theorem on the essential incompleteness of most deductive systems; Kleene's thesis that the class of recursive functions (6) is not recursively enumerable; Turing's thesis that a 'general decision-machine' in his sense is impossible; Post's theorem on the unsolvability of the *entscheidungsproblem* for his normal systems; the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem leading to the paradoxical result that a formalisation of set-theory in the predicate calculus (any predicate which is satisfied in a non-empty domain is also satisfied in the domain of natural numbers) admits of a *denumerable* model, a result matched by Kleene's incompleteness theorem about the class of pairs which correlates the sets of the set-theory with the natural numbers (6), and lastly the recent attempts made to

elucidate the *essential finiteness* of all 'information' by analogies drawn from Brouwerian lattices, (4) all these to me are not simply mathematical curiosities.

I submit that a self-guaranteed logic is impossible. The assumption of structure is a condition of axiomatisability. There is no logical wisdom in the world beyond the fact that certain statements are postulates or theorems in the system one has adopted (1). Zermelo's *Auswahlaxiom* or *axiome du choix*, (1) which has been debated almost as hotly as Euclid's axiom of parallels, is perhaps only a pragmatic decision or declaration. The attempts now being made to formalise the relations between symbols and *symbol-users* are on the whole less successful and convincing than the attempts to axiomatise syntactics and semantics. To an unsuspected extent, mathematics and science may suffer from a cultural relativity (1) which would make sweeping denials of mysticism presumptuous. *Insight* into cultural nuances is not a question of ordering or structuring to which logic for the most part confines us.

It may serve to bring my logical studies into a sharper focus if I explain why I cannot capitulate to one of my well-meaning and well-informed critics. J. F. Staal in his *Advaita and Neo-Platonism* maintains that Brouwerian and multi-valued logics are but "secondary trends in the West" which has been dominated by the *principium contradictionis* and the *principium tertium non datur*. I cannot acquiesce. Barkley Rooser, in his *Logic for Mathematicians*, has pointed out that the modern 'paradoxes' (Russell, Cantor, Burali-Forti, etc.) arose from "principles which had been generally accepted for thousands of years". The three-valued logic of Bocvar is as good or as bad an attempt to confront the paradoxes as the amputations of mathematics suggested by Russell, Ramsey and Quine, on the one hand, and Church, Curry and Rosser, on the other. To be sure: the rules of two-valued logic can all be interpreted in Brouwerian logic, but only when they are interpreted *weakly:* $A \vee B$ must be interpreted as $\neg(\neg A \,\&\, \neg B)$; and $\neg A$ is provable *if* and *only if* a formula of the kind $A \longrightarrow (B \,\&\, \neg B)$ is provable. Staal thinks that classical and intuitionistic systems coincide substan-

tially for *finite* classes. This is to forget Ackermann's shrewd observation in *Ratio* (1957) "that weighty differences...arise as soon as the construction of real numbers is dealt with". Not long ago Brouwer showed that the assertion (that each monotone full function defined everywhere in [*O*, 1] must be differentiable for some value of the independent variable) is intuitionistically contradictory. And if *f (x)* is a function defined for every number *x*, Brouwer showed that there is a *strong* and a *weak* derivative in a point *P* which are *not* intuitionistically equivalent though they are classically identical. E. W. Beth's semantic interpretation of Brouwer's logic is interesting; but it does not appreciably affect Heything's calculus. Lorenzen's extensions of the *tertium non datur* to intuitionism fail in *application.*

Staal doubts the value of analogies between modern multi-valued logics and Oriental thought. I am not *alone* in saying that analogies of a kind *can* be drawn (2). Ingalls has instituted a comparison between the rejection of double negation in *Navya-nyaya* and Brouwerian logic. P. C. Mahalanobis in *Dialectica* (1954) showed that the Jaina *Syād vada* can be thrown into the form of a probability calculus. For any entity, if *F*, *G*, *H* signify 'is', 'is not' and 'is indeterminate', there are $2^3 - 1 = 7$ propositions which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, each carrying non-zero ($p > o$) probability: *F; G; F* and *G; H; F* and *H; G;* and *H; F, G* and *H. No* empirical proposition in this formalised probability calculus is *certain* or *absolutely true N* ($p = 1$). Elsewhere (9) I have sketched parallels between Jaina logic and the use of multi-valued calculi in quantum physics.

The *coincidentia oppositorum* of mystical dialectic, according to Staal, does not go beyond the *tertium non datur*. Not *all* students of mysticism can assent to his proposals. I agree with N. O. Lossky that "a metalogical principle like the 'Super-one' of Plotinus and Dionysius Areopagita is not subject to the law of excluded middle". What S. L. Frank (of his *Predmet Znaniya,* abbreviated French translation, *La connaissance* et l'etre), christened the 'Unfathomable' *(Nepostizhimoye)* seems to me to be the core of much mysticism, Eastern and Western. The particular construction which Sankara or Ramanuja might have put

on *abādhita* (non-contradictoriness) is not an infallible guide to even Advaitic or Vaiṣṇavite mysticism. I am afraid that I cannot pretend to stand in the well-worn ways of Indian logic. It is an independent interpretation of mystical experience in the light of *all* that modern knowledge has to teach us that I seek.

3. Philosophy of Time, Space and Consciousness

The role of time-ordering in our structured knowledge of the world of ordinary experience and scientific description has been one of my chief preoccupations. Brouwer in his address to the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy at Amsterdam (1948), said: "Consciousness in its deepest home seems ... to oscillate between stillness and sensation". I am persuaded that the logic of relativity can be exhibited as the logic of time-ordering entailing space-ordering (7, 8). Most cosmological solutions of Einstein's field-equations with non-vanishing density of matter have the peculiarity that, in a certain sense, they presuppose an 'absolute' time-coordinate. The Klein-Gordon, Maxwell and Dirac equations of quantum field-theory can be investigated in a four-dimensional space-time continuum with 'space-like' geodesics of *finite* length and 'time-like' geodesics of *infinite* length. In the 'Kinematic' universe of Milne and the 'new cosmologies' of Bondi, Gold, Hoyle and Jordan, in which matter is being continuously created, time has an 'arrow' right from the start. I have recently (13) explored thermodynamics and information theory from this angle. It is likely, I think, that the stochastic laws of 'matter' are a special subgroup of a class of laws relevant to psychology.

My emphasis on time-order I have attempted to elicit consistently from biological, neuro-physiological and psychological studies (10). I discern the emphasis in du Noüy's experimental studies of "biological time"; the work of Woodger and Bertalanffy on the "division hierarchy"; the electrical stimulation of the temporal lobe of the cortex by Penfield and Bailey; and in the "field-theoretical" approaches to embryology elaborated by Spemann, Weiss and Waddington. It is natural, I suppose, that I should attach considerable importance to stochastic models of

learning. The Bush-Mosteller model perhaps admits of some generalisations pertinent to my structuralist and probabilist standpoint.

4. Human Personality in Parapsychological Perspectives

I firmly hold that parapsychological phenomena, both of the experimental and spontaneous varieties, have a vital bearing on all metaphysical speculation about the nature and destiny of selves (16). The approach may be quite 'unorthodox' judged by various canons of Occidental and Oriental philosophy. I prefer to be 'unorthodox'; I think that I can claim some support from C.D. Broad, H.H. Price, C.J. Ducasse and N.O. Lossky. The tentative lesson that I would draw from this growing field of enquiry is that only *restricted* classes of psychical manifolds (sensations, perhaps *some* images) submit to the condition of a metrical topology and geometry (12,15). The usual objection to theories of 'subconscious' and 'subliminal' selves is that they do not serve to explain *how*, if spatio-temporal barriers are irrelevant to Extra-Sensory Perception (ESP), it can find *points de repère* in space or time. If we start with truncated selves in space and time and introduce ESP in an *ad hoc* fashion, the difficulty seems formidable(19). But surely the whole question is about the metaphysical status of selves (18, 23). I suggest that we are facing a situation in which spatio-temporal linkages have to be embedded in a non-metrisable world of selves with interpersonal exchanges determining the behaviour of the metrical manifolds (14, 22). The mechanical analogy of insulated corpuscles and the no less mechanical analogy of a 'common reservoir' are incompetent to elucidate the I-Thou relationship in graded cases of spontaneous telepathic percipience and cases of what I have called General Psychometric ESP. Dunne's multi-dimensional theory of time has always struck me as a challenging approach to a doctrine of personal immortality cast along newer lines. I have hinted at some topological as well as metaphysical generalisations of it (3,11,12,20).

5. Studies in Mysticism and Existentialism

Mystical techniques like parapsychological phenomena are an

impertinence if selves have no 'depth'. The "seeing the self through oneself " of *Upaniṣadic* teaching is echoed by the "contemplating oneself through oneself" of the *Tao tê Ching* and the state of 'unveiledness' (*Kashf*) of Islamic mysticism in which the saint is in a "state of absence from himself and bewilderment". The *fanā* and its complementary *baqā* of Islamic mysticism are logically as opaque as the *homoiōsis tō theo* of Christian mysticism(25,28,29). And existentialism when it teaches that truth dwells in the 'Inward Man'(*in interiore homine habitat varitas*)is a penultimate mysticism indefatigably trying to repudiate its own origin (31). Heidegger's *Zum Tode sein* cannot be directly translated, as Marcel remarked, into the French *être vers la mort*. There is an undercurrent of mysticism in Rilke to whom Heidegger turns. The *Letters from Muzot* and the *Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge* are every revealing. Death, Rilke teaches, is but the other side of life :

Dein heiliger Einfall
Its der vertrauliche Tod

I hold that God is radically involved in all attempts to change ethically interpersonal relationships. As the 'Moslem Teresa', Rabi'a, said, "First the neighbour, then the house". I would in conclusion urge that the poetry of Āṇḍal, Maṅikkavacagar, Rūmī, Lao Tzu, Juan de la Cruz and Aurobindo deserves as much attention from philosophers as their theology(26,27). The *sa hṛdaya* and *hṛdaya samvāda*, so indispensable to aesthetic appreciation, have their odd counterparts in mystical dialectic.

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THE CONCEPTION OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY

S. C. CHATTERJEE

THE OBJECT of this paper is to explain: (1) in what sense a world philosophy is, and in what sense it is not, possible; and (2) if possible, what should be its fundamental character and structure. This will also serve to explain what we mean by a world philosophy.

A world philosophy does not mean a universal philosophy. A universal philosophy is one whose truths or theories are accepted by or acceptable to all men at all times and all places. In this sense not only philosophy but even science cannot be universal. It is true that we often say uncritically that any science is universal in the sense that its truths and principles are universally accepted and that they are not limited to any particular people or country or time. Hence it is that in the case of the sciences we make no distinction between the Eastern and the Western, the Indian and the Italian, or the English and the French. But in the case of philosophy we generally make such distinctions as between Eastern and Western, Indian and European. This, however, does not mean that whereas the truths of the sciences are universal those of philosophy are regional, i.e. they are true in some places and times and not for all. For, it cannot be maintained that any scientific truth is true for all times and places. The scientific theory of one age has been rejected and replaced by a different theory in another age in the past and may be similarly treated in the future. The geocentric theory of Ptolemy was replaced by the heliocentric theory of Copernicus. The old atomic theory of matter has been rejected and replaced by the energy-theory of modern physics. The law of gravitation has no application in certain distant regions of the universe. Even in this world the law, we are told, may be counter-acted by the power of yoga which enables a yogin to keep his body suspended in the air without any

kind of support what so ever.

Thus we see that there is no justification for distinguishing science as universal from philosophy as non-universal or regional. The reason why we speak of some philosophies as Indian or Eastern and of others as European or Western is probably the fact that they have some distinctive characteristics which we want to express by reference to time and place. This is as much true of philosophy as of the sciences and arts. We speak of Greek art, Italian art, Indian art and so on. So also we speak of ancient physics and modern physics, of traditional logic and modern logic and so forth. But no one would misunderstand what we mean when we so speak.

It follows that we cannot speak of a world philosophy in the sense of a universally accepted or acceptable philosophy. Nor can we speak of a universal science in this sense. It seems not to be possible to have such a philosophy or science. In what sense, then, are we to understand world philosophy, if it is to be at all possible? In the case of science, we know, there are some basic and primary principles which are relatively universal and all-pervasive, while there are some derivative and secondary principles which have a limited application and are liable to exceptions. A science is regarded as general and universal in so far as it formulates certain basic and primary principles in the light of which we can explain and justify the secondary ones and also their possible exceptions. Such a science can embrace the narrower ones within its scope and somehow reconcile them. Thus physics is more general than mechanics; Einstein's theory of relativity is regarded as more general and valid than the Newtonian theory of absolute space and time. Similarly one system of philosophy would be more general than another, if its first principles be more general and comprehensive than those of the other. Proceeding further in this way we may say that a philosophy which is based on the most general and ultimate principles of thought and which gives us the most comprehensive view of reality so as to make possible a synthesis and reconciliation of all other accepted systems of philosopy, would be a world philosophy. It is only in this sense that we can speak

of a world philosophy and consider its general principles and concepts. But before we come to these, we should consider the different conflicting views of reality in the history of philosophy.

With regard to the nature of reality we find many different and conflicting views. Thus according to some philosophers, unconcious matter is the only reality out of which all things including life, mind and soul, come and into which they are dissolved when destroyed. This view of reality we find in materialism, naturalism, dialectical materialism and certain types of modern realism and positivism. There are other thinkers who hold that mind or soul as a self-conscious principle is the ultimate reaity and that material objects have no existence except as ideas or experiences of the mind. This view is known as subjective idealism as found in the Yogacara School of Bauddha philosophy and the idealism of Bishop Berkeley. Some philosophers, on the other hand, think that reality is a dualism of mind and matter. We find such a dualistic conception of reality in the Sankhya-Yoga system and the philosophy of Descartes. The pluralistic conception of reality as a system of many independent entities is to be found in the Jaina and the Nyaya-Vaiśesika systems and the philosophy of Leibniz and the modern personal idealists like James Ward and G. H. Howison.

In the philosophy of the Bauddhas and of Bergson reality is a process of change which ever flows and never stops. It is the urge or energy of life which is always changing and growing, so that what is unchanging has no existence. In the Dvaita Vedanta of Madhva and the Viśiṣtadvaita of Ramanuja as also in the objective idealism of Hegel, reality is conceived as the Supreme Person or universal self which is inseparably related to a world of finite selves and material objects.

In certain other types of idealism like the Advaita of Śaṅkara and the philosophy of F.H. Bradley, Reality is conceived to be pure consciousness or sentience which is above space, time and causality and, therefore, above all change and mutation, limitation and imperfection. It is neither a subject nor an object nor

a unity of subject and object, but pure subject-objectless consciousness or non-relational experience. These different conceptions of Reality conflict with one another because they take an exclusive view of Reality and each claims to give the whole truth about it, which is by no means true. Now what are we to say about these conflicting conceptions of Reality, or the systems of philosophy implied by them? Is the conflict of philosophical systems inevitable and unavoidable? Or, is it possible to synthesise and reconcile them as compatible parts of one comprehensive system of philosophy? If so, we would have a world philosophy in the sense we have here explained. Now such a philosophy is based on certain general principles, and concepts. These may now be stated and briefly explained.

(1) All knowledge of Reality comes from experience and, conversely, all experience reveals Reality in some form or aspect of it. If we are to know the existence of anything we must have some experience of it; otherwise it will remain unknown to us. A man born blind does not know what light or colour is, nor can he know it by any process of reasoning. Even the non-existence of anything is first made known to us by a negative experience or non-perception of it. Non-existence is as real as existence. The non-existence of the sun in the sky at night is no less a real fact than the existence of the moon or the stars. And we know such non-existence, not through a positive experience or perception of it, but through the experience of the absence of positive experience called non-perception. On the other hand, if we have the experience of anything, we know its existence in some way, however partial and imperfect it may be. Different men may see a mountain from different places and distances, and have different views of it. But these different views represent different sides, aspects or perspectives of the same mountain. Even when we see an illusory object, we apprehend a part of real space in which the illusory object exists and which it apparently qualifies. Illusory perception may thus be said to reveal Reality in an apparent form.

(2) Experience in a general sense means any form of immediate consciousness. Consciousness is immediate if and when it is

a consciousness of what is felt as directly given and so does not require any process of inference or reasoning to bring it before consciousness. There may or may not be thought in the sense of judgment in experience. But that is not essential for experience as such. Its essence lies in the feeling of immediacy of the consciousness we have in it. Experience need not necessarily be sensory or cognitive even. It may be supersensuous or intuitive, and affective and conative as well. Moral, aesthetic and religious or spiritual experiences are not, properly speaking, sense experiences, but rather supersensuous experiences. Further, just as we have cognitive experience of certain things, so we may have affective and conative experiences of other things. Sometimes we *feel* sure of the presence of a thing which we cannot perceive by our senses. So also our experiences of bodily or mental strain as well as of mental elation and dejection are more conative than cognitive in their nature. In a wide sense, therefore, experience means any way of being directly conscious of anything.

(3) Reality is the infinite whole of all that is or may possibly be experienced. It includes all being (*sat*) and non-being (*asat*), the manifest universe of space, time and causality, and the unmanifest universe beyond them, all that is definite and objective, and all that is indefinite and unobjective. For, of all these we have or can have some experience, and all experience reveals Reality in some form or aspect of it. In short, Reality is the infinite, unified totality of the contents of all possible experience. It cannot be less than that, for then it would cease to be the whole which Reality must be. It is infinite because we cannot conceive any limits or boundaries to it in space and time. It is unified because all its contents are organically related. Like the parts of a living body, they are what they are, because of their relation to one another so much so that one cannot live and move without affecting the others and the whole, however slightly it may be. In view of this we may describe Reality as one immense organism or, in the words of the Vedic seers, as one great person.

(4) It follows from what we have just stated that Reality is

many-sided and Truth is manifold. Reality has many sides and faces or aspects. One of its faces we see as this manifest universe of ours with all its diverse objects and their diverse characters. It has many other faces which are manifested as other universes. It may have still many other faces which are not manifest and known to us. In fine, Reality has infinite faces, sides and aspects which defy all human calculation. Just as there are many sides and faces of Reality so there are many aspects of the Truth about Reality. Reality cannot be said to be only of this or that nature and character, or to have only this or that particular side and aspect, just as the vast ocean cannot be said to be only this or that wave, or to have this or that size and shape. The whole Truth about Reality will be as manifold as Reality itself. Like Reality, Truth has infinite aspects. It is not possible for ordinary human beings to know the whole Truth in its infinite aspects. They can know only some parts or aspects of it, but not the whole with its inexhaustible diversity and richness.

(5) There are different levels of human experience. Broadly speaking there are four levels of experience, namely, waking, dream, dreamless sleep, and spiritual intuition or spiritual experience. In some of these levels we may distinguish different grades or forms of experience. Thus waking experience may take the form of normal external and internal experience, or of abnormal and illusory experience, or of imagination, thought, attention, reason and intellectual intuition. So also dream may be of the form of memory or reproductive imagination and constructive or creative imagination. Deep, dreamless sleep seems to have no grades or forms. It seems to be a formless and homogeneous consciousness of peace and joy without reference to any subject and object. Of spiritual experience, which is variously described as religious, mystical and supersensuous experience, we may also speak of different grades like meditation (*dhyana*), conscious concentration (*savikalpa samadhi*) and super-conscious absorption (*nirvikalpasamadhi* or *turīya*). In meditation the distinction between the subject and the object of thought is maintained, and the act and object of thought

remain distinct and separate states of consciousness. In *savikalpa samadhi*, the act of thought seems to be lost in the object of thought, though there still remains an indistinct consciousness of both the subject and the object. In *nirvikalpa samadhi*, however, all thought processes cease, all mental modifications are stopped, and nothing is known or thought of by the mind. Still, it is not a state of unconsciousness, but of genuine superphysical experience in which all mental functions cease completely and the self shines in itself as pure subject-objectless consciousness. This is perhaps the highest reach of spiritual experience.

(6) The revelations of Reality from different levels of experience will be somewhat different and sometimes apparently conflicting and contradictory. The water of the ocean seen from a distance seems to be blue, but when we take a glass of it and let it fall in drops through the air, it is seen as colourless. When flying in an aeroplane we find how the face of the earth wears different looks when seen from different altitudes. The sun appears as a small disc of light from the level of man's ordinary sense experience, but from the level of his scientific thought it is an immeasurable orb of fire.

Similarly, Reality is revealed in different forms or in different aspects from the different levels of human experience we have just explained. From the level of man's external sense experience as interpreted by ordinary thought or reason, there is a revelation of Reality as a world of many objects with sensible qualities and certain spatial and temporal relations, i.e. as a material world in space and time. Our senses reveal objects according to their specific nature and power as coloured, sounding, smelling, tasteful or tasteless and so on. And our thought or intellect relates them in space and time. The sensible world and sensible things and their qualities and relations are not subjective fancies but objective facts somehow grounded in Reality itself, for they are revealed by our genuine experiences as interpreted by thought from a particular standpoint. On the other hand, if we approach Reality only from the level of internal or subjective experience or of dream, then we would get a view of

it as a world of subjective mental states, or of minds and their ideas. If, however, we combine our external and internal experiences as equally important and authentic, and approach Reality from a joint standpoint, we will have a revelation of it as a dualistic system of mind and matter, selves and material objects. If one approaches Reality from the level of vital consciousness or the experience of life process, there would be a revelation of it as a process of change, as an ever-growing life. If, however, one approaches Reality from the level of experience of deep sleep, one would get a revelation of it as bare consciousness which is neither matter, nor life nor a self or subject related to objects.

At the level of rational thought, we would have a revelation of Reality as absolute Reason of thought evolving and working the world of objects-material, vital and mental – from within itself. From the level of meditative and contemplative experience, Reality is revealed as an independent self related to but different from other selves and material objects which are equally real with it. But when we pass from the level of meditation to that of conscious concentration *(savikalpa samadhi)*, there is a revelation of Reality as the all-inclusive Self or Person including all other selves and material objects as parts of its life, as its qualities and attributes. At the level of super-conscious concentration (*nirvikalpa samadhi*) Reality is revealed as the indeterminate Absolute which is neither a subject nor an object nor a unity of subject and object, but one homogeneous pure consiousness.

(7) The different systems of philosophy approach Reality from different points of view or levels of experience and embody different aspects of Truth. As such, they are all partially true, though none of them gives the whole Truth. Thus materialism approaches Reality from the level of sense experience and the standpoint of natural science, and gives us a view of it as a material world in space and time. The material world is revelation of Reality as that is given through our sense experience. Hence the materialistic view of the world gives us one of the revelations or aspects of Reality and is, therefore,

partially true. But materialism as a system of philosophy makes this aspect exhaustive of Reality and so eventually turns out false.

In subjective idealism there is an approach to Reality exclusively from the level of one's internal experience, or subjective consciousness in dream. Hence here Reality is revealed as a world of minds and their ideas. That the world of minds and ideas is real is no doubt true. But that it is the only world or that it is the whole of Reality is obviously false. So we are to say that subjective idealism gives us another aspect of Reality and is, therefore, partially true; but it becomes false when it makes that aspect exhaustive of Reality.

The philosophies of Buddha and Bergson seem to approach Reality from the level of our vital consciousness or experience of life process and so they get a revelation of it as a process of change or as the *elan vital.* That the world of change or of life is real is true. Perhaps it is more true to say that Reality is changing and living than to say that it is dead and inert matter, or that it is a realm of subjective ideas and experiences only, for change and life appear to be pervasive characters of the whole world of experience. Still, these cannot be said to be the only characters of Reality. If that were really so, there would be no consciousness of life and change. A flowing stream does not know that it flows, a flying plane has no awareness of its flight. So we must say that change and life are only certain aspects of Reality like matter and mind, but not the whole of it.

In Hegelian idealism Reality is approached from the level of determinate self-consciousness as interpreted by rational thought. Hence here we have a revelation of Reality as the Absolute Idea or Self necessarily related to a world of objects including finite selves. All determinate consciousness has a necessary reference to the self as the subject of consciousness and some object of which the subject is conscious. The correlativity of subject and object is typical of all determinate consciousness. The Hegelian view of Reality is thus true so far as our determinate self consciousness goes. But it need not, for that very reason, be

accepted as the only or the exhaustive view of Reality. For there are other levels of experience from which we get a different revelation of Reality. Hence we say that Hegelian idealism represents one of the many aspects of Reality, though it may be more pervasive and comprehensive than that represented by subjective idealism.

The Dvaita Vedanta of Madhva seems to approach Reality from the standpoints of sense experience, reason and religious experience, combined and correlated. While our ordinary sense experience and reason convince us of the reality of many different selves and material objects, in the religious experience of devotion, meditation and contemplation we feel the presence of a higher power on whom all are dependent. So here we have a revelation of Reality as an independent Self on whom all other selves and material objects are absolutely dependent, though they are all absolutely different from one another. From the standpoint of sense experience and religious devotion, this is a true revelation of Reality. But being relative to a particular standpoint, it gives us only a particular aspect of Reality, which should not be taken as the whole of it or as exhaustive of it.

Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, on the other hand, seems to approach Reality from the level of direct spiritual experience of the self in the state of determinate or conscious concentration (*savikalpa samādhi*). In this state we have an experience of the self as a subject which is different from but inseparably related to consciousness. To understand the relation between two facts which are different and yet inseparable, we apply the category of 'substance and quality' or 'whole and part'. Hence for Rāmānuja, Reality is a Personal Being who is inseparably related to and qualified by the world of finite selves and material objects (*saguṇa*). This is no doubt a revelation of Reality relative to our determinate consciousness (*savikalpaka jñāna*) of the self. But determinate consciousness being only one form of self-consciousness and there being other possible forms of it, we are to say that Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭadvaita represents one aspect of Reality and his Personal God is one form of it.

The Advaita Vedanta of Śaṅkara seems to approach Reality

mainly from the level of transcendental or superconscious experience of the self (*nirvikalpa samādhi* or *jñāna*), though it does not altogether ignore the evidence of our sense experience or empirical consciousness. In the state of super-conscious concentration we have an indeterminate experience of the self as pure consciousness which is neither a subject nor an object nor the unity of subject and object. Here the self is experienced, not as different from and related to consciousness, but as consciousness itself. The experience is one of self and consciousness as non-different, of self as consciousness and of consciousness as self, and not even of self, consciousness and their non-difference. So here there is a revelation of Reality as indeterminate, pure being which is non-different from pure consciousness in so far as this being is just the being of consciousness. In deep sleep we have a similar experience of the self as bare consciousness which is related neither to a subject nor to an object. So from the level of transcendental consciousness or of dreamless sleep we have a revelation of Reality as indeterminate and impersonal being. But it is then admitted by Śaṅkara that from the level of empirical or worldly consciousness, Being appears as a determinate and qualified Reality, a Personal God who is the object of worship. Śaṅkara, however, seems to give a lower status to the Personal God in so far as he thinks that it is an appearance which is negated from the transcendental standpoint (*pāramārthika dṛṣṭi*). But this does not seem to be quite right and reasonable. Our empirical consciousness and determinate experience of the self being as good and genuine as transcendental consciousness, there is no reason why we should treat the former as lower than the latter, or as giving us only an appearance of Reality. Rather, we should admit that they give us the same Reality in its different aspects. In the light of this view we may say that Reality in one aspect is qualified and determinate (*saguṇa* and *saviseṣa*), and in another aspect is qualityless and indeterminate (*nirguṇa* and *nirviśeṣa*).

It will appear clearly from what we have stated above that the different systems of philosophy arise from different levels of experience. As such, it is only natural that they give us different

views of Reality. But these views being relative to particular levels, are limited to particular aspects of Reality, which their respective approaches enable them to grasp and express. So they are only partial views of Reality as a whole and not the whole truth about it. But when the different systems forget their limitations and each claims to give us the whole truth about Reality, there follows a conflict of the systems of philosophy and the philosophers begin to quarrel among themselves. It is like the quarrel among some blind persons each of whom touched only a part of an elephant's body but claimed to know the whole of it. There came an end to their quarrel only when they were made to understand that their different ideas about the elephant were only partial views of it and that a full view would be one which synthesises and reconciles their partial views. This is true not only in the case of our ordinary knowledge of objects, but also in the sphere of philosophy. The conflict of philosophical systems can be ended only by a synthesis and reconciliation of them in what may be called a synthetic philosophy. This is just what we have here called a world philosophy.

In the light of the foregoing discussion we may say that a world philosophy is based on experience at all its levels, and not on this or that particular level. Experience at all its levels reveals Reality, although it may be in different ways and forms. If a philosophy be based on a particular level to the exclusion of the others, it will miss those aspects and characters of Reality which are revealed from those levels and, as such, it is bound to be partial. If from the level of sense experience we get a view of Reality as a material world, from the level of mental or internal experience and of rational thought, we get a view of it as a mental and rational system. Similarly, from the level of our vital consciousness we have a view of Reality as a living and changing system. We cannot recognise only one level and its revelation and reject the others, for the others are as good and genuine as the one. If the materialist or the vitalist is wrong when he takes matter or life as the only Reality, the idealist or spiritualist would be no less wrong when he takes mind or spirit as the only Reality and relegates everything else to the

region of the false and illusory in the ordinary sense. Rather, we are to say that matter, life and mind or self are different aspects or manifestations of the same Reality, and that materialism, vitalism, idealism and spiritualism each gives us some truth about Reality, but none the whole of it. Similarly, we may say that Reality in one aspect is a self-conscious person as held by some idealists, and in another aspect is indeterminate and impersonal being as maintained by the Advaita Vedantins of the Śankara School; and that it may have still other aspects not known or thought of by us.

Here certain questions may arise and agitate the mind of the philosopher: (*i*) How can the same Reality have such diverse characters and aspects as matter, life, mind and self? (*ii*) How, again, can it be both personal and impersonal, determinate and indeterminate? To the first question we reply that everything of the world has diverse and almost innumerable characters. The positive characters of a thing are all the qualities present in it and all the relations it bears to all other things of the world. The negative characters of a thing are constituted by all the qualities and relations which are absent in it but present in any other object of the world. But of these there is practically no numerical limit. From the sun to a blade of grass none of us dare claim to have exhausted all possible characters. But it may be said that even if many diverse characters may belong to a thing, it cannot possibly have such opposed characters as materiality, vitality, mentality and so on. Here we are to point out that matter, life and mind are not really so opposed as they were once supposed to be. They are now found by the sciences to be different forms of energy. We may go further and say that they are forms of the same energy in view of the fact that they are not only inter-related but inter-dependent, and support, sustain and develop one another. Just as ice and vapour which exhibit opposed qualities are different states of the same substance called water, so matter, life and mind which manifest apparently opposed characters may be different forms of the same Reality. Even in water itself we find such contrary characters as its touch, taste and smell qualities, each of which nega-

tes the others. So materiality, vitality and mentality, even if contrary to one another, may very well be the characters of the same Reality. We feel no difficulty in synthesising the contrary characters of water because we have uniform experience of their co-existence and we recognise all our experiences of them as equally true. But in the other case we find some difficulty in reconciling the different characters of materiality etc., in Reality because our experiences of them come from different levels and we do not recognise these levels as equally genuine and authentic. But, as we have shown before, there is no justification for this differential treatment of the levels of experience.

The second question is: How can the same Reality be personal and impersonal, determinate and indeterminate? This is more difficult to answer and solve finally. For here philosophers differ with regard to the very existence of the levels of experience from which these characters of Reality are apprehended. Some of them hold that all experience is determinate and gives us only qualified and determinate objects, there being no such thing as a perfectly indeterminate experience. Others, however, not only admit the possibility of indeterminate experience, but hold that it is only in this experience that we have the truest and most perfect knowledge of Reality. As we have already stated, both determinate and indeterminate experiences are genuine, we should accept the validity of their respective deliverances and admit that Reality in one aspect is qualified and personal, and in another aspect qualityless and impersonal. That this is quite possible is at least suggested by certain analogous instances. The sky seen by us near the horizon is coloured blue, but in the open intervening region it is colourless. The water of the ocean seems to be a boundless and formless expanse only, but when congealed by extreme cold it assumes definite shapes and forms. Similarly, when Reality is approached through devotional feeling and emotion, it is manifested as a concrete person, but when approached through pure thought, it is manifested as an abstract impersonal being only. Feeling is a principle of concretion, it makes its object a living Reality. It is thus that the worship of symbols and images becomes significant. Pure thought, on the other hand, is

a principle of abstraction, it makes abstract even what is concrete. It is in this way that we arrive at mathematical entities and logical concepts. Turning the other way round, we see how the object itself manifests different characters according to our different emotional approaches to it. The same person when approached through different emotions is found to develop different emotional attitudes. This is illustrated by the different attitudes of a person in relation to his wife and children. Sometimes a person is said to take an impersonal view of a matter. This means that in a sense a person may become impersonal in his attitude to life.

All that we have said here should be taken, not as decisive, but only as suggestive of the truth of our contention that it is possible for Reality to be matter, life, mind and self, and also determinate and indeterminate, personal and impersonal in its different aspects. If the truth of this contention be accepted, then it will be possible for us to synthesise and reconcile different systems of philosophy as compatible parts of one comprehensive philosophy which we have called a world philosophy.

CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

J. N. CHUBB

PERHAPS THE most difficult question which philosophy raises is concerning itself. What is philosophy? What constitutes a philosophical problem? And what is the nature of the reasoning one employs in solving or discussing philosophical problems? What is the criterion that must be satisfied before one can accept a suggested solution of any given problem as 'satisfactory'?

To ask these questions is to raise the central problem of what may be called Critical Philosophy. It involves an attempt on the part of the philosopher to become conscious of what he is doing when he is philosophising. It is philosophy becoming self-conscious.

Without claiming this as a definition we may say that the attempt to achieve a degree of self-consciousness in any field of intellectual inquiry is philosophy or part of philosophy. Critical reflection on science gives us logic or epistemology or the philosophy of science. Philosophy, however, in becoming self-conscious, remains philosophy and does not become transformed into some other intellectual discipline. In the case of science, critical reflection may rest content with discovering the structure and presuppositions of scientific thought and the logic of scientific method. It need not sit in judgment on what it discovers and raise concerning it the question of truth and falsity, but may regard what it discovers as, what Collingwood calls, 'absolute presuppositions', i.e. presuppositions which are not themselves propositions and concerning which therefore we cannot ask whether they are true or false. Philosophers, particularly the absolute idealists, have indeed attempted to sit in judgment on the presuppositions of science and raised the question of their truth or the degree of their truth. The question, I believe, is neither meaningless nor illegitimate, but one who raises this question is already in possession of a metaphysical system within

which he incorporates the presuppositions of scientific thought. On being included in a metaphysical system, *and not before*, the scientific presuppositions are turned into propositions and assigned a relative truth or a lesser degree of truth than the propositions which form the body of the metaphysical system. The notion of truth itself is organic to the system and inseparable from it. The mistake of the metaphysicians is to assume that the presuppositions of science are *in themselves* propositions, that they are unconscious metaphysical commitments about the Universe or the ultimate nature of things. They are merely treated as such by the metaphysician and the degree of their truth is not ascertained by independent reflection, but is prejudged by the commitments of the metaphysical system in which the presuppositions are incorporated as propositions.

In the case of philosophy critical reflection does not merely discover absolute presuppositions. These presuppositions are necessarily propositions. They involve ontological commitments which, however, need not be directly metaphysical. The positivist for example, would neither assert nor deny that there is a Reality which transcends the senses. He would say that talk about such Reality is meaningless. But this attempt to deny truth-value to metaphysical propositions rests on an ontological commitment. The metaphysical point of view is not logically self-contradictory. The rejection of the positivist's theory of meaning violates no law of thought. The positivist cannot show and perhaps does not claim to show that his Verification Principle is an analytic proposition such that its denial is self-contradictory. Hence the positivist in rejecting metaphysics is not rejecting a flagrant self-contradiction, but what is logically considered, a possible point of view. As such he is implicitly, if not consciously, making an affirmation about the nature of the universe. He is in a peculiar sense a rival metaphysician. He does not reject or doubt the truth of any statement which forms part of a metaphysical system, and so is not a metaphysician in the sense in which a sceptic or an agnostic or a materialist is a metaphysician. Nevertheless he rejects the truth of one statement which, without being a part of any metaphysical system, is necessarily presup-

posed by every metaphysical system, the statement, namely, that the Verification Principle has only a limited application and is not true of all significant utterances that claim to give information about the nature of things. This statement is not self-contradictory and to reject it as meaningless because it does not satisfy the verificationist's criterion of meaning is obviously to beg the question. *At the level of presuppositions*, therefore, the positivist cannot simply ignore the metaphysician, but must join issue with him and hence positivism cannot completely free itself of all ontological commitments. In this rather indirect way the positivist cannot help being a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of his own.

The impulse to critical reflection is provided partly by the fact that philosophers fail to arrive at an agreed solution to any philosophical problem. There are widely divergent and seemingly irreconcilable points of view. Disputes multiply endlessly and discussions show no tendency to bring them to an end. Philosophical polemic takes the form of rejecting what one's opponent says as false, and in recent times of charging him with talking nonsense. Victory in philosophical disputes depends, as Śankara points out, on superior dialectical skill and not on the persuasive force of Truth. This situation in philosophy contrasts unfavourably with the situation in science where there is ordered progress and universal agreement. Philosophy, despite Kant, has never entered upon 'the sure path of science'.

This state of affairs leads philosophers occasionally to the task of overhauling philosophy and examining anew the instrument which is used for building up philosophical theories. This results in strictures on the correction of the understanding and solemn pronouncements concerning the extent and limits of human knowledge. Almost always we are provided with a new method or a revolutionary way of doing philosophy which, it is confidently expected, will bring the sorry state of affairs to an end and win for philosophy the same respect and esteem that is accorded to science. But disagreement among philosophers continues as before, and the new philosophy either dies a natural death or becomes a partisan system, contending with the others, thus

adding to the disorder and dissension which it had come to remove.

The latest attempt at a reform of philosophy, and one that claims to be the most radical, has fallen a victim to the same illusion. The philosophy to end all philosophical disputes, by ending all traditional philosophy, has only resulted in presenting the world with one more philosophical system to jostle with the others in pressing its claim for universal recognition.

In his Address on 'Changing Methods in Philosophy'[1] Stuart Hampshire draws attention to the 'constant temptation to produce a slogan or unifying formula' which inevitably results in creating greater problems than it solves and charges the methodologists and verificationists with being "still in the old rationalist tradition intent on proclaiming one more version of the truly scientific philosophy, which by the application of general logical method would remove all metaphysical puzzles". He suggests that a true revolution in philosophy took place as a result of the writings of G.E. Moore, which consisted in the abandoning of a general method and reliance on a universally applicable procedure in philosophy. Positively, it consists in recognising that since philosophy is not "one of the Sciences with assigned problems, we can do no better than carefully unravel each perplexity as it presents itself". Moore's way of doing philosophy suggests that we should give up the belief that "Knowledge must always conform to some predetermined pattern" and recognise that "there is no use and no hope in defining the limits and proper subject-matter of philosophy or in looking for a general-method of solving its problems".

Following out the implications of this silent revolution in philosophy Stuart Hampshire suggests that we should now "finally accept that philosophy itself must always be experimental, and without predetermined limits or anticipated problems". Philosophy should deal with problems as they arise, piecemeal, using whichever method is most appropriate for resolving the puzzle and bringing about clarity and not attempt to 'convert ad hoc procedures into general methods or to make

[1] *Philosophy*, April, 1951.

universal claims for them'. He concludes that "what is new and genuinely original in contemporary philosophy, or in the best of it, is just the fact that it offers not yet another new method or system, but (almost for the first time) a cultivated absence of method or system". Philosophy will then be concerned with 'a changing miscellany of questions' and "all attempts to find an underlying common origin of philosophical problems is only the ghost of the old fallacy that philosophy must have some unique subject-matter of its own – if not Being or Reality, then Language".

The previous reformers had said that there is only one universal philosophy and one method (their own), and whoever did not agree with this were caught in logical errors and linguistic muddles. This, says Stuart Hampshire, is the great error which has vitiated the whole course of philosophy from Socrates down to the earlier verificationists, excluding of course G.E. Moore, who is regarded practically as the father of the new age of philosophy.

As an attempt at critical philosophy this formulation of what is new in the best of contemporary philosophy is woefully naive and not a whit less dogmatic than the priorism of earlier reformers. Let us by way of illustration, consider two ways in which religious quarrels and squabbles may be sought to be brought to and end. One is by proclaiming that a particular religion is the only true and universal religion and all men should come within its fold; the other is to announce that religion is an illusion and that therefore no one should quarrel in the name of that which is false and worthless.

If the attempt of the rationalists to remove dissensions in philosophy is similar to the first way of overcoming religious disputes, the programme of Stuart Hampshire, who claims to speak for contemporary philosophy, suggests a method which is not unlike that recommended by the debunker of religion. For what it does is to debunk metaphysics, system-building and all philosophy in the grand manner. At a stroke it banishes the questions regarding the eternal and the unseen as meaningless or as of no concern to the philosopher. The attempt to achieve

an integrated, comprehensive view of the totality of experience is dismissed as the dream of the deluded rationalist. The aim and procedures of the minute philosopher are prescribed as the model of sanity in philosophical thinking. We may adapt Stuart Hampshire's own words to describe the confidence with which this philosophy in the new key is practised: "Here is one more illusion that at last the correct way of dealing with philosophical problems has been discovered – until the next revelation arrives, proving that philosophy is really something different" – or even perhaps we should add, something similar to what philosophers before the verificationists always imagined it to be.

If it is the sense of frustration and despair at their futile bickerings that leads philosophers to reflect on the problems of critical philosophy it is not difficult to understand the current distrust and rejection of speculative philosophy. It is felt that philosophers can disagree only when they make assertions about the nature of things which cannot be directly verified. Let us then leave all factual assertions to the empirical sciences and rid our minds of all commitments as to the nature of things. Metaphysics which commits us not only to assumptions about the nature and analysis of our experience but also to a whole new realm of being lying beyond the limits of our present experience must obviously be put out of the way. Our philosophical language must be kept wholly free of all reference to facts of any kind. The philosopher must not say anything himself but only show how what others have said can be said more clearly or in Reality consists of pseudo-statements which appear to be statements only if we are bewitched or befogged by language. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity and hence if only all philosophers would recognise this revolutionary discovery (but alas! they do not), there would be no more serious disputes in philosophy. We may dispute a theory but not an activity; or if there is disagreement about the results of a particular linguistic analysis a careful review of the analysis is likely to dissolve the disagreement, since neither party to the dispute is committed to making any assertion about the nature of things.

All this, it is not difficult to see, is simply the working out of

a possible point of view which can never be shown to be the one and only point of view which a philosopher can take. Clarifying linguistic muddles and reinterpreting concepts used in scientific thinking by completely eschewing all metaphysical statements and presuppositions is one way in which the intellect can exercise itself, but not the only way. But if the refusal to do metaphysics is not merely the expression of one's personal disinclination for this kind of thinking or the result of a confession that one simply does not understand what and how metaphysical statements can mean, but is based on the assertion, itself a philosophical one, that there is no possible way of doing metaphysics then this point of view rests, as we have seen, on a contradiction. It indirectly implies an assertion which is metaphysical. To deny the truth of metaphysical statements is openly to indulge in metaphysics, but to deny the truth-value of metaphysical statements is to do the same thing in a subtle and indirect manner. To eliminate metaphysics in whatever manner is to contradict oneself directly or indirectly.

What then has gone wrong with the well-meant efforts of the reformers down the ages to restore order and sanity in the kingdom of philosophy? Why has critical philosophy failed, in spite of its intentions, to rise above the dogmatic and partisan attitude, to heal instead of multiplying divisions and to discover and lay bare the secret impulse of all philosophers of all ages? In the article referred to above Stuart Hampshire has chided previous philosophers for claiming that we can reach a universal philosophy by the application of a single method. He, however, hopes to reach the same result by deliberately abjuring the claim to be in possession of a single method. The uncritical assumption in both cases is the same. It is that we can overcome the glaring differences among philosophers by the discovery of a new method or by the discovery that there is no one method which has to be used by all philosophers or by any one philosopher at all times. The result will be achieved by a new form of a priorism or by the resolute rejection of all forms of a priorism in philosophy. These philosophers have not penetrated to the true cause of the apparent anarchy in the realm of philosophy;

nor have they appreciated the significance of differences in type and the divergences in the trends of philosophical thinking. They have sought to make philosophy an objective science by attempting to get rid of deep-seated dissensions instead of rising to a point of view from which all these dissensions are seen to fall into place without feeling the need or even admitting the possibility of bringing them to an end *by a dialectical process*.

What is required then is a critique of critical philosophy. We have to recognise the failure of the attempt to prescribe a method or a lack of method which all philosophers are expected to follow. We must suspend the task of bringing about order out of the chaos of contradictory trends by looking for a magic formula which will remove all dissensions. For if we do this we shall always be thinking and criticising from a point of view which is partisan and therefore productive of fresh problems and controversies. What we should do instead is to look steadily at philosophy and philosophical reasoning and try to become aware of what it is that we and all other philosophers do when we set out to philosophise. This implies cultivating at the level of philosophical thinking what in the spiritual discipline of the Samkhya and the Vedanta is called the *Saksin* or the Witness attitude. It implies a capacity to stand back from the turmoil of polemical thought in a poise of detached contemplation and to become conscious of our thought wholly at its very root. This is the secret of critical philosophy because it results in philosophy becoming conscious of itself.

We find here the truth of the positivist's contention illustrated at a higher level. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. This is true not of the whole of philosophy but of critical philosophy, and the activity is not that of clarifying linguistic puzzles and muddles, for this itself presupposes a notion of clarity and intelligibility which would not be acceptable to all, and so would rest on a theory; it is the activity of contemplating or witnessing thought. Critical philosophy is not primarily a theory but a form of what I have called epistemological introspection,[2] to dist-

[2] See my paper 'The Concept of Philosophy' published in *The Proceedings of the All India Philosophical Congress, 1960*.

inguish it from psychological introspection. It is a clear awareness of what we are doing when we philosophise and of the origin of our thought, i.e. the points of orientation and on what they rest, whatever be the particular structure or system into which our thinking results. The findings of this kind of introspection would no doubt have to be summed up and stated in the form of propositions and would to this extent be a theory and not a mere activity. And further, different philosophers might not be agreed about their respective findings. We have in fact to take special care not to overlook this possibility, otherwise we would ourselves fall into the common and persistent error of thinking that at last with the discovery of this new way of reflecting all philosophical disputes will be brought to an end. A further clarification of this point is necessary.

Philosophical thinking may be divided into two types, constructive and critical. Constructive thinking is the process of expanding and maturing a point of view into a philosophical system. I use the word 'system' in the sense of systematic thinking and therefore my definition of constructive philosophy includes the thinking of those philosophers who tell us that there are no philosophical systems in the sense of comprehensive theories which explain all things. Critical philosophy, as I have explained the term, leads us to recognize explicitly that in the sphere of constructive philosophy divergences of opinion are possible, do in fact exist and are perhaps inevitable. It should recognise too that the findings of critical reflection are not self-evident or exempt from criticism and that they may not be universally accepted. At the same time, since critical reflection is not undertaken with the aim of bringing differences in the field of constructive philosophy to an end, differences concerning the findings of critical reflection will be sought to be settled by further critical reflection and will not spread over the whole field of philosophy. They will be, as it were, localised, and the particular commitments made to particular concrete systems will have no bearing on the controversial issues raised by critical reflection.

This will become clearer when we point out a further

difference between the two types of reflection. Constructive philosophy is biased thinking. The bias is present not as defect of such thinking but as its very essence. It cannot be removed by a further reflection and an exercise in self-criticism, because this further thinking will itself be thinking with a particular bias. Where bias is not allowed to operate at all constructive philosophy comes to an end. Critical philosophy, on the other hand, is thinking without bias, but for that very reason it is precluded from developing into any kind of ontological system. It is thinking without bias because it seeks impartially, in a non-partisan attitude to become aware of the specific biases underlying specific systems of constructive philosophy including one's own. I am using the word 'bias' not in any unfavourable sense, but to call attention to the fact that all constructive thinking has a specific trend or direction, its point of orientation or criterion of what is intelligible and logically satisfying which guides thinking, but is not established by it. There is a common assumption, not always explicitly made, that there is such a thing as thinking in general which is open-minded and non-commital and which arrives at a conclusion after an objective and impartial appraisal of evidence. This is perhaps true of thinking in science if we ignore the presuppositions which it implicitly makes and on which it rests, but it is in no sense true of philosophical thinking. This is because in philosophy we do not *arrive* at a conclusion, but merely explicate and mature *foregone* conclusions.[3] This difference between scientific and philosophical thinking explains why in science disputes can be settled and in philosophy they cannot or at least, have not been settled even after over two millennia of philosophising by some of the greatest minds the world has seen. Scientific thinking reaches conclusions which are determined by objective evidence dispassionately observed and acknowledged. Philosophical thinking reaches no new conclusions for it is at its origin committed to a point of view and 'evidence' in its case simply means the presenting of considerations which tend to show the reasonableness and the logical coherence of the 'conclusion'

[3] *Ibid.*

already presupposed in the production of 'evidence'. In science reasoning is *anterior* to belief, in philosophy it is *interior* to belief.

I shall sum up the findings of critical reflection in so far as I have been able to carry out this activity of detached observation. I repeat that these findings are by no means exempt from error, for no observation can claim to be infallible, but the errors, if any, will be the result not of biased thinking but of imperfect observation or insight.

In philosophy our 'conclusions', if one so wishes to call the assertions that philosophers make, are not fresh judgments to which unbiased thinking drives the mind; they are already prejudged at the start of our thinking. Philosophical arguments are merely ways of developing and exhibiting our prejudices or preferences. Regarded as arguments to prove their conclusions they commit a *petitio principii.* That is why in philosophy no proposition can be either proved or disproved, no system can be established or a rival system eliminated. The attempt at an 'elimination of metaphysics' shows great missionary zeal or perhaps a juvenile enthusiasm, but it shows also a very poor understanding of the nature of philosophy and philosophical reasoning. The zestful exhibition of one prejudice cannot destroy the validity or meaningfulness of another.

Critical philosophy is not a propaedeutic to constructive philosophy. It does not enable us to determine the form and direction of the latter. It does not either sharpen the tools we have been using or provide us with a new tool for solving or dissipating philosophical problems. It is in this mistaken light that the aim of critical philosophy has always been understood, and hence every attempt to reform philosophy with the object of bringing about unanimity of opinion has only resulted in adding to the number of systems claiming exclusive and universal recognition. If critical philosophy were a propaedeutic to and, in consequence, an organic part of constructive philosophy it would cease to be critical, i.e. it would not be free of unquestioned assumptions. It would be merely the exhibition, at a seemingly higher level, of the same bias that animates the whole system of thought.

One should naturally not expect critical reflection to resolve all differences of opinion. Though itself free of bias, or rather for this very reason, it stops short with recognising the different biases underlying systems of constructive philosophy, and does not itself develop into a constructive system. But since the bias is alogical it cannot be submitted to a rational analysis. When this is clearly perceived it will be at once apparent how and why differences of opinion arise and also why it is not possible to resolve these differences by the method of dispute and debate. Here then is the practical consequence of critical reflection. It will change the entire complexion of philosophical discussion. Discussion will no longer be polemical and disputatious. Philosophers will not argue with the object of showing their views to be right and all views inconsistent with theirs to be wrong or meaningless. This point may be further explained by reference to the distinction between stating something and evincing a state of mind. Philosophers have uncritically assumed that their arguments lead to and state conclusions, whereas they merely *evince* the point of view which works itself out in the alleged conclusions. Now if we recognise clearly that our 'arguments' state no conclusions, but merely evince the preformed orientation of thought which develops into a logically coherent system then polemical discussion will automatically come to an end, and the true nature and purpose of a philosophical discussion will be revealed. This will now be seen to consist in a harmonious exchange of ideas and points of view, an attempt to formulate with increasing clarity the point of view one holds in its application to the different problems that our experience presents to us and a persistent and sympathetic attempt to penetrate to and as far as possible share in the basic and alogical commitments which underlie the systems of other thinkers and which serve as the guiding impulse and goal of their thought. When this state of affairs is brought about it will usher in the true revolution in philosophy which previous thinkers have sought in vain to introduce. They failed perhaps because they had not discovered within themselves the presence of the Witness consciousness and so had never, to a sufficient

degree, practised the delicate art of detached contemplation. They had merely sought to achieve universality by rejecting and replacing partial and one-sided systems of philosophy with their own particular brand of thinking which was after all equally partial and one-sided.

The point of view which dissolves the errors of uncritical reflection arises from a way of looking rather than a way of reasoning. It is, as I said, a kind of introspection. Now since criticism reveals the true nature of philosophical reasoning and shows that philosophical arguments merely evince alogical directions of thought and do not state conclusions that are freshly arrived at, it might be thought that the foundation of philosophical reasoning is a kind of empiricism. For we *see* that all this is so and do not reason it out from premises which are taken for granted or are alleged to be self-evident. Is critical reflection not reflection at all but merely a way of seeing simply and effortlessly that something is the case? I do not think it is. First of all even if my view suggests a kind of empiricism it is not empiricism of the type introduced by Locke and rounded off by Hume. The detached contemplation is neither sense-perception nor psychological introspection. It is not just a way of obtaining ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection. It results in a penetrating insight into the nature of philosophical reasoning. It may thus be compared to the scientist's insight into facts which enables him to draw out or formulate a theory or hypothesis to account for the facts. When we understand the true nature of a scientific hypothesis we see that scientific thinking lends no support to the crude kind of empiricism which asserts that all our factual knowledge comes from outside and that the mind has no capacity for drawing on its own resources for the production of ideas which will illuminate our understanding of things. As Plato with gentle irony informed the positivistically minded Antisthenes, we possess not only eyes but also a mind. The scientist does not merely observe and make a record of his observations. His fundamental hypotheses are described as 'free creations', in which insight outstrips observation and wrests from nature the secrets which are not on the surface for all to

see. Likewise the critical philosopher does not merely observe, much less venture a generalisation on the basis of what is observed. The detached contemplation is really a penetrative insight into the very heart of philosophical reasoning. It is a seeing not with the eyes nor with the mind as such, but with the mind in its highest form – the rational mind. And just as scientific theories can be put to the test of experience, the findings of epistemological introspection, viz. that all philosophical thinking rests on an alogical starting point and that 'arguments' in philosophy do not establish and state conclusions but merely *evince* a preformed notion of what to the thinker is intelligible and logically satisfying, can also be tested by examining so-called philosophical arguments and divergent solutions to the same philosophical problems and finding that all philosophical thinking is oriented to a certain goal and reaches a particular 'conclusion' only because it is committed to move in that particular direction.

I believe that the present-day anti-metaphysical thinkers, following an instinct, are half-consciously groping their way towards the view concerning the nature and value of philosophical reasoning which I have presented above. The significant pointers are their view that philosophy is an activity, not a theory, their explanation of divergent and apparently inconsistent theories as 'alternative languages', their rejection of the view that philosophy is a science with a specific subject-matter of its own, their total break with the 'this or nothing' type of dialectics which we find in the writings of the absolute idealists, and lastly Wittgenstein's recommendation, 'don't think, but look' for reaching a proper understanding of concepts.[4] But an honest and explicit recognition on their part that their own way of thinking is only one of many 'alternative languages', resting as it does on its own alogical bias, must lead them to the embarrassing conclusion that since the 'truth' of their philosophical pronouncements is logically undecidable, they must on the logic of their own view, dismiss the question of truth or falsity concerning all philosophical views, including

[4] *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 31 e.

their own, as meaningless. Philosophical propositions would then have to be regarded as 'non-cognitive' and meaningless in the same sense in which metaphysical propositions are said by them to be so. The 'elimination of metaphysics' on semantic grounds must be followed by the 'elimination of philosophy' on purely logical grounds.

That, I believe, is the dilemma awaiting the anti-metaphysical philosopher when he makes the presuppositions of his thought fully explicit. It is not possible to say how he will resolve it. But to one who accepts a spiritual philosophy, like the Vedanta, for instance, which admits and insists on the possibility of a *direct verification* of philosophical propositions in an ultimate experience, the dilemma does not exist. But to discuss the problem of the truth-value of philosophical propositions would require a separate paper.

THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF VALUE STATEMENTS

N. K. DEVARAJ

I

RECENT STUDIES in the field of values, chiefly ethics, have been based on the assumption of a dichotomy between factual and evaluative statements. In fact, the practice has been to reserve the expression 'statement' only for assertions of facts, it being presumed that assertions of value did not qualify to be called statements. And since only statements can be true or false, assertions of or about values could not be legitimately characterised as being true or false.

But what is a factual statement which is sought to be so sharply distinguished from evaluative assertions? And what is a fact as distinguished from a value? Does an evaluative assertion assert something about the existence, inherence or incidence of value detachable from the context of existent entities, in the manner of a factual statement or statement proper which makes assertion of a fact? Even granting that there is a contrast between the factual and evaluative assertions, it may be asked: What are the respects in which the two kinds of assertion may be differentiated or contrasted, and whether there are any respects in which they may be regarded as being similar? These queries make it necessary for us to have a clearer understanding of the factual statements.

Since I do not share the assumption that assertions of facts alone constitute statements proper, I propose to use the expressions 'factual statements' and 'evaluative statements' respectively for assertions of facts on the one hand and those of values on the other. In order to bring out effectively the points of resemblance between the two kinds of assertion, I shall indicate those features of factual statements which they have in common with the evaluative statements. I shall particularly argue the follow-

ing points: (1) There are no purely factual statements which may be indisputably or incorrigibly true. (1.*a*.) No factual statement (so-called) is made true by a single fact. Of the several facts which may be regarded as making a statement true, there are some involving references to the so-called subjective factors. (1.*b*.) All the so-called factual statements involve dependence on the so-called subjective factors. (2) The ultimate criteria of the truth of factual statements are two: successful activity or conative satisfaction, and inter-subjective agreement. (3) The truth of a factual statement cannot be permitted to be challenged beyond a certain point. Continued challenge should logically drive the assertor to doubt his sanity. Having made these points in regard to the factual statements, and having roughly distinguished the kinds of those statements, I shall proceed to show how those points hold good of the evaluative statements. Stating my thesis concerning the nature of the evaluative statements, I shall point out the class of factual statements with which they have the greatest affinity or resemblance. This will enable me later to indicate the sense in which the assertions of value may be considered to have validity.

II

The majority of philosophers and thinkers have cherished the hope or illusion that we can obtain the knowledge of reality as it is, that true knowledge is knowledge of facts as they are. This hope or illusion is accompanied by the faith that language can completely express the nature and content of reality. The faith is enshrined in the famous picture theory of meaning propounded by Wittgenstein in his earlier phase. This theory asserted not only that reality *in toto* could be pictured through language, but also that the structure of language could furnish us with clues to uncover the structure of reality itself. On the other hand, from antiquity onwards, there have been philosophers who have denied that language could be an adequate vehicle for the revelation of the structure of reality. In India this later view was held in the most radical form by the Madhyamikas, while the *Upanisads* and the Vedantists heavily leaned towards it. Some recent thinkers have been inclined to substitute 'facts' for

'reality'. Wittgenstein thought that the world was nothing but a collection of facts. On the other hand Peter Herbst, in an article contributed to *Essays in Conceptual Analysis*, affirms the startling view that 'facts are not part of the furniture of the world' (p.150). This radical difference of opinion between (earlier) Wittgenstein and Mr. Herbst may be taken to be a measure of our confusion in regard to the nature of what constitutes a fact.

Quoting Strawson, Herbst defines facts as follows : "Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about". Here the definition of fact is made dependent on the notion of a true statement, but how to tell a true statement from a false one? If the knowledge of fact is dependent on the knowledge of the statement which is made true by it, and the knowledge of the truth of a statement is dependent on the knowledge of the fact with which that statement should be in agreement, then it is not clear which of the two can be known first and how.

Our view is that the knowledge of the fact in some sense precedes the making of a statement about it. It is possible for me not to make a statement about a fact that I know of. Further, a statement does not so much state or express a fact as *attempt* or *claim* to state or express the fact in question. No statement can state or express a fact completely, if only because the statement makes use of conventional symbols bearing no natural relationship to the constituents of the fact. This leads me to make another observation: it is not a proposition which states or expresses something, but the human agent who utters it. Hence no proposition can be interpreted without reference to the typical human intention or purpose reflected in its structure.

A statement is true or false only in terms of the intention or purpose with which it is uttered; its truth does not lie in its one-to-one correspondence with a fact. The picture theory fallaciously postulated such a correspondence between language and reality. When I say 'this table is brown', the adjective brown used by me does not magically convey to the hearer the exac. shade of brownness that is being experienced by me. For aught we know, the brownness experienced by me may not be the same,

exact shade which is being experienced by my hearer. All that is needed is that there should be *sufficient* similarity between the shades experienced by us, so that the word brown may be able to establish successful communication between us. What my statement (if true) succeeds in doing is *not* the expression or utterance of the unique shade of brownness which the colour of the table has; its success consists, rather, in the use of a verbal expression which will be endorsed by all normally constituted persons seeing the table and seeking to convey their experience of its colour in public symbols. Language has been designed primarily as an instrument of communication of experiences among men; only secondarily, it may be looked upon as a revealer of the structure of reality. Language can reveal reality only to the extent to which that reality is known to the speaker or writer, and to the extent to which the speaker or writer is able to communicate successfully. The success of the communication depends, not on the capacity of language to convey bodily the stuff of raw experience (a feat which it can never accomplish with any degree of success), but on the capacity of human beings to understand each other's references to the fund of raw experiences, which are only roughly similar in different persons, *in terms of intentions and purposes which are relatively better defined*. Thus the reference to the brownness of the table is intended to facilitate the *identification* and *recognition* of the table or its colour. These processes of identification and recognition are fundamental in the sense that they are *presupposed in the operation of all other purposes*.

Any statement of fact involves the processes of memory (or recognition) and classification. The statement 'this is a cow' involves both the recognition and the classification of the entity cow. It follows that the statement *does not refer to the phenomena experienced in the pure present*. Hence the statement could not be made true *merely* by the phenomena occurring in the pure present. One additional prerequisite of the truth of the statement is that the speaker concerned should be in possession of a normal physiological apparatus including a normal memory; he should also have the capacity to use words in the normal fashion.

When I report a sense experience with the conviction of its truth, my feelings of conviction is rooted not so much in the perception of an agreement between my statement and the fact as in the implied *confidence or faith in my normality*. As regards the fact I can report it only as it appears to me and to the majority of my fellow beings. I have no access to any pure fact unrevealed in the experiences of myself and my fellow beings. My confident assertion that 'this is the fact' is, in the last analysis, an affirmation of my normality i.e. my fundamental similarity with my fellow beings. Seeing is certainly believing, but seeing inspires confident belief only as long as I am assured of the possession of a normal sight. If a hundred persons, coming one by one or in groups, declare in all seriousness that the table before me is not brown but black, then, after a temporary sense of puzzlement, I would be led to doubt the normality of my sight and the trustworthiness of my eyes as reporters of colours. For I can go on making emphatic assertion about the actuality of my visual experiences only so long as I am convinced of my sight being similar to the sights of my fellow beings. The real reason why I had not so far been led to suspect the trustworthiness of my sight was the fact that its reports had not so far been at variance with those of others. Now that the report given by my eyes conflicts with the unanimous report of others, I have no option but to distrust the normality of the physiological apparatus which constitutes my organ of seeing.

The pragmatists have suggested that the criterion of the truth of a statement is, in the last analysis, the success attending the expectations and reactions based on that statement. But how can I know in a particular case whether or not the success I am experiencing is genuine? The experience of the success can be considered valid only if it is endorsed by the fellow-beings competent to judge it. It is not denied that there may be successes or satisfactions which are wholly of a private character; such may be the satisfaction obtained by eating a dish. However, even in the case of such private satisfactions, a suspicion as to the normality of my palate may make me cautious as regards the desirability of the dish in question. Most of our

successes would not be successes unless they were publicly recognised to be such. By and large it is through my association with my fellow beings, or with those among men and women who are more or less like-minded with me in virtue of the sameness of vocation, taste, etc., that I keep assured of my normality, and thereby of the trustworthiness of my apprehensions and experiences. The ultimate test of the truthfulness of a cognition, as stated in language, is the inter-subjectively recognisable *use* which the cognition in question may be put to. It follows from this that the truth of a statement does not consist in its correspondence with a pure fact. The statement 'this table is brown' would be true even if no creatures other than men saw it brown; even if, e.g. all camels saw it green and all monkeys yellow. In the last analysis all truth that we can possibly obtain and care for is *human* truth, and there is no way of knowing reality except as it appears to *us* in our common experience.

In his *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* Russell, says: "What is most personal in each individual's experience tends to evaporate during the process of translation into language....We all believe our private world to be much more like the public world than it really is" (pp. 17–18). The sameness of the public world is defined not so much by the similarity of the sensory experiences aroused by it in different minds, as by the *functional identity* of objects and processes that constitute it. While parts of the meanings of the words undoubtedly consist of the colours, forms and other marks of the objects by which we identify them, the more important ingredients in meanings are those characteristics and relations of things which define the latter's uses. Thus a chair is what can be used to seat me or my guest, a table what can be used for supporting my books, papers, etc. *The ultimate object of language or discourse is the furtherance of my life as a creative being engaged in the production and enjoyment of values.* I seek to communicate to others through language those features of reality which are relevant for the manipulation of objects in the realisation of values.

This explains why the language used by us should to such a

large extent be general. There are few things in the world which are meaningful to us on account of their individuality; a thing is to me what it can do for me. I should be satisfied with *any* of the ten thousand copies of a book available in the market, with *any* of a number of similarly constructed chairs etc. The features of the objects that interest me most are those which make them usable for me as a layman, as a physician or patient, as a politician, as a poet or painter, or as a member or the fighting forces. The various purposes for which objects can be used and/or talked about constitute the different contexts or universes of discourses. Each universe of discourse has its own methods of imposing unity on the varied materials constituting it, and of judging the validity or value of the statements falling within it.

That is a fact which can be depended upon for the production of an objective value, i.e. a value which can be publicly observed and appreciated, or which can be observed and appreciated by a normal man. A factual statement is a statement which claims to state such as 'In this region during summer water boils at 100°C', 'Any labourer in Calcutta can be hired to work for eight hours for five rupees', etc., are factual statements. A general factual statement is not one that accurately utters or expresses the hypothetical entity called the general fact; on the contrary, it mentions the tendencies associated with some objects or processes which can be depended upon in the manipulations intended for obtaining certain results.

The so-called evaluative statements resemble, in the last analysis, the general factual statements which assert the prevalence of certain tendencies in some objects or processes.

III

Evaluative statements are in essence preferential statements or statements of preference. Behaviour involving preference is a characteristic feature of the living beings. The propensity to prefer one object or situation to another cannot be attributed to material phenomena except in a metaphorical sense. Nor can the material objects assert or force their preferences. Living beings, on the contrary, express their preferences in their reactions

involving avoidance or rejection, acceptance or choice. In the case of beings higher in scale the activities of rejection and choice may express themselves in much more complicated forms, e.g. in the strivings to destroy some objects that are present in the environment and to produce objects or arrangements which so far exist only in the imagination.

Probably some capacity for the conscious appreciation of the value of the objects and arrangements existing in the environment is present in many kinds of living beings. Man is endowed not only with this capacity in a fuller measure, but also with the power to use language. It is not generally recognised that man's use of language is controlled primarily by his disposition to seek or produce values. This fact about man and his speech was noted by the *Mīmāmsakas*. I do not talk about facts in an idle spirit. I talk about them for the purpose of communication, and I seek to communicate my impressions of facts either because I am interested in getting something done through the assistance or co-operation of others, or because I am anxious to share my peculiar view of certain objects or facts with others. I also use language to produce new conceptual objects (a scheme, an idea, a poem) which I expect to be accepted or appreciated by those who are competent to judge them. When I am myself called upon to act as a judge, I make use of what may be called the preferential language. I judge or pronounce one scheme, one idea, one course of action, or one poem to be better than or superior to another.

There are as many kinds of preferential speech and judgement as there are kinds of value. Evaluative statements are generally statements involving comparison or comparative estimate. The element of comparison, however, is not always made explicit. I judge a manufactured article with respect to its relative cost or price, its utility, its durability, and its beauty. These various values which an object embodies or enables me to realise act and react on one another within the context of the complex pattern of life (conceived as a system of values) which I seek to live. The complexity of the values or patterns or preference cherished by man arises from two factors: his constant exposure to the

opinions of his fellow-beings in respect of the various values, some of which are imbibed by him through the channels of education and training; and his own creative imagination which, acting on his thoughts, opinions and tastes, occasionally sets him in opposition to the patterns of preference cherished and sought to be imposed on him by others. One important feature of the sense of values operating in man is its liability to continual change or growth or development. The process of this change or development is greatly accelerated by different kinds of *education* and training. In its higher forms education is concerned not so much with the transmission of information about facts, objects or processes, as with the inculcation of the *sense of evidence*, and the *sense of standards*. Thus in the higher stages of scientific education, what the student is chiefly required to learn are the processes by which the mass of observational and/or experimental materials in a particular field are comprehended under testable hypotheses, and the ways in which the competing claims of rival hypotheses, theories, viewpoints and approaches are weighed and settled. In the field of literary studies the progress of the student is measured by the extent of his insight into the qualities which characterise masterpieces of different kinds, and the relations they bear to the complexities of belief and attitude (relating to the universe, society, history) prevailing in their respective times.

The philosopher-theorists of art and morality often write as if the main business of the disciplines of aesthetics and ethics were to enable us, through the provision of suitable definitions, to *recognise* works of art and right or wrong actions. No teacher of art or literature, however, aims merely at teaching the student how to recognise a painting or a poem. His real aim is higher and more complex; it is to inculcate in the student the critical sensitiveness which would enable him to distinguish higher forms of artistic or literary achievement from the lower. The proper aim of education in art and literature is to impart to the learner the sense of the *relative* merits of different works of art and literature. A similar aim should be ascribed to education in the science or philosophy of morals. It is not, directly, the business

of the moral philosopher to produce morally desirable citizens, even as it is no part of the business of the teacher of art or literature to produce better artists or better literary writers. Indeed, intensive education in art and literature may sometimes interfere with the natural, inspired working of the creative minds, and intensive education in moral philosophy may similarly interfere with the working of the innate generous and noble impulses of a moral genius. What education in arts (including literature) and moral philosophy aims at producing are not so much those who would create art and practise morality as those who would be able to judge art-works and moral deeds in the light of consciously formulated standards.

The growth of moral knowledge does not consist in the growing acquaintance with the variety of actions which may be described as right or wrong, even as growth in the understanding of art and literature does not consist merely in the growing acquaintance with the examples of works produced in those fields. We believe, on the contrary, that real growth in knowledge or insight in these fields consists mainly in the growing appreciation of the qualitative differences which determine the various degrees and levels of excellence attained by the productions of different practitioners. Similar remarks apply to growth in knowledge or insight in the sphere of morality.

The notion that the business of moral philosophy is mainly to define the categories of right and good has been largely responsible for the misconception that right and good are qualities which inhere in objects, situations or actions e.g., as greenness, inheres in leaves. Seeing how difficult it was to identify these qualities, the sceptical thinkers were led, under the influence of the same notion, to deny that moral distinctions had any objective basis at all.

G.E. Moore thought that the word good denoted a simple, unanalysable property. "We must accept either that the word 'good' denotes a simple unanalysable property, or that it denotes a complex analysable property, or that it denotes nothing at all."[1]

Other intuitionists similarly thought that the word 'right'

[1] Warnock, Mary: *Ethics since 1900*, Home University Library, p.24.

denoted a property. None of these thinkers paused to take notice of an important phenomenon of our moral life – that we are frequently required to choose from two or more courses of action all of which seem to be productive of good or right, and to choose from among two or more alternatives of action all of which are seen to be productive of different degrees or kinds of evil. Moralists like Moore are often found stating that, in a given set of circumstances, we have an obligation to produce *the greatest amount of good.* "Our 'duty' therefore, can only be defined as that action which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative" (Moore). Moore and others have failed to see that such a conception of obligation or duty amounts to the abandonment of the view that goodness and rightness are properties of actions taken in isolation from all other things in the world.

I consider a course of action to be right and obligatory – until a friend comes and suggests a better alternative. Do I now cease to see the quality of rightness in the previous course of action? Has the quality in the meanwhile disappeared from that course of action, in the manner in which the colour of a thing may disappear under the action of a chemical agent? Or, should we say, rather, that in the second course of action suggested by my friend the quality of goodness appears in an intenser or deeper form? But that would render the previous course of action not wrong or bad but only less good. Some other difficulties of the quality theory of rightness may also be noted. A person throws a coin to a beggar; I praise him for his action of generosity. But as soon as I come to know that his real intention in throwing the coin was to hit the beggar on his head, or to impress his lady friend with his generosity, my estimate of the moral quality of his act changes. In a different context T.S. Eliot has pointed out that the appearance of a new masterpiece in literature may change our estimate of the older masterpieces. None of these phenomena can be explained by the theory which makes rightness or goodness a quality inhering in an object, act or situation.

In our view no action or work of art can be judged in isola-

tion. Even the most ordinary good action appears to be right or good *because* it improves upon the situation in the previous moment. An action may be good because its non-performance would have prevented the production or appearance of a desirable or value-bearing situation. And even a good action becomes censurable if it falls short of the expectations aroused by the creative potentialities of the circumstances, including the understanding and power of the actor, in which the action was undertaken or performed.

It has been held by some analytical philosophers that our moral judgements are of the nature of imperatives, commands or recommendations. This does not seem to be correct. When T.S. Eliot praises the poetry of Dante or Shakespeare he does not necessarily recommend that the style or sensibility of the Italian poet or the English dramatist should be imitated. In an essay on verse-drama he tells us that one of his important concerns as a writer of verse-drama was to avoid the echoes of Shakespeare in his verse. When I declare that Gandhi is a greater moral personality than Nehru I do not necessarily recommend that men and women in India should be like Gandhiji and not like Nehru. I may admire both Gandhi and Nehru without having the least intention of following in the footsteps of either. Having praised a Buddha or a Gandhi to the full, I may yet declare that an artist or a literary writer should not attempt to imitate the ascetic self-denial of such personalities.

I shall now try to sum up my views concerning the nature (or meaning) of evaluative statements. When I declare that the table is brown I mean that the table has a particular colour for the purposes of identification and recognition *for all normally constituted human beings, whom I claim to represent.* Similarly, when I declare an action to be right or wrong under the given circumstances, I claim to speak for all human beings endowed with a normal sensibility and a normal imagination. I can pass judgement on an imagined scheme and an imagined course of action because I have the power to live and evaluate in relation to that whose being consists merely in being

contemplated and desired by me. This, indeed, is the pattern of my progress towards higher and higher forms of value. On the basis of what is known to me to be good or valuable, I can imagine what is better and more valuable. Having imagined the better, I strive to attain it. Having seen or imagined something to be desirable, I endeavour to make others see the thing in the same light. In striving to convert others to my view I try to rehearse the processes through which I had been led to cherish a certain view. While arguing with my fellow-beings, I all along believe that the processes of ratiocination that I employ would appeal to others. Having felt and expressed preference for a deed or a work of art, I try to prove that my act of preference follows the inclinations of the normal human sensibility.

The normal human sensibility includes all the possibilities of expansion and development brought about by education, or by contact with minds of the higher order. In the final analysis, the proposition that the table is brown admits of no other proof than this, that it appears to be so to all normally constituted human beings. Similarly, the statement that, in a given set of circumstances, one course of action appears to be worthier than another, amounts to the claim or assertion that all normally constituted persons, with the requisite degree of imagination or imaginative training would see the courses of action in respect of their moral merits as the maker of the statement sees them.

It was stated by John Stuart Mill that questions of ultimate ends did not admit of proofs. The ultimate end of every action for me *is a state of my being* in relation either to the given or to the conceived environment. I seek to adjust myself to the physical and social environment with which I am immediately connected; I also seek to live in relationship with the universe, which includes human history, conceived as the theatre for the realisation of my spiritual possibilities. This latter type of living is largely imaginative, and is a function of the development of my *imaginative*, *conceptual* or *symbolic* life. When I judge a poem (a novel, a play) to be superior to another, what I actually

affirm is the superiority of one lived experience, as embodied in one set of symbols, to another lived experience, incarnated in another set of symbols. Similar remarks would apply to my judgement concerning the relative merits of two or more philosophical works or systems. It follows from this that only those persons who have had wide experience of reading and enjoying masterpieces of one or other kind, can be dependable judges of new productions in a given *genre*.

There may be occasions when experts differ among themselves in regard to the merits of a work of art, a philosophical thesis, or a scientific hypothesis. Experts in the different fields are continually engaged in devising objective tests, or laying down objective rules or criteria, for assessing achievements in their respective fields. But even in the field of science, no rules or criteria mechanically applied can serve as perfect substitutes for the act of intuitive appraisals and judgements. Neither the scientists and the artists who conceive unusual hypotheses and new works of art, nor the critics who discover and respond to new beauties or elegancies in the creations of the geniuses, can afford to dispense with the living intuition or insight and depend wholly on the rules and criteria already laid down by their predecessors. All such rules and criteria stand in need of revision and reformulation from time to time. There may be differences of opinion among experts concerning the merits of a work of art, a scientific hypothesis, a pattern of life etc., but the situation need not warrant either scepticism or despair. The experts of one generation try to correct the mistakes or errors of emphasis committed by one or other among them, and the mistakes and errors of a generation may be corrected by the experts of the future generations.

In the above discussion we have made reference to experts in connection with the evaluation of the work of art and thought. Can it be affirmed that some sort of expertness is also needed for making correct appraisals in the sphere of morals? Sceptical thinkers in ethics do not seem to appreciate the need of expertness in persons judging or interpreting moral situations. These thinkers seem to believe that if moral values were

objective, they would be equally visible to the learned and to the ignorant, to the criminals no less than to the conscientious and virtuous. Such a belief could be justified only if rightness or goodness were a quality like greenness. We have already seen why such a naive view of rightness and goodness should be rejected.

It may be granted that the moral value of some actions or courses of conduct can be readily seen by ordinary men and women: this would explain how self-sacrificing heroes like Mahatma Gandhi come to be universally admired. However, ordinary men and women, whose minds are loaded with conventional notions concerning right and wrong, may not be reliable judges of morality in more complex situations. Moral values cannot always be neatly separated from other values pursued by man. When I judge an action in the light of convention, I make but a limited use of my imagination. I compare the given action with the conventional course of action, and pronounce the former to be right or wrong according as it agrees or fails to agree with the latter. But there may be cases when the conventional course of action itself needs to be re-examined and reappraised, in the light of values other than those intended to be realised through the observance of the convention. Divorce between husband and wife may be immoral in the majority of cases, but there may be instances when the continuance of the marriage bond may be more injurious to the cause of the cherished values than its dissolution. Such instances of actual or intended departure from conventional forms of conduct may be more satisfactorily assessed by the experts than by the common man.[2] The experts alone might be able to raise themselves imaginatively to the point wherefrom the possibilities of the realisation of some values and the destruction or endangering of other values through the course of conduct under scrutiny could be clearly seen or visualised. It is not

[2] There may be cases when an expert or group of experts, highly conditioned or obsessed by a theory fails to see what is clearly visible to unaffected common sense. However, true expertness (particularly in a critic of art and literature) includes the capacity for both naive response and naive wonder.

asserted that the experts themselves could not differ among themselves regarding the merits of a given course of conduct. The possibility of such differences in regard to values can never be finally ruled out. But this may be due to the fact that there is *a real plurality of standards* prevailing in the different fields of valuation. Even the experts may not find it possible to make a final choice from among different patterns of values, realisable through different patterns of living. Indeed, the experts may very well agree among themselves to recommend, for different groups of persons, different patterns of living suited to their differring tastes and capacities. It follows from this that what is ideal for one person (e.g. a poet) may not be ideal for another person (e.g. a scientist or a political leader). And yet there is no incongruity, factual or logical, in the supposition that persons following different ideals or patterns of values may be able to extend appreciation to one another. A great critic is generally able to admire different kinds of greatness in art and literature. Romain Rolland, a French novelist and music critic, was able to interpret the greatness of such disparate personalities as Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and Goethe. Detaching myself from my actual life, I can, in the capacity of an impartial judge or critic, project myself, through sympathetic imagination or empathy, into the complex of lived experience embodied in a group of symbols or in a heroic deed, which was cherished by another person. The possibility of such projection by the critical or evaluating mind points towards some fundamental principle of identity characterising all normally constituted persons.

All formulated standards or criteria are abstractions from the total value-bearing experiences and/or deeds which alone constitute the actual standards. All evaluative statements involve comparisons, explicit or implicit, with such standards or standard forms of experience and action. Higher or different types of standards, upsetting previous evaluations, emerge as a consequence of the activities of the geniuses in the different fields. The validity or acceptability of these emergent standards, as well as of previous standards or models, and of evaluations made in

the light of those standards, can be attested to only by the empathetic imagination of the normally constituted and properly trained persons. In fine, an evaluative statement asserts or claims to assert the (general) fact that all normally constituted and properly trained persons tend, under a given set of circumstances, to prefer one type of experience or deed (actual or imagined) to another.

THE CONCEPT OF AXIONOETICS

A. G. JAVADEKAR

1. What is Axionoetics?

Axionoetics (Greek, *axiam* to deem worth; *nous*, mind) is broadly speaking, a study of all human experiences in terms of value. It is an attempt at making a comprehensive evaluative survey of everything that human mind is capable of as evidenced in its concrete achievements in the scientific, the philosophical, the moral, the religious, and the artistic forms of knowledge. All these achievements of the mind may collectively be regarded as forming the human institution of knowledge. Axionoetics is an axiological approach to this most supreme human institution of knowledge. Thus while the traditional epistemology is a study of knowledge mostly in its abstract form, axionoetics is a fulfilment of that study by making the actually acquired knowledge the subject matter of this study and attempting to reach an organisation and integration of all human knowledge on the principle of value. The stimulus for such an enquiry is in the existent state of chaos both in philosophy in particular and in human knowledge in general.

2. Provocative State of Chaos in Philosophy

Philosophers hold different views of the nature and the function of philosophy. They differ regarding what constitute the proper problems of philosophical investigation as well as the adequate methodological procedure to be followed. They further differ as regards the epistemological stand-points about the nature and the test of validity as well as the limitations and valuation of human knowledge. Above all they differ in the conclusions they reach. The entire history of philosophy stands testimony to this chaotic state. One wonders whether this disappointing state of affairs may not itself be regarded as sufficiently

provocative for a rethinking in philosophy.

3. Knowledge Determinant of Reality

Beneath the diversity of philosophical opinion one can see that the effort is to investigate and understand reality in whatever sense that term is used. Reality is one perennial subject matter of philosophy. If it were the case that the given reality determines the philosophical conclusions, there should not have been such a wide divergence in philosophical results. The fact is that between reality on the one hand and the knowledge which the philosopher has of that reality on the other, the determinant factor is not reality, but knowledge. If it were reality that determined knowledge, the unitary reality being what it is should have given rise to unitary knowledge. Then it is difficult to account for the diversity of philosophical knowledge. Between the two terms which enter into relation, viz. reality and knowledge, the former is an invariable factor while the latter is a variable one. The diversity and divergence of the philosophical conclusions could be accounted for with reference to this variable factor of knowledge.

The passage is not from reality to knowledge, but from knowledge to reality. Reality is believed to be and expected to be determining knowledge, but the fact is that knowledge determines reality.

This must not be understood merely as the restatement of idealism. This statement does resemble idealism, but it must not be confused with it.

4. Comprehensive Axionoetic Idealism

The epistemological controversy refers to the relation to dependence or independence of reality with reference of knowledge as also the question of existential priority between them. Epistemological realism asserts the independence and priority of reality, while epistemological idealism asserts reality's dependence on knowledge. The position as I have stated above does not refer to this secondary problem in epistemology. There is a more comprehensive and a more fundamental idealism

(which I call axionoetic idealism) for which both the epistemological statements of idealism and realism are definitive statements of knowledge about the question of the relation between reality and knowledge. Solve the problem as you like, in the ultimate analysis the factual problem is attempted to be solved by a cognitive position that you take. The two famous orders of *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* are the two forms of fundamental cognition. The independence and priority of reality may be a fact, but that is determined through knowledge alone.

This statement of comprehensive idealism must also be distinguished from the metaphysical idealism. The question of the qualitative nature of reality is solved by idealism asserting that the reality is spiritual, and by materialism asserting it to be material. Both these positions are knowledge statements determining the factual question of the nature of reality; whichever position may be right the fundamental idealism remains unquestionable.

Approach to reality, therefore, is inevitably through knowledge. And the most realistic and the materialistic of philosophies are but expressions of this fundamental idealism. It is not given to reality to assert its independent and material character, it is for the human knowledge to judge it to be so and so.

The centre of interest thus automatically comes to be shifted from reality to knowledge. Knowledge is the exclusive gateway to and measure of reality. This knowledge itself is the proper subject-matter of philosophical evaluation.

5. The Traditional Epistemologies: Narrow and Abstract

The traditionally known epistemology undertakes to study knowledge. But this account suffers from being too narrow and abstract. The problem of knowledge has been studied from the psychological, the logical, the sociological, the positivist, the linguistic and the dialectical points of view. All these approaches have been of importance revealing certain aspects of the nature of knowledge, but all of them suffer from making exclusive and extravagant claims. These attempts end variously or cumulatively in subjectivism, relativism, formalism, abstractionism,

scepticism and solipsism. Each such method as empiricism, rationalism, authoritarianism, intuitionism, pragmatism and linguistic analysis is looked upon as an independent and self-sufficient method, but none of these methods can have such exclusive self-sufficiency. Nor again such theories of truth as correspondence, coherence, workability and intrinsic validity are satisfactory independently of one another.

The above considerations suggest a need for an improvement in our view regarding the concept and data of philosophy and also regarding the nature of knowledge situation.

6. Axionoetic Concept of Philosophy

Philosophy is the most comprehensive discipline of the human mind. Its data are most extensive and its method unique. Since the roots of human knowledge are in the variety of experiences that man actually has and possibly can have, all of them ought legitimately to be made the subject-matter of philosophy. These experiences may be at the sensuous, the instinctive, the intellectual or the intuitive levels. They may be mainly cognitive or affective or conative. But each of these deserves a philosophical recognition. Instincts and emotions, intellectual operations and sentiments, reasoning and imagination, doubt and belief, insight and foresight, understanding and appreciation, all these modes make up the fabric of human experience. Philosophy must take note of all these modes. The experiences through which the abnormal, the subnormal, the normal and the supernormal persons go may have a lesson to teach to philosophy. Not only the waking, the dreaming and the sleeping states are of significance, but also the unconscious, the subconscious, the conscious, the self-conscious, and the superconscious levels of experience give an immensely profound material for philosophical investigation. The data of philosophy must include not only the common man's experience but also those of the geniuses, the poets, the artists, the scientists, the speculative philosophers, the moralists, the religious devotees, the mystics and the saints. Philosophy, for example, cannot avoid taking note of the parapsychological phenomena.

It can be easily seen that any attempt to concentrate exclusively upon a certain aspect of experience, and to follow a certain stereotyped method for the search of truth is to narrow down the scope of philosophy to such an extent that it gives a truncated and a distorted picture of philosophy. Such pictures we amply find both in the past and the contemporary schools of philosophy.

Philosophy should not be made a handmaid to narrow extra-philosophical disciplines or points of view such as the abstract sciences like mathematics, the natural sciences like physics, chemistry or biology, the social sciences like psychology or sociology or linguistics or history, and the valuational sciences like logic, ethics and aesthetics. It may draw from these but must not take any one of them exclusively for granted. It has to be comparative, critical, comprehensive, synthetical and valuational. It must be an autonomous though an overall discipline. The philosophical method, therefore, cannot be on a par with any of the specific sciences. It is largely speculative, interpretative, evaluative and experimental as well as experiential. It cannot have an initial bias for the authoritative or the mystical method or for the rational or the empirical methods. It must not approach any field of enquiry either with dogmatic belief or with sceptical disbelief but openness of mind which consists in sympathetic understanding and appreciation of a certain point of view as well as critical regarding the overwhelming or extravagant claims that the view may make. The philosopher ought to develop an attitude of constructive appreciation of all as supplied by the varieties of experiences. The philosophical effort is successful in proportion as the philosopher's personality becomes the repository of such virtues as physical fitness of sense organs, physiologically perfect health, biological liveliness, psychological equilibrium, intellectual alertness, aesthetic sense of proportion, moral integrity, and spiritual creativity. Philosophy, in brief, is a *yoga* in the making.

7. Integral Knowledge Situation

Axionoetics takes account of the integral knowledge situation

to avoid the glaring defects of parochial philosophy and the artificial problems of the traditional epistemology. The human personality is complex and the various elements in the total personality influence the production of knowledge. The knowing agent has a physical body and through the instrumentality of his physical senses, he comes into contact with the physical environment.

The knower is a living organism and the biological forces have their influences upon human knowledge. Particularly the various instincts which are at the root of the personality have a determinant role to play. He has a mind which works according to the laws of psychology, where the non-cognitive and the non-intellectual elements too enter into the knowledge situation.

The intellectual aspect of human personality works according to the laws of logic and takes cognitive decisions add forms judgements.

The intuitive element in the cognitive agent has a certain immediacy of recognition about it. It has a direct insight into truth.

The individual human personality is a product of social and historical forces. The economic status, the social inheritance, the political persuasions and compulsions, the educational make-up, the cultural affinities, the religious background of beliefs, the moral set-up of values, and the spiritual aspirations go to build up the personality of the cognitive agent. These factors consciously or unconsciously enter into concretising the knowledge situation. The general level of the knowledge passed on from generation to generation, the specific interests of the times, the society and the individual knower, the social requirements and the personal ambitions determine the choice of the problems for investigation. The given state of knowledge determines the means, the methods and the standards as well as the modes of verification pertaining to the specific field of investigation.

Further, the knowledge situation involves two-fold ethical conditions. The knower has to fulfil certain moral qualifications to be a good knower. Impartiality, objectivity critical evaluation of evidence, freedom from bias and prejudice, disinterestedness,

love of truth are some of the most basic of the cognitive virtues that make-up the integrity of the knowing agent. Besides these moral conditions which work as an efficient cause there is a purposive or final moral cause in the form of the realisation of certain ideals such as truth, goodness and beauty. Knowing is itself a sort of an activity involving inner teleology. Knowledge serves certain ends whether they are consciously sought for or not. The movement of knowledge is within an axiological frame of the given and the desired values.

Finally we must recognise a spiritual principle in knowledge. Knowledge is a creative activity on the part of the spirit without which the personality of the cognitive agent ceases to have a dimension of dynamism. Knowledge is an illumination, and no other factor in knowledge has that power of illumination. This metaphysical insight which some of the absolutist philosophers have shown compels our recognition.

Thus in the knowledge situation, there is not merely the traditionally recognised trio of the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge, but besides these elements which are in organic relationship there are a number of factors as depicted above. The knower moves within the perspectives supplied by the two-fold sets of values, one determined by the scientific spirit and the other determined by the ideals or values which the society and the individual place before themselves. Ordinarily the bulk of the individual's knowledge is only passsively received through social sanction and authority. But the growth of knowledge is made possible by an active and free contribution. The highest forms of knowledge are constitutive, constructive, operative, and creative. Knowledge is the activity of the knower on the environment, external or internal, with a view to produce truth. The increase in knowledge is not by wanton and accidental accretion of knowledge. It is the resultant of the planned co-operative activity of the experts. Knowledge fulfils itself by progressive organisation and integration of all its forms.

8. Integration of the Forms of Knowledge

This integration cannot be complete if we do not take into

account all the various forms of knowledge. Not only science but philosophy, literature, religion and art constitute the various dimensions of the concrete human institution of knowledge. But what we actually find at present is the chaotic state of this institution. Each scientist limits his enquiry to his own specific field employing specific methods proved to be most efficacious in that field. That certainly makes him an expert, a specialist. But it is rarely recognised that the height of his knowledge also is very likely to measure the depth of his ignorance. It will be seen that if there is an internal intimate relation among the various sciences, then no one can really know one's own subject of special interest well by remaining ignorant of the others. Therefore, give-and-take between the various sciences, both regarding the methods of approach and the findings of each one of the disciplines is absolutely obligatory. A change in the part means necessarily a change in the whole. This truth of the coherence theory does not seem to be applied to the integration of the various sciences. What we often find is that the claims of an individual science are extended beyond its sphere and an illegitimate reduction of the other forms to a stereotyped form of the given science is attempted. The contemporary movement of the 'Unity of Science' imposes a physicalist unity on a subject-matter which need not be and is not physical.

Knowledge does need to be organised and unified, but this unification must be neither arbitrary nor at the cost of real variety of the subject-matter.

Nor again can we regard that the so-called scientific knowledge is the only certified knowledge. Scientific knowledge is only one dimension of the human knowledge. Philosophy and religion, literature and art are equally important areas. They are also in their own way forms of knowledge. Each of these spheres of human intelligence has its own ethos, a system of values most dear to itself. The layman's first and foremost impression regarding these diverse activities of human genius is that each one of these is a uniquely important pursuit, but there does not appear to be any co-ordination of these pursuits. The artist goes his own way, so does the moralist; the scientist

is not prepared to look to the right or to the left and the same is the case with the man of literature. Each one appears to be living in his own world little bothering about the worlds in which other persons live. There cannot be a state of affairs more chaotic than this. There has been a tremendous increase in knowledge but there is a complete lack of the principle of unity, continuity and harmonisation of that knowledge.

At the bottom of all these independent pursuits there is the human being. He is a complex but none-the-less a unitary personality. The values of his life spring from the satisfaction he derives from the objects of his interests. His interests are diverse because his make-up is itself complex. But this complexity does not disturb his unity. And consequently there ought to be a harmony in the diverse pursuits. Each value which a man seeks to realise must be recognised as unique and irreducible. The co-ordination, systematisation and integration of these interests is the ideal to be reached. There cannot be satisfaction of a single interest at the cost of others. To realise the satisfaction of some of the interests is not really to seek the satisfaction of man as a whole.

9. Harmonisation of the Epistemic and the Non-epistemic Values

Thus it could be seen that the problem of the unification and integration of human knowledge is allied with the axiological problem of harmonising both the epistemic and the non-epistemic values. Truth is only one value, but that cannot be reached to the maximum unless all the aspects of the truth namely the formal validity, material conformity, practical workability are realised. Unity between the theoretical and the practical, between the abstract and the concrete aspects of the truth has to be sought. The scientific truth must be brought into intimate relationship with the poetic truth. Harmony of knowledge cannot be reached till the demands of the philosophic, the religious, the moral and the spiritual values are made good. The unity of the cognitive, the affective and the conative aspects of the human experience compels a harmony in their respective values

of truth, beauty and goodness. Truth is no truth, nor beauty beautiful, nor goodness good, unless they are harmonised with one another. Their mutual irreducibility is granted, but their harmony demanded.

The problem of the validation of knowledge is not a problem of an impossible comparison of knowledge and reality nor again a problem of applying the abstract logical principle of coherence to the concretely diverse spheres of knowledge, nor of reaching a psychological satisfaction of successful activity, but it is essentially a problem of the valuation of knowledge in terms of all the values – the intellectual, the emotional, the moral, and the spiritual – that are dear to a human being.

10. The Triune Absolute

The Vedāntic concept of the triune Absolute is very significant in this connection. The Brahman is described as being-knowledge-bliss (*sat-cit-ānanda*). There is a distinction without a difference in these characterisations, and they depend upon the different procedures of approach to one and the same reality. Thus the existential, ontological or metaphysical approach ends in 'being', the epistemological, cognitive or experiential approach ends in 'consciousness' or 'knowledge', and the axiological or appreciative or evaluational approach ends in 'bliss'. Thus our diverse methodological procedures diversely determine the nature of reality without undermining its identity.

To determine reality existentially to be spirit is metaphysical idealism. To determine it experientially to be consciousnes is epistemological idealism. To determine it axiologically to be value as a principle of blissfulness is axionoetic idealism. In the history of philosophy we have tried a metaphysical approach to knowledge and an epistemological approach to reality. But now an axiological approach both to knowledge and reality is needed. And this is not an imposition of an alien element of value on reality and knowledge. On the one hand, reality has no value structure. Fact and value cannot be asundered. It is an error to abstract the actual from the ideal, the positive from the normative. On the other hand, knowledge too has a view

point of value. Our cognitive estimates are essentially axiological evaluations. All description has a prescriptive implication. All understanding is appreciation and appraisal. To know an object is to feel it, love it, value it. Therefore, if valuation of knowledge is the central problem of a theory of knowledge it is completely fulfilled only when the epistemic value of truth is brought into integration with the schemes of values of human life.

The concept of value has a certain advantage in that it has a compelling interest for human consciousness. Value is axiomatic, self-evident, intuitive, simultaneously subjective and objective as well as universal. The essential function of axionoetics is to reach a hierarchical scale of values in science, philosophy, literature, history, religion and art as forms of knowledge and by employing the criterion of the supremely valuable in human experience and knowledge to determine the nature of reality.

In the triune of being, knowledge and bliss there is to be found the origin of all forms of knowledge. Knowledge directed upon being gives rise to truth. Truth is reality known. In this effort arise science and philosophy. Knowledge directed upon bliss gives rise to the value of beauty expressed in literature and art. When knowledge touched with emotion becomes an activity of realisation of the ideal truth in life, it is goodness manifested through morality. The culmination of the moral effort is in religion. Religion is knowledge replete with love. Knowledge filled with aesthetic experience expresses joy or beauty through all forms of the fine arts.

11. Evaluative and Creative Nature of Human Intelligence

The human intelligence which is at the root of all these forms of knowledge shows as its most distinctive characteristics valuational discrimination and superb forms of creative power. Its natural tendency to discriminate between the absolute and the relative, the eternal and the ephemeral, the immutable and the mutable, the final, and the provisional, the good and the pleasant, the intrinsic and the instrumental, the ideal and the actual and so on, constitute the hall-mark of human intelligence. With this power of discrimination also goes its unhesitating preference for

the former over the latter. This natural preference bestows them with values. Values thus are the natural criteria of reality.

Another essence of intelligence is its creative power. Creativity is characterised by spontaniety, freedom, originality, novelty, unpredictability, sportivity and progressiveness. These factors are found in different forms and proportions in the activities of the human mind.

Under the cognitive experience come instinctive, perceptive, intellectual, and intuitive knowledge. The creativity of instinctive knowledge mainly consists in giving a direction to human behaviour. The creativity of perceptive knowledge consists in giving a form to the given sensations. The creativity of intellectual knowledge consists in putting on constructive interpretations and categorisation of the perceptions. The creativity of intuitive knowledge consists in formulation of axiomatic and postulational principles, suggestion of hypotheses, appreciation of values, and determination of likes and dislikes.

The intellectual constructions take on diverse forms in the different sciences. Thus, for example, in the mathematical sciences, the creativity is analytical and deductive. In the empirical sciences it is synthetical and inductive. In the positive sciences it is descriptive of factual contents. In the normative sciences it becomes appreciative of norms and values. In the speculative science of philosophy the intellectual creativity consists in the construction of a comprehensive *weltanschauung*.

At the affective level of experience we have such forms of knowledge as literature, fine arts and religion. The creative activity in literature is mainly imaginative, in fine arts it is largely recreative, and in religion it is supremely generative of peacefulness through meditation, devotion and mystical vision.

Under the conative forms of creative experience comes the knowledge of crafts which helps the manufacturing of physically useful objects and instruments. The applied science and technology are found to be creative in the most astonishing inventions. The most important conative form of creativity is in the progressiveness of moral, social, legal, political and international institutions.

This creative process of intelligence needs to be applied for the co-ordination of all these forms of knowledge reoriented in terms of the human values. That is the ambitious aim of axionoetics.

ADVENTURE INTO THE UNKNOWN

D. D. KOSAMBI

1. Why Science?

The question 'Why solve problems?' is psychological. It is as necessary for some as breathing. Why scientific problems, not theology, or literary effort, or some form of artistic expression? Many practising scientists never work out the answer consciously. Those lands where the leading intellectuals speculated exclusively upon religious philosophy and theology remained ignorant, backward and were progressively enslaved (like India) in spite of a millennial culture. No advance was possible out of this decay without modern techniques of production, towards which the intellectuals' main contribution was through science. There is a deeper relationship: Science is the cognition of necessity; freedom is the recognition of necessity. By finding out why a certain thing happens, we turn it to our advantage rather than be ruled helplessly by the event. Science is also the history of science. What is essential is absorbed into the general body of human knowledge, to become technique. No scientist doubts Newton's towering achievement; virtually no scientist ever reads Newton in the original. A good undergraduate commands decidedly more physics and mathematics than was known to Newton, but which could not have developed without Newton's researches. This cumulative effect links science to the technology of mechanised production (where machine saves immense labour by accumulating previous labour) to give science its matchless social power in contrast to art and literature with their direct personal appeal. Archimedes, Newton and Gauss form a chain wherein each link is connected in some way to the preceding; the discoveries of the latter would not have been possible without the earlier. Shakespeare does not imply the pre-existence of Aeschylus or of Kalidasa; each of these three has an indepen-

dent status. For that very reason, drama has advanced far less from the Greeks to the present day than has mathematics or science in general. Even the anonymous statues of Egypt and Greece or the first Chinese bronzes show a command of technique, material and of art forms that make them masterpieces; but the art is not linked to production as such, hence not cumulative. The artist survives to the extent that his name remains attached to some work that people of later ages can appreciate. The scientist, even when his name be forgotten, or his work buried under the wrong tombstone, has only to make some original contribution, however small, to be able to feel with more truth than the poet, "I shall not wholly die; The greater part of me will escape Libitina". The most bitter theological questions were argued out with the sword; for science, we have the pragmatic test, experiment, which is more civilized except when some well-paid pseudo-scientist wishes to 'experiment' with thermo-nuclear weapons or bacterial warfare.

2. Natural Philosophy

It was obligatory for me to learn several European languages in school and college in the USA. The libraries were the best in the world for accessibility and range of books. Alexander von Humboldt's *Cosmos* surveyed the whole universe known to the middle of the nineteenth century, from the earth to those mysterious prawn-shaped figures visible through powerful telescopes, the spiral nebulae. The Einstein theory, arousing passions of theological intensity, had just been regarded as proved, and offered new insight into the structure of space, time and matter. Innumerable outlines made it easy to learn something about every branch of science. Freud had taught men to take an honest look at their own minds. H.G. Wells showed in his *Outline of History* how much the professional annalistic historian had to learn, though Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* made it extremely unlikely that the historian would learn it. The inspiring lives of Pasteur and Claude Bernard proved that man could gain new freedom from disease through the laboratory; the deadliest poison became a tool for the saving of life through

investigation of the body's functions. Such were the real *ṛṣis* and *bodhisattvas* of modern times, the sages whose scientific achievement added to man's stature. This contrasted with the supposed inner perfection of mythical Indian sages, expressed in incomprehensible language and fantastically interpreted by commentators. The ability to replace incomprehensible Sanskrit words by still longer and equally meaningless English terms can make a prosperous career. It cannot produce an Albert Schweitzer, whose magnificent study *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, analysis of Bach's music and record as medical missionary at Lambarene were impressive even in my irreverent undergraduate years.

Engineering is based upon physics and chemistry, which are qualified as 'exact sciences' precisely because they admit a mathematical basis. Mathematics unlocked the door to the atom and to the movement of celestial bodies equally well. Aptitude granted mathematical research needed the least financial resources of any science. Mathematical results possess a clarity and give an intellectual satisfaction above all others. They have absolute validity in their own domain, due to the rigorous logical process involved, independent of experimental verification upon which applications to the exact sciences must depend. This was the very language of nature, *scientiarum clavis et porta* as Roger Bacon put it. Its supreme, transcendental, aesthetic fascination can only be experienced, never explained.

Unfortunately, not every kind of mathematics unlocks every door to nature's secrets. For some twenty years, my main work lay in tensor analysis and path-geometry (my own term). The structure of space-time had been analysed by the measurement of 'distance' in space and time; I showed that it could be done without distance, merely by the racks that explored the 'space', even when the concept of 'space' was generalised beyond physical recognition. In 1949, Einstein pointed out to me during one of several long and highly involved private technical discussions that certain beautifully formulated theories of his would mean that the whole universe consisted of no more than two charged particles. Then he added with a rueful smile, 'Perhaps I have been working on the wrong lines, and nature does not

obey differential equations after all'. If a scientist of his rank could face the possibility that his entire life-work might have to be discarded, why insist that the theorems whose inner beauty brought me so much pleasure after heavy toil must be of profound significance in natural philosophy? Fashions change quickly in physics where theory is so rapidly outstripped bye xperiment. It seemed and still seems to me that non-associative linear algebras and Markov chains would remove many of the physicists' theoritical difficulties; the experimenters are satisfied with abandoning the principle of parity. The 'red shift' of distant stars will perhaps be explained one day as due to the absorption of energy when light travels at cosmic distances through extremely tenuous matter, rather than evidence for an expanding universe. Such speculations are of no use unless they tally in mathematical detail with observed data.

3. Chance and Certainty

Borderline phenomena of classical physics illustrate the in exhaustibility of the properties of matter. Ice, according to the textbooks, melts and water freezes at zero degrees Centigrade. But when carefully purified samples of water are slowly cooled and the ice slowly melted again, a considerable gap is found between the melting and freezing points. Fundamental particles that make-up the atom and its nucleus show another type of aberrant behaviour. An electron can cross a potential barrier, as if a stone were of itself to roll uphill against gravity, and down the other side. Even the observation of isolated particles becomes difficult, for the very act of observation means some interaction and effect upon the observable. The certainty of classical physics develops only when many fundamental particles are organised into higher units with clear patterns. In the same way, individual molecules of water may move in any direction with almost any speed, but the river as a whole shows directed motion in spite of eddies. So also for aggregates of living matter. In human society, the net behaviour of the group smooths out the vagaries of individual action.

The mathematical analysis best suited for handling such aggre-

gates is the theory of probability. Variation is as important a characteristic of the collective as the mean value. Prediction can only be made within a certain probability, which sounds like the language of the race course. But when the chances of a mistake amount to one in a million, most people take the effect as certain. The level of significance desired may be a personal matter. For example, there is a chance of a letter being lost in the mail; whether or not we register or insure it depends upon our estimate of the risk involved and the expectation of loss. Thus, modern statistical method can be an excellent guide to action. It extends the assurance of exact science to biological and social sciences. Though no man can say when death will come to him, as it certainly must, it is fairly easy to predict within a reasonable margin of error about how many men out of a large group will die after a set number of years. That is why life insurance manages to be a highly paying business, without recourse to astrology. It is further possible to say how occupation and living conditions affect longevity. The man who has to work in a lead mine (without special protection) has his expectation of life reduced by a predictable number of years, more surely than if he were shot at by lead bullets on the battlefield.

Deductions based upon probability differ radically from those of pure mathematics. Conclusions cannot be 'true or false' without qualification, when the variation inherent in the trials is assessed. The standard method is to set up a 'null hypothesis', take the observed results as due to purely random independent variation. The theory suitably applied (and the application needs profound grasp) then gives one of two conclusions: that the numerical observations (if relevant) are compatible with the hypothesis; or not. But either conclusion would be true only with a certain calculable probability, which tells us about how often we would go wrong in action. The trick is to set up the experiment in such a way that the desired action may be taken if the null hypothesis is contradicted; for, incompatibility implies falsehood whereas compatibility need not imply truth.

This may lead to difficulties when the experimenter's will to believe is stronger than his common sense. Parapsychologists test *ESP*, 'extra-sensory perception' (such as telepathy) by having two people match cards at a distance. The effect is so faint and irregular as to call for delicate statistical tests, which show that the chances are very small, for random matching, wherefore the parapsychologists claim victory. Unfortunately, my own experiments showed that the kind of shuffling practised for *ESP* is inefficient when judged by the same kind of statistics that is applied to card matching. Cards originally next to each other tend too often to stay together. Claims of *ESP* would be more convincing if one produced supplementary evidence (say matching encephalograms for sender and receiver) for a physical mechanism of transmission. Some regard the effect as beyond normal sensation, transcendental, not accessible to material analysis. In that case, laboratory tests and the statistical 'proof' become mere ritual.[1]

One of my theoretical papers deals with probability and statistics in infinitely many dimensions. There has been no effective use, because we could not get or make the special electronic calculating machine needed to translate this theory into practice. On the other hand, a brief note on genetics was unexpectedly successful. Professional geneticists use it for all kinds of investigations, such as heredity in house mice. It seems to have given a new lease of life to genetical theories which I, personally, should like to see revised. I am accused at times of not appreciating my own formula. It would have been pleasant to see the formula applied to the increase of food production but the pure scientists of the country which grows the world's greatest food surpluses and suppresses or destroys them to keep grain prices high in a hungry world sneer at 'clever gardening'. There is some difference of opinion here as regards the proper relation of theory to practice.

[1] All the well-designed experiments in parapsychology have used random procedures for target selection, and the statistics used in *ESP* research were approved by the American Statistical Institute as early as in the 1930's.—K. R. Rao.

4. Ancient Indian Culture

To teach myself statistics, I decided to take up some practical problems from the very beginning. One such was the study of examination marks of students. It turned out that even the easiest of examinations in India (the first-year college examination) was based on a standard that differed from that of the instruction, if in twenty-five years no student of the 90 per cent or more that passed could score more than 82 per cent overall while the professors who taught and examined had scored much less in their own time. Improvement of the system (whether in examination or instruction) was out of the question in a country where the teaching profession is the waste-basket of all 'white-clothes' occupations and the medium of higher instruction still remains a foreign language.

A more fruitful problem was the statistical study of punch-marked coins. It turned out that the apparently crude bits of 'shreff-marked' silver were coins carefully weighed as modern machine-minted rupees. The effect of circulation on any metal currency is obviously to decrease the average weight in proportion to the time and to increase the variation in weight. This is the mark any society leaves upon its coinage, just by use. The theory of this 'homogeneous random process' is well known, but its application meant the careful weighing, one at a time, of over 7,000 modern coins as control. Numismatics becomes a science rather than a branch of epigraphy and archaeology. The main groups of punch-marked coins in the larger Taxila Hoard could be arranged in definite chronological order, the oldest groups being the lightest in average weight. There seems to have been a fairly regular pre-Mauryan system of checking silver coins.

Arranging coin-groups in order of time led naturally to the question: who struck these coins? The hoard was deposited a few years after Alexander's death: but who left the marks on the coins? The shockingly discordant written sources (*Puranas*, Buddhist and Jain records) often give different names for the same king. Study of the records meant knowledge of Sanskrit, of which I had absorbed a little through the pores. Other pre-occupations made it impossible to learn the classical idiom

like any other beginner. So, the same method was adopted as for study of statistics: to take up a specific work, of which the simplest was Bhartṛhari's epigrams (*subhāṣitas*). The supposed philosophy of Bhartṛhari, as glorified by commentators, was at variance with his poetry of frustration and escape. By pointing this out in an essay which caused every godfearing Sanskritist to shudder, I fell into Indology, as it were, through the roof.

There was one defect in the essay, in that the existence and the text of Bhartṛhari were both rather uncertain. This meant text criticism, which ought to have been completed in a few months, as the entire work supposedly contains no more than 300 stanzas. Study of about 400 manuscripts yielded numerous versions with characteristically different stanzas, as well as divergent readings in the common verses. Two and a half years of steady collation work showed that I should never have undertaken such a task: but abandoning it then would mean complete loss of the heavy labour, which could yield nothing to whoever came after me. It took five years to edit Bhartṛhari, but even the critics who dislike the editor or his philosophy maintain that the result is a landmark in text criticism. Different methods were needed to edit (with a very able collaborator) the oldest known anthology of classical Sanskrit verse, composed about A.D. 1100 under the Pāla dynasty. The main sources were atrocious photographs of a palm-leaf manuscript in Tibet, and of a most corrupt paper manuscript in Nepal. My judgment of the class character of Sanskrit literature has not become less harsh, but I can at least claim to have rescued over fifty poets from the total oblivion to which lovers of Sanskrit had consigned them.

All this gave a certain grasp of Sanskrit, but hardly of ancient Indian history; the necessary documents simply did not exist. My countrymen eked out doubtful sources with an exuberant imagination and what L. Renou has called 'logique imperturbable'. One reads of the revival of Nationalism and Hinduism under Chandragupta II, of whom nothing is known with certainty. Indian nationalism is a phenomenon of the bourgeois age, not to be imagined before the development of provincial languages (long after the Guptas) under distinct common markets. Our

present-day clashes between linguistic groups are an index to the development of local bourgeoisies in the various states. Hinduism came into existence after Mohammedan invasion. Clearly, one of two positions had to be taken. Either India has no history at all, or some better definition of history was needed. The latter I derived from the study of Karl Marx, who himself expressed the former view. History is the development in chronological order of successive changes in the means and relations of production. Thus slavery in the Graeco-Roman sense was replaced by the caste system in India only because commodity production was at a lower level. Indian history has to be written without the episodes that fill the history books of other countries. But what were the relevant sources? Granted that the plough is more important than a dynasty, when and where was the tool first introduced? What class took the surplus produced thereby? Archaeology provided some data, but I could get a great deal more from the peasants. Field work in philology and social anthropology had to be combined with archaeology in the field as distinguished from the site archaeology of a 'dig'. Our villagers, low caste nomads, and tribal minorities live at a more primitive stage than city people or the brahmins who wrote the *purāṇas*. Their cults, when not masked by brahmin identification with Sanskritised deities, go back to prehistory like the stone axes used in Roman sacrifices. Tracing a local god through village tradition gives a priceless clue to ancient migrations, primitive tracks, early trade routes and the merger of cattle breeding tribesmen with food gatherers which led to firm agricultural settlement. The technique of observation has to be developed afresh for every province in India. The conclusions published as *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History* had a mixed reception because of the reference to Marx, which automatically classifies them as dangerous political agitation in the eyes of many, while official Marxists look with suspicion upon the work of an outsider.

Field investigation continues to give new and useful results. Experts say glumly that my collection of microliths is unique not only in range of sites but in containing pierced specimen.

A totally unsuspected megalithic culture came to light this year. It fell to my lot to discover, read and publish a Brāhmī inscription at Kārle caves, which had passed unnoticed though in plain sight of the 50,000 people who visit the place every year. The suggestion for using the Māḷsheṭ Pass should give Maharashṭra a badly needed key road from Bombay to Ahmadnagar, and save a few million rupees though the funicular railway down Nāneghāṭ would have been more spectacular.

5. Social Aspects

The greatest obstacles to research in any backward, underdeveloped country are those needlessly created by the scientist's or scholar's colleagues and fellow citizens. The meretricious ability to please the right people, an attractive pose, glib charlatanism and a clever press agent are indispensable. Mere scientific ability is at a discount. The Byzantine emperor Nikephoros Phokas assured himself of ample notice from superficial observers, at someone else's expense by setting up in his own name at a strategic site in the Roman Forum, a column pilfered from some grandiose temple. Many eminent intellectuals have mastered this technique in India.

The deep question is not what floats to the top of a stagnant class but of fundamental relationship between the great discoverers and their social environment. Conservatives take history as the personal achievement of great men, especially the history of science. The Marxist assertion is that the great man is he who finds some way to fulfil a deep though perhaps unstated social need of his times. Thus, B. Hessen explained Newton's work in terms of the technical and economic necessities of his class, time and place. The thesis was successful enough to be noticed and contested by a distinguished authority on 17th century European history, Sir George Clark. Clark's knowledge of the sources is unquestionably greater than Hessen's, but the refutation manages to overreach the argument. According to Clark, 'the scientific movement (of the 17th century) was set going by 'six interpenetrating but independent impulses' from outside and 'some of its results percolated

down into practice and were applied'. The external impulses were 'from economic life, from war, from medicine, from the arts, and from religion. What is left then of the independence of science?' The sixth impulse was from the 'disinterested desire to know'. So far as I know, all six impulses applied from the very earliest civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, China and probably the Indus Valley, without producing what we recognise as 'science' from, say, the time of Galileo. What was the missing ingredient, if not the rise of the proto-bourgeoisie in Europe? No Marxist would claim that science can be independent of the social system within which the scientist must function.

Much the same treatment may be given to literature. Disregarding oversimplification, can one say that Shakespeare's plays mainfest the rise of the Elizabethan proto-bourgeoisie, when the said dramas are full of kings, lords and princes? The answer is yes. Compare *Hamlet* or *Richard the Third* with the leading characters in *Beowulf* or the *Chanson de Roland*. The fattest Shakespearean parts like Shylock and Falstaff are difficult to visualise in any feudal literature. The characters in those plays have a 'modern' psychology, which accounts for their appeal to the succeeding bourgeoisie, and hence for the survival value of the dramas. Troilus and Cressida are not feudal characters any more than they are Homeric; Newton's Latin prose and archaic geometrical proofs in the *Principia* make that work unreadable, but do not make it Roman or Greek science.

It would take a whole book to develop this thesis for India's trifling successes and considerable failure in modern science. In what follows, only the most obvious defects in applying science to major Indian problems are considered, without discussion of the extent to which this accounts for the lack of really great scientists in India.

India, the experts tell us, is over-populated and will remain poor unless birth control and population planning is introduced. But surely, over-population can only be with respect to the available food supply. Availability depends upon production, transport, and the system of distribution. What is the total

amount of food produced? We have theological quarrels between two schools of statisticians, but no reliable estimate of how much is actually grown and what proportion thereof escapes vermin – including middlemen and profiteers – to reach the consumer. If shopkeepers can and do raise prices without effective control, what does a rise in the national income mean? Is the scarcity of grain or of purchasing power? A great deal is said about superstitious common people who must be educated before birth control becomes effective. The superstition which makes the poor long for children has a solid economic foundation. Children are the sole means of support for those among the common people who manage to reach helpless old age. The futility of numerical 'planning' of the population, when nothing is done to ensure that even the able-bodied have a decent level of subsistence, is obvious to anyone but a born expert. Convince the people that even the childless will be fed and looked after when unable to fend for themselves and birth control will become popular.

Let me give examples of scientific effort which could easily have been turned to better account. Considerable funds will be devoted during the Third Plan to research on the uses of bagasse (sugarcane pulp). At present, it is used as fuel and the ashes as fertilizer, whereas paper and many other things could be made from it. But are the other uses (quite well known) the best in the present state of Indian economy? The extra money to be spent on fuel, not to speak of difficulties in getting fuel, would increase the already high cost of sugar manufacture; new factories for by-products mean considerable foreign exchange for the machinery, and for the 'experts'. However, if the bagasse is fermented in closed vats, the gas given off can be burned, so that the fuel value is not reduced. The sludge makes excellent fertilizer, which saves money on chemical fertilizers and improves the soil. The scheme (not mine, but due to Hungarian scientists) has apparently been pushed into the background. Again, the proper height of a dam is important in order to reduce the outlay to a minimum, without the risk of running dry more than (say) once in twenty years. The problem is

statistical, based upon the rainfall and runoff data where both exist. The principles I suggested were adopted by the Planning Commission, though not as emanating from me. Neither the engineers nor the Planning Commission, would consider a more important suggestion, namely, that many cheap small dams should be located by plan and built from local materials with local labour. Monsoon water would be conserved and two or three crops raised annually on good soil that now yields only one. The real obstacle is not ignorance of technique but private ownership of land and lack of co-operation among the owners.

This country needs every form of power available, but is too poor to throw money away on costly fads like atomic energy merely because they look ultra-modern. A really paying development will be of solar energy, neglected by the advanced countries because they have not so much sunlight as the tropics. Our problem lies deeper than power production. The reforestation, indispensable for good agriculture, will not be possible without fuel to replace firewood and charcoal. Coal mining does not suffice even for industry; fuel oil has to be imported. A good solar cooker would be the answer. Such cookers exist and have been used abroad. The one produced in India was hopelessly inefficient (in spite of the many Indian physicists of international reputation). Neatly timed publicity and a fake demonstration made the gullible public buy just enough useless 'cookers' for a quick profit to the manufacturer.

A flimsy 'Indian Report' on the effects of atomic radiation shows our low moral and scientific calibre by ignoring the extensive data compiled since 1945 in the one country which has had the most painful experience of atomic radiation applied to human beings — Japan. The real danger is not death, which is a release for most Indians, but genetic damage to all humanity. We know what radiation does to heredity in the ephemeral banana-fly *Drosophila melanogaster*. A good deal was found out in the U.S.A. about what happens to laboratory mice. What little has been released for publication is enough to terrify. Man is as much more complicated than a mouse as the mouse than the fruit-fly. Humans take a proportionately longer time to

breed and to reach maturity, giving fuller scope for genetic derangements to develop. It may take some twenty generations to find out just what these derangements amount to. By then they will have been bred into many millions of human beings, not as a disease but incurably as a set of hereditary characters. Mankind cannot afford to gamble with its own future in this way, whether that future lies in the hands of communists or not. Atomic war and the testing of nuclear weapons must stop. These views on nuclear war are now fashionable enough to be safely expressed.

6. Epilogue

A mathematician must earn that designation by enriching mathematics with original theorems of basic importance. Einstein, for all the stimulus his ideas gave to contemporary differential geometry, was not, and never regarded himself as a mathematician. So, my excursions into statistics, indology, archaeology and the rest are irrelevant unless some real mathematics emerged at the end. Alternatively, is there something wrong in the philosophy that asserts the unity of theory and practice ?

Mathematics is no longer the by-product of a natural philosopher's investigations, as it had been from Pythagoras to Gauss. All sorts of mathematical technique exist today, fully developed long before the physicist feels the need for it. One should contrast G. H. Hardy's *Mathematician's Apology* (Cambridge, 1941) with L. Hogben's *Mathematics for the Million* (London, 1936). The former, though leader and virtually creator of the modern school of British mathematics, was indifferent to applications and the social context of mathematical discovery. Those were the aspects of mathematics of primary interest to the biologist Hogben, who thereby presented rather elementary mathematics in attractive popularisation. Hardy counted uselessness among the great assets of real mathematics; forgetting Archimedes's military engines, he blamed 'Hogben mathematics' for the senseless destruction of world wars. This was just before the manufacture of nuclear weapons by the 'Science

has known Sin' group, in collaboration with outstanding mathematicians like J. von Neumann. If any important mathematics came out of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, the secret has been well kept.

The theory of numbers is the oldest branch of mathematics. Hogben mathematics would not exist without numbers, while Hardy and his associates devoted their best efforts to number-theory. Two outstanding problems here are : (1) Fermat's Last Theorem, which can be explained to a schoolboy in spite of its melodramatic title; (2) The Riemann Hypothesis, decidedly more recondite. Both have defeated the efforts of great mathematicians to prove or to disprove them. The Fermat theorem, if true, would lead to no new mathematics ; proof of the Riemann conjecture would lay the very foundations of analytic number theory. These unsolved problems gave rise to a distressing possibility in mathematical reasoning : was there a category of propositions 'neither (demonstrably) true nor false' ?

Riemann's conjecture has to do with the distribution of primes, which are those integers (like 257) not divisible by any smaller number except unity. Every whole number can be expressed in just one way as the product of primes, hence their importance. There are infinitely many primes. A given integer is either a prime or not, with no question of probability ; yet the occurrence of primes among the integers is highly irregular, without a pattern. Given a specific prime, it is always possible to find the next by hard work, but not by formula. This parallels an experimental situation. Weights of coins of the same denomination fluctuate so much that I could never predict what the next coin would show on delicate balances. However, if there was a next coin, its weight could always be recorded as one more figure of a series. Enough such figures outlined a curve for the distribution of weights. The series of weights formed a *sample* from a population assumed subject to probability laws. Could something of the sort not be proved for the primes ? It was necessary to change the scale, because primes occur with less and less frequency (on the whole) as the integers grow larger. The change gave a fixed *average* number of primes per

interval of any constant length on the changed scale. Still, the number varied unpredictably from interval to interval. The number of primes per interval was then shown by me to follow a simple though unsuspected probability law, the Poisson distribution. This describes many experimental samples such as the number of cosmic rays per second, of bacteria in thin cultures, of calls in a telephone exchange. Previous failures in prime number theory resulted from the attempt to fit an exact description to an infinite set of infinite random samples.

Every competent judge who saw only this radically new basic result intuitively felt that it was correct as well as of fundamental importance. Unfortunately, the Reimann hypothesis followed as a simple consequence. Could a problem over which the world's greatest mathematicians had come to grief for over a century be thus casually solved in the jungles of India? Psychologically, it seemed much more probable that the interloper was just another 'circle-squarer'. Mathematics may be a cold, impersonal science of pure thought; the mathematician can be thoughtless, heatedly acrid, even rabid, over what he dislikes. Let me admit at once that I made every sort of mistake in the first presentation. There is no excuse for this, though there were strong reasons: I had to fight for my results over three long years between waves of agony from chronic arthritis, against massive daily doses of aspirin, splitting headaches, fever, lack of assistance and steady disparagement. It was much more difficult to discover good mathematicians who were able to see the main point of the proof than it had been to make the original mathematical discovery. How much of this is due to my own disagreeable personality and what part to the spirit of a tight medieval guild that rules mathematical circles in certain countries with an 'affluent society' need not be considered here. There is surely a great deal to be said for the notion that the success of science is fundamentally related to the particular form of society.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

DAYA KRISHNA

REALITY SEEMS as much an object of seeking as anything else. 'Is it *really* so?' can be asked about everything even if in certain contexts it may appear idle, gratuitous or perverse to ask such a question. The situation which makes it perpetually possible to ask this question is the distinction between the object as it is in itself and as it may be in relation to the person who is supposed to know it. The object must be presupposed to have a nature of its own, if the notion of truth is to have meaning. Equally, if the notion of error is to have any significance, the possibility must be granted that the object may be known as different from what it is. How, then, to distinguish between truth and error, between knowledge of the object as it really is and knowledge of the object as different from what it is in itself? The former must be possible, if truth is to be ever known; the latter, if error is to be ever committed.

The situation, in a sense, is no different in the other seekings of man. The possibility of being mistaken is always there. One can always ask oneself the question if one is really feeling the emotion one thinks one is feeling or if the action one is doing in a difficult situation is really the right action under the circumstances. Feelings are supposed to be subjective, but even among feelings the question of their genuineness is not irrelevant. One's feelings may be as imaginary as one's perception is, at times illusory. The feeling is there in some sense just as the perception is there, but in both cases the judgment is that it is not as it ought to have been.

Without the notion of objectivity, human seeking will not make much sense in any realm whatsoever. If every perception is veridical, every thought true, every feeling adequate, every action right then there is just no question of seeking anything, for everything is realised all the time. The possibility of the

illusory, the false, the inadequate, the wrong gives meaning to human seeking but these terms themselves have meaning only if there is some objectivity with which they can possibly be confronted and judged in its light.

The notion of objectivity, I am aware, is not in good repute these days. Mathematicians and physicists, psychologists and sociologists, artists and thinkers, all, in their different ways and different fields, have tried to show its futility and irrelevance. Behind them lies the philosophers' conviction that the notion of 'things-in-themselves' can lead only to a futile scepticism which leads nowhere. But none of these bold spirits take the position that every opinion is *equally* true, every object *equally* beautiful and every action *equally* right. All is *not* permitted; certain things have to be rejected and there are criteria of rejection. Even those who tried for the *überwindung* of all values stumbled against that of authenticity. As for the scientists, they are all the time busy verifying their theories and disputing if they are true or false.

The distinction between the subjective and the objective is, then, the motivating force behind every seeking of man. The tension between the two provides that dynamic strain which leads man ever forward. One seeks truth, happiness, beauty, love, good, meaning, significance and is aware all the time that that which one thinks or feels to be so may not really be so at all. One has been deluded in the past. So there seems no reason why one may not be deluded in the present. The source of this ever-present possibility of being deluded lies in that very distinction of the subjective and the objective which, in another context, provides the basis for every seeking of man. The 'subjective' is just another name for all that is erroneous, fanciful, false, evil, wrong. Subject or rather all that is in the subject which contributes to the obstruction of the occurrence of correct knowledge, ecstatic feeling and right willing is, then, the source of all delusion in man. But, on the other hand, the subject is equally the source of that striving towards every value which makes human life so distinctively different from that of any other being in this world.

Simultaneously, the source of delusion and creativity, the source of all striving and that which stands in the way of the fulfilment of the striving, the subject feels ambivalent towards itself and that which he vaguely senses to be the object of his striving. Such an object may be designated as 'God' if we understand by the term a being which is completely real, which arouses us to a permanent ecstasy, and which is worthy of being the object of such an ecstasy. Neither omniscience nor omnipotence should be required of God. Only that he be independent of us and unaffectable in his being and qualities by anything else. Also, that his being be such as to arouse in us a permanent ecstasy and that his qualities be deemed worthy of such an arousal. The analogy, obviously, is with human love though not much of an answering ecstasy is required in God as it is in the case of the person one loves. Rather, it is more akin to the deep experience felt with respect to natural phenomena where no answering ecstasy is required. Perhaps, it would be even truer to put the analogy somewhere between, for we do want God to respond a little to the ecstasy he arouses in us, though we do not want to make the arousal of our ecstasy conditional on the answering response in him.

But though 'God' be a unitary name for that which man seeks in different fields, the dichotomy between subject and object and the problems raised thereby do not cease to exist. The possibility of being in error or in delusion is here as great as anywhere else. In fact, the history of religion is full of such charges and counter-charges and mystics of the highest eminence have spoken thus about one another. Further, even if one is not deluded, the question remains, 'how can one know God as he is in himself' and this question is no different nor does it raise problems of a different order than the knowing of any other thing as it is in itself.

The dichotomy of the subject and the object, which raises the problem, itself seems to be of a complex sort when closely examined. What, after all, is the object and what the subject between which the dichotomy is supposed to hold? The paradigmatic case is that of external perception in which the object

seems to be there out in space as contrasted with the body which is the locus of all reference and thus treated as subject in the situation. But, as everyone knows, the body itself can be treated as an object since it is not different from other things which are perceived and treated as object by us. Not merely this, one's own mental processes can be considered as object in the same sense in which we consider another's mind an object to us. The subject, then, whittles down to a locus of reference, a vanishing point which can hardly be characterised as anything else except that to which everything appears. Such a subject can hardly be the source of delusion and error, for it just does not seem to have any content to itself. In a certain sense, no specific content can even be ascribed to the subject since whatever content it would own, it would own by *identification* only. The possessive 'my' can apply to anything and just as there can be, intrinsically, no limits to what the subject can identify itself with so, equally, there can be none to what it can distinguish and detach itself from.

The subject and the 'subjective' are, then, distinct to a great extent. The one can hardly account for the other. Equally, the object and the 'objective' have to be distinguished to some extent. The contrast between the subject and the object is metaphysically required to understand the multiple relationships of man to the universe. The contrast between the 'subjective' and the 'objective', on the other hand, is required to understand the failure of these relationships. The failure is as much a fact as the relationships. Yet, what is supposed to account for the relationships does not seem to account for the failures, though at first thought it seems that it should be.

There is, then, a double problem. The metaphysical dichotomy between the subject and the object and the epistemological[1] dichotomy between the subjective and the objective both required to understand intelligibly the human situation seem in a certain sense to make it impossible also. One may not hope to achieve

[1] The term 'epistemological' is generally used to refer to problems in the field of knowledge only. Here it is used in a wider sense referring to the analogous problems in the realms of feeling and willing also.

abiding truth, unswerving ecstasy, impeccable rightness, not because there is some limit or defect which one cannot overcome but because the very structure of the situation which makes the pursuit of these ends possible makes their complete realisation impossible also. The situation is tantalising in the extreme, for it is not that one does not seem to achieve truth, ecstasy or rightness in one's life. Rather, one seems to be achieving them all the time and losing them also.

The situation becomes more complicated as there is not just one subject but many subjects and even the subjects who are supposed not to be contemporarily present are effective by what they articulated as truth or ecstasy or rightness they discovered in their own experience. The exploration and the discovery seem to be a collective enterprise of all humanity including those in the past, the present and the future. So also is the elaboration of the discriminatory criteria in these different realms. The shadow of the past does loom large, but the shadow of the future is even greater for if the present can negative the findings of the past the future may do so with the present. The individual subject has to collate the truth he has found with that which others have discovered in their lives. Not merely this, the communities or societies where even relative consensus prevails have to confront the challenge of other societies and cultures which have found a different answer to the same or similar questions. Even a cross-cultural consensus would have to confront the possibility of its being questioned by societies and cultures that are yet to emerge in the future.

The problem thus presented by this situation is two-fold. The truth in any realm is apprehended by an individual, yet its confirmation by others is so much a necessary part of it that one is required to doubt it oneself, if no such confirmation is forthcoming. One is supposed to declare against the whole world what one considers to be the truth, but equally one is regarded as insane if one persists in holding what one apprehends as truth against its continued rejection on the part of others. Truth is not merely to be confirmed by oneself but by others also. Yet, the individual has nothing else but his own insight and experience

to go on in the matter. What others say has certainly to be considered, but whether it has to be accepted or rejected or modified is and cannot but be the individual's own judgment. No one can possibly hold that an assertion is true just because most people choose to assert it, yet hardly anyone will dare assert that other's confirmation has got nothing to do with one's *own* holding of one's judgment or insight as true.

The deeper problem is, however, unfolded by the fact that the judgment of oncoming generations is considered as relevant to the establishment of truth as the confirmation by the contemporaries. But the dilemma of the oncoming generations is faced by each generation anew and unless we suppose humanity to die one day, the dilemma is insoluble in principle. Further, even if humanity were to die one day it would not be sure if it knew the truth just as the individual human being who does could not be sure if he knew the truth. It may, of course, have the satisfaction that none else in the future would know any better, but that is poor satisfaction indeed. The privileged position of the present with respect to the past is reversed in its relations to the future. Ultimately, however, no position in time seems to be privileged with respect to that which man seeks, for the past was present once and the future too would share in the virtues and uncertainties of the present.

The progressive linear conception of human seeking is matched by other conceptions which try to escape the unending infinity involved in the linear conception. There is something dizzying about a series that never ends. Some thinkers have tried to overcome the feeling by finding the model of human seeking in terms of a convergent series which, though infinite, yet converges to a finite sum. The defect of the model is that we *already* know the sum to which the series converges, a situation which just does not obtain in any of the seekings of man. Further, as the series is made by us, we *know* what the next steps in the series are going to be. This is impossible in the case of what man seeks, for he just does not know what is going to come next.

The cyclical conception makes the situation no better. We are doomed eternally to repeat and the haunting shadow of a con-

stantly threatened achievement is laid to rest, so is laid the very idea of achievement itself. The introduction of valuational judgement into the different phases of the cycle is, ultimately, a gratuitous one. Either one has to introduce supra-cyclical criteria to judge the different phases of the cycle or to absolutise the criteria of one phase to judge the others. The idea of a golden age at the beginning or at the end of the cycle seems equally gratuitous, for if in the beginning it was really so golden there could hardly have been any reason for its deterioration and if the other ages were really so dark they could scarcely result in an age where truth is known, ecstasy achieved and rightness practised almost without exception. The fluctuating conception such, as that of Sorokin, gives up the notion of a unitary truth, unitary ecstasy and unitary rightness at its central core.

The community of persons and community of generations raises vis-a-vis the individual subject problems of another sort. A person is as much an 'other' to the subject as any other object in the world. This presents a dilemma of the acutest type, a dilemma that is intensely felt in interpersonal interrelationships of the most different kinds. One is only vaguely aware of the subjectivity of the other; most of the time one cannot but think and feel the other as an object. Conversely, one cannot but be aware of oneself as a subject. The awareness of oneself as an object is only on the fringes and flickers only fitfully, never to last very long. Many of the agonising tragedies of love and friendship emanate from this fact, as also the moral dilemmas that haunt the interpersonal relations of men.

The existence of other subjects presents problems of a metaphysical kind also. The differences among subjects at the level at which they are treated as pure subjects is difficult to determine. All the differences that are specifiable belong to the subject as identified with some object or the other. Points of reference can only be distinguished spatio-temporally, but subjects are not treated as spatio-temporal at all. The denial of temporality affects radically the notion of past and future subjects; the denial of space affects those of the contemporaries. Leibniz is the classic name with whom is associated the attempt

to solve the problem at the non-spatio-temporal level. But, basically, it is God alone who is the real subject in Leibniz; others are real only in virtue of the unreality of the confusedness of their apprehensions.

The problem exists for the spiritual seekers also. For, all the differences between different seekers can be specified only in so far as they fall short of realisation. Among realised souls, it is difficult to see how they could be distinguished. Of course, one may take the help of the notion of 'degrees of realisation' and try to distinguish in terms of it. But the problem remains the same as in Leibniz, for the less realised are distinguishable only in virtue of their imperfection. Even the specification of the distinction between the realised soul and God is not possible except in terms of some intrinsic imperfection of the one in respect of the other.

The dilemma is significant in the sense that every seeking of man involves in some sense an intrinsic reference to other subjects. If, however, the distinction between different subjects itself is ultimately untenable, the inter-subjective character of human seeking seems to be wrong somewhere at its very core. The dilemma is mirrored in the every day situation where each holds his vision to be true and yet continuously appeals to others for confirmation in argument and discussion. The intrinsic necessity for others in every seeking of man coupled with the continuous demand for essential independence from them epitomises this situation very well.

The situation does not seem to be the same in the case of the distinction between the Subject and the Object, though many have thought it to be ultimately as untenable as the distinction between one subject and another. There seems to be no reason why some such position as that of Sāmkhya be ultimately held to be untenable even if it be conceded that the category of 'being' or 'thing' is wider than both. The dilemma in this case lies, in my opinion, in another direction. The distinction itself makes impossible the realisation of the ideals man seeks to achieve in different dimensions.

The human situation, then, may be characterised as consist-

ing of seekings which are sustained by dichotomies which themselves make in principle impossible the fulfilment of those seekings. To put the same thing in a little different way, it may be said that the human situation can only be articulated intelligibly in terms of pairs of concepts which appear contradictory to each other. Each seems equally required, but their conjoint requirement makes the situation desperately impossible. The 'desperateness' and the 'impossibility', however, are revealed only to thought. Life is lived without desperation and man continues to seek truth, ecstasy and rightness without any awareness of the impossibility of what he seeks.

Such a situation may be characterised as Maya, if one so desires. Or, one may characterise it as 'appearance', if one likes the term better. Only one should remember that one cannot get out of Maya or the world of Appearance except by not *thinking* about the way one lives through one's life.

Religion, all the world over, is an attempt to answer this dilemma. God is the supreme Paradox that is supposed to solve all paradoxes. But, as everyone knows, it solves and has solved nothing. The term is the terminus of all man's seeking – necessary, yet introducing the final contradiction between Man, God and the world. The supposed resolution is only *asserted* by the individual; the biography of the realised souls and their history over known periods of time tells a different tale. Christ and Buddha failed in their own times as much as Christianity and Buddhism have failed over historic times. Even the story of persons deemed to be incarnated Gods on this earth is as much a story of success as of failure. One may choose one's own roster of realised souls or of God-incarnate in man and ask oneself how the story of man shows any resolution except in one's assertion of it.

This, obviously, is not to deny either the outstanding impact of their personalities on history or the almost transcendent aspect of their being which seems to justify all life itself. What is denied is the claimed resolution of the paradox intrinsic to the seeking of man on the simple ground that the evidence does not support it. The evidence is the history of man and the life of

the individual who is supposed to have found the resolution to the paradox of human seeking in different fields. The first we know very well. Whether interpreted as a Fall or as a continuous Progress, there could hardly be two opinions about the resolution of the paradox having been achieved in it. As for the latter, both in the life of the contemporaries claimed to be realised souls and in those of the past as reconstructed even by the most credulous anecdotes, the evidence against the achievement of resolution is overwhelming unless we adopt a policy of double standards in judging that evidence.

The necessity of resolution, however, is felt *only* because it is assumed that a pair of contradictories cannot characterise a *real* situation. The notions of 'appearance', 'maya', 'phenomena', 'unreal' derive all their strength from this basic assumption. The history of philosophy may be understood as a continuous struggle between those who are bent on showing contradictions in different areas of experience and those who are trying to show the inadequate nature of the analysis that leads to such a conclusion. Dialectical philosphers are no exceptions; they seek resolution of the contradiction as assiduously as those they contend against. The Absolute is needed just for this reason; otherwise, one would not think of it at all. Even the religious philosophers who usually tend to articulate their insights in the simultaneous assertion of pairs of contradictory propositions seek their ultimate resolution in God who is supposed to be completely real and completely ecstatic just because it has no blemish of the shadow of the opposite in itself.

The concept of Alternative Absolutes elaborated in the writings of the two most original thinkers of contemporary India, K.C. Bhattacharyya and Kalidas Bhattacharyya, does not escape, in my opinion, the charge of having made this assumption. The *only* possible reason why the alternative absolutes cannot be asserted *simultaneously* is because it would involve the affirmation of a contradiction, a thought too radical even for the radical Bhattacharyyas.

The law has been considered as absolute necessity for thought, even if it is disputed whether it is meaningful to consider it as

characterising that which the thought is supposed to be about. I have never been convinced of such an assertion. It may be concluded that the notion of resolution is necessary to make sense of human seeking in any realm. But this is a poor ground for the *assertion* of the resolution, for the counter-notion to resolution is equally necessary to make sense of the human seeking. If what makes sense of the human seeking is to be asserted, then both have to be asserted simultaneously and, then, we will have the paradox and the dilemma with us once more.

TRUTH AND ERROR

S. K. MAITRA

THERE ARE two quite distinct enquiries regarding truth, viz. the enquiry about the meaning or definition of truth and the enquiry about a suitable criterion or test of truth.

As regards the question of a criterion it is sufficient to remark that the various criteria proposed such as clearness and distinctness, consensus, self-evidence, intuition, practical fruitfulness, authority, etc. are all open to the common charge of being either dogmatic or inconsistent. If any of these criteria is considered sufficient by itself it lays itself open to the charge of being dogmatic. If, however, any reason is offered in support of any of these, then reason, and not the criterion proposed, becomes the true criterion. Further, what is clear and distinct to some is not so to others. And the same is true of intuition and of the so-called self-evidence of beliefs. The appeal to authority is also of little use as authorities are not always found to agree. Nor is consensus an effective test as is proved by many human beliefs, once held without exception, but now discarded in the light of fresh evidence. Practical fruitfulness of ideas is also no sure test. Even dream ideas bring dream-fruition but such fruition does not make these ideas true.

As there is no agreement amongst philosophers about a suitable criterion, so also there is none about the question of the nature or meaning of truth. There are two principal answers to this latter question viz.: (1) that truth is some kind of correspondence of belief to facts and (2) that truth is the agreement or coherence of beliefs. The answers go by the names of the Correspondence and the Coherence Theories of Truth.

THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

According to the Correspondence Theory, truth is the agreement

of our judgment or belief with a fact or facts in the real world. Since the judgment as a psychical occurrence is never denied, the question of truth relates to what we judge or believe, not to the judgment or belief as an occurrence in our mental history. Some philosophers thus consider the judgment in its objective reference in abstraction from the subjective act of judging or believing to admit of characterisation as true or false. In other words, according to these philosophers it is propositions that are true or false – propositions in the sense of *what* we judge, considered apart from the act of judging, believing or disbelieving. And propositions are true in so far as there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements constituting the proposition and the elements constituting some fact or facts in the real world.

The most serious difficulty in the 'correspondence theory' is its inability to give a precise definition of correspondence. If correspondence means as in the accounts of its recent exponents a one-to-one correspondence between the elements constituting a proposition and the atomic particulars called the facts in the real world, then the theory is obviously false as a theory of the truth of propositions. Let us suppose a proposition to say that '*X* is to the left of *Y*'. Here the elements of the proposition are *X*, 'to the left of', and *Y*. The proposition is true, according to this theory, if there are corresponding facts in the real world, viz. an *X*, a relation 'to the left of' and a *Y*. But these atomic particulars will correspond to the elements of the proposition equally if '*Y* is to the left of *X*' instead of '*X* being to the left of *Y*' as is said in the proposition. If however it is contended that the correspondence must be a correspondence in the order of the elements besides being a one-to-one correspondence of the elements, then the theory must show how the proposition is to be distinguished from the fact which makes it true. If the fact is known as fact as distinguished from the proposition, it cannot be known by simple apprehension or acquaintance, as the fact includes both atomic particulars and also their arrangement or order as occurring in the real world. If therefore the fact is to be known at all, it must be through another proposition, the truth whereof will raise the same problem over again, landing us into

an infinite regress. Thus, therefore, the inevitable dilemma is that correspondence of propositions with facts will either mean prior knowledge of facts through other propositions leading to an infinite regress or correspondence must remain for ever an unknown and unknowable correspondence.

Nor can it be said that the knowledge of the fact as fact as a difficulty is valid not against correspondence as the definition of truth but against corresponding as the criterion of truth. A correspondence that can never be known as correspondence is as useless as a definition of truth as it is as a truth-test or truth criterion. A definition that defines the known by the admittedly unknown is no definition worth the name.

In the *Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers* it is pointed out that we get into difficulties with the correspondence theory "when we try to give a clear meaning to 'correspondence' and 'fact'. No doubt it is true that there are no centaurs and we may say that the statement there are no centaurs corresponds with the facts, but it is hard to see what sort of relation called correspondence it can enter into with such a statement." It seems, however, that this line of criticism is not quite fair. Once concede negative facts as advocated by Russell, the difficulty vanishes, for then the statement 'there are no centaurs' resolves into 'Horses are not Men', or 'Men are not Horses' and these incompatibilities are as much facts and part and parcel of reality as are the so-called positive facts and compatibilities of experiences.

We shall conclude our criticism of the correspondence theory with a brief examination of Russel's view as he states it in his *Human Knowledge and its Limits*. "Significance", says Russell, "is a characteristic of all sentences that are not non-sensical, and not only of sentences in the indicative, but also of such as are interrogative, imperative or optative. For the present purpose, however, we shall confine ourselves to sentences in the indicative ... The significance of a sentence may always be understood as in some sense a description. When this description describes a fact, the sentence is true; otherwise it is 'false' ... Beliefs however, are not always

expressed in sentences". "Suppose you are expecting to meet some person of whom you are fond .... Your expectation may be wordless, even if it is detailed and complex. You may expect that he will be smiling, you may recall his voice, his gait .... In this case you are expecting an experience of your own .... Your expectation is 'true' if the impression, within it comes, is such that it might have been the prototype of your previous idea if the time-order has been reversed" (1951, p. 167).

All this seems very plausible, but we can counter it by another case equally plausible. Suppose that receiving a wire from an intimate friend of mine I go to the railway station and await his arrival. While waiting I imagine my friend coming with his suit-case and his hold-all and I imagine him getting down when the train arrives and greeting me smiling. Suppose that when the train arrives I see my friend getting down exactly as I expected him to. But then I find that I am in my bed and only dreaming a very vivid dream. Here is correspondence of expectation with impression and yet it is rejected as a dream without truth or reality. How will Russell reconcile such phenomena with his theory of truth as correspondence of idea with an impression as its prototype ?

The Coherence Theory

The coherence theory maintains that truth is a relation of harmony or coherence between judgments and is not any relation of correspondence between a judgment and a reality other than the mind that judges. Against the correspondence theory it points out that if truth were to consist in a relation between a judgment and a real other than the mind that judges, then in order to know that the judgment does correspond we must have prior knowledge of the real to which our judgment must correspond in order to be true. But such knowledge will make the judgment superfluous as we already possess the knowledge which the judgment is supposed to make possible. Besides this prior knowledge which is necessarily presupposed in the idea of correspondence as constituting the meaning of truth will again have to be justified by the test of correspondence involving the same

difficulty. This inevitable, infinite regress can be avoided only if truth is regarded not as correspondence of a judgment with a fact other than the mind that judges, but as the agreement or harmony of the judgment with the judgment or judgments that constitute its objective reference. Truth, in other words, is the consistency or harmony of a judgment with the system of judgments that constitutes its objective reference or meaning.

It follows from the coherence theory that if a judgment is true in so far as it coheres with the judgment or judgments which constitute its objective reference, the judgments which constitute the objective reference or meaning must themselves be true as cohering with still other judgments as their objective reference, and these again with other judgments so that the truth of any single judgment will be its coherence or harmony with all judgments, actual and possible. But as this is an idea which no human being can hope to reach, for practical purpose one has to be satisfied with harmony with as many judgments as are within one's reach. Hence the more numerous the judgments with which a given judgment can be shown to agree, the truer it is, so that while absolute truth as harmony with all judgments, actual and possible, may be only ideal that no one can reach, one can still have relative truth as progressive approximation to an absolutely coherent whole of experience in different degrees of consistency with an ever-widening system of judgments realised in actual experience.

The objection to this view of truth is that its view of all human truths as only partial truths in different degrees of approximation to the complete, all-inclusive truth is in reality a theory of degrees of falsity rather than of grades of truth, strictly speaking. If no human truth is completely free from inconsistency, if all truths that are within our reach are only approximations to the complete truth, if, in short, they all fall short of truth as such as being more or less infected with discrepancy, then they are all more or less false appearances wrongly described as partial truths. If our judgments represent only a progress to the truth and differ only in respect of their greater or lesser distance from the completely coherent truth, then they cannot be even

partially true and should be described rather as grades of falsity or error. This will be clear if we consider an analogous case. If of two candidates in an examination, one fails in two subjects, while the other fails in three, we do not say that the first of these is more successful than the second. On the contrary we consider both to be unsuccessful as having fallen short of the pass standard, though the second is more of a failure than the first.

A second objection to the coherence theory is that in so far as, according to this theory, no human truth is absolutely true, the same must hold as regards the truth of the coherence theory itself. Hence judged by its own standard the theory that coherence constitutes the meaning or definition of truth cannot be said to be true without qualification.

Another objection to this theory is that like the correspondence theory, it is unable to give any precise definition of coherence. If coherence is to be defined as mere coexistence of experienced facts, then coherence will apply equally to brute conjunctions as well as necessary connexions of facts. But the circumstance of two or more phenomena being observed to be either simultaneous or successive in experience does not necessarily prove that they cohere in a systematic unity or whole.

THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF TRUTH

While according to the coherence theory truth is the logical relation of harmony or consistency of our experiences, according to pragmatism, truth is the felt relation of consistency of our theoretical and practical consciousness as experienced in the successful working of our ideas in life. According to pragmatism, the intellect is only an instrument in the service of the will, every idea being a plan of action, the truth whereof consists in its successful working. A belief is thus true if it works so that successful working is not only the criterion or test of truth, but is also the meaning or definition of truth. As William James says, truth is truth tested and verified in experience so that there is no sense in speaking of an idea as true independently of the practical test of its verification in experience. Hence the pragmatic theory

has been described as the psychological as distinguished from the logical theory of truth.

Since according to pragmatism, the true is what is verified in experience and since experience is no unchanging, static reality but an everchanging flux best described by the metaphor of a flowing stream, it follows that the truths established by today's experience may be falsified tomorrow because of changed circumstances. There cannot, therefore, be any absolute immutable truth nor any eternal verities which are true irrespective of circumstances. Hence while according to the coherence theory there is at least an absolutely coherent experience to which all human truths approximate in different degrees and in this sense are more or less true, according to the pragmatic theory no truth is absolutely true, all truth being relative and therefore liable to be falsified under changed conditions.

In defining truth as a belief that works, Pragmatism mistakes what is in reality the effect of truth with truth itself. Beliefs work because they are true and not that they are true because they work. Besides, a belief may work well and yet not be true. A clever lie may work yielding the desired results. Contrarily, the man who sees through the liar's game and is yet unable to get his belief accepted illustrates the case of true beliefs that are true and yet do not work.

True beliefs are no doubt generally useful, but it is not their usefulness that makes them true, rather it is their truth that accounts for their usefulness. Besides, the test of working is not always dependable. What works for some, may not work for others and what works for one at one time, may not work for one at a different time. The belief that a particular medicine will cure a disease may work for some and effect the cure and may not work for others and yield the expected result. And the same thing may happen to one and the same individual, curing him at one time and failing to do so at another time.

The pragmatic definition of truth as a belief that works identifies truth with its verification in experience. But if no belief is true unless verified in experience, then no universal proposition can be true. The proposition, all men are mortal, cannot be

proved true on pragmatic principles till the mortality of every man, past, present and future, has been verified in experience.

Lastly, the pragmatist denial of absolute, immutable truth on the ground that with change of conditions in an everchanging world the true becomes false and the false true, is based on a confusion of the real issue. When the absolutist says that the statement, Napoleon died in St. Helena in 1821, is true, what he means is that the statement is true not for 1821 only, not again for the island of St. Helena, but is true for all time and for all places. It is true that one who is 30 years old in 1950 is 40 and not 30, in 1960, but that does not affect the truth of the statement in 1960 that he was 30 in 1950. What is true in the situation *X* may not be true in the situation *Y*, but that does not take away the immutability of the truth of the belief that related to the situation.

The Advaita Theory of the True as the Abadhita or Non-Contradicted

We have considered the three European theories of truth, viz. correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories and we have found that none of these can bear strict examination. It remains now to consider the Advaita Theory according to which the true is what cannot be contradicted or sublated. This is a negative definition of truth and is connected with the Advaita Theory of *Adhyāsa* or superimposition as involved in all practical experience. According to Advaitism the true is what survives criticism, i.e. what cannot be overthrown by any experience. Now what endures in all judgments is not the objective content, the so-called objectivity of the content being always liable to be superseded by discoveries of fresh aspects of experience not capable of being comprised and assimilated in the objective content without rearrangement and recasting thereof. Hence the objectivity of a judgment in only a relative objectivity i.e. an objectivity relative to a particular level of experience and is always liable to be overthrown when a higher level is reached. Hence truth cannot belong to the content of a judgment, there being no finality or immuta-

bility in the apparent objective truth of the content. In other words, the so-called objectivity of the content may at any time be found to be subjective appearance devoid of strict objectivity. The objective snake of the snake-rope illusion becomes a subjective appearance as soon as the illusory character of the illusion is discovered on closer inspection. Advaitism therefore, contends that what survives in all judgments is the consciousness of the content and not the content in which the judgment clothes itself in the act of judging. We cannot get away from the consciousness that judges though the content which is judged is never criticism-proof. What is never sublated, if other words, is not the content that appears as the object of the judgment but the light of consciousness which reveals the content. In other words, according to Advaitism, all ordinary experience is a case of *Adhyāsa* or false identification in which pure consciousness (*Śudha Chaitanya*) appears as object-consciousness (*Viṣaya Chaitanya*) or consciousness in the garb of objects cognised. Consciousness as it appears in ordinary experience is always the consciousness of an object and is therefore always other than the objective as such. When therefore consciousness appears as an object cognised as in the judgment of experience it is nothing but a false appearance of consciousness as such which is unobjective by nature. Just as the rope that appears as a snake is only falsely appearing as such so is the unobjective light of consciousness only falsely appearing when it appears as one with the object cognised. Hence all objective experience, according to the Advaitin, is a case of false identification of the unobjective consciousness with the objective. This is why no objective experience is criticism-proof and capable of self-maintenance. What is true, therefore, in all judgment and what cannot be contradicted or sublated is not the objectivity of experience, i.e. the objective content as which it appears but bare consciousness as such, i.e. consciousness as the unobjective light in which all objective contents are revealed as objects.

It may be objected that this is nothing but rank scepticism and is no theory of truth strictly speaking. At least it is a theory that has no use for us, ordinary mortals, in so far as it

reduces all objective experience to nullity leaving a blank emptiness as truth. But this is a misreading of the Advaita point of view. What the Advaitin denies is the claim to finality for any of our empirical truths, they all alike being condemned as false when judged by the strict standard of non-contradiction. But at the same time the Advaita recognises different grades of falsity amongst our so-called empirical truths, some surviving longer than others; and this is all that is necessary for the conduct of life. Thus some truths die very young. They are our ordinary illusions. As soon as their discrepancy with our more enduring experiences, or their discrepancy with the experiences of others, is discovered they are sublated and delegated to the domain of the false. What are called the truths of common sense live a much longer life, some of them reaching a mature age and thereafter passing away. The truths of science are harder nuts. Some of them are octogenarians and some even centenarians and some live even for a thousand years, but then their end comes sometime or other. Geocentricity had several centuries of life while helio-centricity had a much shorter life giving way to Einstein's Relativity of the present day. This is all that is necessary for life. We regulate our lives by choosing the longer-lived truths in preference to the shorter-lived, but this is not to say that even the longest-lived objective truth will ever live an eternal everlasting life.

The objection that consciousness itself is no eternal immutable reality as is shown by complete lapse of consciousness in dreamless sleep, swoon, etc. is also beside the point. What is absent in such states is not consciousness itself but objective consciousness or consciousness of objects. One who awakes from a sound sleep could not say that he had a good sleep if there was a complete cessation of consciousness in his undisturbed sleep and rest.

The Theory of Error

Our theory of error is a corollary of our theory of truth. All objectivity is a false appearance of pure consciousness. It is consciousness falsely appearing as the object of consciousness

and is therefore error. But falsity is of different grades. A higher falsity cancels a lower falsity but a lower falsity cannot supersede a higher falsity. This is how appearances may be arranged as lower and higher. The rope-appearance cancels the snake- appearance but the snake-appearance cannot supersede the rope-appearance. But this does not mean that the rope-appearance is the truth and the snake-appearance is the false element in the matter. The rope-appearance is also an objective appearance of pure consciousness and as such lacks ultimate truth and reality just as the snake-appearance does. The only difference is that though false in the end the rope-apperance can cancel an ordinary illusion like the snake-appearance. In this sense all objectivity (in the language of Indian philosophy the *Dṛsya* as such) lacks ultimate truth and reality, though there are grades of objective falsity, the higher cancelling the lower but the lower incapable of dislodging the higher.

The question is raised what is it that is false in a false experience or illusion. The Indian Naiyayika says that it is all wrong reference, i.e. a matter of false knowing. When I perceive a rope as a snake I mistake one thing as another and the mistake consists in a subjective wrong reference, i.e. referring an object seen elsewhere (snake) to a wrong locus. This view, however, does not bear strict examination. What is rejected or falsified in the act of correction is not the subjective experience. When I say, 'this is a rope and not a snake', I do not say that I did not see a snake at the time of the illusion. Certainly when the illusion lasted I did not see my seeing but saw a trans-subjective or objective snake in the locus of the rope lying before me. The subsequent act of correction does not say that the illusion never occurred. What it says is that the object seen was no real object, that it was an appearance that never was, never is and never will be in the locus in which it appeared. Therefore what is false in the illusory experience is not the experience itself but the object that was experienced. This is Padmapada's view in the Panchapadika. The author of the 'Vivarana' (Prakāssatma Yoti) however, contends that every illusion is a case of *Viṣyadhyāta and Jnaanādhyasa*. It is not merely the object

that is false in an illusion but also the experience of such a false object. An appearance that is perceived in the locus in which it stands eternally negated cannot be a case of either true object or of true knowing. Hence, according to Vivaraṇakara, error is as much a case of false knowing as of false knowing of a false object. In fact, all such knowing is no knowing at all in so far as the object known does not belong to the locus in which it is perceived.

A further point to be noted is that an illusion relates only to appearances. What never appears and cannot appear, can never be the content of an illusion. A square-circle nowhere appears and never appears and therefore cannot be the object of an illusion. This is why falsity is defined as that which appears in a locus in which it stands eternally negated (*Pratipanna upadhan traikālika nisedhapratiyogitṣam–nithyātvam*).

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THEOLOGICAL STATEMENTS

Y. MASIH

My Problem

From the very beginning, theological problems have been my main preoccupation. Very early I grew dissatisfied with the claims of Christianity for the monopoly of religious truths, though Christianity alone has been the exclusive source of spiritual consolation to me. However, it is a form of Christianity which has been powerfully influenced by Indian thought and Western philosophy. I feel now that any form of religion has to be viewed in a much larger perspective than what hitherto has been the case. Freudian analysis and empirical approach to religion have caused a great deal of worry to all types of religionists. In the light of independent reflection and thinking, aided of course, by the writings of thinkers, past and present, Eastern and Western, I have tried to suggest a certain solution to the issues arising from empirical criticism and linguistic analysis. Hence. I am indebted to all for making me what I am in relation to my spiritual anchorage. I am very well aware of the gaps and the extreme sketchiness of the solution attempted here. But I can assure the reader that whatever is presented here has been the result of much meditation and genuine efforts on my part.

The Nature of My Religious Problem

Every philosopher is quite familiar now with the empirical criterion of meaningful discourse. According to it, any cognitive statement, the model of which is found in science, in some respect and in principle has some observables relevant to its meaningfulness. This criterion rules out God-statements from being meaningful. However, at present there has been some

concession to the wholesale denunciation of theological statements at least in two respects. First, the empiricist himself confesses his inability in stating his criterion with precision.[1] Therefore, the empiricist is now reluctant to apply the criterion of meaning with the same rigour with which Prof. A. J. Ayer had used it in the first edition of *Language, Truth and Logic.* Secondly, there is a prevailing consensus of opinion that statements lacking cognitive meaning may have quite different kinds of meaning. For example, ethical statements are said to have emotive or imperative meaning. Hence in the light of this observation, the task of a philosopher is to find out that horizon of experience to which theological statements refer. An attempt will be made here accordingly to find out the 'cash value' of theological statements in terms of those experiences on which they are based.

One feels a great deal of temerity, verging on anxiety, in daring to differ from Prof. Ian Ramsey, Prof. H.D. Lewis, Mr. Austin Farrer, Mr. I.M. Crombie, Father F.C. Copleston and other present Christian theologians with regard to the objectivity of the Transcendental Being involved in theological statements. I am not quite sure, but one gets the impression that they strongly wish to hold that God-statements are factual and that the predicates of 'infinite love' and 'infinite knowledge' are genuinely revelatory concepts of Him, no matter how much of category-distortion be involved in their use. Further, some of them would posit a special faculty of divination (R. Otto), intuition (H. Bergson) and the Grace of God (K. Barth) as the instrument through which God's disclosure about Himself is received. Here the remarks of Mr. I.M. Crombie appear to me very helpful in as much as they point out that the intertwining of Christian thought and practice 'stretches' and 'supples' the mind for the grasp of the divine truth.[2] This may mean that mental preparation is a necessary pre-requisite for the responsiveness to or the

[1] Hempel, C.G. 'The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning', *Logical Positivism* Edited by A.J. Ayer, pp. 108–29, specially p. 123 and Hempel's 'Remark on' p. 129.

[2] *Faith and Logic*, edited by Basil Mitchell, George Allen, 1958.

appreciation of spritual 'truth'. The term 'appreciation' has been preferred to 'understanding' in order to show that religious apprehension is more akin to ethical appraisal than to scientific 'knowing'. Again, religious 'truth' is more of the nature of 'values' or 'ideals' than of empirical facts. If we accept this, then the term 'objectivity' has to be suitably interpreted in relation to religious truths.

A factual statement of commonsense or of science can be checked up by my own repeated perceptions or by the perceptions of others or by instruments like a photograph and so on. Here a fact is 'out there' existing in its own rights and independently of the likes and dislikes of human perceivers. In making factual statements one has to exercise 'ethical neutrality'. A human subject as an observer of a fact has to be like a mirror reflecting nothing more than what is there. On the other hand in matters spiritual instead of personality-disengagement there is the full involvement of the total personality :

> "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind..." (St. Luke 10:27).

In the words of Bella K. Milmed, the worshipper makes every effort to perceive what he *wants* to perceive. Hence Buber is right in maintaining that in science a fact is apprehended in 'I-It' relationship; whereas a religious truth comes under 'I-Thou' relationship. Hence in religion that which is most subjective is most objective, that is, that which fits into the demand of the total self is felt as a self-validating experience. However, this is only a hint or a clue as to how a religious fact can be construed. We shall refer to other elements too which determine the objectivity of God or other religious facts.

Of course, it would be conceded that I-It and I-Thou relationships are the two extremes which have been carved out of the primitive feeling of a big, buzzing, blooming confusion or 'a blur with incipient diversities'. Most probably these two extremes are the ideal limits which are hardly attained in our concrete experi-

[3]Milmed, Bella K., 'Theories of Religious Knowledge from Kant to Jaspers', *Philosophy*, July, 1954, p. 207.

ence. A certain element of personality does enter into a seemingly factual statement. For example a certain factual statement confirming one's hypothesis comes to be felt with its peculiar warmth and fervour. If it were not so, a Köhler, a Freud and a Thorndike would not have advanced their theories in psychology with so much heat and emotional enthusiasm. Of course, when too much of the personality enters into the I-IT statements, they are then justly regarded as poetical. For example,

> "*And then my heart with pleasure fills,*
> *And dances with the daffodils*"

may be said to be poetry and not statements of facts in I-It relationship.

Similarly, a truth appreciated in I-Thou relationship is supported by factuality. For instance, the very heavens are said to declare the glory of God. Not only the Psalmist but St. Paul too maintains:

> "...the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead..." (Romans 1:20).

It is therefore not without reason that contingency and design in nature have been adduced in support of God-statements.

From the above considerations it can be stated that scientific statements, which here may be taken to be co-extensive with cognitive statements, are quite different in nature from theological statements. The defining features of scientific experience are intended to be exclusively impersonal. This is what was emphasised in the searchlight view of consciousness which is involved in a knowing situation. This appeared to be so reasonable that the idealists who had taken their stand on epistemological argument shifted their stand from this to *a contingentia mundi*'.[4] Unfortunately theologians have not consistently maintained that theological statements are constituted by the personality of the religionist. For our convenience we shall call the

[4] Bosanquet, B.: *The Distinction Between Mind and its Object*, Manchester University Press, 1913. Pringle-Pattison, A.S. *The Idea of God*, Lect. X.

personality-backed statements psychological. A psychological statement is constituted by the psychical processes within the personality of the religious believer. However, a psychological statement is not solipsistic.[5] The reason for not maintaning the psychological nature of theological statement is not far to seek.

If theological statements be regarded as psychological, then it is feared that God becomes no better than an object of dream, fancy or fiction. This actually has been the insinuation which has been made concerning theological entities by Russell,[6] Freud[7] and others. Russell holds that the vision of God in no wise differs from that of a demon.[8]

However, against this misunderstanding of theological statements, religious saints and seers have always protested. They have distinguished between demonic and divine possession.[9] For instance, St. Teresa remarks that divine visitation is characterized by nourishment and energy.[10] Again, Jesus Christ himself maintained that divine possession is far more powerful than Satanic influence.[11]

Though the distinction between demonic and divine presence can be made without much ado, the psychological nature of theological statements has to be conceded. God and devil both belong to theological statement and what is true of the devil is also going to be true of God. Now a devil is said to be a projection of psychological complexes, and so it follows that God too may be regarded as having his seat in the psyche even when he may not be taken to be a projection. The working of

[5] C.B.Martin, suggests that 'God' may be known solipsistically in 'A Religious Way of Knowing', *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, edited by A. Flew and A. Macintyre, p. 86

[6] Russell, B. 'The Existence of God–A Debate', *Why I am not a Christian*, pp. 157–58.

[7] Freud, S., *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, Pelican, p. 195 and *The Future of an Illusion*, Hogarth Press, 1927, p. 42. See also *Civlization and its Discontents*, Hogarth Press, 1930.

[8] A. Macintyre 'Vision', *New Essays in Philosophical Theology.*

[9] Copleston, F. C., *Why I am not a Christian* by B. Russell.

[10] Quoted by William James in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Longmans, 1935, p. 21.

[11] St. Matthew, 12 : 25–29.

God is an integrative function of the self; whereas the influence of a devil shows self in its disintegrated aspect. But both of them arise from the integrative function of the self. Judged from this context the categories which apply to theological statements are God and Demon, Heaven and Hell, Saved and Damned, Belief and Unbelief etc. The concepts of truth and falsity are better applied to cognitive statements, the meaningfulness of which is rightly determined by the principle of verifiability. But it would be objected here that surely theologians do think that a statement which is admittedly theological is verifiable. For example, it is maintained that 'God is Love' can be verified in relation to suffering.[12] If there is suffering utterly pointless, then it is said it would count against 'God is Love'. But this contention can hardly be supported by the actual state of affairs. The attitude of the believer towards the love of God is non-tentative and absolute. His attitude is: Even if Thou slay me, I will love Thee true. Has not Spinoza familiarised us with the intellectual love of God? A believer loves God not selfishly or unselfishly but selflessly. He loves God without the prospect of being reciprocated. This unrequited love is like the consuming passion of the moth for the flame. Here the question is not, what is man that Thou shalt be mindful of him, but rather what is God that man should be mindful of Him.

Even when we reject the contention concerning theological statements to be assertory, we have yet to explain the reason as to why they have been so regarded. The reason appears to be largely metaphysical which for me is once again a system of psychological statements. For our purpose, metaphysics may be said to deal with the reality as a whole. Of course the reality as a whole can never enter the experience of any human being, as Kant in his *antinomies* and Bradley[13] have shown. Hence metaphysics is supposed to deal with entities that transcend the observables. At least the empiricist refutes metaphysics in

[12]Crombie, I. M. : 'Theology and Falsification,' *Philosophical Theology*, p. 124, and again, 'The Possibility of Theological Statements,' *Faith and Logic*, p. 72.

[13]Bradley, F. H.: *Principles of Logic*, p. 54; *Appearance and Reality.*

this sense of the term.[14] However, metaphysics as dealing with the reality as a whole lends itself to its being interpreted as a system of pyschological statements. I have tried to show this in 'The Psychology of the Metaphysician'.[15] Taking my stand on the findings of organismic theorists in the study of personality[16] it has been maintained in this article that by reason of his metaphysical construction a metaphysician satisfies his urge to be whole. Here as elsewhere in this context I have leaned heavily on the contributions of C. G. Jung, especially on his process of individuation. The cash value of metaphysical statements lies in the promotion of the holistic tendency or the tendency of self-completion in the metaphysician. Of course one metaphysical statement cannot be said to be adequate unless it be supported by the statements of common sense, science and logic. Further, it was hinted here that theological statements induce holism much more than metaphysical statements. However, a brief re-statement concerning the holistic drive in man appears to be desirable.

THE BIOSPHERIC HOLISM IN THEOLOGY

It might not be true to hold with J.C. Smuts that the whole universe is holistic, from atoms to the deity. But nobody can deny the presence of a holistic drive in each organism by virtue of which it guards itself against outer disturbances and excessive irritation.[17] The organismic theorists in psychology have gone a step forward. Jung and Goldstein maintain that there is a centering drive of which each individual more or less becomes conscious. He forms an image of his personality which may be termed after Andras Angyal as his symbolic self. Further, there are not only those processes by which an individual maintains

[14]Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic*, Chap. I. Victor Gollancz, 1948.

[15]*Darshan*, January, 1962, pp. 95–104.

[16]Angyal, A., *Foundations for a Science of Personality*, N. Y., 1941; 'The Holistic Approach in Psychology', *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1948, pp. 178–82; Golstein, K., *The Organism*, American Book Co., 1939; Lacky P. *Self-Consistency*, Island Press, N. Y., 1945; Maslow, A. H., *Motivation And Personality*, Harper, N. Y., 1954.

[17]Freud, S., *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, pp. 50–51.

his *autonomy*, but there is also *homonomy* by virtue of which an individual expands and enriches his personality by appropriating and incorporating things and values operating within his psychological sphere. This homonomous activity, once again, following the terminology of Andras Angyal, may be called 'biospheric-holism'. Because of the working of this biospheric holism each individual by drawing upon the fund of human heritage gathers all the scattered processes within him into an integrated whole. Now we shall dwell a little both on the strength of the drive and on the nature of the symbolic self in relation to which this drive is satisfied.

The Intensity of The Holistic Drive

Freud maintained that in general primitive drives of infancy working under the pleasure principle are far more intense than their later appearance under reality principle. Hence, according to him, repressed impulses were regarded as intense for the simple reason that during the state of being repressed they continue their existence in their primitiveness without being educated to the reality. But why should an impulse because of its primitiveness be intense at all? Here holism comes to our aid. It appears to us better to hold that the psyche tends to be a whole and any part severed from the whole seeks its union or rather reunification with the whole. For this reason primitive impulses and banished complexes seeking to be integrated are characterised by special intensity. This point can be further strengthened by the following consideration.

In 1918 in his book *The Dynamic Psychology*, R.S. Woodworth was trying to explain the retention of the successful response and the elimination of the erroneous ones of a cat in a puzzle box. According to the suggestion of this book the successful response was retained because of the advantage it enjoyed of the sudden release of the pent-up energy. In other words, the energy remains damned up as long as no successful response takes place. As soon as the successful response of pressing the button resulting in the opening of the cage and the eating of the fish takes place the successful response gets invested with inten-

sity due to the sudden release of the pent-up force. This theory of the sudden release of the pent-up force can be easily brought under the law of enclosure. Each activity tends to be a sub-whole in a larger whole. For this reason any gap and disturbance have to be removed for achieving a holistic equilibrium. Repressed complexes are so many gaps in the task of realising oneself as one completed whole. Hence it can be maintained that the master tendency in every individual of becoming a whole is most primitive, most insistent, most comprehensive and most pervasive. Hence any object, any image of the symbolic self which tends to give one the feeling of being a completed whole would be characterised by great deal of intensity. Religious experience is the feeling of a completed whole in the light of a symbolic self. As such religious attitude is absolute, non-tentative and total. It lies in the staking out of the whole personality with regard to a symbolic self. The typical expression here is :

> "*Were the whole realm of nature mine,*
> *That were an offering far too small;*
> *Love so amazing, so divine,*
> *Demands my soul, my life, my all.*"

Jesus himself likened the kingdom of God to a pearl of great price. This intensity of feeling tends to spread out with regard to everything with which the symbolic self or God is related. The divine attributes of love, Omnipotence or Omniscience are the echoes from the intensity of finding one's redeemer or saviour, which in the language of psychology we have called symbolic self. Now we turn to the nature and function of the symbolic self.

The Symbolic Self

The symbolic self is an ideal image of what an individual would be if he were perfected. It might be that the formation of the Ideal Ego is greatly helped by the paternal or parental images as Freud would contend. But with Jung, against Freud, it has to be maintained that unless there is an urge to be an ideal self

there would be no inducement for the formation of the Ego Ideal. However, both Freud and Jung hold that the formation of the Ego-Ideal is not fully conscious. Much remains at the level of the UCS. The ideal self is that which draws out the maximum energy at the disposal of an individual. But the nature of the symbolic self conceived as an ideal differs with individuals. That which is a symbol for an introvert is not so for an extrovert. Similarly, a symbolic self of an individual with medieval mentality would not serve an individual with modern mentality or a mentality far ahead of his age. With Jung, it can be further maintained that an archetypal symbol of the self can never be fully cognitively understood. Once made intelligible, the symbol ceases to be the archetypal self.

GOD-EXPERIENCE

In the light of hints thrown above, we can say that God is that symbolic self in relation to which an individual comes to acquire the feeling of being a completed whole. Take away God from the life of a devotee and he becomes a dead thing. God-statement therefore is not an assertion which can be consciously verified. Much less can it be rendered precise in terms of sense-experience. Hence, God-statement is very much like value judgement with the difference that the value involved here is supreme, going beyond by including at the same time the value-judgement of Ethics or Logic or Aesthetics. Hence God has been called by Hoffding as the conservation of all values. God-statement interpreted in the light of the symbolic self has certain implications.

It would be idle to hold that there is only one religion of the Supreme Spirit (S. Radhakrishnan) or one Personal God (Christianity or Islam) of which other religions are so many dialects or modifications. We have to confess that there is a plurality of Gods. A God in order to be a God must bring *bodhi* or enlightenment to his worshippers. In this sense, Jesus Christ is the God of the Christians but not of the Muslims or of the Hindus. This depends very much on the type of the worshipper. I think that the relativity of Godhead has to be accepted as an

important contribution of Indian thinking to religious *Weltanschauung* of the present era.[18] God and his worshippers are correlative. But does that mean that God is just a projection of a certain complex in the mind of the worshippers?

This question can be answered obliquely. In addition to autonomy, there is also biospheric homonomy in an individual. No individual can be taken to be a chrysalis in a cocoon. He has to expand his personality by coming to terms with his environment, physical and social. In doing so he has to incorporate much of the factual statements. Consequently, the symbolic self or God too has to be supported by a number of factual or cognitive statements. There is hardly any significant theological statement which is not based on 'arguments' or 'proofs'. But these arguments are not for supporting further factual statements. They are so many pleas in the service of one's conviction. Theologically speaking, 'what shall profit a man if he gains a whole world of facts and loses his own soul?'

Theological statements have to be cognitively supported because the biospheric homonomy includes intellectual operations too. Further, the 'biosphere' has to be insulated or capsuled. For this reason what appears to one as a pearl of great price has to be shared and accepted as such by others. Otherwise, one's feeling of completion is always likely to be jeopardised by the theological construction of others. Therefore, the whole weight of one's logical acumen is thrown in defence of one's own theological statements, and, against all those statements which are at variance with them. For this reason theological statements appear to be cognitive. But the fire which lights them, sustains them and invests them with warmth comes from biospheric homonomy. How do we frame a theological *Weltanschauung*?

We have already remarked that theological statements are mataphysical. In this context we take recourse to the root-meta-

[18]Zuurdeeg, W.F., *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion*, George Allen, 1959; James, W., *The Varieties*, p. 487; Jung, C. G., *Psychology and Religion*, p. 7 and *Modern Man in Search of A Soul*, p. 282; *Essays in Contemporary Events*, p. 21.

phor theory of metaphysics.[19] According to it, we pick up a certain empirical concept from a favoured field of enquiry and raise it to the status of a key-notion for illuminating all the facts of all other fields. Of course no one individual can know all the facts nor can any notion do justice to all of them. Such key-notions of necessity become so many metaphors, Fougasse cartoons (D. M. Emmet) and for the anti-metaphysicians, so many category-distortions. 'Love of God', 'creation', 'omniscience' and other such terms are so many metaphors. Paradoxes, negations, parables, category-distortions in religious language are so many devices for evoking the sense of a 'convictor', of a God or of a symbolic self.[20] Hence the very meaning of a theological statement lies in bringing 'peace and pistis', 'divine unrest', repentance, the joy of being saved etc. These are so many stresses in the striving of an individual in becoming a whole with reference to a God or a convictor.

The transcendence of God does not mean His independence of his worshippers. The transcendence and immanence of God are both within the psyche of the individual. The 'Thou' of the 'I-Thou' relationship is simply halo of the 'I' within the psyche of an individual. The psyche itself has locus in an individual but goes much beyond it. God appearing in the psyche of an individual is neither an illusion nor a fiction, much less an activity which can be ignored at will. The vision of God does not depend on the will of the worshipper. There are unpredictable moments in which the symbolic image wells up from the depth

[19]The root-metaphor theory was hinted at by Whitehead and has been well developed by S. C. Pepper and Prof. D. M. Emmet. Whitehead, A. N., *Process and Reality*, p. 3; Pepper, S. C.: 'The Root-metaphor Theory of Metaphysics,' *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 32, 1935; *World Hypotheses* (1942), Emmet, D. M.: *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*, Macmillan, 1949; Ramsey, I.: "Possibility and Purpose of Metaphysical Theology" in *Prospect of Metaphysics*, Edited by I. Ramsey, Allen and Unwin, 1961. This theory in principle has been accepted by both Prof. W. H. Walsh and H. H. Price. Walsh, W. H.: *Reason and Experience*, pp. 241–47; Price, H. H.: 'Clarity is not Enough', *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, 1945, Supplementary volume XIX, p. 21*n*.

[20]Masih, Y., 'Religious Experience and Language', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 1961, pp. 57–65.

of the psyche and which eludes any intellectual grasp of the devotee. In this aspect God remains a 'hidden God' and appears to be disclosing Himself according to his own Grace. It is, however, distinguished from all other visions of demons of hallucinatory images both by its effectiveness and power, on the one hand, and by the resulting peace and joy, enhancement and expansiveness of the personality on the other hand. Therefore, God is objective in the sense that he is independent of the will of the worshipper, and in a sense is apprehended by divine revelation. God's presence can be felt by the usual method of prayer, meditation and other religious acts.

There is another sense in which God appears to be objective. God-experience is not confined to a few unique individuals, but is fairly common to a vast majority of people. Tradition and scriptures are the means adopted for the inter-communication and standardisation of religious experience. As the holistic tendency and the symbolic self are largely unconscious, so the religious language comprising of metaphors, parables etc., cannot be so easily standardised. Not to speak of theological statements of the various religions of the world, the theological statements of the various sects within a single religion must differ. Certain theological statements of a religious community are effective as long as they serve to evoke the presence of a convictor of that group. They cease to be effective as soon as they fail to evoke the numinous experience in the members of the religious community. Therefore no parables can be said to be faithful in the sense of being faithful description or faithful photographic reproduction of God. They are faithful in the sense of being effective in inducing numinous experience of God, characterised by awe, dread, creatureliness etc. God, therefore, is made objective by the religious language of a believing community, on the one hand, and by the individualistic experience of being saved or damned, uplifted or crushed etc., on the other hand.

Is this religious activity meaningless, seeing that theological statements are psychological in nature and noting that God has his locus in the psyche of the individual? In the first instance, God, for the worshipper, is an object of the utmost devotion and

is the most precious thing for an individual. But is it so for the unbeliever? For a Hindu, Jesus is not a saviour, and for a Christian, Lord Krishna is not a reality. But such unbeliefs do not take away the efficacy of Jesus or Krishna as convictors or saviours. But can there be a person with no deity at all? I doubt very much whether there can be a person without a convictor of one type or the other. Even an avowed atheist like Bertrand Russell has truth and humanity as objects of devotion. Similarly, Freud, according to Erich Fromm, favoured a religion of humanity which would establish real brotherhood of men, free from inner hate and dread, enabling men to pursue scientific truth as their greatest object of devotion.[21] Therefore, the critics of traditional forms of religion are not irreligious. Some of them are holding to the ideals of truth, beauty, goodness, heroism and universal brotherhood of men with far greater zeal than the traditional religionists. Some of the serious critics of traditional religions are the prophets of some modern forms of would-be religions. Once we understand the meaning of theological statements, we shall cease criticising others for not holding some of our pet forms of religion. With this enlarged appreciation of religious values, we shall be in a position to enter into the inner core of the Delphic message 'man, know thyself', or the message of Lord Buddha in the following words: 'Be a light unto yourself and seek your salvation with diligence'.

The task of becoming a fully realised self is neither trite nor meaningless. In a way the whole of factual knowledge is for the sake of nurturing the self. By actualising all those potentialities with which we are born in the world we become things of beauty. And a thing of beauty is a joy for ever. It would never pass into nothingness. This putting on of eternity in the human is neither humbug nor meaningless.

[21]Fromm, E., *Psycho-analysis and Religion.*

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

J. N. MOHANTY

I THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS

(*a*) Puzzles: 'Zuruck zu den sachen', 'back to the facts', was Edmund Husserl's epoch-making slogan. Though I have been captivated by this slogan long before I got the opportunity of studying phenomenology at Gottingen, I have never ceased to be puzzled by it. Husserl's programme attracted me because of its rejection of *speculative* metaphysics. Philosophy, so it seemed to me, must in some sense be descriptive. But *what* should it describe? What sort of facts are those that philosophy should describe? How are these facts different from the facts described by ordinary perceptual knowledge and also from those described by the natural sciences? Further, is pure description at all possible? Pure description, it would seem, would be possible only if it were also possible for something to be *given* without the least admixture of interpretation. But is not all that seems to be given shot through with interpretations? More especially is not all givenness subject to the mould imposed by language? Is there, positively asking, any mode of direct, i.e. non-linguistic access to the facts concerned? Finally, how is the ancient and age-old conception of philosophy as explanatory and interpretative in function to be accommodated into the idea of a descriptive philosophy? In other words, should philosophy abandon its age-old function which as it were, has come to constitute its defining character and assume a totally new role, and, if so, would not the new science forfeit its claim to be called 'philosophy'?

(*b*) Hegelians like Bradley and Blanshard, speculative metaphysicians like Whitehead, existentialists like Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and linguistic philosophers like Ryle, Austin and Goodman–all agree in condemning the idea of the unadulterated given, though they might differ amongst themselves as to the

nature and the source of the interpretations involved. (The interpretations are tagged on either to an ontological scheme or to a conceptual framework, or to a language-system.) Whitehead expresses the point most forcefully: 'If we desire a record of uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record its autobiography'.[1] And in the same vein writes also Martin Heidegger: 'Alles vorpradikative schlichte Sehen des Zuhandenen ist an ihm selbst schon verstehend-auslegend'.[2] The most primitive 'seeing' is 'interpretative'. It is therefore not surprising that Heidegger should have subscribed to the apparently paradoxical view that the phenomenolgical method of description is really interpretative. Similarly, for the [3]Hegelian there is no absolute immediacy. Immediacy is either a merely logical presupposition and therefore incapable of presenting data, or the consummating goal towards which experience and knowledge are moving and in which they would but commit suicide: in neither case is it capable of presenting data for phenomenological description. For the later Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, even ostentation to be meaningful should presuppose a language system. And, yet curiously enough all of them–only the extreme Hegelian excluding–recognise the value of description as a philosophical method. Whitehead speaks of his metaphysics as being descriptive in character.[4] So does, and more explicitly, Heidegger. And Wittgenstein writes: 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.[5]

The contradiction can be resolved, so it seems to me, by recognising that what the phenomenological method of description stands for is *not* the primacy of intuition over understanding. What the method aims at is not getting hold of the primitive immediacy alone, though it seeks to do that *also*. The opposition between intuition and understanding, between the given and

[1]Whitehead A. N., *Process and Reality*, New York edition, p. 22.

[2]Heidegger M., *Sein und Zeit*, Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 7th edition, 1953, p. 149.

[3]Heidegger, M., *Ibid*, p. 37.

[4]Whitehead, A.N., *Ibid*, p. 15.

[5]Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, p. 45.

the interpretations of it is a false opposition. Reflection and understanding lead to fresh intuitions. And intuitions may come to lay bare interpretations that have come to be sedimented in the structure of phenomena.

(*c*) The idea of a philosophical *system*, understood in the sense of traditional speculative deductive metaphysics is obviously incompatible with such a conception of philosophical method. For, a phenomenological philosophy should neither deduce nor reduce. It should avoid, as Nicolai Hartmann constantly reminds us, both kinds of reduction: 'nach Unten' and 'nach Oben'. There is however another sense in which there *is* room for system in such a philosophy. Two principles seem to me to be illuminating, and both I owe again to Nicolai Hartmann though not in the form in which I here make use of them. There should be, in the first place, a minimum of speculative metaphysics. Pure description is an ideal after which we could only strive, and in this striving our heuristic principle should be to make as few speculative-deductive commitments as possible. And in the second place, the system should be an 'open', rather than a 'closed' one. A typical example of what is meant by a 'closed' system is the Hegelian philosophy, in which there is *an explanation* for *every* phenomenon in the sense that phenomena are *deductively* linked up with each other, so as to lead up to the highest *concept*. Now, by an 'open' system I mean one in which the phenomena 'announce' their own status or *topos* and, when they are conceptually placed side by side there are found to be missing links, gaps that can only be conceptually filled in. The Advaita Vedanta, it may be claimed, is a good example of such an 'open system' – though no doubt later Advaita dialecticians sought to 'close' the gaps conceptually. Gaps are to be filled in as far as possible with fresh phenomenological data failing which they are themselves to be admitted as irreducible phenomena.

(*d*) What are those phenomena that philosophy should describe? It was a common doctrine of the phenomenologists tha these are nothing other than essences and essential structures. The full implication however of this was not as clearly brought

out as it ought to have been. There is no doubt that the different aspects of the situation were seen, though only in different contexts and often by different thinkers: what is still lacking is a perception of the essential unity and interrelation of these aspects. There were invitably three different groups of thinkers, each claiming to be pursuing the programme of phenomenology: the ontologists (Scheler and Hartmann), the subjectivists (the later Husserl, Natorp) and the linguistic analysts (Hans Lipps, Gilbert Ryle). It has not yet however been sufficiently realised that these three groups were concerned with three different aspects of the proper object of philosophical thought. I would now proceed to explicate this above statement. Critical philosophers since Kant have from time to time suspected naive ontology, and have sought to reduce ontology either to transcendental logic (Kant), or with the help of some other *linguistic* device. Quine, for example, following Russel has reduced ontological commitments to the range of values that are permissible for the variables in the existential quantifier. But more interesting is Carnap's attempt to translate statements in the material mode to those in the formal mode. Now, we may broadly distinguish between two different ways of replacing the material mode of speech ; the formal mode of Carnap, and the phenomenolgical mode. Whereas the former considers the way the corresponding words are used, the latter considers the mode in which the entity under consideration is given. Thus while the ontological or the material mode speaks of entities and the formal mode of the logical behaviour of the corresponding words, the phenomenological mode considers *the mode of givenness* of that entity. Now the phenomena that a phenomenological philosophy is to describe are such that with regard to them the ontological mode of speech is inseparable from the formal and the phenomenological modes. This may be clarified with reference to two statements, which I quote below, the one from K. C. Bhattacharyya and the other from Edmund Husserl.

K.C. Bhattacharyya writes: "Speakability is a contingent character of the content of empirical thought but it is a neces-

sary character of the content of pure philosophic thought ".[6]

Referring to the points of distinction between the phenomenological and the ontological attitudes, Husserl writes: Das sind kardinale Unterschiede, die nur Verallgeneinerungen des enifachen Unterschiedes sind, dass Bedeutungen setzen und Gegerstande setzen zweierleits ".[7]

Both Bhattacharyya and Husserl are thus drawing attention to the fact that the essences that phenomenology is to describe are but meanings, and thus any ontological assertion about them cannot but have an equivalent in the formal mode. Likewise, such an essence has its own mode of givenness which is not just accidental to its mode of being. Far from it, the mode of givenness and the mode of being are but inseparable poles of the same phenomenon. This equivalence, however, does not hold good of empirical facts of whom as Bhattacharyya rightly saw, speakability – and I should add 'giveability' – is only a contingent character.

Thus those philosophers who deny to philosophy any factual content and assign to it the task of exploring the logical behaviour of words are partly right, as also are those who take up the programme of bringing to light the subjective *constitution* of the objective essence. The former are right in so far as the objects of philosophical description are, unlike empirical facts, revealed through meaning-analysis. They err, however, in thinking that philosophical statements are for that reason of no ontological significance and also in concentrating on the therapeutic use of their linguistic wisdom. We contend, however, that ontology is possible through linguistic analysis, though such ontology would be very different from naive dogmatic ontology. The same is also true of the programme of constitution-analysis. Both meaning-analysis and constitution-analysis are the gateways to critical ontology, and the three, in their unity, constitute *the integral phenomenological method.*

The reason why linguistic analysis has been regarded as onto-

[6] Battacharyya, K.C., *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Progressive Publishers, CBhatta, 102–03.

[7] Husserl, E., *Ideen, Drittes Batch*, Martinus Nijhoff, Haag, 1952, pp. 88–9.

logically unfruitful and why questions of language and questions of fact have been sharply sundered seems to be a mistaken notion about the nature of language which on its part derives from a mistaken theory of meaning.

II Meaning and Reference

Meaning has wrongly been taken to consist in use. After the early empiricists' image theory and the later day positivists' verifiability theory were rightly abandoned, the modern analysts have taken to the view that knowing the meaning of an expression is the same as knowing how to use it in accordance with the rules and conventions of the language under consideration. Such a theory of meaning has, in the eyes of its propounders, two distinct advantages. On the one hand, it renders it impossible to speak any longer of meanings as entities in any sense. On the other hand, it avoids the subjectivism of the image theory and the verifiability theory, for the rules and conventions that confer meaning, are far from being subjective. Now if this is what constitutes *meaning*, and if all extra-linguistic facts, objects or events (whichever language one may prefer) are objects of *references*, then analysis of the meaning of an expression could only bring to light its behaviour within the language to which it belongs, and such analysis could by no means provide us with a basis on which to build an ontology.

Now such a conventionalist and operationalist theory of meaning is inadequate for the following reasons : It cannot account for what happens when we grasp the meaning of a word or of a sentence in a flash as it were. It would not do to say that what we grasp is a set of rules and conventions, for reasons of which Wittgenstein himself is aware.[8] It is not the bare possibility of use, for what we grasp is not this possibility itself but rather that which makes its use possible. Wittgenstein is right[9] that certain objective circumstances, human customs and institutions – in the present case, a conventional system of signs with rules of operation – must be given in order that I could intend a

[8]Wittgenstein, L., *loc. cit.*, p. 53.
[9]Wittgenstein, L., *loc. cit.*, p. 108.

meaning. But this does not imply that a linguistic expression is nothing but a physical sign or that our understanding of it is nothing other than the capacity to operate with it in accordance with certain rules. We contend on the other hand, that given such a set of signs with rules of operation, the set would not amount to *language* – nor would the operation amount to an understanding – unless an intellectual act or meaning intention supervened. Now the meaning in the substantive, the much abused abstract entity, is a phenomenological datum not to be 'liquidated' by any theory,[10] though its Platonic character would be less appalling if only we remember that it is but the intentional correlate, as Edmund Husserl would say, of the meaning-intending act.

In other words, it must have to be recognised that meanings have an identity and objectivity about them, which all forms of psychologism and conventionalism threaten to destroy. At the same time the 'It means' has its necessary correlate in the 'I mean', and both have a necessary reference to 'in the language L'. Platonism in theory of meaning must therefore be so interpreted as to be the fulfilment of both subjectivism and formalism. The relation between the 'I mean' and the 'It means' is especially intimate, using an analogy which I have elsewhere employed, just as in modern physics it has come to be recognised that the wave theory and the corpuscular theory of elementary particles are no more rival hypotheses but are really complementary descriptions, so in the theory of meaning it has to be recognised that Platonism and anti-Platonism, the ontological and the subjective approaches, are complementary, not rival and not even alternate ways of describing the same unitary phenomenon. The ontological hypostatisation has to be supplemented by bearing the subjective and the linguistic 'background' in mind, just as the subjective and the linguistic relativism has to be overcome by making it subservient to a recognition of the ideality and the objectivity of meanings.

[10]For an examination of some other attempts to eliminate Platonism, see my *Meaning and Truth* (Presidential Address, Logic and Metaphysics Section, Indian Philosophical Congress; 36th session, Viswabharati University, Santiniketan, 1961.

To admit the element of truth that is there in a Platonistic theory of meaning is *not* however to betray one's failure as Quine supposes to distinguish between meaning and reference, for it is precisely this distinction – kept in mind by both Frege and Husserl – that provides the basis for Platonism. Nor can it be said that Platonism here implies the unpalatable thesis that in understanding the meaning of an expression we inspect impalpable abstractions. It is particularly against this last accusation that a few words of clarification are needed.

Understanding an expression 'S is p' may or may not be a constituent of the knowledge that S is p. When it *is* a constituent of the knowledge, the intention is of course directed towards the fact referred to, and not towards the meanings themselves. But even when the understanding is a mere understanding not amounting to knowledge, we do *not* inspect meanings, for meanings are just not the sort of entities which could be so inspected. They can perhaps be more appropriately described as *transparent* media *through* which the intention is directed towards the object referred to. They are not intended in the same sense in which the fact referred to is: the latter is *the object* intended, the meaning is just the mode of so intending. Our theory that even a mere understanding of an expression not amounting to knowledge is also to refer implies that reference, like sense, or meaning, belongs to expressions qua expressions, and it is obvious that with this we are rejecting the view of those who hold that expressions have only meaning while it is only a genuine use of them that refers. The Meinongian ghosts could be avoided if only we bear in mind that not all intended references are capable of being fulfilled.

A distinction between understanding and knowing may be recommended on the basis of the above considerations. According to this distinction, to understand a sentence 'S is p' is *also* to understand *what kind of facts* it refers to, but this does not amount to knowing *the fact*, unless the understanding has entered into the knowledge as a constituent thereof. Knowing that 'S is p', however, presupposes an understanding of the sentence 'S is p'. Knowledge in this sense recommended implies

a unique identification, in Husserl's language, a *fulfilment.* This is not more than suggesting that the two, understanding with its generality and knowing with its unique identification, represent two poles between which human cognitive endeavour oscillates. Scientific knowledge, in trying to get away from unique reference to generality, aims a pure understanding. Perception of physical objects and acceptance of other persons are not without reason regarded as the standard type of knowing, for they excel just in the unique identification achieved.

III THE THEORETICAL AND THE PRACTICAL MODES OF GIVENNESS

How is such unique reference possible? The extra-linguistic reference of language presents no problem at all, for such reference is an essential character of language qua language. The really pertinent problem is, how is it possible to make unique reference? Most philosphers who have dealt with this problem fall back upon such words as 'this', 'here', 'now' words called by Russell 'egocentric particulars' and by F.W. Hall 'empirical ties'. But the mere fact that even these expressions have an aspect of sense distinguishable from their reference makes it possible that one can understand them without knowing what precisely is being uniquely referred to. We have to recognise that a knowledge of the unique individual is for from being a contemplative affair. It is necessary to recognise the distinction between two fundamental modes of givenness: the theoretical and the practical. The unique particular (physical object) and the unique individual (person) are identified not through theoretic contemplation, but through practical relationships.

In the theory of perception this distinction saves us from much embarrassment. It is well known how the vexed question of the perception of physical objects has been treated in contemporary philosophy. Starting with the sense-data, the qualities or the essences as the only given elements, philosophers have been compelled to regard the physical object either as totally unknown (but believed on 'animal faith') or as merely inferred or

even as a construction out of those elements. None of these consequences has proved acceptable for one reason, amongst others, that they all go against that primary evidence with which things are *given* in unreflective experience. These are *not* given in that theoretical attitude in which one discovers sense-data or essences. Philosophers – as Whitehead rightly saw – have erred in regarding perception as a contemplative experience, and the percipient person as a passive epistemological subject which he is not. In the reflective and contemplative attitude, the stubborn brute physical objects recede to the background and in their place we are confronted with sense-data and essences. This – and not the much discussed argument from illusion – is the real source of the sense-datum approach, which is destined to failure as it surreptitiously seeks to replace the data of the mode by the data of another. It is not true to contend that the sense-datum theory is only an alternate *linguistic* recommendation, the physical object language being another such possibility. The truth seems to be that they are not co-ordinate possibilities, but are rooted in two *successive* modes of disclosure, the physical object being given in the primary, unreflective, practical mode and the sense-data in a subsequent, reflective and theoretical mode. Each theory, or each language if you like, has thus its own justification. *Given* the physical object, it can of course be *analysed* into sense-data and essences.[11] But the theoretician's attempt to recompose that original pre-theoretical unity out of these data is bound to fail. This is the truth contained in the Whiteheadian Theorem that the 'associative hierarchy' of an actual occasion is infinite.[12]

As with the problem of our perception of physical objects, so also with the problem of our knowledge of other *persons*. Here

[11] Prof. J.N. Chubb (Bombay) tells me that the late Prof. K.C. Bhattacharyya in an unpublished letter expresses the view that the sense-data are results of 'aesthetic abstraction'. Professor Chubb also tells me that the late Professor Collingwood once told him that in his opinion no intelligible relation could be formulated between physical object and sense-data since they belong to two different levels. I find myself in agreement with the insight underlying these remarks.

[12] Whitehead, A.N.: *Science and the Modern World*, 1926, p. 198.

again it is an erroneous procedure to begin with my awareness of myself and then to search for some means (inference, or 'empathy' or *Einfühlung*) by which I could reach, apprehend or realise other selves. It is again through a system of practical relationships that I discover others as well as myself, in fact both together and as inseparable. This is the element of truth in Heidegger's contention that the person is, in his essential structure, 'with others'. As the practical relationship reveals the person-with-other-persons, so does theoretical reflection lead through various stages to the transcendental subjectivity of Kant and Husserl. Husserl was in a way right when he insisted that even the transcendental subjectivity is intentional. Though one cannot, once one is launched in the process of reflection, stop here and is inevitably led to the Advaita conception of a pure transcendental consciousness that is *not* a cousciousness of... yet, it must be said that the notion of such a pure consciousness is not only beyond ontology but also beyond phenomenology. The pure consciousness is *not given* in either of the modes of givenness, theoretical or practical. The notion of pure consciousness in fact represents the limiting point of our turning away from the ontological attitude and since the phenomenological mode has always a correlative ontology, it cannot even be a phenomenological datum. Hence such a pure unobjective not-intentional consciousness can only be postulated by an act of faith.

The practical mode thus reveals on the one hand the world of things and on the other a community of persons, the 'It' and the 'Thou'. Corresponding to this we may draw the distinction – following Kant[13] – between the *technically-practical* and the *morally-practical*. Both present real existence and conceptually irreducible unities which, when sought to be grasped by theoretical consciousness, disintegrate into endless series.

The distinction between theory and practice sought to be advocated here may be developed in other directions. Just as it can be asked *what* precisely are disclosed or given through each of the modes, so it can also be asked: *who contemplates* and *who acts*. The *who* of contemplation is the *subject*. The *who* of action is the

[13] See Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, 'Introduction'.

person. As the subject of thinking I am no more the unique individual that I otherwise am, for thought being essentially universal and communicable. I, while thinking, step out of the privacy of my individuality. As an agent however, I am *this* unique person acting always within a determinate situation. The person in fact as Max Scheler insisted, is an 'act-centre'. It is true no doubt that in so distinguishing between thought and action, and correspondingly between the subject and the person, we are describing ideal limiting cases; what are distinguished need not be separable. Factual inter-weaving need not blind us to essential distinctions. Our thought may – and in fact is – practically be motivated, but the ideal of thought is to get detached from practice and reach universality. Action also – though as said above is inseparable from the individual agent and a determinate situation – aims at universality as in moral action. But it should be borne in mind that there is a *radical distinction* between the universality which thought aims at and the universality which action aims at: the ideal of the *subject* is to gain universality by emptying itself to zero, the ideal of the *person* is to gain universality by enriching and harmonising his inner contents and his relationship to other persons. Man is both a subject and a person.

IV A Phenomenological Discontinuity

Philosophy is generally taken to involve reflection. The suggestion then that the unreflective practical attitude, and the corresponding mode of disclosure be accorded the recognition that we have given to it may seem to involve a paradox. How can reflection accept the unreflective orientation, and its disclosures? And should not philosophy rather challenge the naivety of that primitive attitude, and then shatter it into bits in order to reconstruct it in accordance with reflective categories? Or, at least should not philosophy 'transcend' that primitive naivety? Or, if one is in sympathy with that primitive naivety, should not one, as a philosopher, undertake the task of 'proving', or deductively demonstrating – as G. E. Moore sought to do – the beliefs ascribed to it?

Now, as is well known, the main point of distinction between a phenomenological philosophy and a deductive metaphysics is that the former 'describes', whereas the latter 'deduces', 'proves' or 'explains'. Accordingly, a phenomenologist philosopher has to face a paradox, a paradox that is involved in his very procedure: on the one hand he has to instal himself in an attitude, be it of unreflective naivety, or of reflective contemplation. At the same time, he has to 'transcend' it to be its passive witness (*sākṣin*) to suspend belief as Husserl would say in order to be able to describe. This paradox cannot be resolved, and has to be accepted: this simultaneous participation and transcendence, which in fact provides the key to a phenomenological philosophy. The philosopher therefore need not *accept* the *beliefs* of unreflective attitude, just as he need not also reject them. Achieving the needed transcendence, his job is to tell the tale. He is not to be a partisan but an impartial spectator. G. E. Moore when he sought to defend common sense as against speculative philosophers committed a double error: he ascribed to the pre-reflective attitude beliefs which are themselves only other philosophical theories, and he sought to demonstrate what has a non-demonstrative certainty. He failed thereby to exhibit the nature and the source of that certainty.

A phenomenological philosophy has to accept a radical phenomenological discontinuity, and any attempt to overcome it is to be suspected as originating from a too hasty desire for achieving metaphysical simplicity. One of the beauties of the Advaita is that it accepts such a discontinuity between the *vyavahārika* and the *pāramāvthika*, and considers any relationship between them as being logically indescribable. Our distinction between the practical and the theoretical may be regarded as a pale reflection of that spiritual philosophy in the level of secular philosophising.

THE HUMANISM OF ROY

G. D. PARIKH

AMONG HIS Indian contemporaries M. N. Roy occupies a unique position; there is perhaps no parallel in the whole of the East. Two main aspects of this uniqueness are particularly striking: the universality of his experience and the unorthodox nature of his thinking. That his life, no less than his ideas, was his testament is a measure of his real greatness which, I think, is bound to grow with time in its value and significance.

Roy was beyond doubt the founder of Indian communism; in fact, as Head of the Eastern Section of the Communist International, he played a pioneering role in respect of communist movements in several countries in the East. And this was at a time when communism appeared to be the only hope of liberation to many who were prepared to sacrifice everything for its realisation. But Roy's understanding of such liberation had gone far beyond mere political subversion or even economic reorganisation; it involved the emancipation of the people as a whole, their emergence into a new and ever widening realm of creativity as masters of their destiny. This position, amply corroborated later, ought to enable us to see the earlier event in a proper perspective. It will then be seen that the founder of communism in India was also one who for the first time introduced the social factor in our thinking of the struggle for independence. In speaking of independence as a means rather than as an end, he was anticipated; and there were some who had even maintained that the end was an improvement in the lot of the common man. But it was with Roy that the struggle got for the first time directly linked up with an analysis of the Indian society. The struggle against the British thus became the struggle against Imperialism. It could not be possibly developed by an all-embracing nationalism motivated largely by racial animosity. It demanded recognition of the social basis of

Imperialism inside the country and a genuine emphasis on the democratic objectives the national movement ought to realise.

Already in 1940 Roy defined his position as follows: "We shall have to free Indian society from the most antiquated ideas and fossilised institutions. Then, we shall have to free it from the medieval feudal relations and mode of production which place serious handicaps on the economic development of the country. Finally, we shall have to free the Indian masses from the latest form of bondage, namely, capitalist exploitation. We shall have to fight it in its most highly developed form – Imperialism; and very probably its most brutal expression - Fascism – will also have to be combated. The revolution which we are heralding is thus not only one revolution, but really three revolutions which took place over a period of thousand years, experienced by many generations in other parts of the world. All the great historical tasks performed by these three revolutions shall have to be performed in our country, perhaps in one generation or even less. That is probably the most tremendous task ever set to any human community." This essentially was the basis of his subsequent explorations. All these were inspired by the recognition that "we have three different sets of problems. They cannot be solved singly. We simply cannot separate them. They are interwoven. And their solution is so complex that even history cannot help us, because such complications have never happened in history."

It was emphasised that the Indian Revolution thus was taking place under peculiar historical conditions. It involved the solving of the social problems of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries in the twentieth century atmosphere. While the latter provided Marxism as a guide to revolutionary practice, it had hardly any direct relevance to the eighteenth century problems of Indian society. One has therefore to turn to it as a philosophy which illuminates the entire course of human history and examine as such its bearings on situations of the pre-Marxian periods instead of depending on it as a theory of promoting revolutions in a specific period of history. Marxism as a method applied to the Problems of democratic revolutions alone was

strictly in order. The revolution on the order of the day being the bourgeois democratic revolution, philosophical radicalism was essentially its ideology. The bourgeoisie on its way to entering into a junior partnership with Imperialism, may not accept it or be prepared to carry through the historical task of the democratic revolution. But there was nothing to prevent the Marxists, if they did not swear by it merely as a faith or a bunch of dogmas, from recognising that Radicalism was the shadow of Marxism cast ahead of its times. Roy warned against the replacement of Manu by Marx and pleaded for a little look at Voltaire as an essential precondition for a proper understanding of the latter. And the distinct nature of the Indian revolution, he maintained, was bound to put its own stamp on the nature of the State it would bring into existence. Such a State, he already visualised in 1940, could 'neither be a parliamentary democratic state nor the dictatorship of the proletariat'. India may on the other hand be a new type of peasant democracy eventually passing through a transition to socialism.

It was essentially this approach that came to be tried and tested during the period of the war. It posed democracy against nationalism, freedom against fascism, the need for a Peoples' Government against the slogan of a National Government. It asserted that national independence had hardly any meaning excepting as freedom of the individual men and women who inhabit the nation. It asserted that nationalism was essentially totalitarian and as such a breeding ground of fascism; as a mere worship of geography, it was an antiquated cult. It even went further to emphasise that India could neither be free nor preserve her freedom in a world dominated by fascism, that Imperialism fighting with fascism was engaged in a war neither of its choice nor in its interests, and that such a war, if it ended in the defeat of fascism, was bound to find India nearer to her cherished goal. Experience however revealed the inability of the people, in the atmosphere surcharged with emotions, to distinguish between passion and reason, between slogan and sense. The entire approach thereby got enriched until it eventually blossomed into the open and dynamic philosophy of New Humanism.

Any social change, before it actually takes place, must occur in the minds of men. Revolution essentially is in this sense a subjective phenomenon. Freedom cannot be meaningfully pursued as an ideal by a people dominated by other worldliness, steeped in backwardness and prejudice, living under the influence of a semi-authoritarian culture. Introduction of egalitarian ideas in such a context can only produce explosions almost entirely unrelated to revolution. The minds must therefore be liberated as an essential precondition for all progress and prosperity; the mental soil must be tilled. Roy therefore spoke of the supreme significance of a philosophical revolution, the need for a Renaissance in India.

Few countries show a greater pride in their past than India and yet none of them perhaps is more ignorant of it. Pride here is generally blind, the attitude worshipful, the spirit behind it being generally of reverence and idolatry. The result naturally is the prevalence of myths instead of a proper and informed appreciation of the great and the glorious. Domination of the religious mode of thought makes an average Indian prone to believe than to doubt or to question. And the beliefs and the prejudices are vested with the significance of a special genius thus enabling him to seek consolation in his so-called superiority over the rest of mankind. It thus either serves as an escape from the prevalent miseries and hardships or provides doubtful compensation for them. Occasionally it even breeds a special type of arrogance when, unable to save himself, he starts believing in his 'mission' of saving the world. He postulates a basic opposition between his so-called spiritualism and the materialist West and begins to strengthen the assumption with the aid of deliberately selected, tendencious or fictitious evidence. And in all this anxiety to save the souls of others, he loses sight completely of the numerous expressions of unmitigated selfishness and vulgar materialism so clearly and widely visible in the society around him.

The object of the philosophical revolution is basically to change this outlook. Roy's attitude to the past was not negative; it was critical and historical. What he insisted upon was the need for a critical revaluation of the past; what he revolted against

was the outlook dominated by the graveyards of history. His was an anxiety to distinguish the chaff from the grain. A little critical and questioning attitude, he believed, was bound to reveal that elements from the past, considered generally precious, are not really so and that the so-called spiritual genius of India was in a sense only a measure of her backwardness.

Such an intellectual movement of resurgence will have to promote, he pleaded, efforts in the direction of writing a history of the country, free from the deriding or deifying twists or overtones given to it either by the Imperialist masters or the spokesmen of Nationalism. Aware of the difficulties inherent in any such effort, he argued for efforts to reconstruct in the fiirst instance the history of philosophy which "runs parallel to other branches of the history of Mankind". What is usually spoken of as philosophy was not philosophy – it was theology. "The medley of religious thoughts" which goes by the name of Indian traditions at present may be taken as the basic materials to work with so that a history of philosophy may be deduced, and the road ahead may be illuminated.

Roy was fully aware of the enormous difficulties facing the Indian Renaissance, for, side by side with it, there existed a strong revivalist movement in the country. "That sort of revivalism may be tolerated as harmless senility. But really it is not so harmless as all that. The recently growing revivalist movement is tendentious ; indeed, it is a positive danger. The object is to discover moral sanctions for reactionary ideas and ideals which are bred in the cesspool of social and cultural backwardness." This made this apparently intellectual movement one of immediate and direct significance for the reconstruction of the political and the economic life of the country. He emphasised how Indian revivalism was growing in the atmosphere of spiritual crisis confronting the country and the way it was sought to be reinforced by capitalising the lapses and the irrationalities produced by a similar crisis in the West. Taking place in the mid-twentieth century, the Renaissance movement will further have to endeavour to enable us to look upon the entire human heritage as our own.

This accent on the orientation of the outlook of the people as an essential precondition of the development of society is one of the most significant contributions of M. N. Roy. Another major contribution was his idea of grassroots democracy. Choosing the age-old aphorism, namely, education is the precondition of democracy, as his point of departure, Roy maintained that neither the crystallisation of free institutions nor their proper functioning was possible unless the urge for freedom, for securing the conditions of a decent human life, was activised in the people themselves. In the absence of the latter, democracy is bound to degenerate into a scramble for power.

Roy argued that freedom was a path rather than a goal. He deliberately abstained from furnishing any blue-print of the ideal society he desired to be achieved. He was not aiming at any particular set of economic or political institutions; he was rather thinking in terms of developments which could furnish an increasing measure of freedom to a growing number of individuals. There was no particular moment in history when the ideal could be expected to be fully realised. In fact, it was not something to work for; it was rather something to be lived. And all efforts must be directed towards progressive elimination of limitations imposed by the conditions around on such living. This approach naturally emphasised the practice of democracy rather than mere theorisations about it; it had to be guided by the moral dictum: example is better than precept.

His approach to politics thus demanded a reorientation of political practice. Power was not the goal of political activity; structural changes should not be imposed from above. If the unit of democracy is the individual, democratic practice ought to start with the individual. This does not exclude co-operative human endeavours; in fact, such endeavours are indispensable for promoting freedom. But they cannot be permitted to reduce men into mere instruments, a mass swayed one way or the other by demagogy. To transform masses into men is the purpose of all genuine democratic practice.

Roy stated that placing the individual 'in the centre of a social philosophy' was easy; 'individualism was the cardinal

principle' of liberal social philosophy and political theory. But in practice it was reduced to an abstract doctrine ; the sovereign individual, to a legal fiction. The collectivistic theories that arose during the period of decay of liberalism had on the other hand advanced a fraudulent concept of freedom. He traced the decline of liberal philosophy to its ambiguity about the sanction of morality. Transcendentalism, he maintained, had placed ethical values beyond the test of human experience while utilitarianism deprived them of any objective standard. His was an attempt to assert the primacy and the supremacy of the individual as a moral being by asserting the sanction of moral values in his rationality ; and the latter was characterised as a biological function.

"Ethics must be the foundation of the moral philosophy which is the crying need of our time. In order to avoid the quicksand of transcendentalism and the pitfalls of relativity, ethics must be integrated in a general philosophy. A humanist ethics based on a naturalist rationalism can be built only on the rock-bottom of a mechanistic cosmology and physical-realist ontology". His idea of a grassroots democracy can be meaningfully grasped against the background of this philosophic position to which he arrived in New Humanism. As a social philosophy, New Humanism emerged from the realisation of the inadequacies of current ideologies and it claimed to show the road ahead.

The crisis of Parliamentary Democracy produced Fascism ; Communism on ceasing to be an idea and beginning to be built up in brick and mortar degenerated into a new tyranny. The traditional approaches thus clearly appeared to be devoid of any liberating possibilities. The crisis of the forties of which the global war was the most destructive symptom thus posed the problem of making democracy possible, of restoring morality in public life. It was essentially an intellectual and a moral crisis. But a crisis always involves hope. Roy's was a response to it which opened up such hopeful possibilities.

This response can be briefly indicated by referring to a few basic propositions from the *Theses of Radical Democracy*. "The purpose of all rational human endeavour, individual as well as

collective, is attainment of freedom in ever increasing measure. Freedom is progressive disappearance of all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities of individuals, as human beings, and not as cogs in the wheels of a mechanised social organism. The position of the individual, therefore is the measure of the progressive and liberating significanc of any collective effort or social organisation. The success of any collective endeavour is to be measured by the actual benefit for its constituent units."

While Roy continued to share the inspiration of Marxism and to recognise its position in the history of ideas, he also sought to transcend its limitations and provide its critical assessment. He remained a materialist but rejected the economic interpretation of history. Acknowledging the role of ideas as a causal factor in social change, Roy maintained that their dynamics and the process of social development were independent and interacting processes and no causal relation could be established between them at any particular point. He questioned the organismic view of society and characterised the withering away of the State as an illusion. Compartmentalisation between political and economic democracy was obviously fallacious, he argued, and went on to point out that neither of them could be real without the other. Revolution, he maintained, must proceed beyond the economic organisation of society if it is to have a genuine liberating significance.

As stated earlier, Roy's preoccupations in the forties centred round the question: Is democracy possible? The crisis of the inter-war period had revealed the validity of the Marxian challenge. It had opened up the way to ever growing action by the state with the purpose of reducing inequalities and alleviating the hardships and the sufferings of the community. In the context of underdevelopment, this approach acquires a much larger measure of validity in view of the over-riding importance of the economic problem. The danger of a growing Leviathan thus becomes real and the institutional apparatus of a parliamentary democracy provides no guarantees against the danger. Delegation of power by the atomised individua's through periodic elections only tended, on the one hand, to intensify the scramble

for power and on the other to reduce the real sovereign to a state of helplessness. The gulf between the decision-making level and the individual citizen constantly tends to increase; and unable to influence the decisions, the individual beings to lose interest in their nature and implications. Increasing complexities of modern life accentuate this process and intelligent political interest begins to disappear. Politics comes to be dominated by emotional extravagance and democracy degenerates into demagogy.

It is in this context that Roy developed the idea of a grass roots democracy. He spoke of a more organised political structure involving a large measure of diffusion of power. Devolution of functions and a corresponding decentralisation of the process of decision-making can enable people to actively participate in the exercise of power over a certain range and promote their political interest and understanding. The basic unit of the pyramidal political structure is a People's Committee which is not only an embodiment of the people's will to govern themselves but also a school of their political education. On the basis of a network of such committees stand the units at the district, state and the national levels elected by these units. That a large population society cannot simply dispense with representation is obvious; what Roy was seeking was institutional guarantees against such representation amounting to surrender of power by the people. Constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, independent judiciary, devices like referendum and recall are not likely to suffice for the purpose; what was essential was a remodelling of the political structure itself so as to provide for an increasingly effective exercise of power by the people themselves.

The economic aspect of this reorganisation consists of the efforts of the people, organised on a co-operative basis, to solve their own problems. The co-operative form of organisation while providing scope for individual initiative can effectively prevent growth of inequalities and of concentration of power either in private hands or in those of the bureaucracy. True, modern technology does promote centralisation; there are also sectors

of the national economy which by their very nature necessarily demand nationalisation. But it is equally—nay much more—important to promote a spirit of self-reliance in the community and to provide for a built-in structure in the economy, conducive to the process of diffusion of power. The question of turning back to traditional capitalism does not arise, that by accepting a more positive role of the state, capitalism can work instead of breaking down is also a poor consolation. The dangers of wholesale nationalisation and total planning on the national level have, on the other hand, also become amply clear. One can hardly pin one's faith in these for solving the economic problem of promoting prosperity on an egalitarian basis. Whether the communist approach to economic reorganisation flows from Marxism itself or is essentially pragmatic in nature is a moot point. But its failure in restoring production to its original purpose of satisfying 'human' demand is obvious. To harness developmental effort to that end and to make it conducive to the actual enjoyment of improving living standards by the individual members of the community is what Roy aimed at; and he further insisted that the methods and technics of promoting that effort must be generally capable of contributing to the growth of confidence in the people about solving their own problems.

Roy did not think in terms of an ideal society or its blueprint; in fact such an idea would be inconsistent with his argument. Institutions of a free society can crystallise only through the efforts of free, rational and discriminating individuals and the question of anticipating their detailed nature does not arise. Rather than being directed towards a specific goal, action has to have a proper direction. The direction in the case of Roy was deduced from a life-long experience and understanding of the leading movements and ideas of our times. At the same time, he maintained an open-minded attitude towards his conclusions. His thinking centred round the question : Is action possible on the basis of tentative conclusions or an open philosophy ? Is practice of democracy possible ?

The two main preoccupations of Roy in the forties thus were :

one, liberation of public life from the domination of dogmas and passions, prejudices and superstitions and ensuring the prevalence of reason in it; and two, restoration of morality in public life. Politics, understood as pursuit of power, whether in the context of a formal democracy or a dictatorship, militates against the former; morality backed by non-rational sanctions fails in achieving the latter. Roy rejected the approach of power and its underlying belief that structural changes can only be imposed from above. Drawing upon his profound and universal experience, he sought to drive home the lesson that power as an end in itself is dangerous and power as a means to an end is self-stultifying. Accepting ideas and co-operative endeavours of rational and discriminating individuals as the proper driving force of social change, Roy naturally finds no place in his picture of social development for the organisation of a political party. A pyramidal structure which seeks to eliminate the distance between an individual voter and the level of decision-making and affords opportunities to the people to participate in the exercise of power can hardly have a place for an intermediary between an individual voter and the State. Roy thus arrived at the idea of a partyless democracy and started actually working for it by dissolving the Radical Democratic Party which he had founded and built in the face of unparalleled opposition. History perhaps records no other instance of a political party convening its conference to dissolve itself. As to his other preoccupation, he postulated a secular sanction for ethics and argued for restoring morality in public life through activising the innate rationality of human beings.

The ideas of Roy do not at all represent a closed system. It may however be legitimately claimed that in a period of failing ideas and ideologies, New Humanism possibly shows the way ahead. Furnishing a sound foundation for the belief in the educability of man, it emphasises his intellectual and moral liberation as the starting point of all endeavours of social reconstruction. It seeks to introduce in respect of the latter a growing harmony and cohesion in changes in the economic, political and the social spheres. And above all it shows the way to social

change in the context of an enormous increase in the power of the State. Man as *man* alone can meet the challenge of this age and his growth to his rightful stature can furnish guarantees against the abuse of that power. New Humanism thus represents a synthesis capable of promoting a process of maturing of mind and growth of free institutions in a manner free from the risks, involved in a synthetic approach, of becoming a fetter on human development and creativity. Its essence seems to lie in its integral and open nature.

Incessant striving, the "quest for freedom and search for truth", brought Roy to ever new ideas and ideals which he not only preached but sought to live. And the harmony between his life and his ideals resulted in paradoxes which baffled his contemporaries. Beginning as a militant nationalist worshipping geography, he could make any land his own. Appearing to swear by a dogma, he struggled as a rationalist. Believing in ideologies, he retained an indomitable interest in ideas. Founder of a political party, he never became partisan. He did not strive for success and greatness though he was amply capable of achieving them ; he always insisted in measuring his work by his own standards resulting from his basic commitment to freedom, reason and virtue. He strove to live a good life and to bring such living within the reach of all.

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE

RAJENDRA PRASAD

It is nothing more than a philosophical commonplace to say that language, meaning by 'language' natural or ordinary language, performs a variety of functions. But this is only another way of saying that it is put to various uses by its users because, left to itself, it does nothing at all. It is we who use it and do several things with it. Whatever it does, it does because of being used by man. In fact, it is absurd or nonsensical to talk of a language which is never used by anybody. How much a language owes to its use is very well shown by the fact that, if it is not in use for a pretty long time, it is called a dead language. Therefore, those who are concerned with the study of linguistic meaning must realise the importance of use, as it is utterly futile to try to find out the meaning of an expression apart from its use. If meaning is held to be an intrinsic property of words, then, indeed, one needs to pay attention only to words and nothing else. But this is certainly a position which nobody nowadays thinks even worthy of a serious consideration. Philosophers and linguists seem to have agreed that language has meaning in use and because of use and not as an independent property of it. The way to discover the meaning of an expression (i.e. linguistic expression), therefore, is to watch its function in its real uses and the best question to ask is 'How does it function in real situations?', or simply, 'How is its used?'. But when we ask 'What is the meaning of the expression E?', it may misleadingly suggest that we are looking for an intrinsic property of E, and then we may proceed to seek for meaning in isolation. It is for this reason that some philosophers propose to completely eliminate the word 'meaning' from semantic studies and do with some other word in its stead. But it does not seem to be necessary to take such a drastic step 'Meaning' is a very useful term which enables us to say conve-

niently so many things, saying which without its aid may be a good linguistic exercise but would surely be a very hard job. It is so commonly used that its complete elimination from usage does not even seem to be feasible. Moreover, if we consciously realise what we are doing when we are asking for the meaning of an expression and know where or how to look for it, we can very well continue using it and phrasing our semantic questions and their answers in terms of it without being misled. Therefore, I shall not deliberately avoid talking in terms of 'meaning', although what I shall be doing will not be a search for any abstract or intrinsic property of expressions; it will be rather a study of the functions they perform, or uses they are put to in human communication. Therefore, such expressions as 'E is used cognitively (or non-cognitively)', 'E functions cognitively (or non-cognitively)', or 'E has cognitive (or non-cognitive) meaning' will be used synonymously.

To repeat what has already been said, there is nothing which a linguistic expression does in abstraction or isolation from its use. Hence, to say that it performs a particular function is another way of saying that it is used in a particular way. But it can be, used in a variety of ways even at the same time. The only way then to understand how an expression is used in a particular case is to look to the real contexts of its use. Linguistic expressions are used in concrete contexts or situations. A context of use is a very complex thing which contains human as well as non-human factors. In brief, it consists of the intentions, attitudes, etc., of the speaker,[1] the intonation of utterance, its effects (intended, expected, or actual) on the hearer, the psychological state of the hearer, the relation of the speaker to the hearer, the occasion of use, the physical conditions prevailing at the time, etc. The importance of contextual factors will be clearly seen in the following example. The sentence 'Johnny will drive Smith to the city' said to an appropriate person on an

[1]In the use of language on the one side there may be the speaker or writer and on the other the hearer or reader. But for the sake of simplicity I shall mostly refer only to the speaker and the hearer. 'The word user' will be used to stand for both speaker and writer, and 'add essee' or 'recipient for both hearer and reader.

appropriate occasion in a right tone of voice by a right person may function as a request, order, advice, question, or piece of information as to who is going to drive Smith to the city. How it actually behaves can be deciphered only by having a proper understanding of the context. Without knowing the context it is logically impossible to determine the way it really functions simply because it functions in any way only in a context. Apart from the context it possesses only the lexical meanings of its constituent words and the potentiality for doing several things. This shows that the grammatical form of an expression is not a very safe indicator of its function. It is true that we usually employ expressions of a particular grammatical form to perform a particular job, but there is no complete uniformity in this procedure.

Understanding the use of an expression also involves understanding the *verbal rules* of its use, its logical relations to other expressions, etc. These verbal factors may be said to constitute the *verbal context* against the above which may be said to constitute the *non-verbal context*. Attention must be paid to both the verbal and non-verbal contexts. But it seems obvious that the latter is more important than the former. As the above example shows, if we consider only the verbal factors, we will not be able to decide whether the sentence in question expresses a request, order, or prediction. This is natural in view of the fact that language is used to help its users in the transactions of everyday life and the verbal rules of use are evolved only to make it an effective tool. In the analysis which will be offered in the coming pages, therefore, more attention will be paid to non-verbal than to verbal factors. The emphasis on context, however, must not be taken to mean that I am prescribing a complete knowledge of it. That is not possible several times. But what is required is only a working knowledge of the relevant factors and that is not very difficult to have.

When language performs a multiplicity of functions depending upon contextual conditions, a philosophical study of it must not overlook any one of them. However, the task of philosophical analysis will be greatly facilitated if the different functions are

classified or put into some distinct groups. This would be only a logical or terminological classification intended only to help the study and should not be taken to be an attempt at reducing any one function to, or grading it as higher than, another. I shall, therefore, put the various functions of language into two broad classes and call them 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive'. In what follows I shall present a general characterisation of these functions which may also be called a functional analysis of language. I am fully aware of the complexity and extremely difficult nature of the subject, and, therefore, what is offered makes no claim to embody an exhaustive or complete formulation of a linguistic theory. However, I hope that it would be adequate enough to enable the reader to understand what I mean when I call an expression congnitive or non-cognitive and also to judge for himself whether a given expression functions cognitively or non-cognitively.

The logical relationship between the terms 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive' is of a very peculiar type. They *seem* to constitute a pair of genuine contradictories like 'red' and 'non-red'. It is characteristic of genuine contradictories that they are mutually exclusive and taken together exhaust the universe of discourse. A thing, of which it makes sense to say that it is coloured, must be either red or non-red but not both. The same object cannot at the same time be both red and non-red even in a qualified sense. All this is not true of the terms 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive' when they are applied to linguistic expressions. They possess only one feature of genuine contradictories, i.e. exhaustiveness. A linguistic expression must function cognitively or non-cognitively because there is no other way of functioning. But they are not mutually exclusive because, as it will be shown later on, they can be applied to the same expression in the same context; the same expression can be in the same context primarily cognitive (or non-cognitive) and secondarily non-cognitive (or cognitive). This mode of speaking is not available for the terms 'red' and 'non-red'. It does not make sense to say that an object is primarily red and secondarily non-red, or vice versa. If it is red, it cannot at the same time be said to be non-red with any qualification whatsoever.

It is, because of complexities like the above in the usage of the terms 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive', not profitable to speak in terms of distinct kinds or types of expressions. That mode of speaking may give the erroneous suggestion that linguistic expressions can be divided into two mutually exclusive classes of those which are purely cognitive and those which are purely non-cognitive. It also may suggest, incorrectly again, that an expression is cognitive or non-cognitive by itself, whereas the fact is that its being so is determined by the way it functions. Even if this suggettion is not there, it certainly minimises the importance of knowing how language functions. It is better, therefore, to speak of cognitive and non-cognitive functions, aspects, or uses, of language than to speak of cognitive and non-cognitive kinds or classes of linguistic expressions.

Another thing to be noted is that when I characterise a particular function of language as cognitive or non-cognitive, I am only giving a name to it and not making any evaluation. I want to keep these terms and other related ones like 'descriptive', 'informative', 'factual', 'emotive', 'persuasive' etc., completely free from any evaluative or emotive suggestion. It may be that in some uses of theirs these terms have become laden with evaluative or emotive meanings. It seems that when people react vehemently against an analysis which declares ethical expressions to be non-cognitive, the reason very often is their mistaken belief that to do so is to give them a lower or less respectable status than to those which are declared to be cognitive. On an understanding like this such a reaction is quite natural. Ethical judgments are very highly prized by man and to condemn them is sure to arouse his anger. That is why I wish to make it clear at the very outset that the use of these terms in this paper should be always understood in a non-emotive and non-evaluative sense. The reason for the choice of these terms is that they seem to serve better than others the logical task of labelling properly the various functions of language.

The above remarks, I believe, very well show that I am not holding a monistic theory of language according to which it is always used for doing only one kind of job ; nor am I holding a

theory which Toulmin and Baier call the theory of the Great Divide[2] (and Frankena calls linguistic dualism[3]). The latter theory holds that language performs only two functions and all linguistic expressions can be neatly grouped into two classes, maintaining further that the same expression cannot do both the functions or belong to both the classes. Such views have been so convincingly criticised and refuted in recent years that commenting on them here would only be like beating a dead horse.

When an expression is uttered with the primary purpose of conveying information of any kind, I shall say that it is used or functions, cognitively. The informative job can be done in several ways. We can convey information by means of expressions functioning as reports, predictions, descriptions, narratives, statements of fact, etc. All such linguistic activities will be termed cognitive irrespective of the grammatical structures of the expressions used. Thus 'cognitive' stands not for a single use but for a group of uses. There may be important respects in which cognitive uses differ among themselves. What is common to all of them is that they are used mainly and ordinarily for conveying information. Within informative discourse I include the language of sciences and a part of our ordinary speech. I am using the word 'information' in a broad sense because I want to say that not only the language of descriptive sciences, but even that of logic and mathematics, is informative. The latter is certainly intended to extend our knowledge to convey information, may be only about the operation of symbols or the formal properties of deductive systems. Further, an informative discourse may contain true as well as false expressions. That is, if somebody uses language to convey information, he will be said to be making a cognitive use of his language, no matter whether the information conveyed is true or false.

The uses of language which are not informative will be called non-cognitive. 'Non-cognitive' also does not stand for one single

[2] Toulmin, S.E. and K. Baier, "On Describing", *Mind*, LXI, 1952.

[3] Frankena, William K. "Some Aspects of Language", *Language, Thought and Culture*, Ed. Paul Henle, The University of Michigan Press, 1958 p. 122.

use but for a group of different uses. Language functions non-informatively or non-cognitively when it is used mainly to express a decision or choice, to express or evoke an attitude of feeling, to express a proposal or resolution, to persuade someone to do something, to ask, instruct, direct, or order someone to do something, to say something only for the sake of observing a social formality, to perform an action by means of the very act of uttering an expression, etc. These uses have been termed expressive, evocative, persuasive, prescriptive, ceremonial, performatory, etc. It is not claimed that the above exhaust all non-cognitive uses, nor is it held that they are mutually exclusive. Very commonly several non-cognitive jobs are performed by the same expression even at the same time and this is true of cognitive uses as well. In fact, it is very usual that an expression functions in the same use cognitively as well as non-cognitively and does both the functions in more than one way. This is quite natural in view of the fact that we often want to achieve so many things by the use of a single expression. The non-cognitive uses do differ among themselves, but the primary purpose behind every non-cognitive use of language is to do with language something other than conveying information. That is why a negative term has been used as the common label for all such uses.

The fact that I have made the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive uses on the basis of the purposes of the speaker (or writer) should not be construed as implying the denial of the possibliiy of the ways of making the distinction. I admit that there may also be many other ways of classifying linguistic expressions into cognitive and non-cognitive. For example, one can call an expression cognitive or non-cognitive because of a certain kind of effects it produces, or is expected to produce, on the recipient. Frankena has very admirably shown that there can be several ways of characterising an expression as cognitive or non-cognitive and to call it cognitive or non-cognitive in one sense does not imply that it is so in other senses as well.[4] I admit the force of his argument and, therefore, when I say that particular expression is cognitive or non-cognitive, it should

[4] *Ibid.*, 146–72.

mean only that the primary purpose of its ordinary use is to convey information or to do something else. Proceeding in a different way somebody may decide to call an expression cognitive which according to my analysis is non-cognitive. But so long as he does not deny the primacy of the purpose which I think is involved in its use, I shall have nothing to quarrel with him, nor will he be really contradicting me.

As a matter of fact, such classifications are bound to be somewhat arbitrary. But there is an important consideration for preferring one to the other. That is the comparative efficiency of the scheme of classification concerned to explain the main facts about the actual uses of language. It is on this very ground that purposes of use have been given such a central position in this work. The discussion that follows will reveal their importance.

Whenever an expression is uttered some of the hearer's responses to it are considered to be logically relevant or appropriate and others as irrelevant or inappropriate. It is the purposes of use, which, to a very great extent, decide the appropriateness or inappropriateness of these responses. Also, there are certain things to which the speaker is regarded to be logically committed because of his uttering an expression. These commitments are also very greatly determined by his purposes in making the utterance. Therefore, a theory of language which treats purposes as central can very well explain such facts.

When a military sergeant issues to his soldiers the command 'March on to the enemy's camp', the response logically appropriate to it will be to obey or disobey it in action, or to express readiness to obey or disobey it when the conditions required to make obedience or disobedience possible are fulfilled. This is so because the main purpose of his issuing the command is to make the soldiers act in a particular way, i.e., to make them march on to the enemy's camp. The soldiers are required to act and not merely to entertain a particular belief or set of beliefs. This point becomes clearer when we notice that a response which is appropriate to an expression uttered with one purpose becomes inappropriate in case the same utterance is uttered with a different purpose. When a doctor asks his patient 'How are

you?', it is quite appropriate for the latter to give an inventory of his ills; but to do so in reply to a friend's greeting 'How are you?' would be entirely inappropriate. If the addressee starts narrating his ills in the latter case, we would naturally say that he has misunderstood the expression 'How are you?', or that he does not know how to respond properly to a greeting.

Similarly, when a person makes an utterance, he is committed to certain things in virtue of making that utterance. For example, when a physician says to a patient, intending to predict his speedy recovery, 'I am sure you will be completely cured within a fortnight', he is committed to offer reasons in support of his prediction, if required. In case there is no good reason for making the prediction, the doctor will be accused of making a prediction which is unsound or unlikely to come true, and consequently his prediction will lose its value. But if a neighbour says to the sick man the same thing only to cheer him up, he is not committed to show that what he says is supported by medical facts. He may not be knowing any medical facts about the man's disease or its cure, but he will not be misusing language or doing something wrong if he tells him that he will surely be alright within a fortnight. The doctor's utterance is subject to verification and therefore it can be true or false, but it does not make sense to attribute to the neighbour's utterance, which is intended only to cheer up the hearer, either verifibiality, or truth or falsity. The latter may be said to be sincere or insincere, timely or untimely, etc. This is so because the primary intention or purpose of the neighbour is different from that of the doctor. We can, therefore, say that because the primary purposes for using cognitive and non-cognitive expressions are different, the speaker's commitments and appropriate responses of the hearer in the two cases will also be different. This does not, however, mean that there cannot be anything common to the uses of the two types of expressions, but only that there must be certain important differences between them which will be recognised if one examines the concrete contexts in which they are used.

Had it been the case that whenever we uttered a particular

expression there was only one purpose involved in its use, there would have been no difficulty in deciding whether to call it cognitive or non-cognitive. But this is almost rare. What is usual is that several purposes, cognitive as well as non-cognitive, are involved in a single use. In such cases we have to find out what is the *primary purpose*. In order to decide whether an expression is cognitive or non-cognitive in a *particular use* of it we have to ascertain which one of the purposes, if it is used for more than one purpose, is primary. We can then call it cognitive or non-cognitive according as the primary purpose of its use is cognitive (i.e. to convey information) or non-cognitive (i.e. to do something other than conveying information). In the above example the doctor may be intending both to predict, on the basis of his medical knowledge and experience, the period of recovery and to cheer up the patient. If his main purpose is the former the expression 'I am sure...' will be cognitive, and if the latter, then it will be non-cognitive. The primacy of one purpose does not mean that no other purpose is present, but only that, if there is one, it is not so prominent. It may be difficult to ascertain on some occasions which purpose is primary, but looking carefully to the context or contexts of use one can do that in most cases. Sometimes one may commit mistakes in determining which purpose is primary and which is not, but that would not mean that no purpose is primary.

There is another complicating factor. The same expression can also be used with different primary purposes on different occasions. Therefore, reference to primary purposes can be of help only in deciding whether a particular expression is to be called cognitive or non-cognitive in a particular use of it and not in deciding what it is to be called generally. For the latter task we shall have to see how it is *ordinarily* or *usually* used. That is, if the primary purpose of its ordinary use is non-cognitive, it should be called non-cognitive generally.

By ordinary use I mean the most common, normal, or frequent, use. For example, the ordinary use of a pencil is to write with it, but one may sometimes use it to scratch one's ears. A match stick is ordinarily used to make fire, but one may also use it as

a toothpick. To say, then, that an expression is ordinarily used in a particular way does not exclude the possibility of its being used in any other way. What it means is that other uses are rare or non-frequent. It is a fact that some classes or types of expressions are ordinarily used cognitively and some non-cognitively. Therefore, when we have to decide whether to call a particular expression or a particular class of expressions cognitive or non-cognitive in a general sense, there is no better way to do so than to examine their ordinary uses. In some circumstances almost any expression can be used cognitively (or non-cognitively). The important thing, then, is to formulate a criterion for calling an expression cognitive (or non-cognitive) in a general sense. The criterion, as the above discussion shows, may be stated thus: *An expression is cognitive (or non-cognitive) if, and only if, the primary purpose of its ordinary use is cognitive (or non-cognitive).* If there are some cases in which an expression, which is ordinarily used cognitively, is used non-cognitively, then such uses of it may be called non-standard, non-ordinary, or atypical. Similarly, the cognitive uses of non-cognitive expressions will be called non-ordinary, non-standard, etc. On this view, therefore, to say that an expression is cognitive or non-cognitive does not entail that it is wholly or purely so. It may perform a variety of functions, but its characterisation as cognitive or non-cognitive depends upon what it is primarily intended to do in its ordinary uses.

To illustrate what has been said above let us take an example. The sentence 'It is Sunday' is ordinarily used to tell the day and is therefore, cognitive. But when uttered by a pious Christian to his children on an appropriate occasion it may very well mean 'Hurry up, let us go to church'. Here the main purpose of the father is non-cognitive and therefore in this particular use the sentence is functioning non-cognitively. If it is called cognitive in spite of such uses, that is so because its ordinary uses are cognitive. The ordinary uses of an expression are logically, prior to and more basic than its non-ordinary uses in the sense that one has first to understand the former in order to be able to understand the latter. One must first know that 'It is Sunday' is used to tell the day so that one may understand its other

uses. Also, there is a greater fixity or uniformity in the ordinary uses than in the non-ordinary ones. The above sentence in normal use means the same to a Hindu and a Christian, but in a non-ordinary use it may mean to the latter 'Let us go to church' while to the former (if he is a public servant) 'Let us relax' or 'Sleep more', because Sunday is a holiday and does not have any religious significance for him. I admit that these are not very effective tests for distinguishing between ordinary and non-ordinary uses. But it seems to me that we cannot have rigorous tests for the expressions of a natural language because they are very often ambiguous and vague. However, for practical purposes, a close attention to usage and contexts plus a due regard for linguistic flexibilities will be virtually all that one would need in order to be able to determine which use is ordinary and which non-ordinary.

It is now clear that 'cognitive' and 'non-cognitive', as used in this paper, are not adjectives of grammar or syntax but of the uses or functions of language. They do not say anything about the grammatical structure of expressions characterisable by means of them. There are some writers who realise the importance of knowing how an expression is used for knowing what it means, but they are not prepared to accept the importance of the user's purposes in determining how it is used. It seems that they want to keep off all psychological considerations from their theory of language. But that is not only unwarranted, but also detrimental to the proper understanding of the functions of language. The fact is that, because it is man who puts language to various uses, to discover the different ways in which it is used it is essential to know how *he* uses it in different contexts. But that can be done successfully only if we know what he intends or purposes it to do when he uses it. Moreover, to say that there are purposes involved in the uses of language does not require us to explore what *specific* purposes are there. If we mention some broad or general purposes, they will suffice to fulfil the needs of analysis. It is only this that the present analysis claims to have done.

It is not always obvious what purpose is involved in the use

of an expression, nor is the speaker always consciously aware of the purpose of his utterance. But when we reflect on how we use our language it becomes hard not to recognise the important role played by purposes and still harder to explain our linguistic behaviour without referring to them. The importance of purposes is overlooked because many of our expressions have become, in usage, standardised vehicles for certain purposes. When anyone in normal circumstances makes the factual statement 'Nehru was the Prime Minister of India', his purpose is to convey information about Nehru, or India, or both. When we have before us such sentences which are in standard usage almost always used for a particular purpose, we take it for granted that they are used in this or that way and do not care or need to look to the purpose involved. In all such cases purposes are there, but they are so common, or habitual, that we do not need to take note of them explicitly. There are also some occasions when we utter something only to let off steam. One may say that no purpose is involved in the use of such utterances. I do not want to deny this fact, but would say that these utterances are not made for communication. They are on the level of physical sighs or groans; they are not on the proper linguistic level about which I am talking. I have been talking all along about language as used in human communication; the role purposes play in the various uses we make of it cannot be denied.

GOD HAS NO PLACE IN MY PHILOSOPHY

C. KUNHAN RAJA

TO ME the world is what I know or at least what I can possibly know. To say that there is an objective world absolutely independent of me is a contradiction in terms. When I say that there is a world, it presupposes that the world is known to me. It may not be a full knowledge and a final knowledge of the entire facts in the world. Such a knowledge is what is to be designated 'Omniscience'. The question has to be considered whether there is a factor called 'Omniscience'. In every knowledge there is shining, a part of the universe in a partial way. There is nothing in the universe that is absolutely beyond the scope of knowledge. There was no condition when the parts of the world were not known, when there was no knowledge to comprehend the parts of the world.

In the same way there cannot be a knowledge in an absolute state, in itself, without an object to be comprehended in that knowledge. There is a knowledge because there is something that is known. Everything is not always being known. There is knowledge sometimes, and sometimes the same thing does not come within the scope of that knowledge. That means that there is a process known as knowing, the process of bringing into the scope of that knowledge what was not within the scope of that knowledge and leaving off what was within that scope after some time. The thing remains within the scope of a knowledge only so long as the process of knowing continues. A process requires an agent, an intelligent agent.

Thus there are four elements that are self-evident in our life-experience. They are the object, the subject, the knowledge and the process of knowing. The question arises whether they are four distinct elements that come into mutual combination and / or that get themselves separated. It is to be understood that

man has no experience of any of the four factors being separated from the others. The four elements as a unity is what is experienced. Every one feels that he, as the agent of the knowing process, continues while the process and the knowledge and the object known change. But there is no knower without a process of knowing and a knowledge and an object that is known. To this extent there is a change even in the knower; at one time it is the knower of one object, as the agent of a particular knowing process, as the seat of a particular knowledge and at the other time it is the knower of another object. The permanence felt in the matter of the knower is no more valid than the permanency of the object too. An object remains while its knower changes. A particular process continues while the agency for that process changes. A particular piece of knowledge continues while its locus as the knower changes.

On account of the very intimate and indissoluble nature of the combination among the four elements, what one can postulate is that all the four together become a fact in the universe; not one of them is a fact independently and separated from the others. The facts of the universe are the combinations of an agent, a process, an effect and an object. There are other such combinations too that are indissoluble. Take the object of a knowledge. A thing is known as something in a state of movement and change and in a certain aspect. Thus some activity and some attribute are indissoluble from the combination that we call an object in our knowledge. If we look at a rose, it has a colour, a smell and a form and so on; it has also some change in it and also some movement in it. At least there is the change in time; what was before is still there. There is a growth which is in the form of a movement. The object of our knowledge is not any one of the three factors; it is a combination of all the three.

A thing is there in the universe only as known to us. There is nothing in itself independent of a knowledge. When we analyse our experience we find that there is nothing in the universe as an independent fact and that everything in the universe is related to something else from which it cannot be dissolved. Yet

when we do not make such an analysis, it is our experience that there is this distinction between the knower, the subject, and the object that is known. We keep the two separate and we keep their attributes too separate. For example when we see a rose, there is no rose independent of our knowledge; yet we never confuse the rose with ourselves or its colour and its shape and its smell as belonging to us who see the rose; nor do we attribute to the rose the joy that we have when we smell the rose or appreciate its beautiful form and colour. In this way our experience does not yield to us the entire fact about what we experience. It is a further analysis of the experience that yield details not known in the act of knowing a thing.

But there is no uniform method of such an analysis and the results of such an analysis are not also uniform in the case of the different persons who have attempted such an analysis to know the real facts in the experiences. But I think that there is some agreement on certain points in the matter of such an analysis of the experience of man. There is postulated a dualism between the subject, the agent, that experiences and the object, the matter, that is experienced. Life is associated with the agent that experiences, and the material object that is experienced is accepted as in itself lifeless dead. The world is primarily divided into two constituent factors, the life and the matter. But there is no sort of agreement in the case of the relation of the two. In modern science, matter is dead by its very nature, and it evolves, and a phenomenon called 'life' appears in the course of such an evolution. Matter is primary and earlier, and life is secondary and later. There must have been a stage when there was no change, no evolution, in matter, and matter was uniform and in a static state. Then evolution started, and there arose the diversified world. It is in the course of this diversification that the factor named 'life' also made its appearance in the dead matter, and the result was the production of a certain type of matter now known as the 'cells'. The condition in which the 'cells' made their appearance in the course of evolution, has vanished and will not, at least may not, reappear. It is those primary cells, cells producing new cells that continue 'life'. But

no new cell produced can be independent of another cell.

That dead matter acquired life is a theory that is found in most of the ancient patterns of thought. But how did this first change, the change of dead matter into living matter, occur? Here again there is a great difference of opinion among the various thinkers the world has known. The present theory seems to be that there is a natural force in the dead matter and that there is also a natural law, and that on account of this natural force in matter and according to the natural law, evolution starts and proceeds. There is the theory of a 'Primary Atom' which burst and which expanded into the present world, and it is still expanding. There is also the theory that the whole of the world cannot be traced back to a single 'Atom Point'; the world has to be considered as in a state of continuous change. Evolution did not start at a single point, it started in a vast area. These two theories are according to the principle of the world having evolved from the primary, dead matter. There is another theory, according to which the dead matter is itself an evolute and is not primary in its nature; it evolved from 'Electro-magnetism'. If what is primary is a pre-material, electro-magnetic field, then what is called matter is an evolution from this primary, pre-matter field. But in the second theory, we are simply going as step farther than the position taken up in the theory that the world evolved from dead matter, that the world of diversification is a product of the dead matter of uniformity. I start on the postulate that the world that we experience started from the uniform, dead matter. What I have to say on this point will be applicable to the theory of matter itself being a product from the electro-magnetic field. The point that I discuss is just this: How did the first stir come into the uniform dead matter to evolve and to change and to get diversified.

The answer given is that there is a force in the dead matter and that this force set the dead, motionless, unchanging matter into a state of motion and change and also into a state of living matter. Now, the question has to be considered what this natural force in dead matter is which started the motion and change in the dead matter. Was it always in dead matter or did not come

into matter at a certain stage? If it had been there, why should there be a beginning and why did not the change and motion set out even in an earlier stage? Reason demands that the change and the motion had been there without a beginning. If there is a beginning, what is it that determines that beginning? Why did the force operate only at that particular stage and not earlier? If the force came into matter at a certain stage and if evolution started at the stage, where was that force before? Whence did it come and why and how? If the force had been ever there and if its operation started only at that stage, what is it that determines that stage? Did such a determinant appear at a certain stage and did the evolution start on account of the appearance of that determinant? Where was that determinant prior and whence and how and why did it appear at that particular stage? In this way, it is difficult to satisfy reason with a theory of a *start* for the evolution. Theology asserts that God created the world and that there was a stage when there was no world and no life in the world. The present scientific theory of a first start for the evolution is only an acceptance of the theory of Creation by God, eliminating God from that theory. It is neither rationalistic science nor rationalistic philosophy. If we accept a beginning, then we must explain the cause of the beginning at that special moment. If God is that cause, then God cannot be questioned; it is His Will. Now if such a God is eliminated and if a natural cause is postulated then we must have an explanation. We cannot say, 'It is the will of Nature'. Nature, being dead, has no will.

When the dead matter starts on its course of evolution and when there is the production of organic matter, the cells, then what is the difference that is brought about in the dead matter when it becomes living matter? The characteristic of living matter is that there is movement and there is growth from within itself, without that matter having to depend on another agency for its growth and its motion. We can make a plant with paper and it can have all the features of a plant in appearance; it can have branches and leaves and flowers and fruits. But there is no life in that plant; the branches and the leaves and

the flowers and the fruits did not grow and they will not fade away also. That scheme of paper became a plant through the activity of an organism, of a living matter in the form of the maker of that paper plant. But if a seed is put on the ground that seed grows into a plant, grows branches and flowers and fruits, and in course of time there is also decay in it by its very nature.

The umpire in a foot-ball match or in a hockey match can place the ball in the proper position in the play-field. But that ball will not start rolling until the players give it a kick or a hit. But a bird can fly without an urge from another body and an animal can run and a man can walk, in the same way because, there is life in the bird and in the animal and in the man. There may be differences in the matter of the quantity and quality of the force found in a living matter. Thus a plant cannot move from its position while an animal can. An animal cannot change its environment while a man can. But an animal and man cannot continue to grow and to move, cannot continue to live, if certain parts are cut off, while a tree can. The tree can continue its life in one part while another part is cut off, and an injury done to one part is not felt by the other parts. But if in the case of an animal, a fly settles on its body, the tail comes to its rescue, and if a thorn pricks a man his hand is there to help him, to pluck out the thorn. Such differences do not make the living matter different in kind; there is only a difference in gradation in the same kind.

If it is not life force that started the evolution then what is it? If it is the life force that is at the back of evolution, we need not go in for any agency outside of matter to be accepted as the cause for the start of evolution. Life force is in matter, and there is no matter without the life force. Thus we can explain that the evolution started from within matter itself. Just as the change and growth and movement in the organic matter is from within, the change and the movement in the whole universe is from within the material world itself. The primary force in matter which started the course of evolution operates exactly in the same way in which the life force functions in living matter. Why

should we draw a distinction between the primary and the later forces that bring about changes and movements in material bodies from within? I can understand a difference in gradation, but not a difference in kind. Just as the later changing and moving and evolving matter is the product of the primary, unmoving, unchanging matter, the life force in the evolved matter is also a product of the primary force that started the evolution. Just as matter changes during the course of evolution, in the same way, the force too changes in its function from what it was in its primary stage to what it became in its later stage. This will mean that what is called life force in all matter and that ultimately matter. The difference is only in gradation and not in kind. What is called inorganic matter is matter in which the life force is so faint that it cannot be properly detected, and may be ignored.

The force that started the evolution in dead matter and the force that we call life force which differentiates dead matter from organic matter in the evolved and diversified matter have the same function, that is, effecting changes and movements in matter from within itself without an agent outside of matter. I see no rational ground to assume that there is no relation between the two and that they are entirely different from each other; that the force that started evolution is primary and absolute and permanent while life force is an accident that came later and that may come to an end. I can very well accept a position that the function of the primary, absolute force in its stage as a life force is a later phenomenon and may come to a stop. That is another matter. What I am thinking of is that what appears as life force in matter in the phenomenal world is an evolution of that same primary force that set the dead matter in a state of motion and change, and is an aspect of that same primary force; it is not a new factor in the universe, absolutely different from the primary force.

If life is an accident, the position of the scientist will be that what is called knowledge is an accident and that science is knowledge in an accidental man. The scientist and the science are in this case both accidents. If matter is absolute and primary, how can an accident grasp an absolute? How can we say that primary

matter was dead, except in so far as in our own knowledge that matter should be so? If it is not *known* to be dead in nature cannot be dead or it may be otherwise. It is only knowledge immediate that determines its nature, and matter and its nature have no reality except as they are known to man. To say that science is an accident in the universe is a contradiction in terms. We distinguish a science from a casual knowledge because there is something that is fundamental and absolute in the nature of what is called science. How do we say that the knowledge which man had at some earlier time that the earth is flat and stationary was false, casual, not based on the true facts of the universe, and that the knowledge now that the earth is round, turns on its axis and moves round the sun is correct and scientific, if knowledge by its very nature is casual? If knowledge by itself is casual, then a distinction between casual knowledge and scientific knowledge itself becomes an absurdity.

Again a scientist understands a fact as scientifically established only if the establishment of the fact is in itself scientifically carried out. The position that I take up is that intelligence can understand a fact as containing some order within, only if the fact is planned and arranged in an intelligent way by an intelligent agent. It is on account of the distinction between the plan and the arrangement having been intelligently made that a scientist is able to say that this is scientific and that that is casual. If there is a science and if there is a scientist in the world, then that requires the position that there was intelligence behind the original start in the process of evolution in the world. Why should it have started, why should it have started along a certain line? Evolution is not mere change and movement. It is change and movement of the nature of a progression. A progression requires a destination and a method. Without intelligence there is no possibility of fixing a destination and a method, the very fact that we call the change and movement in the universe by the term 'Evolution' also demands an intelligence at the start and during the course of such changes and movements. A satisfactory position can be recognised only in the acceptance that what we call life or intelligence in the evolved world is the same fact in kind

which was at the back of the start and course of the evolution. A life-function in the evolved world may be different from the primary function of the intelligence, just as the moving and changing matter is different from the primary matter that started in the course of evolution. What I want in my philosophy is that both matter and life are primary and fundamental in the universe.

Is there a dualism between the primary matter and the primary intelligence? Or is there only one? If there is only one as fundamental and if the other is a product of that one fundamental, which is the primary and fundamental and which is the product? If there is an absolute dualism between matter and life, then the question again arises why the two came together. I will take up this alternative presently. If matter is the absolute and if intelligence is a product, then the difficulties have been already shown. To produce something from within itself is the characteristic feature of what we term intelligence and cannot be a feature of matter without intelligence. But it is not at all against reason to assume that there was originally only intelligence and that matter was produced from that by itself. Intelligence is capable of such a production of matter from within itself. Otherwise it ceases to be intelligence. The only difficulty is what relates to the origin, why there was no such production earlier. If intelligence did not produce matter at an earlier stage then there must be some external ground for the intelligence to start that production of matter at the stage and not earlier. There is a school of thought in India according to which the absolute intelligence is the source from which as the material cause, matter was produced and by which as agent matter was produced.

A more reasonable stand seems to be that matter and intelligence are both primary and fundamental, there being a duailsm in the universe. Here also we have to accept the position that both were together and not separate and that there is no occasion for them to come together. If they were absolutely separate and if they came together, then the cause of such isolation and later coalition has to be determined. One position found in Indian thought is that they were always seperate and they never came

together too. But matter received a reflection from the primary intelligence on itself and the change and movement are the results of such a reflection. Thus, it is neither dead matter that evolved nor did intelligence function as an agent. It is the reflection of the primary intelligence that functions as an agent in the evolved world; the intelligence in the agents in the phenomenal world is not real intelligence, but only a reflection of it in the dead matter. It requires a postulation of the existence of a certain aspect in dead matter that can reflect intelligence. There is a fundamental difference between the force that is at the back of evolution and the force that functions as life-force in the world. We can as well equate the aspect of dead matter which is capable of reflecting pure intelligence and intelligence itself. But the position taken up is one which starts and conducts the evolution in neither dead matter nor intelligence; it is dead matter becoming intelligent through the proximity of intelligence. Evolution is from within matter and there is no need for a God or any such external agent to start change and movement in the matter. The only unsatisfactory part in this position is that what is only apparently intelligent functions as if it were really intelligent in itself. The only way in which the difficulty can be overcome is to say that what matter has got is not the mere reflection of intelligence from an extraneous source, but that matter is in itself intelligent.

If there is such an intelligence in matter itself, then, prior to diversification, that intelligence must have had a universal character. It is a universal intelligence which became differentiated when, through its own agency, undifferentiated matter too became differentiated. Does that universal intelligence still continue in its universal nature even after its own differentiation? If there is no universal intelligence remaining after differentiation, how can there be co-ordination in the function of the different parts into which the matter has differentiated? If there is still a universal intelligence remaining and if along with it, there are the differentiated intelligences too, then the question arises why should we not recognise a dualism between the universal intelligence and the individualised intelligences?

This is the position taken up by another school of thought in ancient India. According to this school matter was uniform in appearance, in its primary stage. But the differences were there in a latent and undetectable condition. In that primary condition, there was only a continuum of material particles which did not have even spatial extension. The universal intelligence gave a motion to such particles so that they began to combine and develop attributes, and the various facts of the world were produced with features that were common among a group of facts, but different from other such groups. The uniformity of the primary matter was that there was no common feature between any two particles, and what happened in the course of differentiation was that features that were common among a few facts and different from other groups of facts were developed. Besides matter there were certain entities that were capable of developing intelligence, but they did not have any intelligence in their absolute state. It was some sort of inscrutable factor in them that was also at the back of the start of change and movement. In the course of such change and movement, the entities too developed intelligence. The universal intelligence too functioned as an agent right through the course of change and movement in the world.

What is common in all systems of thought in India is that change and movement started in matter through the agency of intelligence. There is another apparent feature common to all the systems of thought, and that is that there is no real beginning for the course of change and movement in the world. There is no system of thought that postulates an absolute beginning to the course of change and movement in the universe. Though the entire world of change and movement is without a beginning, a particular current of change and movement may have a final terminus, yet the whole current is eternal. As for the beginning, what at best may be meant is that the currents in the changing and moving world may recede back to a state of static uniform and may restart in the course of change and movement. At that terminus of absolute freedom from change and movement, there must be some agent external to matter to enable

matter to restart in the course of change and movement. Life in matter is in the state of change and movement, and the force in the state of motionless uniform is not life. It is to explain this position that a universal intelligence or an intelligence outside, of matter is postulated. If a combination of particles is accepted then there must be an agent to start the combination which is in the form of a movement. But if there is no combination of what are parts, then there is no need for an external agent, the change and movement being within matter itself. One particle is external to another particle and as such for their combination, there is a need for an agent; but if the whole of the moving and changing matter is a single unit, there is no change or movement external to itself. On account of this difference in the primary postulate, there is a difference in view, one being that reason requires an external agent and the other being that reason does not stand in need of such an agent; there is either Theism or Atheism.

But there is another way of looking into the problem. If matter is always in a state of movement, then reason demands that there is no external agent; this is rationalistic anti-theism. What reason proves is that there can be no such external agent. If matter is always in a state of change and movement, that change and that movement is according to a law within themselves; it is only when dead matter starts in the course of change and movement that we have to postulate an intelligence to determine the law in such change and movement. In a dynamic world, where matter is always changing and moving, an external intelligence is not needed for the change and movement. The changing and moving matter is in itself intelligence. Intelligent man does not test the law in the dynamic world with the standard of his own intelligence; he tests his own intelligence with the law in the intelligent movement and change in the intelligent matter.

There is the intelligent matter; man is only such an intelligent matter. Man is dynamic by nature. Man is neither a spirit nor a mere material complex. He is either living matter or life in matter. Life and matter cannot be isolated from each other;

there is no matter without life and no life without matter. there may be a difference in the relative ratio of the life aspect and the matter aspect in the various facts of the universe, the difference being in their functional aspects. In some, the life element functions more prominently and in others the matter aspect may be more prominent. All the same, everything is dynamic, with the matter side, with the movement and change side, and the intelligent side planning and effecting the change and movement in the matter. The world is here, was here and will ever remain here. There is neither a creation nor a destruction. There is always fluctuation, which is change and movement. Every fact in the universe contains the three elements of a matter: its change and movement and the intelligent planning and execution of the change and movement. We cannot isolate any one of the three sides from the others. I want no God. The world that I have presented above satisfies all my intellectual needs.

If there is an outside agency for matter to come into existence and to function in the universe and if God be that agency, then more difficulties are produced for the intellect than the difficulties solved, if at all God solves any difficulties of the intellect. There are two views regarding God's agency in the matter of the facts in the world having come into existence. There is an Indian view that God created the phenomenal world from within himself as the material cause and by himself as the agent. God must be infinite and omniscient and omnipotent, if it is to be a God. I cannot understand how an omniscient, omnipotent, infinite God could create from within himself what is finite, limited in knowledge and limited in power. Are such limitations within God? Then there is no God. Did he create it? Whence could it be and why? How can limitations come out of something that has no limitations? And is there any source outside of God whence such a limitation could have come into what is produced out of the unlimited? Then there was already something in the universe besides God, not created by God. Why should we say that God created the world? The Universe could be there already like those limitations. The world of limitations could not have come from God nor through God's agency.

If God created the world through his own agency, from nothing, then why did he create what was full of limitations? And God must be all-mercy. Why did he create a limited world in which many of the limitations function as evil and suffering? If God is all-merciful his business is to alleviate evil and suffering and not to create suffering through evil. If it be argued that God created evil and suffering so that he could help hamanity to find the way out, the more rational position would have been that he did not create them at all. There is no meaning in kicking a man down on the road and then helping him to stand on his own legs. Evil and suffering in a world created by the all-merciful God is a logical impossibility. The position may be that God did not create evil and suffering, that he created a good world of happiness, and that man, after his creation, produced evil and suffering through his own mistake; then God helps man to get out of the suffering which man has created by himself. This does not at all improve the position. Why did God create the man of imperfection in such a way that his imperfection would enable him to create evil, and suffering through such an evil? God with the attributes which alone entitle him to be a God, and the creation of such a world are incompatible.

The only other position that I can think of is that God is actually here and that there is no meaning in applying intellect and logic to what is here as a fact. Is there really a God, or is it only a belief that there is a God? We must understand that a belief in God did not originate in man an account of the nature of man's intellectual being. God was trust on man by conquerors and empire builders to maintain their position as conquerors and empire builders. They had the co-operation of some people with intellect in this effort, and such associates of conquerors and empire builders are the priests. If the credulous people are told that corresponding to the emperor within his empire, there is another Power in the whole world and that power is God, then the ordinary people are likely to attach some supernatural element in the person and authority of the emperor. Some teachers also come up as messengers of that God. Religion

did not originate from the superstition of the ordinary people; it came from the ambition of conquerors.

In different countries different emperors set up different messengers of God; the God also thus became many, each God being the object of worship for a separate empire, and also the agent to send a separate messenger. The emperors and the priests arrogated to themselves the august position of being the guardians of God, the custodians of his religion and the defenders of his law; they rewarded and punished people in the name of God. Every such emperor claimed that his own God and the messenger of his own God were alone really a God and a messenger of God. Thus, God, installed as the creator of the world and of humanity and the protector of humanity became the cause for conflict and destruction among humanity. Man has suffered far more in the name of God and his messenger and his religion than through all the other causes out together like diseases, wars and aberrations of Nature like fire and floods. Religions did not unite; religions got split up into sects and became causes for feuds and sufferings. If such are the Gods who are guarding human happiness, such Gods should be pulled down from their position. Fortunately all that is wanted is only to pull down the beliefs about Gods from man's mind. There is no God in the world to be pulled down. The misfortune of humanity has been that while the emperors vanished, the Gods installed by them continue to create suffering among men. Man will certainly be happier if he is relieved of the malady of belief in God.

It cannot also be maintained that belief and faith in God have made man nobler. That is not our experience. If a man with belief in God is also found to be a man of noble character, it is not on account of such belief that he has a noble character, it is in spite of his belief in God. It cannot also be maintained that man is bad without a belief in God. Among them who openly deny God and refuse to surrender to him, there are individuals who are far nobler in character than the best among those who have faith in God. God is not wanted for moral life in the world among humanity; God has been a danger for moral

life among men. Even now in the matter of mutual opposition among nations, religion plays its part as one of the most powerful elements, not less powerful than economic or political causes and certainly more powerful than all of them. Even in the case of the East-West, tension of the modern time the conflict of 'Dialectical Materialism' vs. 'Creationism' is a very powerful factor. I am convinced that if God and religion can be removed from the life of man, then the conflict of democracy and totalitarianism, and of capitalism and communism would vanish also as causes of the disruption of humanity.

Intellectual needs the realities of the world, moral life – not one of them warrants the existence of God in the universe; on the other hand all of them, including international amity, requires that God be banished from man's mind. *God has no place in my Philosophy.*

PRACTICALISTIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

K. RAMAKRISHNA RAO

In my view, philosophies are essentially proposals for the resolution of problems, and their character and content are therefore conditioned by the context of the social situation out of which they arise and the problems to which they are applied. Philosophical analysis involves a contextual inquiry into the past as well as the present situations for the identification of problems. Philosophical inventiveness consists not only in the proposed resolution of these problems, but also in the prognostication of future problems.

As long as people, having had divergent cultural inheritances, differ in important ways, and as long as the social circumstances shift and change constantly with the progress wrought by science and technology or the destruction caused by war and other calamities, there can be no 'universal' or 'world' philosophy. A 'world' philosophy is possible if all peoples were to share the same past and if all societies were alike. A 'universal' philosophy is absurd unless change is an illusion and progress a myth.

Philosophies in India have suffered two long by their self-imposed exile from the world that is encountered in actual experience to an imaginary terrain where empty problems opened never ending dialogues. Philosophers have too long ratiocinated for no avail about sin and suffering, self and salvation, removed from their context of occurrence. It is time that we stop the sanctimonious breast-beating about our ancient systems of thought and reflect on new modes commensurate with the changed and changing conditions of our emerging nation.

A true philosophy of India should be able not only to reflect the cultural currents, past and present, but also to throw light on future problems. Changing conditions in the political, economic

and social life of contemporary India call for changing patterns of thinking. The non-violent political revolution caused by Indian independence should be followed by a more important revolution in the modes of Indian thinking.

The rise of nationalism opened up new avenues of action, and the spread of the knowledge of science has shown the inadequacies of the traditional ways to solve the present conflicts. There is a need to re-examine the traditional values and virtues in order to discard or to adapt them to changing circumstances. Therefore, there is a need for a philosophy that would make such an examination possible—a philosophy which is not divorced from the past but is looking forward to the future, and is relevant to the present.

The problems confronting India today are material as well as intellectual. As Mr. Nehru has said, "We are plunging into the world of science and technology and trying to organize our knowledge in such a way that it commands more of the forces of nature, and we are held back not only by our poverty and under-development, but also by some inherited ideas and customs. There is no future for us without science and technology. At the same time, that future will be shallow and empty and without any real meaning if we ignore or forget our past". "So," he continues, "in the tumult and confusion of our times, we stand facing both ways, forward to the future and backwards to the past, being pulled in both direction; How can we resolve this conflict and evolve a structure of living which fulfils our material needs and at the same time sustains our mind and spirit? What new ideals or old ideas, varied and adapted to the new world, can we place before our people, and how can we galvanize them into wakefulness and action?"[1]

What can philosophy do to solve this problem? More accurately, what do these problems do for philosophy in India? It seems to me that in the first place, there is a need for philosophies seeking to be practical. In the second place, these philosophies need to emphasise the context of the social situation

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[1] Nehru, Jawaharlal, 'India, Today and Tomorrow', *Wisdom*, 345, June, 1960.

without placing the individual in opposition to society. In the third place, they should show a tendency to go beyond what is present with hope and idealism.

What does it mean to be practical? It does not mean the denial of what is usually regarded as ideal or spiritual or intrinsically rational, but it does mean precisely the denial of the false dichotomy between the practical and the ideal between practice and theory. Men, being what they are, cannot, unless they believe in self-abdication, do without action. Since action is hazardous, and never absolutely secure or certain, man's desire to find something intrinsically fixed and immutable led him to deprecate action and relegate it to practical utilities thus marking it off from the ideal end and rational purposes.

The monstrous division of Hindu society into castes and the social dishonour in which certain classes are held on the basis of the work they do is a direct consequence of the deprecation of action. The lack of regard for the dignity of labour which prevails in India even today, may also be explained along these lines. The individious social discrimination based on work, the indiscriminate praise of theory over practice and the futile attempts to find a fixed and permanent order precipitating a static and stagnant society, it may be said, are the sour fruits of a false philosophy of life.

It is to be noted, however, that the philosophies seeking to be practical are not those that are the philosophical justifications for self-seeking utilitarian acts, or things of expediency. They involve no less intellectual values, appreciation of aesthetic objects, and adherence to moral standards. They do not merely elevate the individual out of social subordination but help to create an ordered and stable society. So then the practical is something that is relevant to a social context.

In the discussion of the 'practicality' of any given philosophy two problems would arise : (1) To what extent and in which ways have the present circumstances influenced thought, and (2) what are the consequences of his philosophy in influencing a change in or gaining control over the present circumstances?

A 'practical' philosophy is one which would seek its problems

and principles in practical action. Modern developments in science have made it possible for man to gain a greater power and control over nature. And this has profoundly altered social institutions, political machinery, value scales, and economic systems. And this state of affairs naturally has an effect on philosophy itself, and this is in no small measure responsible for the 'practicality' that we see in the contemporary American and European philosophies. The supremacy of the practical is indicated in the efforts to reduce thought or the conditions under which it operates to some form of action. As pragmatism would have it, the test of a hypothesis consists in its successful operation in action. Actions have consequences and what is significant in thought is reducible to these consequences and their meaning.

Philosophy is an inquiry in thought concerning the modes of resolution of problems encountered in experience or anticipated in the future. It is concerned neither with an elaboration of dialectical systems nor the deduction of logistic forms from alleged postulates. There is no sharp dichotomy between theory and practice in so far as both are concerned with solution of problems, since the solution of problems in practice depends upon coming to agreement through communication and discussion. We are therefore concerned as much with men, their fears and frustrations, their ambitions and anxieties, their values and guilts, as with the laws of their behaviour. But the paradox of our times is that we have achieved tremendous control over nature, but we have done little to inquire into how we could prevent its misuse.

Since all men have a stake in the problems confronting them, each of them has a share in the solution of their problems. It is his right as well as responsibility. Practical problems arise in practical situations and involve the association of men. Consequently, fundamental decisions on practical matters have to be made by people whose decision is a result of the comprehension of the problem and is by agreement. Thus, the social context of action assumes importance. Individuals, in so far as they share problems with their fellow-members and co-operate with them in their resolution, find their fulfilment in social participation

rather than withdrawal. Individuality, then, does not consist in the expression and fulfilment of egoistic or self-subserving ideas and ends, but in the responsibility to participate in the resolution of problems to the best of one's abilities. There is no opposition between society on the one hand and the individual on the other. Societies exist for the sake of individuals, and the latter find their fulfilment by participating in the former.

If we equate philosophy with problem-resolution, either within the perspectives of the individual or those of a community, it may degenerate into mediocrity and may become a victim of compromise, temporal expediency, and opportunism, to a gradual exclusion of ultimate ends and ideals. Therefore, the philosophies seeking to be practical should meet the need to go beyond the present problems, to envisage the future and foreshadow its patterns. This instills hope and idealism, and gives a pervasiveness to philosophy.

The third characteristic of 'practicality' also obviates other difficulties involved in being practical. A practical philosophy inasmuch as it is closely related to circumstances tends to take little or no notice of rival theories as they are by implication irrelevant to what seems to be demanding circumstances. But if 'practicality' is conceived to include the vision beyod what is present, the examination of other theories becomes necessary and even useful for the prognostication of future problems and patterns. Also inquiry would be liberated from the interests and pressures of those who have the power to inquire when their task is clearly understood to be one not only of solving the problems as they arise but also of striving for an ideal in so far as it is consistent with needs and problems. This is pragmatic idealism.

Based on this conception we may formulate a prognostication of philosophical problems opening up new avenues of action. What could this new approach do for ethics, for politics, and for philosophy of religion ? How can we build a scale of values based on action and lived in experience, at consistent with an ideal that would inspire hope and give continuity to our action? What course of political activity do we have to indulge in to guarantee freedom and individuality to our people, yet without

sacrificing the material advantages of rigorous discipline and social action? And how can we adapt our religion and tradition to reinforce our action without standing in the way of our progress? I cannot sketch in this brief essay the specifics of the new ethics, politics or philosophy of religion. I shall only attempt to sketch an approach.

It was hoped that if men could improve their material conditions, they would progressively reach out towards secure values and stable peace. But we notice that the enormous improvements in physical instrumentalities for solving material wants has not met in the advanced West with the corresponding improvement in satisfying the intellectual or moral wants. In the wake of independence Indians are, I think rightly, emphasising progress towards the satisfaction of material needs. But one must not live under the illusion that moral improvements will follow material progress. The need to formulate a philosophy that will involve a hierarchy of values based on material wants but without being subject to their domination is, therefore imminent.

In our attempt to formulate a hierarchy of values; there is a desire to conserve what tradition has bequeathed to us. But too often those that are to be preserved come into conflict with those to be achieved. The problem is how to escape this opposi-
tion between tradition and innovation. This problem is parti-
tion between tradition and innovation. This problem is parti-
cularly acute in countries, like India, with a long and impressive tradition. May not we conceive of a dynamic scale of values that would avoid this opposition?

There would be no moral problems if one's desires did not come into conflict with those of others. When they do, individuals need to reflect. And their reflection enables them to foresee the consequences so as to form certain ends. Since ends are not expedients for immediate action, individuals need to formulate their ends which are mutually consistent and re-enforcing. But we formulate ends because we wish certain consequences in action. In so far as we are responsible for these consequences we are accountable for them. Freedom and

necessity, then, would consist in the freedom to choose ends and the necessity to see that those ends have relevance to and do not conflict with the environing conditions and the moral problems they arouse.

A contextual view of politics becomes also imminent in a practicalistic approach. There is nothing in the idea of democracy itself that would guarantee equality, freedom, and fraternity. Have we not seen how some of the democratic countries of the West have spread their colonial rule in Asia and Africa and exploited them, and how the economic individualism practised in industry and trade reacted against equality of opportunity and aggravated economic inequalities? Democracy is not merely a fine ideal. But it is something dynamic, and the form it takes is necessarily bound with the circumstances and conditions which make it possible. In the establishment of a democratic state, we are concerned with the formation of a political context which can preserve the right of the individual to act. This leads us to emphasise the right *means* of action to achieve worthy political *ends*.

Absolute and unconditional freedom is purely an ideal. Freedom, like democracy, is relative to the conditions and circumstances that make it possible. And hence it can be promoted by creating and sustaining such conditions as are necessary for a free play of individual action and initiative. This, however, would involve some restriction of individual liberties, which in itself becomes necessary for the establishment of larger liberties. Mr. Nehru, who characterises himself as 'too much of an individualist and believer in personal freedom', says, "Yet it seemed to me obvious that in a complex social structure, individual freedom had to be limited, and perhaps the only way to read personal freedom was through some such limitation in the social sphere. The lesser liberties may often need limitation in the interest of the larger freedom." [2]

The problems of religion are varied and complex. Their influence is pervasive and powerful. A religion might instill hope and activate people; it could also cause despair and hinder

[2] Nehru, Jawaharlal, *The Discovery of India*, Asia Publishing House, 1966.

progress. It may supply some deeply felt inner need of human nature, raise man to greatness, and even give an enduring set of values; or it may degenerate into mere superstition and dogma. Since the ways of religion affect variously the way men live and believe, men's approach to religion should be consistent with their modes of thinking. But the way people think is influenced by their circumstances and material needs, and these needs are by no means common to all people. Therefore, there could be no universal religion, any more than there could be a universal philosophy.

Religious faith should be elaborated and understood in its relation to the perspectives of the individual and the demands of the circumstances. Individuals may vary in their interpretation of a faith, for their perspectives are different; or they may reformulate their religious problems as changes occur in the social contexts in which their faith operates. There is no fixed and immutable essence in all the religions taken together or in any one of them considered individually. Religion is as much purposive and actional as any other form of human achievement or belief.

This brings us into direct conflict with the position taken by Arnold Toynbee and others. Toynbee argues that religions, as practised, contain both essential truths and non-essential practices and propositions. This is true, according to him, of all the seven 'higher religions'. The essential truths, he goes on to argue, are valid without regard to time and place. In a sense, these essential truths or counsels are indispensable to human life. Without them humanity would not be human. In order that these essential truths be communicated to people living in a certain temporal and social context, they become institutionalised, and the local and temporary circumstances influence the religions, and thus the religions accumulate accidental accretions. While these are useful and necessary, one is often prone to mistake means for ends and consider the accidental accretions as no less sacrosanct than the essential truths themselves. This, according to Toynbee, is what makes the 'higher religions' degenerate into taboo. Hence we are faced with the "task of disengaging the

essence from the non-essentials in mankind's religious heritage".

He says: "What is permanent and universal has always and everywhere to be translated into something temporary and local in order to make it accessible to particular human beings here and now. But we ought never to allow ourselves to forget that every translation of this kind is bound to be a mistranslation to some extent, and that it is therefore also bound to be contingent and provisional. The penalty for neglecting the perpetually urgent task of discarding the current mistranslation is to allow the light radiated by the essence of a religion to be shut off from human souls by an opaque film of accretions."[3]

I find it difficult to believe that there is something universal and essentially true beneath what is preached and practised. Toynbee himself agrees: "The practical test of religion, always and everywhere, is its success or failure in helping human souls to respond to the challanges of Suffering and Sin."[4] Since the response of 'human souls' is obviously experienced as a particular fact consequent to certain religious acts, I see no reason why we should discard living and learning in the concrete and particular in favour of an unknown abstract which is dubbed to be universal and true. What matters to us is what we believe in, the institutions that communicate these beliefs, and the instruments that put these beliefs into action. These institutions and instruments are as important and useful as the beliefs themselves.

We often tend to dissociate religion from what stands as religion because we wish that it were otherwise or because we identify it with an ideal. Since institutions grow rigid and inflexible, while our needs and aspirations are changing, we take comfort in talking about something which does not change but which at the same time satisfies our ideals and aspirations. The danger arises thus when we confuse the ideal with a static abstraction unconnected and dissociated from human activity. If we conceive religion to be a component of human beliefs and actions, it loses its

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[3] Toynbee, Arnold, *A Historian's Approach to Religion*, Oxford University Press, London, 1956, pp. 271, 272.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 298.

substantive characteristics in so far as there would be no universal and immutable essences underlying the changing patterns of human belief and action.

What is universal in religion is an outlook and not a body of doctrines. Religious outlook provides for and nurtures the essential element of the ideal in the 'practical'. In any practical situation, the ideal is in a precarious position. The demands of the present and the urge to seek satisfaction in the immediate are prone to put men under constant pressure to equate temporal opportunism, egocentric utility, and the gratification of immediate urges with 'practicality', or to idolise the ideal as something that bears no relation to the actualities of the situation.

But religion as an outlook would help to create and sustain an atmosphere in which men retain their responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying, and expanding the heritage of their values. It would help to activate men to pursue relentlessly their search for an ideal and against obstacles even at the risk of a personal loss because they believe in the enduring value of the ideal end. Religion thus conceived does not oppose science or preach fixed dogma. It embodies everything noble in man and sustains the enduring values without ever growing rigid. It is open to new ideas, but it sustains continuity.

What is said so far is not a comprehensive account of a philosophy for fast changing India. It would seem to me that in a very significant sense it would not be possible to pinpoint adequately what this philosophy is going to be. This is only an approach and should therefore take various forms. This is more like pragmatism in the United States which has influenced the directions of many later philosophic developments to such an extent that it would be difficult to name a pure pragmatist at this stage in America. So also this aspect of Indian thought that is presented here may tend in the future to influence schools of thought rather than become one.

MAN AND GOD
AN ESSAY IN TRANSCENDENTAL PERSONALISM

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

PHILOSOPHY BEGINS with problems and the solutions that it attempts give rise to new problems. The progress in philosophy is marked as much by the clarification of old problems as by the discovery of new ones. The first problem of philosophy, a problem which is as persistent as any other is concerned with the nature of philosophy itself. This much at least we can say that if philosophy means anything it means the courage to differ. Philosophy, however, does not revel in differences but considers them as a challenge of history to philosophical quest. As an historical phenomenon it is not born of jejune curiosity. Though it shifts its centre of interest from one period of history to another, from one pattern of culture to another, at one time amassing arguments for the dogmas of a specific religion, at another championing the cause of free thought against every religious conviction, religious and philosophic interests are difficult to isolate. Corresponding to the difference in the psychological and the cultural context the motive to philosophic reflection may vary. Philosophy may be born in wonder when all that is familiar becomes unfamiliar, or in universal doubt when every proposition becomes questionable or in an experience of suffering as a constant feature of life when everything becomes sound and fury signifying nothing. Whatever may be the specific form of philosophic quest it is really associated with religion as an 'ultimate concern'. Hegel had rightly seen the bond that links philosophy to religion and art but erred in reducing philosophy to conceptual activity and in assigning priority to philosophic knowledge. In every form of philosophical knowledge there is an alogical and non-conceptual

element which defies analysis. The element of risk which is involved in all philosophic speculation progresses from level to level to culminate ultimately in an act of faith. Hermann Lotze was frank enough to conclude his great work on metaphysics with the hope not to have erred everywhere and with the confession : God knows better.

The only appropriate way to begin philosophical inquiry is phenomenological reflection, a systematic description of what is given in consciousness. But the moment I try to become conscious of what I am conscious, to know what I know I find that the realm of consciousness is not self-sufficient. Every act of consciousness seems to be intentional, to refer to something beyond itself and to something other than myself. Every act of consciousness seems to be an act self-transcendence. What is then the status of this otherness? Is its nature exhausted in my consciousness in such a way as to entitle me to say *esse est percipi* or is it only an accident in its life to be known? Apparently the objects which may be said to be given in an act of cogito do not depend upon it. The ideas of objects are not objects. The realm of possible objectivity far transcends the realm of ideas and the realm of reality that of objectivity. No part of the real is forced to become the object of my knowledge and to admit penetration by knowledge. But if we prefer to take shelter behind the infinite spirit to vindicate the idealistic thesis we immediately leave the field of epistemological inquiry. Epistemological considerations are confined to the intellectual plane of knowledge and can never overcome the distinction between the subject, the object and the act of knowledge. In this field of discourse we can at the most draw some useful distinction of the kind which John Locke made between primary and secondary qualities and consider only secondary qualities as dependent on knowledge, though here again we have no means to know whether physical reality is really shorn of all secondary qualities and what we experience as such is nothing but human reactions to a qualityless reality.

Kant's way to idealism is different. He maintains on good grounds that can never know the thing as it is without the

imprint of the *a priori* conditions of knowledge. Hence, what I know is only the appearance of the reality which is unknown. Though I can agree with Kant that I cannot know anything without making it the object of my knowledge, I cannot see how it can lead farther than the tautological statement that I cannot know anything without knowing it. Again there is no ground to suppose that the realm of unknowability is as uniform as Kant thinks. That the material thing is unknowable, that the self as noumenal is unknowable, that God is unknowable may refer to different orders of unknowability. I cannot also subscribe to the arrogant claim that reality is chaotic and it is left to our understanding to make experience possible. I cannot for a moment presume that categories are only *a priori* conditions of finite knowledge and without any basis in reality and that our understanding is the architect of the universe. In every pre-logical experience when reality is lived without being rationalised the role of thought is substantially reduced. It is only true of the world of science that it is a logical construction which is developed to fulfil the demands of scientific intelligibility and which changed with the changing pattern of science. Hence, in the field of epistemology there is no other alternative but to fall in line with critical realism, to refuse to equate reality with objectivity and to hold fast to the distinction between subject and object. But realism has its limits. What I can have in knowledge is not reality without any mediation but only as represented by ideas, images and symbols. Thus only can the revolt against dualism of which Lovejoy spoke be averted and the problem of error is not allowed to become insoluble.

What I call reality is constituted of three different layers. The material layer appears to be the foundation of the ground which makes possible the appearance of the higher layers, the vital and the mental. Life and mind are co-extensive and every call of the human body may reflect some rudimentary form of consciousness. It is certainly very dubious whether we can consider every particle of matter as animated and instinct with life. The realm of materiality seems to be vaster than that of mind and life.

Thus so far as empirical reality is concerned a pluralistic ontology is justified and there seems to be no ground to reduce matter into mind or mind into matter. For all the changes that we may introduce in our concept of matter a little reflection shows that however fine and subtle the matter may become it cannot be identified with mind, and there is little warrant for the conclusions which some of the theorists of modern physics have drawn. Rather I would agree with the ontological analysis of Nicolai Hartmann with its different grades of reality, each with an irreducible novum. Thus, higher levels of reality may be said to depend on the lower for their expression, though enjoying an autonomy of their own in their characteristic novelty. But reality considered as a continuum of matter, life and mind does not go beyond the animal level and does not brook any spiritual transformation. Reality at this level may be called Nature and the transition from nature to culture is made possible through a totally new factor which is called by Hegel the objective spirit but which I will simply designate as the spirit par excellence and distinguish it from the person or the self of which we shall speak later. Nicolai Hartmann calls it spirit without consciousness and hails it as a great contribution of Hegel. It has its own autonomous ontic status and is not an individual's own making. It informs language, law, state and as the spirit of the times it moulds our thoughts, aspirations and emotional attitudes.

It is in the state and society that the individual can work for ends that transcend the circumscribed circle of his own interest. They lead us to still greater manifestations of spirit, to humanity with which every one of us is integrated and to history which makes room for cultural variety and diversity. In his historical expression it imparts its peculiar character to every age and makes intelligible the bias of the times. But it has no ontic status over and above the persons through whom it works. The heroes of history not only speak aloud what is latent in the historical process but accepting its challenge can make it partly yield to their initiative. History can never be understood exclusively as a teleological process which moves towards a far

off divine event, or as the realisation of one definite purpose, be it the realisation of the idea of freedom as it is with Hegel, or the education of mankind as with Lessing. It is by no means a world tribunal which can judge individuals and nations as it was considered by Schiller. Still less can it be understood as determined wholly by geographical, racial and economic factors. The periods of history may not be uniformly determined and the economic determination of the historical process may be truer of the present than of the past, may be truer of some cultures than of others. Every culture in history represents something unique in its revelation of the spirit and demands different criteria of evaluation for its understanding. It is not so much the evolution of life which is unpredictable as the historical process which is incalculable. The curious fusion of the logical and the alogical elements in history can only be recognised without being explained.

What is the place of man then in a reality which is constituted of three different levels and which is transformed by spirit into a realm of culture? He is a living growth with a physical substratum. Considered as a mind body unity he is rightly considered an imperfect animal, helpless in nature. He is always in the making, never complete by himself. But he is also a moral being who can appreciate and respond to values and who has his roots deep in history. He cannot outgrow history; he grows and matures in the historical process by which he is carried. Neither the spirit is of his making nor the values are his creation. Values constitute a realm of pure validity which is not his achievement. Hence moral consciousness is rightly assigned a privileged place in the life of man. It is here in the consciousness of the categorical ought that he feels responsibility. There cannot be any moral life without responsibility and no responsibility can be imputed to man without his freedom. But freedom does not seem to be the constant feature of his existence. The 'divine spark' in him is often obscured and he is carried by the impulse of the movement. The most that we can say of him in his empirical manifestation is that his decisions are his because no external factor determines them.

But certainly his decisions are not decisive.

I think it is dangerous to talk glibly of man's transcending the moral order. What is realisable is only the transformation of the world of law into that of grace. Kant thought of the inherent conflict of inclination and duty and Schiller thought of their possibility of the reconciliation in harmony or beauty. On the plane of reconciliation the conflict of nature and the moral order is resolved and virtue is expressed with grace without the pain of struggle and renunciation. Morality then may point to a stage which does not annul it but works for its fulfilment.

What is then the status of values? In my phylosophy of values I am chiefly influenced by the current of the German axiological thought, by the teachings of Lotze, Scheler, N. Hartmann, Windelband and above all by the excellent investigations of H. Rickert. In consonance with the Platonic tradition I consider values to be non-mental non-material ideal essences which stand outside the conditions for reality. It does not matter much whether we consider values in a general theory of ontology as N. Hartmann does or consider the realm of values as completely outside the pale of a theory of being. What is true is the fact that values are not real, if by reality we mean the complex of matter, life and mind with their spatiotemporal and conceptual articulations. The realm of values is a realm of ideal essences which obtain for a consiousness which can respond to them and which can appreciate them. They impart meaning to human life and make it worth living. Only slowly does our consiousness open itself to the fullness of their world. The basic values are many and are irreducible. It may be considered as a great merit of Kant to have worked in this direction, to have refused to reduce the realm of art into any other sphere, though by his temper he could not but allow moral values to predominate. It is under his influence perhaps that we are apt to consider all values on the pattern of moral values as essentially the expression of an ought (Sollen). But the ought is only a reflection of moral values in our consiousness and not a characteristic of all values the indifference of values to reality is appear in the realm of aesthetic values which are

by no means the expression of an imperative and which may not refer to any factuality. The world of art develops in a realm of pure possibilities and is neither a duplication nor an imitation of reality. It is re-creation. Man with all his ingenuity in science cannot vie with nature. Whereas he cannot create anything equal to the humblest achievements of nature he may over take it with his attainments in art. The creations of a great artist are much more rich in life than the average mortals of the earth. The values which the artist symbolises and reflects in his creation reveal a new world of human joys and sorrows, a new order of law with its own time and space. As such they are *sui generis* and are not reducible into moral or social values. Values are timeless though in our acts of valuation we are conditioned by time and history. It is man's privilege to respond to values and it is his tragedy that he cannot hearken to the call of some without renouncing others.

The consideration of the realm of culture and values leads us to the perennial problem of man's destiny. It is but natural that at this stage of our inquiry we are forced to part company with the dominant currents of Western thought and to seek inspiration from the wisdom of the East It is strange that among the thinkers of the West, Kant, in spite of his reputation to have demolished once for all the dreamy speculations of the metaphysician, can help us most in the formulation of the critical metaphysics. My view of the ultimate nature of self and God has some affinity with the teaching of Madhava and Ramanuja and owes much to the mystic insights of Muslim thinkers and sufis like Al-Ghazzali, Rumi, Junaid and Mujaddid. While in their analysis of empirical reality, in their appreciation of values, in their philosopy of history and culture thinkers of the Occident have made lasting contribution to philosophic thought. I find their approach to the problem of human personality and their incursions into metaphysics to be mostly based on unwarranted assumptions.

First I do not see why matter must have only the qualities and forms which are known to us and why it should not continue to persist in some other form in another plane of existence. The

same holds good of life and mind. We may say in a language which may remind one of Spinoza that life, mind and matter are some among the infinite possibilities of creation and there may be unlimited forms of expression which are not known to us in our present state of knowledge. Further the whole basis of subjective idealism and even of personalistic trends in the West is the identification of self with mind. Once the supermental character of self is denied there is no wonder that the idea of survival seems preposterous and the unity of consciousness seems to be reducible into a conglomeration of mental states or simply appears as a logical unity of apperception. The arguments of Hume against the unity of mind are applicable only to the sub-personal level of consciousness which is common to man and the brute. It was the fatal error of Leibniz to have ignored the great chasm that yawns between the level of mentality and that of personality. I make a distinction between the person which is the same as the self and personality. I consider personality as the self which is expressed in time and space through the triple limitation of mind, matter and life. This distinction corresponds roughly to the one made by Kant between the empirical and the noumenal self. The Hindu view of incarnation considers the present phase of personality as not necessarily the final one but as a stage in a long journey. In my view, however, the earthly life is involved in a genuine transmigration which can only mean an ascent to higher planes of existence and not a retreat to the same. Kant had remarked that time and space may not be the only forms of intuition but the ones which we know as the valid *a priori* conditions of our sensory experience. But even the time-space continuum is more than a formal condition of sensory experience. It corresponds to the pattern in which reality unfolds itself on different planes. Thus reality is empirical and phenomenal on all possible planes of existence of this life and of life after on every stage before final deliverance. This involves a reinterpretation of the doctrine of creation. Creation as applied to persons is different from what it is as applied to sub-personal centres of reality. In its application to sub-personal levels it is

creatio ex nihilo, an outcome of divine creativity and as applied to personal levels it can only be envisaged as emanation unfoldment or explication. But the self cannot leave its divine sanctuary and make its habitat in the world of creation without emoloying gross media for the needs of its phenomenal existence. It cannot work, act and play without some stage being prepared for its appearance. Fichte partly grasped the truth when he considered reality as posited by the supreme ego for a moral end, for the exercise of moral action. The external world is not only a ground for the practice of moral ends or a platform for action. It is given also for enjoyment. What wonder is there if the objects of the world reveal on the one hand 'purposiveness without a purpose' which they share with works of art, and on the other a wise organisation and adjustment which speaks for rationality and teleology in the world order. Hence reality is as much *maya* as *lila*, as much creation out of nothing as an expression of God's creative exuberance. It means that the reality of the world is not ultimate in any way; ultimacy belongs only to persons.

The involvement of persons in the flux of phenomenality means the emergence from the state of pre-existence to existence, a descent from leisure to activity, from innocence to morality. We can only form an idea of the self in its condition of phenomenality, as such and such, as this and that, as now and then. Lotze has justly remarked: "Unspeakable as it is how things look in darkness, equally contradictory is the demand to know how the spirit is before it entered in any of the situations in which alone its life unfolds itself". But it is not exhausted in its phenomenality. It is more than it appears.

It has been debated whether God is a person. The price that we pay for our philosophical scruples in refusing to call him a person is to make him an idol, to make him identical with a part or the whole of his own creation. The highest that we can know on earth is personal existence as the unity of consciousness and as the consciousness of the unity. Our oxperience of personal life here is of course fragmentary and occassionally threatened with a split. The person has not the original character

of *sat*, *chit*, and *ananda* but conditioned and limited by the empirical conditions of matter, life and mind. The highest that we can think of is to think of a supreme person who embraces in his life an infinite variety of personal orders and who can give vent to his creativity through infinite forms of expression. We can then wonder with Lotze how it is credible that even the smallest may claim existence and the greatest should remain conspicuous by his absence. The ontological argument is not a verbal quibble after all.

Though God is the supreme expression of the ego he is more than the person. He is not only the highest that can be thought of but even higher than the highest that can be thought of him. The mystics of all times have made a distinction between the manifest and hidden aspects of Godhead. His primordial nature, the Godhead as such far transcends his personal and manifest aspect. The Muslim sufi Mujaddid calls him supremely Beyond, beyond all that is beyond. No mystic illumination can exhaust his essence and apprehend the inaprehensible. Religion in one way is our response in silence to the mystery of divine transcendence, in another our answer in surrender and prayer to the secret of his presence in the depths of our self. The mystic's experience of God is not intuition in the way of Bergson. Whereas Bergson's intuition is a product of life the mystic's illumination is the incursion of the beyond here and now, a two-way movement between the finite and the infinite But the mystic experience cannot be made conceptual. Says Al-Ghazzali of mystics; "Then their stage progresses from the vision of forms and figures to stages which are indescribable in language and which cannot be interpreted without using words necessarily containing error".

Our line of thought leads inevitably to a God who is eternal and eternal with all that he embraces in the fullness of his being. Values are timeless and equally timeless may be the truth of the propositions. Eternity is not simple timelessness. It is analogous to time on the finite plane and speaks for a positive characteristic of an existence which is transcendent.

To sum up: The person as a noumenal reality participates

in the divine life before it enters into any of the situations of empirical existence. Creation in relation to the person signified primarily explication and unfoldment and secondarily the fragmentary penetration of the eternal order into the order of creation which for us is the continuum of life, matter and mind. I conceive the highest stage of man's ascent more in line with Madhava and Ramanuja than that of the Advaita Vedantist. It is in the language of the sufis annihilation in God and preservation through him. It is only on the lowest planes of materiality that the individuality is completely extinguished and it is on this plane that a drop of water is lost in the ocean without the ability to regain its individuality. On the psychological level of sympathetic union in friendship or on the aesthetic level of empathy the individuality is not lost and submerged but enriched. Love is not the extinction of individuality but its enrichment and transformation. Only it is no more assertive, it has made itself inconspicuous in surrender. There is no reason to suppose that the final phase of man should be more in the nature of material absorption than that of communion. The Quran in a beautiful passage gives the vision of man's progress to higher planes of existence. "But nay, I swear by the after-glow of sunset, and by the night and all that it enshroudeth, and by the moon in all her fulness that he shall move on from plane to plane." And the end of this progress is a return to the source and a renewed participation in life divine.

THE SEARCH FOR INTEGRATED LIFE

K. C. VARADACHARI

To WRITE one's philosophy is to reveal one's personality, which is about the most difficult to do. It is, however, possible to state what one has been aiming at or has in that process of aiming discovered other goals than what one did in fact start with. A gradual process of integration willy-nilly takes place even as one grows biologically and socially. Spiritual growth is something that cannot be severed from these processes which almost everybody witnesses in himself and others. Such a description of one's growth is possible. It is not as if all the time we have attempted to reason out according to rules of logical necessity. But all have had at least one interest that he is aiming at a systematic conception of the world he lives in and has his being. A philosophy is a conscious or deliberate attempt to describe the state of one's attainment in this.

It has been brought forward rather neatly by Indian thinkers that in regard to our knowledge and action in this universe, different levels of experience exist. The conception is not merely spatial and temporal but also individual and psychological. This means that one has indeed to get at the proper instruments of knowledge suitable and limited to each one of these levels. Thus whatever may be the purpose of the biological evolution or other types of evolution, sensory knowledge can go only up to a particular extent; and anything depending on the sensory could not go much beyond unless certain conditions like uniformity of nature and systematic nature of the world even within our sensory experience are accepted.

It became clear to me very early that one has firstly to find out for whom is this knowledge and who it is that gains this knowledge. If the human individual is not one single being but a plurality of personalities, as our waking and dreaming life shows,

not to speak of the multiple personalities we exhibit in our human relationships, it becomes clear that our knowledge cannot have that completeness and our philosophies must suffer from a radical defect owing to the knower. A disintegrated personality can hardly be a subject, and the object which we know would be commensurately imaginative or fragmented knowledge. It may not be totally illusory because what is seen through two or three personalities is bound to be confusing, contradictory and worthless and in life it would lead to misery.

This basic need in philosophy to become a person, integrated and undivided, is nowadays being more and more realised. The truth of this was enunciated by the *Māndukyopaniṣad* when it counselled that one must become the integrated fourth person, in whom the three lower personalities of the mechanical waking, the emotive dream and the deep sleep have merged or dissolved. This fourth has firstly to be discovered and the knowledge activity of this Self, for it is then only capable of being a self or subject, would lead to the real knowledge of things as in themselves. This goal of knowing all things as they are in themselves is certainly stated clearly by the *Iśayagyopaniṣad* which says that one who attains the Supreme Being will see all things in their real nature as from eternity (*yatharatyato arthan vyadadhar śaśvatībhyaḥ samabhyaḥ*).

This is the integration that is necessary in order to be the Seer (*Kavih*) of Reality as it is in itself. All other seeing is bound to be either fragmentary or illusory or opposite of reality (*viparyaya*). Once convinced of this it became clear that the mystic insight is about the most adequate instrument of knowing all things in their real nature or truth; of course it must be said that not all that passes for integral insight is that, since mystics are of several grades of attainment.

This is the first integration: the integration that is of the *pramātṛ* (knower or seer or *ṛsi*) and this *pramana* (instrument of knowledge). This cannot be described as unnecessary for this is fundamental. Know first the person then it is possible for one to know all rightly. This seemed to me to be the inward truth of the call to integration or discovery of the *turya*, which

is *advaita* or one reality as seer.

But this discovery or attainment of the integral self obviously leads us to the next problem of integration of man with his three personalities operating in and through the body and the senses. On the one hand, it is clear that the integral self operating with the direct light of its own soul-sight would know the right function of the body and its several organs. Though we may take into consideration our modern development in the fields of physiology and psychology, yet by and large it is clear that an integrated self *controls* the system, whereas the unintegrated selves or personalities break up the harmonious function. The self attained gives us a better attitude or the attitude of real relations in the universe as well as in the physiological body that we have. The great discovery of the selfhood in man having a similar or correspondential relation to the selfhood of the universe was what attracted my attention. This is something that shows that the whole universe and not only my self has a universal self (or God) whom all adore and obey absolutely. Even as the self integrated within is obeyed and supported and enjoyed by the body, so too this universal self is obeyed and supported and enjoyed by the universe and all. This conception of the individual himself even when integrated in himself as a body of God is fruitful in so far as it makes the integration of the individual with the universe and all souls possible. It is not necessary to deduce all to one Self and abolish the individuals and the world. One begins to see all in and through God and the individual integral consciousness so much capable of granting truth in itself of all things that have come into being from eternity, will when it functions through the Divine Nature of self of all (*sarvāntaryāmi*) develop real divine gnosis, and takes the individual's vision beyond the manifested universe and help also to perceive all the eternal and the terrestrial worlds. Such a vision or divine gnosis is truly possible to one who has so much become of the Divine and the Universal. It is this truth that our knowledge must transcend both the sensory and the inferential as also the cosmic and enter into the knowledge of the Divine Universal Nature, that has been

brilliantly counselled as the hight of Divine Vision. It is no longer *svānubhava*, for *anubhava* yet carries with it the meaning of leading up to rather than revealing the Ultimate. It would be more proper to speak of this attainment as the *Divya-bhāva* even as the *atma's* integral knowing must be called *sva-bhāva*, this too becomes recognised as due to the grace of God. It is under such conditions that one is said to achieve *sāksātkāra* (similar or identical Vision) *sārūpya* (identical form or similar form with divine attributes). *sālokya* (living with the Divine in His highest world to which all creation is moving), and *sāyujya* (connected with the Divine or like the Divine with all the universe without remainder). This is the divine destiny that one gains through the practice of the 'bodyhood' of God. This is, like the first integration, a practice *abhyāsa* rather than a ratiocination : it demands the closest following of the realisations in daily practice (*nityācāra*). Mere reasoning can never lead to integrations of this dimension. Man is (or can be) integral with the Divine and only through the Divine can a sustaining integration come about with the universe as a whole and indivisibly.

If Advaita in my opinion affirmed the need for the individual integration, Viśiṣṭādvaita affirmed the need for the practice of the bodyhood of God, which leads to the integration of human being with the Divine—*sāyujya*.

The abolition of all other souls either by denying them or by absorbing or merging or liquidating all into one grand Absolute was an impossible solution, since the others and myself tended to persevere in the new statuses except when asleep or contemplating total *nirvāṇa* or *pralaya*.

This societal conception was no less serious than the individual and it appeared that the solution to this problem lay in the serious integration that has to be undertaken at the level of creation.

The concept of social *dharma* or law by which each individual was made of conform to the pattern of harmony of the whole was much more easy to establish by force and by regimented education and cultural emotionalism and functionalistic

divisions that naturally have grown as responses to the challenge of human evolution. The discovery of the *dharma* for each individual oscillates between the societal organic laws and the individual aspirations for freedom *in* the first instance in society and in the second instance *from* society and the biological round of existence. These conceptions have lead to the search for metaphysical grounds for individual value and worth that are contained in the yearning for uniqueness and value in each and for each. The world becomes a world of values and valuations and *dharma* is the pre-eminent expression of this value-world or universe. Each has intrinsic value as the expression of the Infinite and manifesting that through its involutionary and evolutionary search. It is clear that when the Indian thinkers sought to assert the 'Return to the Cause or Source' as the way of liberation or to liberation, it was assumed that they have had their outward movement towards manifestation which ended up in that night which has made life itself all misery, conflict and loss of awareness about purposes. The Indian thinkers have assumed that there are two basic movements, one proceeding towards the Central Being or God or Brahman and another receding from it exploring the domains of enjoyment of creation or *lila*. Complementary though in the Absolute or God, yet they are opposed movements: the individual has to discover his direction and achieve that integration that comes after descent. In a world in which every individual is seeking the fullest concrete expression of freedom, in which the attainment of the freedom by any one has not been followed up by the equal freedom of every one else, though eagerly anticipated, idealised and fanatically pursued by those who have laid claim for their own personal emancipation or freedom, it becomes clear that plurality of individuals (souls or *purusas*) cannot but be accepted. It does not argue for one single soul or *purusa* or *purusottama*; this inherent pluralism can be seen to be the characteristic of the universe. Perfection of each individual lies in his attainment of the full potentialities of oneself as a spiritual member of the Society of souls under the supreme governance of a sovereign spirit. The concept of a sovereign

principle becomes imperative in so far as it is the unifying principle of spiritual manyness. The infinity of this principle claims the status of possible perfection of all souls in evolution or the process of creative harmony beyond descent and ascent. The uniqueness of the realisation of freedom in the creative process of *lila* (spiritual play of transcendence through self-surrender or grace) is the most wonderful fact about liberation, which is (1) a losing and (2) a finding and (3) a transcending. The mystic really experiences the three processes, the losing, the finding or birth, and the enlargement or participation in the life of the one, the self of all.

The individual is seen to be a person growing in the evolutionary process through direct awareness or knowledge of all that the world means and reveals to every one. In God who is the One Divine Abode of rest and perfection and perfecting, all find : (1) their *svadharma* native to them as selves or bodies of God ; (2) their *svadharma* as common members of the universal functions ordained by that multiplicity that enriches the One unity, and (3) their *svadharma* as active (intelligent perfected souls) in the Kingdom of Grace and Eternity, as gnostic individuals.

The pluralistic truth cannot be given the go-by, for it is the fulfilment of the first and second integrations. Thus in the third integration are attained the ethical, religious and mystical imperatives which are integral to the One.

I have developed these basic formulations in my book *The Living Teaching of Vedanta* (1934). Though I have since then developed some of these at greater length in other books and papers the basic conception of the Individual in the universe seems to be remaining the same. They form the kernel of my view of life, and they seem to me to furnish a working hypothesis towards a spiritually integrated life, into which other types of integrations could be worked.

The influences operating on my development are various. The Eastern thought and mystic practices have as could be seen basic to my growth, formed my environment. The saints of the last century have also added to the stimulations of my

development. The Western philosophical thinkers from Heraclitus and Socrates and Plato down to Leibniz and Hegel and Bergson have helped in the process and I was enabled to study them from the higher than the intellectual point of view and indeed that has led me to see that purified intellect, an intellect released from the thraldom of sensist empiricism and pragmatism helps the universal and global perspective that alone can be called real and personal knowledge. Impersonalistic knowledge must be transcended in a trans-impersonal knowledge, that is available only in the cosmic personal knowledge. I have become quite confident that the highest Universal knowledge—infinite knowledge—is open only in and through the integrated person—the fourth person—*turiya Purusa*, so to speak.

THE VISION OF GOD IN THE GODLY

JAYACHAMARAJA WADIYAR

THE CONDITION in which we find ourselves in our embodied state is spatial and temporal, as well as objectively isolated in individual existence. There is a disembodied state which religion promises, a state in which the soul is released from spatial, temporal and individual limitations. Such a state is realised in mystic experience. The mystics are in direct communion with God who transcends time and space.

Now God is posited as an idea pertaining to the realm of the Infinite and the Eternal. No individual is confined to a part or a finite portion of the Infinite and the Eternal and, therefore, cannot be said to exhaust what is inexhaustible. Our knowledge of God progresses along with our several spatial and temporal environments through which we successively pass. The Upanishad declares that to try to exhaust the inexhaustible is an impossible task when it says: *Yato vaco nivartante aprapya Manasa saha*'[1] meaning, that speech and thought fail to encompass the Infinite and the Eternal which is inexhaustible.

However, there is a way to encompass divinity or grasp it in its entirety. This is by seeing God in the Godly. But who are the Godly? There are the *Jnanis* or the mystics. Sri Krishna says that they are his very soul: *Jnanī tvatmaiva me matam.*[2]

Let us take a tree for illustration. It has various values from the stand points of a botanist, biologist, chemist, physician, engineer, architect, artist, poet, philosopher, timber-merchant carpenter, forester, wood-cutter and the fuel-seller. But, then comes the mystic whose value of the tree is not the same as those of the several values which the foregoing people attach to it; for his vision is related to God. The mystic sees the tree

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[1] *Taittiriya Upanishad,* II. 4. I.

[2] *Bhagavadgita,* VII, 18.

as a piece of God's workmanship. The tree appears to him as standing in relation to Godhood and never in the isolated manner as the others see it. There is no reference whatever to the God-principle in the view of others. To the mystic, however, the tree is a manifestation of God. He thinks that God himself manifests in that form, one out of a countless number of forms which is possible to God. The mystic thus envisages God himself in the tree. This value of the mystic is the spiritual value, the ultimate value which is the synthesis of all partial values that are empirical (*vyavaharika*). To the mystic again, the tree can have no existence whatsoever as dissevered from God. It is an object revealed by God under temporal, spatial and individual conditions. Such a vision of the mystic of God in the tree or God as the tree, is indeed a rare experience. This vision of seeing God everywhere, at all times and in all places is described as extraordinary. The person who may have it, even as a momentary glimpse is stated to be *mahātmā* or a great soul. He is a soul whose consciousness has reached God-consciousness: '*Vāsudevaḥ sarvamiti sa mahātmā sudurlabhaḥ*'.[3] Such a vision comes to the mystic or the godly man in an easy and simple manner and includes also all that which cannot be called godly.

Seeing moral and other distinctions is a characteristic of the empirical. The vision of God everywhere, however, is a consciousness transcending empirical differentiations. This vision is called *samadarśana*. A mystic raised to this level is designated as the *Avadhūta* or *Jīvanmukta*. Like the elements, sky, wind, water and earth, he would be performing his functions irrespective of the human standards of likes and dislikes, loves and hates, moral and vice, and would be above all such pairs of opposites (*dvandvātīta*). Therefore, the *samadarśana* (equal insight) mystic at his summit has no motives and does not differentiate between the good and the wicked man. His position is thus described in the *Bhagavadgītā* :

> '*Suhrnmitraryudasina-*
> *madhyasthadveṣyabandhuṣu ;*

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[3] *Bhagavadgītā :* VI. 19.

sādhuṣvapi ca papeṣu
samabudhhirviśiṣyate.'[4]

The verse describes a sage of 'equal disposition' who makes no moral distinctions. In short, it presents a mystic's angle of vision. For, to the mystic all seem the same – be they friends, associates, foes, neutrals, indifferents, hatefuls, relatives, the Godly or the un-Godly.

However, this standard is difficult to attain. It is a standard savouring of the un-moral, the un-worldly – or the other-worldly. The possibility of such a state, however, is certain. From analogies in nature such as the existence of sunshine and shower, light and darkness, which are the same for all people, we can conclude such a possibility. This is a standard metaphysically sustainable and therefore rational and cannot be dismissed with the reproach that it is pathological. Hence it is a far easier task to assimilate God in the Godly than otherwise. As between the sinner and the saint, the position of God is not one of complete absence in the former and complete presence in the latter, for God is omnipresent. But the presence of God is observed in the sinner as light covered under an opaque glass and in the saint the all effulgent appears like a taper enhanced in brilliance by the crystal dome. This seems to be the meaning of the statement in the *Bhagavadgītā* when the Lord says '*Samohaṁ sarvabhūteṣu na me dveṣyosti na priyaḥ.*'[5]

Short of experience, the vision of God everywhere or recognition of God's presence in all things, has much metaphysical validity. When such an experience is reached, the validity is raised from the metaphysical to the experimental level (*aparokṣānubhūti*). Even the metaphysical level is for the philosopher not the commoner. The experimental level transmutes and transports the philosopher into a seer (*Rṣi*) or mystic. If the ordinary mystic sees God in himself (*ahaṁ Brahmāsmi*) God in his turn sees the Godly soul in himself. This seems to be the meaning of the expression '*Jñānī tvātmaiva me matam*'. Yāmunācārya, a Vaiṣṇava Philosopher who preceded Rāmānuja,

[4] *Bhagavadgīta :* VI. 9.
[5] *Bhagavadgīta:* IX. 28.

expresses this truth beautifully in his *stotraratna* thus:

'*Sākṛttvadākāravilokanāśayā*
tṛṇīkṛtanuttamabhuktimuktibhiḥ;
mahātmabhirmāmavalokyataṁ naya
ksanepi te yadvirahotidussahaḥ.'

i.e. 'O Lord, the great souls are those who have with disdain discarded all joys both of earth and heaven, in order that they may have but a glimpse of Thy beauty. Of such superior value are these to Thee, that the slightest separation from them is to Thee intolerable. My solicitation to Thee is not for union or communion with Thee, but with those godly souls who are Thine, so dearly owned by Thyself as Thine and Thy self, Thy very self.'

The Godly (*Mahatma*) may be defined to be those who have, by constant practice and meditation and spiritual endeavour (*sadhana*) and moral purity (*sadacara*), arrived at the stage of seeing no differences (*ekatvamanupasyatah*). Whether it be the acorn in which they see the tree or the tree in which they find the acorn, all to them is a compound, cumulative, synthetic sight, where all matter to them is mind-involved and all mind is matter-involved. The godly are those who feel the presence of God everywhere, those who are reminded of God (*Smṛtisantanarupa*) wherever they direct their gaze, wherever their thought runs. These are the real pantheists (*Vasudevah sarvamiti*). The godly person (*Jñanī* or *Mahatma*) is he who is eternally conscious of the fact that he has, and can possibly have, no existence entirely cut off or isolated from the universal soul, in which he factually has his being.

In the *Bhṛgu vallī* of the *Taittiriya Upanishad*, Varuna, the father of Bhṛgu, gives the son graduated teaching which reveals God from the material base *annam*, to the spiritual apex (*anandam*). There is not a *kośa* or place or kingdom, of existence which is devoid of that infilling, informing spirit, God. The godly man is the mystic whose vision consists in constant God-awareness which runs through the Bhṛgu-Varuna dialogue, where it is shown that the physico-chemistry of *annam* begets the biology of *prana* which engenders in its turn the psychology of

manas from which sprouts forth the philosophy of *vijnana* which bears the spiritual experience of *ananda*. This *ananda*, God (*Anando brahmeti vyajanat*)[6] permeates all existence like the warp and woof of the cloth (*otaśca protaśca*).

Where science dichotomises, the mystic or the godly man synthesises which is his unique purpose. Here is a description of this process by a foreign writer: "Again beyond young dreams of love and patriotism may appear the higher and more permanent idealisations we all call religious and mystic. So too, ordinary work-experience of everyday life may develop those intellectual qualities of order and sequence we call science; they may even reach out to the all-embracing generalities of philosophy. Again too, our simple sense-impressions may be amplified and transformed into that vivid imagery which characterizes the poet's, the artist's vision, the mystic's apocalypse."[7] If science is in tune with the finite things, mysticism or godliness is in tune with the Infinite, the ultimate value.

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[6] *Taittiriya Upanishad :* III 6. 1.

[7] Brandford, Victor : *Living Religions.*

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ABU SAYEED AYYUB

ABU SAYEED AYYUB holds an honours degree in physics from Presidency College, Calcutta, and a first class M.A. degree in philosophy from the Calcutta University. He taught philosophy at Calcutta and Viswa-Bharati Universities and was Head of the Department of Indian Studies at Melbourne University during 1961. He edited the quarterly journal *Quest* for ten years and is currently a Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, working on the compatibility of different types of religious thought (Tagore, Gandhi and Azad in particular) with a secular society. Publications include *Modernism and Tagore* (in Bengali); *Truth and Poetry*. He is a contributor to the *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, edited by S. Radhakrishnan (Allen & Unwin).

NIKUNJA VIHARI BANERJEE

After obtaining an honours degree in Philosophy from City College, Calcutta, N. V. BANERJEE became a scholar in the Postgraduate Department of Philosophy in the University of Calcutta and obtained a first class M.A. degree in Philosophy. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of London on the basis of his researches on the Philosophy of Kant.

He was the Secretary, Sectional President and General President of the Indian Philosophical Congress; and President of the Akhil Bharatiya Darsan Parishad. He retired as the Professor of Philosophy in the University of Delhi. He was

also for some time Professor at the Institute of Advanced Study in Simla. He has travelled widely in Europe and Asia and lectured at many Asian and European Universities.

He has contributed articles to well-known philosophical journals in India and abroad including the *Philosophical Review*, *The Monist* and *The Hibbert Journal*. He contributed a chapter to the *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*. His book *Concerning Human Understanding* was published by George Allen & Unwin in 1958. His latest book is *Language, Meaning and Persons*.

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYA

Born on August 17, 1911 in East Bengal, now East Pakistan, PROFESSOR BHATTACHARYA was brought up at the native town of his father, situated thirteen miles from Calcutta. His father K. C. Bhattacharya was a renowned philosopher, and his elder brother Professor Gopinath Bhattacharya was already a brilliant scholar when he was a student. In my student life, Prof. Kalidas Bhattacharya says, "I was deeply influenced by my brother and later I fell under the influence of my father and this later influence has really moulded my life and thoughts. All that I have written may be taken as my own way of approaching my father's thoughts".

From 1936 to 1944, he was a lecturer in Philosophy in Vidyasagar College, Calcutta. In 1944 he joined the Postgraduate Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta, as a lecturer in Philosophy, where he served till 1951 when he was offered Professorship in Indian Philosophy in the Postgraduate Department of the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta. He was there for more than five years and in January 1957 he came to Poet Tagore's University, Visva-Bharati, at Santiniketan. He worked there as Professor of Philosophy until he became the Vice-Chancellor of that University.

Professor Bhattacharya is the author of the following books:

1. *Object Content and Relation*, Dasgupta & Co., Calcutta.

2. *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, Dasgupta & Co., Calcutta.
3. *The Concept of Cause as in India and the West*, in *Our Heritage*, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta.
4. *The Indian Concepts of Knowledge and Self*, in *Our Heritage*, Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta.

SATINDRANATH CHAKRAVARTI

Born in Calcutta on October 22, 1916, PROFESSOR CHAKRAVARTI was brought up in a village in Vikrampore, now in East Pakistan. His father was Professor of History in a College at Calcutta. Educated at Saraswati Institution, City and Sanskrit College, and Calcutta University, Professor Chakravarti studied under Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta, Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya, Dr. N. K. Brahma, Dr. Mahendranath Sarkar, Prof. H. Kabir and Prof. A.S.M. Ayyub. He taught logic and philosophy from 1940 and has been a regular contributor to regional language journals on philosophical and pedagogic subjects.

C. T. K. CHARI

Born on June 5, 1909, PROFESSOR CHARI is Chairman of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Madras Christian College, Tambaram, near Madras. Among many of his academic activities are : President of the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1956 ; Principal Miller Lecturer, Madras University, 1958 ; Chairman of the Parapsychology Section, Madras Psychology Conference, 1959 ; Elected Corresponding Member of the British Society for Psychical Research ; Member of the Editorial Board of *The Journal of the Psychological Researches* (Madras Psychological Society) ; Editor-in-Chief of the *Essays in Philosophy* presented to Professor T.M.P. Mahadevan on his fiftieth

birthday. Professor Chari is the author of numerous research papers in Philosophy, Psychology and Parapsychology.

S. C. CHATTERJEE

Born in West Bengal on 3rd August 1893, PROFESSOR CHATTERJEE is educated in Nyayaratna Institution, Ripon College, Scottish Church College, and Calcutta University. He worked as the Head of the Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University; Visiting Professor of Indian Philosophy and Culture, University of Hawaii (USA). He is the author of *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (with Dr. D.M. Datta), *The Problems of Philosophy*, *The Fundamentals of Hinduism*, *Tattva-Jijnasa*. Prof. Chatterjee says that his "philosophical perspective is shaped by the study of Kant, Hegel, Bradley and the Vedanta, and the teachings of the late Professor K.C. Bhattacharya and Sri Ramakrishna."

J. N. CHUBB

Born on January 5, 1910 and educated at the Universities of Bombay and Oxford, PROFESSOR CHUBB served as the Head of the Department of Philosophy at Elphinstone College, Bombay.

Professor Chubb says: "I have been led to make a sharp distinction, and even a separation, between 'critical' and 'constructive' philosophy. With regard to the latter, I have been influenced most by Sri Aurobindo whose philosophy is, to my mind, the most magnificent and complete synthesis of all human aspirations, trends of thought and truths based on supra-rational spiritual experiences, their seeming divergence being reconciled in a more plastic way of thinking which he called the Logic of the Infinite..."

"...The case is different with regard to critical philosophy. In the task of bringing philosophy to self-conciousness in my

own mind I have not been influenced, as far as I know, by any philosopher or system of philosophy, though, as in the case of other 'critical' philosophers, my thought has been provoked and stimulated by the unedifying spectacle of the eternal wrangling among philosophers."

Many of Professor Chubb's research papers appeared in the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress.*

N. K. DEVARAJ

Born in Rampur in Western U.P. in the year 1917, PROFESSOR DEVARAJ studied at the Banaras Hindu University, first as a science student in Intermediate class. Changing over to Arts course two years later, he took his B.A. with honours in english literature and with philosophy as one of the optional subjects. Shifting to Allahabad University, he took M. A. degree in philosophy in 1938. He wrote his doctoral thesis on *Criteriology in Samkara* under the guidance of late Prof. R.D. Ranade in 1941. Having served in two colleges in Bihar for about six years, he was appointed as Lecturer (later on Assistant Professor) in Philosophy in the Lucknow University where he served for about twelve years. He was also awarded D. Litt. for the thesis entitled *The Philosophy of Culture: An Introduction to Creative Humanism* by the Lucknow University in 1956. During 1957–1958 he visited the United States as recipient of the UNESCO Grant for Regional Cultural Studies. Prof. Devaraj was appointed to the Chair of Sayaji Rao Gaekwad, Professor of Indian Civilization & Culture in the Banaras Hindu University in 1960. "Looking in retrospect," says Prof. Devaraj, "I feel that the more enduring influences in my thought have been (1) the Vedantic doctrine of the detached observer, (2) the Kantian view of the subjective origin of the categories of explanation, and (3) the perception of the worth of aesthetic experience coupled with the conviction that critical judgments about literature have some sort of validity."

Among his published writings are the following :

1. Logic and Reality (*Uttara Bharati*, November, 1958)
2. Notes towards a definition of philosophy (*The Journal of Philosophy*, New York, March 26, 1959)
3. Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis? (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, 1959)
4. The Nature of Art (*The Indian Journal of Philosophy*, December, 1959)
5. The Tasks Before Indian Philosophy (Seminar, Bombay, September 1961), etc.

He also published a large number of books in Hindi including (1) *A History of Indian Philosophy*, (2) *A Comparative Study of Eastern and Western Philosophy*, (3) *A History of Western Philosophy*, and (4) *Indian Culture in the Light of the Mahakavyas*. A Hindi translation of his D. Litt. thesis is also published in 1957.

ANANT GANESH JAVADEKAR

Born on 9-9-1919 at Indapur, Poona District, Maharashtra, PROFESSOR JAVADEKAR studied among others with Professors S. V. Dandekar, R. D. Ranade, A. C. Mukherji and N. G, Damle. He worked as Lecturer, S. P. College, Poona, 1942-47; Baroda College 1947-49. He is presently Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at M. S. University, Baroda. Among his academic activities are: Joint Local Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress, Baroda, 1953; President, Ethics and Social Philosophy Section, Akhil Bharateeya Dharshan Parishad, 1959; President, Logic and Metaphysics Section, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1959; Member, Indian Delegation to Entretiens International Institute of Philosophy.

Professor Javadekar is the author of the following two books besides several dozens of research articles: *Approach to Reality*, Baroda, Oriental Institute, M. S. University of Baroda, 1957; *Axionoetics: Valuational Theory of Knowledge*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1962.

DAMODAR DHARMANAND KOSAMBI

Born in Goa, July 31, 1907, and educated at Cambridge, Mass, U.S.A., 1911-1929 (Grammar School, High School, Harvard University), PROFESSOR KOSAMBI taught at Banaras Hindu University 1929-31; Aligarh Muslim University 1931-33; Fergusson College, Poona, 1933-45; Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Bombay, 1945-62.

Among the influences that shaped his thought, Professor Kosambi mentions: "A most remarkable father, the late Professor Dharmanand Kosambi (great Orientalist and Buddhist scholar); a considerable range of experience of all walks of life from a backward Indian village to working his way through college by odd jobs. The accessibility of the Widener Library at Harvard University was of the utmost importance."

Professor Kosambi published over a hundred original papers in various subjects, primarily differential geometry, probability statistics; also Indology and ancient Indian culture. Among his books are *Introduction to the Study of Indian History*, Bombay, 1956; *Exasperating Essays*, Poona, 1957; *Myth & Reality*, Bombay, 1962.

DAYA KRISHNA

Born in 1924, took M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Delhi. PROFESSOR DAYA KRISHNA held Research Fellowships at the Hindu College, Delhi, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner and the University of Delhi and taught philosophy at the University of Saugar, 1956-1960. Recipient of a Research Fellowship from the Rockfeller Foundation in 1960-61, Professor Daya Krishna is now Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at Rajasthan University, Jaipur. He is a member of the editorial board of *Diogenes*,

the quarterly *Journal of the International Institute for Philosophy and Humanistic Sciences.*

Speaking of influences, Professor Krishna writes: "Among classical thinkers, I have always felt that Kant, Hegel, and Sankara have exhausted the ultimate positions between themselves. Diametrically opposed thought-currents have always aroused my interest and held my sympathy and attention. I have never been able to understand the charge of 'unintelligibility' and 'nonsense' hurled by everybody against everybody else, as I seem to understand all equally well. Among contemporary Indian thinkers, the two who have aroused my utmost interest and whom I regard as outstandingly original are K. C. Bhattacharya and his son Kalidas Bhattacharya."

Besides dozens of research papers he is the author of two books:

1. *The Nature of Philosophy*, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1956.
2. *Planning, Power and Welfare*, Congress for Cultural Freedom, Delhi, 1959.

VASIREDDY SRI KRISHNA

Born on October 8, 1902, Professor V. S. Krishna studied at Oxford and Vienna. Joining Andhra University as a Lecturer in Economics, Dr. Krishna taught at Andhra for a number of years and served as the Principal of the University Colleges from 1945 to 1949. He was elected as the Vice-Chancellor of Andhra University first in 1949 and held that position until he became the Chairman of the University Grants Commission in 1961. Dr. Krishna died in February 1961.

Known for his scholarship both in Economics and Philosophy, Dr. Krishna influenced generations of students at Andhra University. His William Meyer Lectures on *International Economic Co-operation* are published by the University of Madras.

S. K. MAITRA

Graduated from Scottish Church College, Calcutta, with honours in philosophy in 1911, PROFESSOR MAITRA was a student of Professor Henry Stephen. Professor Henry Stephen was a staunch Hegelian though he also held Lotze in great esteem. In fact, when he joined the Postgraduate Department of Calcutta University in 1914, Professor Maitra says that he was as staunch a believer in Hegel as were his class-fellows who came under the influence of Professor Stephen and his teaching. "However", says Maitra, "My Philosophical views gradually changed as I commenced studying Indian Philosophy in earnest. I soon found out that neither Hegel nor Ramanuja could meet the demand for a satisfactory world-view and that Bradley, and more especially Sankaracharya were more honest in confessing to ultimate inexplicabilities. My break with Hegelianism and a decided changeover to Sankarite Advaita appeared in my article 'Degrees of Goodness and Badness'. It was published as one of the papers in my *Studies in Philosophy and Religion.* The paper published in this volume "Truth and Error", develops the theoretical implications of what is hinted at but not fully worked out in the paper on 'Goodness and Badness'."

YAKUB MASIH

Born of Muslim parents on the first March, 1916, at Patna (Bihar) and brought up as a Protestant Christian and later on was initiated into the Hindu lore through the media of Hindi and Sanskrit, PROFESSOR MASIH says : "I am still proud of my Muslim parentage, even when I do not seem to have any trace of Islam in my intellectual and religious development."

He was brought up and educated in Bihar. He was awarded D.Litt. for his thesis on *Freudianism and Religion*, by the Patna University. He also received Ph.D. from the University of Edinburgh, the thesis being *Some Considerations of the Philosophical Position of Samuel Alexander with special reference to his Theology*. He has been teaching philosophy since 1938 and presently is the Professor and Head of the Postgraduate Department of Philosophy, Bihar University, Muzaffarpur.

Besides several research papers, Professor Masih published the following books in English:

1. *General Psychology*, 1947.
2. *An Introduction to Modern Philosophy*, 1947.

(A second revised edition is in the press)

JITENDRANATH MOHANTY

Born in 1928, Professor Mohanty was educated at Cuttack, Calcutta and Göttingen. Speaking of the influences that shaped his philosophical thinking Prof. Mohanty says: "At Calcutta, Dr. N. K. Brahman introduced me to philosophy and left a permanent impression on my mind. About the same time I became interested in Sri Aurobindo, and the issue Sankara vis-a-vis Sri Aurobindo engaged my attention for a number of years to come. Two great Sanskrit scholars taught me Indian Philosophy, the late Mr. Yogendranath Tarka Vedantatirtha and Pandit Ananta Kumar Tarkatirtha. The latter has ever since remained my *Guru* in Indian Philosophy. Amongst other major influences on me at Calcutta were Dr. Kalidas Bhattacharya who stimulated my urge for creative thinking, and Dr. R. Das whose influence helped me to restrain imagination and strive after academic rigour. Out of the University I found myself in the company of Whitehead's *Process and Reality* and Husserl's *Ideen*. Later at Göttingen, I could attempt a review of contemporary Platnoism under the supervision of Professor Herman Wein. Two other persons at Göttingen

influenced my thought most. They are Professor Josef König and the Physicist C. F. von Weizsäcker."

In 1954, Prof. Mohanty joined Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan trek in Orissa, but was soon called to teach philosophy at the Calcutta University. During 1960-61, he served as Associate Professor of Indian Philosophy in the Research Department of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. In 1961, he presided over the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the 36th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Santiniketan. He is the author of numerous research papers. Presently, Professor Mohanty is the Head of the Department of Philosophy, Burdwan University, West Bengal.

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY

Born in 1924, Dr. Murty is Professor of Philosophy, and Special Officer and Principal, Andhra University Postgraduate Centre, Guntur. He was visiting Professor, Princeton University in 1959 and delivered Spalding lectures at Oxford in 1963. He occasionally lectured also at several universities in Europe, West Asia and U.S.A. He was elected President, Logic and Metaphysics Section, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1958; General President Akhila Bharatiya Darsan Parishad, 1963; and President, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1968. His principal publications are *Revelation & Reason in Advaita Vedanta*, Columbia University Press, New York, and Asia Publishing House, Bombay; *Studies in the Problems of Peace*, Asia; *Metaphysics, Man and Freedom*, Asia; *Indian Foreign Policy*, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta; and *The Indian Spirit*, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta. Prof. Murty is also the editor of *Telugu Encyclopaedia* volume on Philosophy and Religion; *Samakalin Bharatiya Darsan* (Contemporary Indian Philosophy), *Akhila Bharatiya Darsan Parishad; Readings in Indian History, Politics & Philosophy*, Allen & Unwin, London.

RAJENDRA PRASAD

Born on January 19, 1926, DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD studied at Patna University and the University of Michigan. His main philosophical interests include Analytical Philosophy, Logic and Ethics. He is presently Professor of Philosophy at Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur.

C. KUNHAN RAJA

Born on 18th September 1889, PROFESSOR KUNHAN RAJA came from an ancient royal family in Kerala. Prof. Raja attended Madras and Oxford Universities and studied also in Germany. He was the first Professor of Sanskrit in Madras, Tehran and Andhra Universities. Connected with the Adyar Library for some twenty-seven years, he published many books by way of editions and translations and expositions of several oriental texts. After retiring from Andhra University in 1960, he settled down in Bangalore where he died.

Prof. Raja grew up in an atmosphere of religion; but the effects of religion on man and the life of people representing religion disappointed him very much. The *Vedas*, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* and the writings of Kalidasa had greatly influenced his life ideals, with their realism, the importance given to life and the supremacy of man in the world. It was the Mimamsa system of philosophy that enabled him to find himself out.

Prof. Raja was elected Sectional President at the All India Oriental Conference on two occasions. He was also Sectional President in the Indian Philosophical Congress. He edited a large number of rare Sanskrit works based on single and insufficient manuscript material and translated many Sanskrit works. He organised and catalogued the Bikaner Palace Library and started the Ganga series for Sanskrit and Sadul

series for Hindi and Rajasthani. He published many articles on various subjects. His publications cover literature, philosophy, Vedas, grammar, music, law and astronomy.

K. RAMAKRISHNA RAO

Born on October 4, 1932, PROFESSOR RAMAKRISHNA RAO studied at Andhra University and the University of Chicago. Among those who influenced his thought were M. K. Gandhi, Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Richard McKeon and Charles Morris.

Both a philosopher and a psychologist, Dr. Rao taught in the Department of Philosophy of Andhra University (1953–58) and was on the Research Staff of the Parapsychology Laboratory of Duke University (1962–65). Presently, he is the Professor and Head of the Department of Psychology and Parapsychology at Andhra University.

He is a member of various national and international professional associations. He was President of the International Parapsychological Association in 1965.

He has been a consulting editor to a number of journals including *Journal of Parapsychology* (USA) and *Metapsychica* (Italy).

Professor Rao is the author of a large number of research papers in philosophy and psychology and three books: *Psi Cognition* (Tagore Publishing House, 1957), *Experimental Parapsychology* (Charles C. Thomas, 1966) and *Gandhi and Pragmatism* (Oxford & IBH, 1968). An Italian translation of *Experimental Parapsychology* has also been published.

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

Born on 5th September 1909, in the city of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, PROFESSOR VAHIDUDDIN was left an orphan in

early childhood and was brought up by his paternal grandmother, a woman of rare piety and charm. Speaking of her, he says: "Indeed it is her life of suffering without indignation and resentment that has convinced me more than anything else of an order higher than we are used to and of a Being who is so close and yet supremely beyond." Graduating from Osmania University, he took his doctorate at Marburg in 1937 on 'the Experience of Values in the Context of the Cultures of the East and the West'. His student life in Germany was greatly enriched by personal contact especially with Rudolf Otto in whose house he lived for more than 2 years. He says that he was also greatly benefited by the lectures and seminars of Nicolai Hartmann, Karl Jaspers and Erich Frank. Prof. Vahiduddin also spent some time at Sorbonne. His interests in philosophy are mainly concerned with the metaphysics of personality, philosophy of religion, aesthetics and the philosophy of history. He taught for more than 20 years in the Department of Philosophy of Osmania University, first as Lecturer and Reader and then as Professor and Chairman of the Department. In 1966 he joined the Department of Philosophy, Delhi, as Professor and Head. He is the author of several research publications.

K. C. VARADACHARI

Born on August 14, 1902 at Tirupati, obtaining his M.A. and Ph. D. degrees from Madras University, PROFESSOR VARADACHARI taught philosophy at Madras Christian College, Union Christian College, Lingaraj College and Sri Venkateswara University. After retirement from Sri Venkateswara University, he joined Madras University as Professor of Comparative Religion.

He is the author of a large number of books and articles. Among his published books are:

1. *Metaphysics of Sri Bhashya*, 1928.
2. *Sri Ramanuja's Theory of Knowledge*, 1932, 1943.

3. *Living Teaching of Vedanta*, 1934.
4. *Idea of God* (in Visishtadvaita) 1950.
5. *Aspects of Bhakti* (University of Mysore Lectures) 1954.
6. *Visishtadvaita – Synthesis of Philosophy and Religion* (University of Travancore Lectures) 1954.
7. *Human Progress* (University of Madras, Principal Miller Endowment).
8. *Introduction to Logic*, 1956.
9. *Yoga Psychology in the Minor Upanishads* (J.S.V.O.I.).
10. *Philosophy of Religion of the Alvars* (J.S.V.O.I.).

JAYA CHAMARAJA WADIYAR

HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA SRI JAYA CHAMARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR, G. C. B. (1946), G. C. S. I. (1945), LL. D. (1942), D. LITT. (1955), LL. D. (1962), LL. D. (Queensland University, Australia, 1963), was born on July 18th 1919. Educated at the Mysore University, he travelled extensively in the Far East, Europe and East Africa, Australia and South America. He went on lecture tours to U.S.A. in 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1965. He was Raj Pramukh and subsequently Governor of Mysore State till May 1964 and was also Governor of Madras 1964–1967. His publications include *An Aspect of Indian Aesthetics* (1956), *African Survey* (1955), *The Gita and Indian Culture* (1963), *Religion and Man* (1965).